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THE 



Camp-Fires of General Lee, 



FROM THE 



^eiiiusulu to |.pj|oumtt(Ji' Coiirt-p^^use. 



WITH REMINISCENCES OF THE MARCH, THE CAMP, THE 
BIVOUAC AND OF PERSONAL ADVENTURE. 



BY 

EDWARD S. ELLIS, 

Author of " The Young Pioneer Series," " The Log Cabin Series," Exa 




PHILADELPHIA: 
HENRY HARRISON & CO. 






Copyrighted Feb., 1S86. 



INTRODUCTION. 



" The Camp-Fiees of Geneeal Lee " aims to 
be a truthful narrative of the great part played 
by the Army of Northern Virginia under its 
illustrious commander in the most terrific cam- 
paigns of modern times. When the wounding of 
General Johnston, early in the war, compelled 
him to turn over his command to General Lee, 
the latter entered upon such a display of gener- 
alship that he speedily proved himself one of the 
foremost military leaders of the century. His 
campaigns rejDresented the highest development 
of the science of war, and will command admi- 
ration for ages to come. 

The history of those brilliant manoeuvres, grand 
combinations and tremendous battles cannot be 
studied too closely by American youth. The 
incense wafted upward from Manassas, the Wil- 
derness, Chancellorsville and Appomattox was the 
same, in truth, as that which was borne aloft from 
the fields of Bunker Hill, Monmouth, Trenton, 
Valley Forge and Yorktown, where Jerseymen 
and Virginians, South Carolinians and Green Moun- 



6 INTRODUCTION. 

tain Boys, stood shoulder to shoulder in the strug- 
gle for liberty. The passions of the later days have 
departed, and those who arrayed themselves under 
the Stars and Bars are now among the most ardent 
defenders of the Union. None is quicker to give 
recognition of the valor of the Boy in Blue than 
he who wore the Gray. Brave men mutually re- 
spect each other, and no stronger ties of friendship 
can be formed than those that now bind together 
the different sections of the Union. We can, there- 
fore, enjoy the fighting of the battles over again, 
each former opponent conceding the full meed of 
praise to the other and uttering nothing in malice. 
We have sought to give, so far as possible, a real- 
istic narrative of those days by presenting pictures 
of the bivouac, the camp-fire and some of the 
numerous personal reminiscences of those engaged 
in the conflict. 

In the preparation of these pages much assist- 
ance has been received from other histories and 
parties. Becognitiou is speciall}^ due Bev. J. Wil- 
liam Jones, D. D., of Richmond, secretary of the 
Southern Historical Society, who placed many 
documents and papers at the author's disposal. 



CONTENTS. 



I. 

THE CAMP-FIRES IN THE PENINSULA. 
CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

On the Chickahominy 11 

CHAPTER II. 

McClellan's Retreat 20 

CHAPTER III. 
The Line op Battle 36 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Last Battles .... - 44 

CHAPTER V. 
Robert E. Lee 68 



II. 

THE CAMP-FIRES IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 

CHAPTER VL 
On the Rappahannock 78 

CHAPTER VII. 

Manceuvring for Position 95 

7 



8 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEE VIIL page 

General Pope's Movements 102 

CHAPTER IX. 
The March of the Conqueror 108 



III. 
THE CAMP-FIRE OF ANTIETAM. 

CHAPTER X. 
Facing Northward 121 

CHAPTER XI. 
Harper's Ferry 131 

CHAPTER XII. 
"Special Orders No. 191" 138 

CHAPTER XIII. 
At Bay 149 

CHAPTER XIV. 
Antibtam 156 

CHAPTER XV. 
Antietam {Concluded} 169 



IV. 

THE CAMP-FIEES OF FREDERICKSBURG AND CHAN- 
CELLORSVILLE. 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Resting on theik Arms 179 

CHAPTER XVII. 
Stuart's Raid into Pennsylvania 189 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
The Union Advance 198 

CHAPTEE XIX. 
The Attack on the Confederate Right 206 



CONTENTS. 9 

CHAPTER XX. PAGE 

The Decisive Struggle 215 

CHAPTER XXI. 
Burnside's Mud-March. — In Winter Quarters 225 



V. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. 

CHAPTER XXn. 
Preliminary Movements 238 

CHAPTER XXII I. 
Jackson's Flank Movement 247 

CHAPTER XXIV. 
The Fall op Stonewall Jackson 254 

CHAPTER XXV. 
The Last Struggle at Ciiancellorsville 262 



VI. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF GETTYSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 
Preliminary Movements 269 

CHAPTER XXVII. 
Manoeuvring for Battle 276 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 
Gettysburg: First Day . . . .* 289 

CHAPTER XXIX. 
Gettysburg : Second Day 297 

CHAPTER XXX. 
Gettysburg: Third and Last Day 307 

CHAPTER XXXI. 
The Confederate Retreat 313 



10 CONTENTS. 

VII. 

THJE SECOND CAMP-FIEE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 

CHAPTER XXXII. page 

A Series of Manceuvres 319 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 
The Camp-Fjke of Mine Run 330 



VIII. 

THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 
The Wilderness 337 

CHAPTER XXXV. 
From Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy 352 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 
Close of the Campaign of 1864 366 

CHAPTER XXXVII. 
Closing In 379 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
The Last Camp-Fire 395 



THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 



THE CAMP-FIRES IN THE PENINSULA. 



CHAPTER I. 

ON THE CHICKAHOMINY. 

" Geneeal, I am very glad to see you ; I had 
hoped to meet you sooner." 

"Yes; I was anxious to meet you, but it was 
impossible." 

The two officei-s saluted each other, and the thou- 
sands of soldiers who witnessed the sight broke into 
tumultuous cheers. 

The first speaker was Robert E. Lee, commander- 
in-chief of the Confederate armies. He was of strik- 
ing appearance, sitting erect and graceful in his sad- 
dle, his grave, dignified countenance lighted up at 
the sight of his loved lieutenant. His full beard was 
rapidly turning gray, and the tremendous weight 
of the responsibility he carried on his shoulders was 
already seaming the handsome countenance with 
deep lines of care and anxiety. 

11 



12 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

General Lee wore tlie sloucli bat wliicli became 
so fixmiliar in tbe years tbat followed, and tlie 
uniform of a major-general in tbe Confederate 
army, tbougb its brilliancy was far less tban tbat 
of many of bis subordinate officers. He spoke in 
measured tones, Avitli tbe reins of bis fine steed rest- 
ing idly in bis left band wbile be leaned over tbe 
saddle and grasped tbe palm of tbe otber officer. 

Tbe latter formed a remarkable contrast to tbe 
illustrious leader of tbe Soutbern armies. He was 
clad in a dilapidated single-breasted coat of rusty 
gray, sun-scorcbed about tbe sboulders until it was 
almost yellow, and a faded cadet cap was tilted for- 
ward on bis nose, wbile be bestrode a rickety sorrel 
liorse and bis stirrups were so sbort tbat bis legs 
were drawn up in tbe most awkward position tbat 
can be imagined. He looked as if be was croucb- 
ing bebind tbe bead of tbe animal and peeping at 
tbe enemy over bis ears. His cliief interest for tbe 
moment seemed to centre in a lemon, wbicb be beld 
in one band and occasionally raised to bis moutb 
wbile squeezing it witb bis fingers. His words, 
mumbled and jerked fortb, sounded precisely tbe 
opposite of tbe measured, clearly-enunciated sen- 
tences of General Lee. His full beard swept over 
bis breast, and tbe steel-blue eyes tbat peered out 
from under tbe flapping cap were as brigbt as stars. 
He was General T. J. Jackson, destined to be knoAvn 
for ever in bistory as " Stonewall " Jackson. 

It was a very bot day in June, 1862, and wbile 



ON THE CHWKAHOMINY. 13 

the two men closed hands and spoke to each other 
the air around them throbbed with the roar of bat- 
tle. Two mighty armies, those of the North and 
the South, were closing in the desperate grapple of 
infuriated giants. The officers paused and listened 
to the uproar. From the woods, where the divis- 
ions of Hill and Longstreet were engaged, came 
the long rattling roll of musketry, while from the 
direction of Stonewall Jackson's own troops the 
clamor was fiercer and more overpowering. 

General Lee looked in the face of Jackson and 
in his measured voice remarked, 

" That fire is very heavy ; can your men stand 
it?" 

The other stopped squeezing the lemon for the 
moment, though it was the most attractive delicacy 
he could raise to his lips, and, leaning his head to 
one side in a way peculiar to himself, listened like 
one who is straining to catch the sounds of music 
in the distance. General Lee was looking into the 
whiskered countenance' and awaiting the reply. A 
moment later the bright eyes were turned toward 
him, and Jackson, with a nod of his head, spoke 
in his jerky fashion : 

" My men can stand that ; my men can stand 
almost anything." 

General Lee hastily gave his instructions. Jack- 
son saluted him, and, wheeling his ungainly steed 
around, galloped rapidly in the direction of his 
corps, which was so hotly engaged with the enemy, 



14 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

while the commander-in-chief remained at Cold 
Harbor, opposite the centre of the Federal army. 
The situation early in March, 1862, was as fol- 
lows: On the day succeeding' the memorable fight 
between the Monitor and the Merrimac, General 
McClellan, an able officer, began a movement 
against the Confederates, then encamped near 
Manassas. Through the mud and rain the Union- 
ists forced their way to the old Manassas battle- 
ground, only to lind that the Confederates had 
abandoned the position the day before, taking with 
them all that was worth removing. General Mc- 
Clellan had long urged that the most feasible route 
to Kichmond was by way of the Peninsula. Presi- 
dent Lincoln finally yielded consent, and the Army 
of the Potomac was transported down the river to 
Fortress Monroe by a fleet of nearly four hundred 
vessels, and the second " On-to-Pichmond " move- 
ment began. The army under the command of 
McClellan was a hundred thousand strong and one 
of the most magnificent organizations ever known. 
The officers and soldiers were full of enthusiasm ; 
they had been well disciplined and trained for se- 
rious work, and all they asked was an opportunity 
to prove their courage and ability. McClellan 
made his way to Yorktown, where he found con- 
fronting him Magruder with a Confederate division 
of about five thousand men, exclusive of the gar- 
risons with which he was guarding a line, thirteen 
miles long, extending across the Peninsula. The 



ON THE cincKAHO.vrxr. 15 

Federal commander began digging, and enormous 
entrenchments were thrown up ; jDOnderous guns 
were ordered from Washington ; miles of corduroy 
road were built, and every preparation was made 
for an extended siege. 

Meanwhile, General Joseph E. Johnston had re- 
inforced the Confederates with his army from Ma- 
nassas, and McClellan, having completed his most 
elaborate preparations, was ready to open fire. As 
he was about to do so he awoke to the fact that 
there were no Confederates in front of him, for 
General Johnston had withdrawn and taken po- 
sition nearer Eichmond. McClellan immediately 
started in pursuit. The Confederate rear-guard, 
reinforced shortly afterward by Longstreet's di- 
vision, stationed themselves at Williamsburg, so 
as to gain time for the baggage- trains to get well 
in the rear of Fort Magruder, which with thirteen 
redoubts commanded all the roads leading north- 
ward. 

Early on the morning of May 5, " Fighting Joe 
Hooker " arrived and began a furious attack, which 
lasted most of the day. The loss of the Union 
troops was heavy, but they remained on the ground, 
and prepared to renew the attack the next morning. 
When, however^ daylight came, his adversary was 
invisible; for General Johnston, having accom- 
plished his purpose, fell back, and was beyond 
reach. McClellan unopposed followed the Confed- 
erate army. The roads were frightful, and nearly 



16 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENEBAL LEE. 

two weeks were consumed in marching less than 
fifty miles. But the Unionists were alarmingly 
close to the capital of the Confederacy. From 
their camp they could look upon the spires and 
steeples of Kichmond, while every one within the 
city plainly heard the sounds of firing in the en- 
trenchments. Many of the inhahitants, believing 
the city was doomed, fled, and the Confederate 
Congress hastily adjourned. 

The situation was most serious indeed. General 
IMcDowell, who was at Fredericksburg with thirty 
thousand men, was daily expected to join forces 
with General Fitz-John Porter, who had captured 
Hanover Court-House, and McClellan Avas evi- 
dently only awaiting the arrival of reinforcements 
before making his final assault on Richmond. 

General Joe Johnston understood the great peril 
and skilfully parried it. The meteoric Stonewall 
Jackson was sent out with a large force to threaten 
Washington. He swept np the Shenandoah Valley 
like a cyclone, captured Front Eoyal, sent General 
Banks scurrying from Strasburg in terror toward 
Washington, his panic-stricken men marching thir- 
ty-five miles in one day in order to place themselves 
securely on the other side of the Potomac. 

The appearance of Jackson so close to the na- 
tional capital threw the Federal government into 
the wildest excitement and alarm. The fear of 
the capture of Washington was the incubus which 
haunted the Union government for years. It was 



ON THE CJITCKA HOMINY. 17 

that dread wlik^li palsied their military arm more 
than once and rendered harmless campaigns that 
otherwise wonld have been resistless in momentum. 
Whenever the Confederates found the Union army- 
threatening Richmond, they created a diversion 
by threatening ^Vashington. 

The eftect in this instance was all that was in- 
tended. The Union government immediately took 
possession of the railroads ; troops were called from 
all quarters of the compass to protect the capital. 
Fremont at Franklin, Banks at Harper's Ferry and 
McDowell at Fredericksburg, with their sixty thou- 
sand men, were ordered to capture Jackson ; but 
that dashing raider was as brilliant on the retreat 
as on the advance, and he dodged the overwhelming- 
forces with the skill of a fox, doubling on his own 
trail, and without mishap rejoined General John- 
ston on the Peninsula. 

INfeanwhile, stirring events were taking place 
near Eiclimond. McClellan had jnished his left 
wing across the Chiekahominy and taken posses- 
sion of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. The move- 
ment was hardly completed when a terrific storm 
came up, which overflowed the surrounding swamps 
and turned the stream into a roaring flood. Seiz- 
ing the opportunity. General Johnston launched his 
army against McClellan 's left wing, and would 
doubtless have captured it had not General Sedg- 
wick's division of Sumner's corps crossed the Chiek- 
ahominy on a tottering bridge and with a strong 

2 



18 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

battery of Napoleon guns plunged into the thick- 
est of the fight and checked the Confederate ad- 
vance. The Confederates were soon after driven 
back to Fair Oaks station, where, just at sunset, Gen- 
eral Johnston was severely wounded by a shell, and, 
though the attack was renewed on the next morning, 
it was repulsed with little difficulty by McClellan.* 
McClellan did not attempt to pursue the Con- 
federates, and for nearly a month remained idle. 
During the three months which had elapsed since 
his arrival on the Peninsula the Confederates had 
improved, it may be said, every hour. They had 
passed their severe conscription law, enrolled their 
troops and gathered the largest force yet placed 
in the field. 

* General Joseph Eccleston Johnston was one of the ablest officers of 
the Southern Confederacy. He was born iu Virginia in 1807, graduated 
at West Point in 1829, and served in the Seminole war. During the Mex- 
ican war he served as captain of topographical engineers under General 
Scott in all the important actions, was twice wounded, and was brevetted 
colonel. In June, 1860, he became quartermaster-general, with the rank 
of brigadier-general. He commanded at Bull Run, and after recovering 
from his severe wound received at Seven Pines was assigned to the com- 
mand of the Departments of Tennessee and Mississippi. After Bragg's 
defeat at Chattanooga he took command of his army, occupying a posi- 
tion at Dalton, Ga., which was turned by Sherman early in May, 1864; 
whereupon he fell back successively to Eesaca, Allatoona Pass, Kene- 
saw Mountain and Atlanta, in turns fighting and being flanked by the 
much more powerful Federal army. He was superseded in July by 
General Hood. In Febi-uary, 1865, he was assigned to the command of 
troops to oppose Sherman's march through the Carolinas. He fought a 
part of Sherman's army at Bentonville, . N. C, on March 19, and sur- 
rendered the forces under his command to that general, April 26, at 
Durham's Station, near Greensboro', N. C. He published a Narmtim 
of Military Operations in 1874. 



ON THE CHIOKAHOMINY. 19 

General Kobert E. Lee was assigned to the com- 
mand of the Confederate army June 3, three days 
after General Johnston received his wound. Lee 
was anxious to strike the Union army a severe 
blow. To do so it was necessary to know the 
weakest and the strongest point of the enemy. 
This knowledge General Lee secured by means of 
Stuart's raid, which was one of the most brilliant 
exploits of the whole war. 



CHAPTER II. 

McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 

General Stuaet having secured the knowledge 
so important to General Lee, the latter decided to 
hurl his army against the Union right wing at Me- 
chanicsville, while Jackson, who was daily expect- 
ed from the Shenandoah, was to advance still far- 
ther to the left, cut off the Union base of supplies 
at White House, and then assail the rear. Stone- 
wall Jackson terrified the authorities in Washing- 
ton into summoning back General McDowell, who 
was on his way to reinforce McClellan, thus leav- 
ing the Union army in a condition to invite the 
attack, which was not delayed. As McClellan con- 
fidently expected McDowell, he had left his right 
wing comparatively unfortified, and that point, as 
was inevitable, was the one against which General 
Lee directed his assault. 

McClellan knew that not only were the prom- 
ised reinforcements denied him, but that the terri- 
ble Stonewall and his division were marching rap- 
idly down the Shenandoah Yalley in the direction 
of Richmond. Realizing his peril, he determined 
to abandon the York River Railroad and «hange 

20 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 21 

the base of supplies to James River, seventeen 
miles distant. To succeed in this important move- 
ment, it was necessary for the right wing to hold its 
position against all assaults until the rest of the 
army, with its forty miles of wagon-train, should 
pick its way through the White Oak Swamp ; but 
before this movement began. General Lee had 
struck his blow. Generals A. P. Hill and Long- 
street crossed the Chickahominy and attacked the 
Union right at Mechanicsville. A small Federal 
force behind entrenchments was soon dispersed 
and driven back toward Beaver Dam Creek. The 
Mechanicsville bridge being thus opened. General 
Longstreet, in obedience to Lee's orders, threw 
his division across the creek. Hill, who had 
j^ushed forward for a mile or two, found him- 
self brought to a standstill by the powerful posi- 
tion of the Unionists on Beaver Dam Creek. 
Nevertheless, he advanced, but was met with such 
a determined resistance that he was obliged to fall 
back. It was beyond his power to cross the stream 
in the face of such a murderous discharge of mus- 
ketry and cannon, and, night coming on, the attack 
ended for the time ; but at daylight the impetuous 
Hill renewed the attempt to cross the stream, at a 
point lower down. While thus engaged the Fed- 
eral troops were observed to be rapidly falling back 
from their almost impregnable position. This was 
caused by the arrival of Stonewall Jackson, who 
had passed around the right flank above and forced 



22 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the Federals to fall back on tlie main army below. 
Hill moved steadily onward, and at noon was in 
front of the formidable position held by the Union 
army near Cold Harbor. 

General McClellan had posted his army on a 
ridge along the southern bank of Powhite Creek, 
a small stream which empties into the Chicka- 
hominy below New Bridge. He had filled a deep 
ravine on his left with sharpshooters, while his 
right rested on elevated ground. His line of bat- 
tle curved backward and was protected by difficult 
approaches. The ground was covered with mat- 
ted undergrowth in some places, and was spongy 
and swampy in others. Breastworks of felled trees 
and of earth had been hurriedly thrown up, and 
behind them the vast lines of infantry, supported 
by artillery, confronted their assailants. Fitz- 
John Porter commanded the Union forces, with 
General Morell on his right and General Sykes 
on his left. Slocum's division, and afterward the 
brigades of French and Meagher, reinforced Por- 
ter, who coolly awaited the Confederate attack. 

Hill opened about noon, and the battle which 
followed was desperate and bloody. So great was 
the anxiety of General Lee that in company with 
General Longstreet he had ridden from his head- 
quarters, on the Nine-Mile road, and now watched 
in person the behavior of his troops under fire. 
His coolness, his serene and majestic presence, in 
the swirl of the conflict were like those of the 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 23 

great Von Moltke, whose placid face never fluslied 
and wlio felt not an additional pulse-throb when 
he saw the French empire crumbling into noth- 
ingness at Sedan before the advance of the Prus- 
sian eagles. 

Hill assaulted the Federal lines with that dash 
and daring so characteristic of him, but he made 
no more impression than if he had charged against 
the side of a granite mountain. The Federal artil- 
lery did dreadful execution, and the infantry poured 
a merciless fire into the Confederate lines ; but so 
impetuous was the rush of the assailants that three 
of Hill's regiments reached the crest of the hill, 
where the Union troops were stationed, and for a 
brief while the fight was hand to hand. But it 
was all in vain; mortal man could not stand the 
fiery sirocco that swept the earth, and the Confed- 
erates were forced to give way after two hours' 
hard fighting, having met with great loss and 
accomplished but little. 

Meanwhile, General Lee was listening for the 
sound of Stonewall Jackson's guns; but nothing 
was heard, and the situation became critical. Lee, 
with his masterly genius, grasped every detail and 
fully appreciated the peril which threatened hiui. 
He saw that McClellan would probably send enough 
reinforcements to Fitz- John Porter to enable him 
to attack him in turn, or, knowing how small was 
the force defending Richmond, might overwhelm 
it and make a hurried march against the city. 



24 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Longstreet was sent to the relief of Hill, and lie 
advanced under a fierce fire to make a feint upon 
the Union left. While thus engaged he caught the 
thunderous roar of guns and heard the tumultuous 
shouting on the left of Lee's line. He knew what 
it meant : Stonewall Jackson had arrived. Having 
hurled his troops into action, Jackson galloped to 
Cold Harbor, where General Lee was so anxiously- 
awaiting him ; and when they met, the scene took 
place with which our first chapter opened. 

Generals Lee and Jackson having hastily formed 
their plans, the latter dashed back to his command, 
and instantly a great change took place in every part 
of the field. Whiting and a portion of Jackson's 
old division quickly moved to the right to support 
Longstreet and to take position between him and 
the remnants of A. P. Hill's division. As soon as 
these and a few other movements were completed 
General Lee ordered an attack along the whole 
line, and in a few minutes the long stretch between 
Cold Harbor and the muddy Chickahominy was 
aflame with fire, and the earth quivered with the 
shock of the contending armies. Porter's troops 
were worn out with their five hours of fighting, 
but the rattle of musketry and the roar of can- 
non roused them again as a giant is roused by 
new wine. Their artillery was reinforced, and con- 
verged wherever the Confederate battalions gleamed 
through the smoke and mists of battle. On the 
right, near McGee's farm, the cannoneers found 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 25 

tlie Confederates at the very throats of their can- 
non. The assailants fell in swaths, but others 
seemed to spring from the ground, and many can- 
noneers were driven from their guns ; but they 
rushed back the next minute to recapture the 
pieces. Ewell was pounding away between Mc- 
Gee's farm and New Cold Harbor, but for a time 
without result. Seeing his straits, Jackson sent 
three brigades of his old division against the wood 
of New Cold Harbor. This was the weakest point 
of the whole Federal line, and it was assailed with 
the fierceness of so many tigers. The Federals 
made a brave defence, but were compelled to fall 
back. Their ammunition ran low, and they were 
in the last stages of exhaustion. In the narrow 
angle of the wood where artillery could not be 
used the soldiers fought singly, striking at a foe 
wherever found, and the conflict became blind, 
aimless, and, indeed, useless. At this critical mo- 
ment, as the sun was sinking in the hot summer 
sky, Stonewall Jackson dashed up with his last 
reserves and ordered a general attack. 

There could be but the one result. General 
Hood and his fiery Texans charged the Federal 
left with an impetuosity which carried everything 
before it. All in vain did the Federal artillery 
converge its fire upon them. As the men went 
down before the iron sleet the ranks closed up, and 
never a man faltered. Halting only long enough 
to fire, they rushed forward with their wild yells 



26 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

until the cannon were readied. The artillery- 
horses, wild with terror, galloped away, and the 
artillerymen who remained behind were trampled 
under the feet of the furious legions from the 
Lone Star State. Far over on the extreme left 
Longstreet had carried forward a similar movement. 
The Unionists fought bravely, but were compelled 
to give way, though they saved most of their guns 
and were able to check Longstreet's movement 
toward Alexander Bridge. But the Confederates 
were conquering everywhere. Two Federal regi- 
ments, while fighting like heroes in the woods 
near Cold Harbor, 'found themselves completely 
surrounded, and the greater number were killed or 
wounded. The survivors were forced to surrender. 
Ewell and D. H. Hill succeeded in planting their 
artillery on the summit of the hill held so long by 
Sykes's division, which was crushed by the fire. 

The retreat of the Federals on the left and cen- 
tre threatened to become a disastrous rout, and the 
situation of the Army of the Potomac was critical 
in the highest degree. Only a single passage re- 
mained by which they could make their way to 
the other side of the Chickahominy. If that were 
seized by the Confederates, the Army of the Poto- 
mac would be blotted out as though it had never 
existed. The North would receive a blow likely 
to prove mortal, and one which would shake every 
town, village and hamlet in the country to its very 
centre. But not yet. The terrific efforts of the 



IIcCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 27 

Confederates had exhausted them, and they halted 
to reform their lines. Night was closing in, and 
there came a lull in the fearful tumult, when the 
combatants on each side were able to halt and learn 
the condition of affairs. 

The losses on each side were frightful. Thirty- 
five thousand Federals were engaged, of whom one- 
fifth were killed or wounded. The loss of the Con- 
federates was fully as great, but they had gained a 
victory of transcendent importance. They had cap- 
tured many guns and prisoners and checked the 
advance upon Bichmond, which a short time be- 
fore looked as if it were to be irresistible. The 
magnificent Army of the Potomac, trained to the 
highest point, finely disciplined, thoroughly armed 
and under the command of skilful ofiicers, not 
only filled the hearts of the North with hope, but 
caused the gravest alarm throughout the South. 
From elevated positions in Richmond men could 
look off with their glasses and plainly see the 
Union soldiers at work in their entrenchments, 
and the " Stars and Bars " seemed to be inter- 
twined, as may be said, with the Stars and Stripes 
which floated above the besieging forces.* 

* Eespecting the flag adopted by the Confederacy, General Joe John- 
stone said a short time since: 

"At the battle of Manassas — you Northerners call it Bull Run — the 
Stars and Bars proved a failure because they were so much like the 
Union colors. Indeed, both armies mistook their enemies for friends, 
and vice versd. After the battle I had resolved to discard this flag, and 
called for each regiment to produce its State colors. This they were 



28 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

We have alluded to the consternation in Rich- 
mond when it was found that the Unionists were 
hammering at the very gates of the city. The 
Confederate Congress hastly adjourned, President 
Davis sent his family farther south, and there 
were general preparations on the part of all to 
move. But all was now changed. Under the sj)len- 
did leadership of Lee and his skilled and intrepid 
lieutenants, the army of invasion had been hurled 
backward; its grip upon the throat of the South 
had been shaken off, and it was seeking affrightedly 
for some path of escape from the wrath of its mas- 
ter. The enormous importance of the Confederate 
victory was moral rather than physical, for, in 
point of fact, the victory itself was not complete. 

The severe fighting at Gaines's Mill and the 
inaction of the Federals on the other side of the 
Chickahominy led General Lee to think that he 
had engaged and defeated the larger part of the 
Army of the Potomac, and that McClellan was so 
environed by dif&culties and dangers that he would 
be forced to surrender his entire command. Thus 
it came about that, while on the north side of the 
Chickahominy thirty thousand Union troops were 
assailed by twice as many Confederates, twenty- 

not able to do, and I asked the army for new designs. Among those 
presented, one by General Beauregard was chosen, and I altered this 
only in making it square instead of oblong. This flag was afterward 
adopted by the Confederate armies. It was a Greek cross of blue on a 
red field, with white stars on the blue bars. The flag was designed by a 
Colonel W^alton, of Louisiana, and presented to General Beauregard." 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 29 

five thousand Confederates on the south side held 
in check more than twice as many Unionists. 

While Lee was quietly preparing to capture the 
Army of the Potomac on the morrow, that army 
was making desperate efforts to gather itself to- 
gether and flee from under the avalanche about to 
fall upon it. Generals, colonels, captains and subor- 
dinate officers were hunting up their men and put- 
ting companies and regiments in shape; privates 
were rushing hither and thither in the effort to 
find where they belonged ; the sick and wounded re- 
ceived scant attention, but it was the best that could 
be given under the circumstances ; the dead, who 
were stretched everywhere, were scarcely thought 
of, for what avail was it to give them any care? 
There was but the single overwhelming desire, 
" How shall we escape the crouching tiger that is 
gathering his muscles for the fatal leap?" 

When men are intent on flight, little time is 
required to make preparation. The sultry sum- 
mer night had no more than fairly closed in when 
the head of the long line of fugitives debouched 
from the wood and began tramping across the 
Alexander bridge. A squadron of cavalry had 
held it during the day, so as to turn back the 
panic-stricken Federals who might seek to escape. 
Hour after hour the swarming multitude tramped 
over the bridge, until in the small hours of the 
morning the last wounded man and the last can- 
non were safely across the stream. The regulars 



30 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

were the last over, and they immediately turned 
about and destroyed the splendid structure that 
had served them so well. 

While this mournful procession was passing, 
General McClellan and his leading officers were 
gathered together near the south entrance to the 
bridge, holding a council of war. The counte- 
nance of the youthful commander was grave and 
he talked in guarded and serious tones. The fire- 
light which fell on the faces of the others showed 
they fully appreciated the gravity of the situation. 
The splendid Army of the Potomac was beaten, 
and what should be done? 

This memorable conference was marked by a 
most extraordinary incident: McClellan, the em- 
bodiment of caution and hesitation, suddenly 
astounded his officers by the proposal to capture 
Richmond while the main body of its defenders 
were too far away to offer any defence. His offi- 
cers, however, had little difficulty in dissuading 
their leader from the project. One cannot but 
speculate as to what would have been the outcome 
of such an achievement. Unquestionably, McClel- 
lan could have taken the city, and a most remark- 
able complication would have followed. He, in 
turn, would have been besieged by the Confeder- 
ates and cut off from his supplies, and, with the 
country around him intensely hostile, could not 
have sustained himself very long. But the very 
hour it was known that McClellan was in Bich- 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 31 

mond the Federal goverument would have pouretl 
forward reinforcements to his assistance ; then, in 
all probability, Stonewall Jackson might have 
dashed into the national capital with his daring 
raiders and thrown everything into confusion. 
However, all this is but conjecture, and, as such 
a condition of affairs can never occur again, it is 
idle to continue the thought. It may be added that 
General Lee more than once seriously considered the 
expediency of " swapping queens," or trading capi- 
tals, and it is a most interesting question as to what 
would have been the result had the extraordinary 
trade ever been made. But McClellan was soldier 
enough to understand that a retreat was necessary 
and a change of base had become inevitable. His 
connections had been severed, and his only hope 
now was the James E,iver, where the Union gun- 
boats could keep the Confederates at a safe distance. 
On the night following the battle Lee sent this 
telegram to E-ichmond : 

" Headquarters in the Field, June 27, 1862. 

"His Excellency, President Davis — 

" Me. President : Profoundly grateful to Al- 
mighty God for the signal victory granted us, it 
is my pleasing task to announce to you the suc- 
cess achieved by this army to-day. 

" The enemy was this morning driven from his 
strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek and 
pursued to that behind Powhite Creek, and, finally, 



32 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENEEAL LEE. 

after a severe contest of five hours, entirely repulsed 
from the field. 

" Night put an end to the contest. I grieve to 
state that our loss in officers and men is great. 

" We sleep on the field, and shall renew the 
contest in the morning. 

" I have the honor to be, very respctfully, 
" (Signed) E. E. Lee, General." 

It was impossible that Lee should know the 
intentions of McClellan. The latter might give 
battle with a view of preserving his communica- 
tions ; he might retreat down the Peninsula or 
down the James. The Confederate chieftain could 
only wait until McClellan's movements were devel- 
oped. That he should be compelled to do so- was 
a great disadvantage, but there was no help for it. 
He did all that was possible. Ewell's division was 
sent to seize the York Kiver Kailroad, and Stuart, 
with his cavalry, was ordered to co-operate with 
him. Reaching Dispatch Station, the Federals 
retreated across the river, and Ewell, after de- 
stroying a part of the railroad, awaited further 
orders. 

Looking southward through the sliimmering air, 
Lee saw vast clouds of dust rolling upward toward 
the sky. There could be no mistaking the mean- 
ing: the Army of the Potomac was retreating. 
Lee suspected that McClellan intended to escape 
down the Peninsula ; accordingly, he sent orders 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 33 

to Ewell to move from Dispatch Station to Bot- 
tom's Bridge, on the road connecting Bichmond 
and Williamsburg, with a view of checking Mc- 
Clellan if he attempted to cross the Chickahominy 
at that point. Discovering no sign that such was 
McClellan's intention, Ewell joined Jackson on 
the following day. 

General Ewell, in the mean time, had pushed 
down the road to the White House in quest of 
the Federals ; but they were gone, and his errand 
was bootless. McClellan conducted the retreat in 
masterly style ; and when morning came, the con- 
dition of his army was infinitely imj)roved over 
that of the previous evening. Lee, having satis- 
fied himself that the Unionists were making for 
the James Biver, saw the important advantage they 
had gained by the skill with which McClellan had 
masked the movement. The Federals were so far 
on their way and in such good form that it was im- 
possible to turn their retreat into the rout that 
had been intended.- Stuart's cavalry, which could 
have rendered such effective service in harassing 
the Federals, had penetrated so far in the Peninsula 
that it may be said it was lost for the time, inas- 
much as it did not reappear during the campaign. 
Ewell's soldiers, who returned during the night, 
were so exhausted that they were as helpless as 
logs until they could procure a few hours' sleep. 

All through the night the vast trains of the 
Army of the Potomac were plodding steadily for- 



34 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ward toward White Oak Swamp. They had gained 
twenty-four hours which were of inestimable im- 
portance, and they improved them to the utmost. 
The bridge in front of Frazier's farm had been re- 
opened, and General Keyes, with his two divisions, 
had encamped at Glendale, near Nelson's farm. 
There he remained to cover the retreat of the 
army through the gloomy morass. The wagons, 
five thousand in number, and a drove of twenty- 
five hundred cattle passed safely over the single 
road, and in the stifling heat of the next day they 
pushed steadily toward the James. 

It was a sad and ' pitiful sight. The ambulances 
were overcrowded with the sick and wounded, 
whose white bandaged faces sometimes peered out 
upon the moving figures or dropped back with 
groans of anguish when the jolting of the vehicle 
made the pain of their wounds greater than they 
could bear. Others had crawled out of the hospital 
and were tottering along as best they could ; but 
many a poor fellow had overestimated his strength, 
and, giving out, dropped by the wayside, waiting 
for the Confederates to hold the canteen to his 
fevered lips and to gather him in with the hun- 
dreds of prisoners already taken. Unto many a 
boy in blue, as he lay gasping by the roadside. 
Death was kind enough to steal forward and close 
his eyes in the last, long sleep, while the thoughts 
of the dying soldier wandered away to his North- 
em. home, where father and mother, brother and 



McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 35 

sister, and perhaps sweetheart, would look long- 
ingly for the form that they should never see again. 
It was the same with the ardent Southerner who 
had left his loved ones in such high spirits and 
with such proud hopes of the triumph that await- 
ed the cause so dear to his heart. The terrible 
missiles of war know no discrimination, and the 
bullet crashing through the brain, the shell rending 
limb and body, stretched many and many a brave 
Confederate low. Far to the southward, in the 
Carolinas, in Georgia and the Gulf States, the 
long lists of the dead would be scanned through 
blinding tears and with bated breath by their 
friends searching for the name they dreaded to 
find. 

Ah ! how often it was found ! and how again 
and again the roll of the fallen should grow and 
expand until the despairing ones should feel that 
Death would never be content until all were taken ! 

"By fairy hands theip knell is rung, 
By forms unseen their dirge is sung : 
There Honor comes, a pilgrim gray, 
To bless the turf that wraps their clay. 
And Freedom shall awhile repair 
To dwell a weeping hermit there." 



CHAPTER III. 

THE LINE OF BATTLE. 

It was on the morning of June 29 that Lee, 
having learned that McClellan was retreating to- 
ward the James, pushed forward his columns in 
pursuit. Magruder and Huger hurried over the 
Williamsburg and Charles City roads, Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill made for the New Bridge crossing of 
the Chickahominy, while Jackson, having crossed 
at Grapevine Bridge, aimed to strike the Federals 
along the south bank of the Chickahominy. 

A somewhat curious complication resulted from 
the following situation. Sumner was not long in 
discovering that the Confederates were recrossing 
the Chickahominy and advancing upon Savage Sta- 
tion. Accordingly, he moved his corps from the 
position it had held at Allen's farm to that place, 
where he was joined by a portion of Franklin's 
corps. Heintzelman, who held position on the left 
of Sumner, had been directed to hold the Williams- 
burg road, but he fell back and crossed White Oak 
Swamp, while Sumner moved to Savage Station. 
Thus it came about that when Magruder advanced 
on the Williamsburg road he found no Federals to 

36 



THE LINE OF BATTLE. 37 

fight, while Sumner, unaware of Heintzelman's 
withdrawal, was astonished to discover the enemy 
in his front at Savage Station. Under these cir- 
cumstances took place the battle of Savage Station, 
on the afternoon of Saturday, June 29, 1862. 

The advance of the Confederates Avas by the Wil- 
liamsburg road and along the railroad-track, pre- 
ceded by an engine which drew an iron-j)lated car 
on which was mounted a heavy gun. This con- 
trivance was more unique than effective. The 
engine would steam slowly along for a short dis- 
tance, and then stop until the gunners within the 
turret of the land-monitor fired the piece. It sent 
the ponderous ball whirring over the country, but 
there is no record that it ever succeeded in strik- 
ing any one. 

About the middle of the afternoon the Signal 
Corps apprised the Federals that the Confederates 
were advancing. Smith had barely time to throw 
Hancock's brigade on Richardson's right and to ex- 
tend his line to a thicket, while Brooks's brigade was 
sent to the extreme left. Magruder, quick to see 
the gap made by the withdrawal of Heintzelman, 
precipitated McLaws's and his own division against 
the most vulnerable part of the Federal line. His 
attack was made with his usual impetuosity and 
reckless bravery, when grim old Sumner arrived 
in the nick of time. He was able to check Ma- 
gruder while Brooks re-established the battle-line 
on that side. 



38 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

The Confederates were in high spirits, and, re- 
membering the splendid victory they had won at 
Gaines's Mill, fought with the most heroic valor, 
determined to deliver a telling blow upon the 
Federals before night could come to their relief. 
They saw that McClellan was conducting his re- 
treat with such skill that it was more than prob- 
able he would extricate his army, and they desired 
to make it cost him dear. The battle raged along 
the whole line until sunset. The Union lines gave 
way again and again under the fierce charges of 
their assailants, but they were reformed as often, 
and even the fiery cOurage of Magruder and his 
men could not effect a lasting breach in the ranks 
of the Federals. 

And where, all this time, was Stonewall Jack- 
son ? Ah ! if he had swept down on the flank, as 
was his wont, with those yells that so often struck 
terror to the hearts of the Federals, the latter must 
have given way and been scattered like chaff in the 
hurricane. But Jackson the indomitable was still 
working at the bridge over which he was to cross 
the Chickahominy. Had that been rebuilded in 
time, he would have come down like a thunder- 
bolt ; but, despite all the energy he could put forth, 
it was not completed until after the shades of night 
were closing in, when he and his soldiers hurried 
across. They were too late to hurl themselves on 
the foe, the roar of whose cannon was in their ears. 

General Sumner wished to hold the ground he 



THE LINE OF BATTLE. 39 

liad defended with sucli valor, but the demand for 
a contraction of the lines was imperative. General 
McClellan ordered his withdrawal, and just as it 
was growing light on the following morning his 
men resumed their march, the last brigade de- 
stroying the bridge which carried them over. 

Full credit must not be denied McClellan for 
the masterly manner in which he conducted the 
retreat. If the spongy ground, matted with un- 
dergrowth and covered at intervals with trees, ren- 
dered the passage by his men difficult, it served 
them the inestimably good turn of making the 
pursuit by Lee equally hard to execute ; and, on 
the other hand, had a general of less skill than 
McClellan been employed to save the immense 
army, he must have failed. He had succeeded in 
placing the White Oak Swamp between him and 
Lee, and he had brought off* his cannon and saved 
his rear-guard from rout. 

At daylight the approaches to White Oak Bridge 
and Frazier's farm were occupied by the Federals, 
while the Charles City road and Porter's former 
position beyond Glendale were covered. Keyes, 
with Porter close behind him, led the retreat of 
the army, and reached the James River early in 
the day ; but, so far as McClellan was concerned, 
they were entirely lost to him. They had been 
detained on the way, and had sent no messenger to 
him. Even the topographical engineers sent out 
by the Federal commander had not reported, and 



40 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

he could only trust to the intelligence of his lieu- 
tenants to extricate themselves from the peril in 
which they might become involved. 

General Keyes made a most fortunate discovery 
while retreating with his division. He came upon 
an old unused road leading toward the James, which 
was easily reopened, and which, running parallel 
to the one he was following, enabled him effect- 
ually to protect his long train against attack. It 
is difiicult for one who has never witnessed such 
a movement to form a just idea of its magni- 
tude. When Keyes halted on the banks of the 
James, the Army of the Potomac extended back- 
ward nearly ten miles. Long as was this line, and 
impossible as it was to defend every portion of it, 
yet the necessity of protecting the train forbade its 
shortening; for it would have been fatal to leave 
the passage of White Oak Swamp open to the 
Confederates. 

The situation of the Union army may be under- 
stood from the following statement : From the pas- 
sage out of the White Oak Swamp the highway 
runs southward to the James Kiver, nine miles 
or so distant. The Union army was strung along 
this road on its way to Haxall's Landing, where it 
was seeking the protection of the gunboats. The 
White Oak pass, crossing a tributary of the Chick- 
ahominy, marked the termination of the famous 
White Oak Swamp, through which McClellan had 
forced his way, fighting as he went. This pass 



THE LINE OF BATTLE. 41 

was the only one over which tlie Confederates could 
follow in direct pursuit of the fleeing Unionists. 
The supreme importance of its being held by the 
latter is therefore apparent to all, for the fate of 
their army depended upon its defence. 

Following the retreating Federals southward 
some two or three miles, the next point from 
which the Confederates could assault them was 
reached. This was Glendale, where the highways 
from Richmond converge. It may be said that 
all the roads leading southward from Richmond 
between the James and the Chickahominy draw 
together at Glendale like the converging sj)okes 
of a wheel; consequently, it required to be forti- 
fied against the Confederate assault that was cer- 
tain to come. Continuing southward, the next 
exposed point was Malvern Hill, just north of 
HaxaU's Landing, the haven of refuge to the 
distressed Unionists. This was in direct commu- 
nication with Richmond by the Newmarket road, 
which sent off a spur to the northward to Glen- 
dale. It was sure to receive attention from Lee, 
though it was the least inviting of the three points, 
its natural strength being very great. 

Having shown the only places where the Union- 
ists were liable to be attacked, let us now see what 
means McClellan took to protect them against his 
enemy. 

The Union commander visited all the threatened 
points and personally directed the movements for 



42 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

defence. Keyes occupied the space between the 
James at Turkey Bend on one side and Malvern 
Hill on the other, Porter taking up a strong posi- 
tion on the same hill. Franklin was stationed at 
the pass of White Oak Swamp, near Frazier's 
farm, with orders to defend it to the last, though 
that officer understood its value too well to require 
any urgency about the matter. All the remaining 
troops were placed in position at Glendale. 

Such being the disposition of the Union troops, 
let us see what was done by Lee. None realized 
more clearly than he the necessity of striking a 
crushing blow with -the least possible delay. He 
had confidently expected to capture the Army of 
the Potomac, and now it was slipj)ing through his 
fingers. Once on the bank of the James under 
the protection of the gunboats, it would be as safe 
against his utmost efforts as if lost in the woods 
of Maine. But tremendous obstacles were in the 
path of the Confederate chieftain. He and his 
lieutenants had never dreamed that the scene of 
the struggle would be shifted to that portion of 
the Peninsula, and they were more ignorant of 
the topography of the country than the Federals. 
It is even stated that Lee was unable to procure 
a county-map by which to guide his movements. 
"While the vast morass known as White Oak 
Swamp offered such a secure protection to the 
flank of the retreating army, it was utterly im- 
passable for Lee except along the avenues already 



THE LINE OF BATTLE. 43 

pointed out ; consequently, he was forced to divide 
his army into several divisions, which, under the 
peculiar character of the country, were unable to 
communicate with one another or to effect a junc- 
tion after the defeat of the Federals. Stonewall 
Jackson, with four divisions, pressed eagerly for- 
ward through the White Oak Swamp with the 
determination of forcing the passage which Frank- 
lin had been ordered to defend to the last extrem- 
ity; Hill and Longstreet were hurrying down from 
Richmond along the highways which debouched at 
Glendale into the road over which the Unionists 
were retreating; Magruder was immediately be- 
hind them, and was to form the right in the attack ; 
while Wise's Legion and other troops posted on the 
James were directed to make all haste down the 
banks of that river, with the object of seizing and 
fortifying Malvern Hill before it could be occu- 
pied by the Federals. 

Such were Lee's plans, and now let us see in 
what manner they were carried out. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE LAST BATTLES. 

Stonewall Jacksoist reached the pass of White 
Oak Swamp shortly before noon, and found Frank- 
lin strongly posted and awaiting him. The Fed- 
eral commander had improved his time well, and 
had some eight or ten batteries posted to cover 
the passage, while the infantry, consisting of nine 
brigades, were drawn up in line of battle. 

Jackson's force was much larger than that of the 
Federals — besides his four divisions, he had twenty 
batteries — and yet it was utterly out of his pow6r 
to use his men with any advantage. There was 
but the single defile, the swamp on his right and 
left being almost as impassable as the rapids be- 
low Niagara. If he advanced, it must be along 
that narrow passage commanded by the guns of 
Franklin. Daring as was the Confederate leader, 
his military instinct caused him to shrink from 
the terrible attempt. To throw his men into that 
narrow defile was only to invite their slaughter, 
and, though the rank and file would have shrank 
at no risk for their beloved leader, they could not 
be expected do that which was impossible. But 

44 



THE LAST BATTLES. 45 

Jackson knew the penalty of delay. His force 
formed the strongest half of the Confederate army, 
and while it stood waiting on the borders of White 
Oak Swamp the Unionists were making good their 
escape. They needed but little more time in which 
to place themselves beyond his reach. Stonewall 
Jackson was not the man to stand idle in the face 
of any danger, no matter how great. Several of 
his batteries were drawn up above the pass with 
the object of silencing the Union guns before the 
decisive charge should be made by his infantry. 
For a time it appeared as if Jackson was to suc- 
ceed in his purpose. A couple of Union batteries 
were silenced and most of the guns destroyed by 
the projectiles. The situation was a hopeful one 
for the assailants, when Franklin opened with his 
rifled ten-pounders, which were placed so far back 
as to be almost beyond range of Jackson's guns. 
They inflicted great injury upon the Confederates. 

All this time the infantry on both sides were 
under arms, expecting the battle to open. They 
were glaring across the pass at each other, chafing 
with fury and sufiering severely from the artillery. 
So soon as the Union guns could be silenced the 
Confederate battle-yell would make the welkin 
ring, and they would swarm through the narrow 
passage as though rushing "to a, festival." 

But, despite the utmost efforts, the Union bat- 
teries were not silenced. The precious hours 
slipped by, and the boom of cannon to the south- 



46 THE CAMP-FIRES QF GENERAL LEE. 

ward told Jackson how sorely lie was needed there. 
His daring soul chafed at the enforced delay, but 
there was no help for it. He was not the one to 
lose his head in any crisis, no matter how trying. 
No temptation could induce him to make such an 
assault as that of " Bob Toombs " a few days before 
at Golding's farm, where the only thing accom- 
plished was the loss of a large number of men and 
a renewed proof of the fact that a man is pretty 
certain to prove his ridiculous incompetency on 
the very first opportunity. 

Hour after hour passed; the flaming sun beat 
down on the soldiers all through the sultry after- 
noon, and the cannon roared and boomed. Men 
shrieked and many were torn to pieces, and still 
the opposing forces glared at each other, awaiting 
the order to leap at each other's throats. But 
when darkness began creeping through the woods, 
the situation was unchanged. The Confederates 
remained on the borders of the swamp and had 
not made a single attempt to force their way. 
Thus the most formidable leader in the Confed- 
erate army, with about half the army itself, was 
held at bay all day, when his presence at Glendale, 
a few miles northward, would have overwhelmed 
the Federals. The powerful left wing of Lee's 
army was paralyzed, and no word could be sent 
to or received from it. 

Some two or three hours after the arrival of Jack- 
son in front of Franklin, Longstreet and A. P. Hill 



THE LAST BATTLES. 47 

reached Glendale, the second point exposed to at- 
tack from the Confederates. They had nearly 
twenty thousand men, under the leadership of the 
foremost generals in the service. McCall's divis- 
ion, in the centre, was the first to receive their 
charge. He had arranged his soldiers in two lines, 
with Meade on the right, Seymour on the left, Rey- 
nolds's brigade in reserve, and his front protected 
by five batteries. 

The Confederates, by way of introduction, 
droj)ped several scores of shells among the Union- 
ists, and then charged with their wonted dash and 
vigor. McCall's division had borne the brunt of 
the preceding day's fighting, and they were in 
sore need of rest ; but they fought valiantly, and 
repelled the first assault. Seymour and Meade were 
quickly assaulted in succession by the Confeder- 
ates, who were searching for the weakest point in 
the line of defence. Hill quickly found it, in the 
shape of an open breach between McCall's divis- 
ion and Hooker's, and he immediately attempted 
to turn them one after the other. Hooker found 
himself assailed with such fury that he was forced 
to bring up all his reserves and a regiment from 
Sumner's corps to the help of Grover, command- 
ing the First Brigade. Still farther to the right, 
Seymour's left wdng, consisting of Seymour's bri- 
gade and a couple of German batteries from the 
reserve artillery, were attacked with the same im- 
petuosity. The gunners were put to flight, and 



48 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GEXEEAL LEE. 

tlie rest, finding tliemselves between two fires, ran 
pell-mell back toward Hooker's brigade. The lat- 
ter parted, so as to allow them to pass through their 
ranks, and thou, closing up, delivered a murder- 
ous fire upon the Confederates, who in the ardor 
of their charge had become somewhat separated 
from one another. IVo of Hooker's regiments 
drove Longstreet's men at the point of the bay- 
onet upon McCall's brigades, who in return 
received them with a hot tire. 

Meanwhile, Sedgwick had received reinforce- 
ments from Franklin, at White Oak Swamp, who 
found he had no need for so many men. They 
quickly occupied the space vacated by Seymour's 
disorganized troops, and the line of battle was 
restored, though the Federals had lost consider- 
able ground. Eur the valiant Confederates were 
not dismayed, and continued the assault with their 
old-time vigor. Swerving otf from the line held by 
Sedgwick and Hooker, they concentrated against 
McCall's right and Kearny's left. The latter was 
able to hold his own, but McCall gave way. ISTear 
sunset the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Virginia made 
a furious charge on Eandol's regular battery, near 
Meade. _ The assailants, trailing their muskets in 
one hand and assuming the form of a > went 
across the open space on the double quick, yelling 
like so many madmen. The grape was poured 
into the singular formation, and the Virginians 
dropped thick and fast r but the gigantic human 



THE LAST BATTLES. 49 

wedge came with tlie speed of a wliirlwind straight 
for the guns, and nothing could stay it. The 
gunners were killed, the cannon captured, and 
Meade was forced to fall back. Within less than 
an hour another charge captured Cooper's battery, 
in the centre of McCall's line, but after a furious 
struggle the Ninth Pennsylvania retook it, and 
the Confederates were forced to abandon Kan- 
dol's battery. 

The sun was low in the horizon, and the sounds 
of battle began to die out. Hill and Longstreet, 
with their two splendid divisions, had done some 
of the finest fighting ever seen, but they had 
attemj)ted impossibilities. From the northward 
came the sullen roar of Jackson's cannon, where, 
as we have shown, he was held all through the 
day by Franklin. Magruder ought to have ap- 
peared on the field of battle long before, but 
remained unaccountably absent. The Confeder- 
ate army was cut in twain, and there was no 
means of bringing the wings together. Believ- 
ing the Unionists had more than sufiicient re- 
serves within call. Hill and Longstreet gave up 
the ground they had won, in order to extricate 
and gather their forces together. 

Having shown the results of the Confederate 
demonstration against the upper and central points 
of the Union line, it only remains to narrate what 
took place on the extreme south, at Malvern Hill, 
on the bank of the James. 



50 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Wise's Legion, as we have already stated, had 
run a race down the James in the hope of reach- 
ing and occupying Malvern Hill ahead of the 
Unionists ; but, having started too late, they arrived 
too late, and while pushing vigorously forward sud- 
denly came against Porter's division, posted on Mal- 
vern Hill. The Confederates were at immense dis- 
advantage, and, though they made a brave attack, it 
was not successful. 

Several gunboats were waiting at Haxall's Land- 
ing, and General McClellan had gone on board the 
Galena with a view of making a reconnoissance up 
the river. The Galena sent a few of its Parrott 
hundred-pound shells into the woods in quest of 
the Confederate reserves. Little actual damage 
was done, but the terrific racket made by the awful 
missiles as they shattered the trees right and left 
produced its effect on the assailants, and, being 
recognized by the Unionists tramping wearily 
southward toward the river, filled them with the 
joy which comes to the shipwrecked mariner when 
at last he sees the friendly sail approaching. 

Hour after hour the dreadful retreat continued. 
Every hut and cabin by the wayside was turned 
into a hospital, and the surgeons, with coats and 
vests off and sleeves rolled uj), worked through 
the stifling heat until the perspiration streamed 
from them and they were scarcely able to move 
from exhaustion. Over the long, wearisome miles 
the sick, wounded and well soldiers straggled to- 



THE LAST BATTLES. 51 

ward the James. Sometimes the drivers of the 
teams were thrown into a panic by the shelling 
and firing, and a general smash-up of everything 
threatened ; but among the disorganized multitude 
there were cool heads and stern wills who kept 
matters in tolerably fair shape. The sight of the 
gleaming James as it wound peacefully southward 
on its way to the sea was delight unspeakable to 
the Federals, and never were famishing pilgrims 
so overjoj^ed at sight of the haven of refuge to- 
ward which they had been struggling so long. 

The battle of Glendale was one of the fiercest 
of the war. It was inconclusive, though the Con- 
federates took the most trophies. Among their 
prisoners was General McCall, who was captured 
while wandering through the woods in quest of his 
lost command; but before sunset on the 30th of 
June the last vehicle of the almost interminable 
wagon-train reached Malvern Hill, where vigor- 
ous preparations were under way to repel the 
assault sure to be made very soon. 

The configuration of the James at Haxall's 
Landing is such that the Union forces could not 
remain there. The stream becomes so narrow above 
City Point that vessels on their way to Haxall's 
were exposed to batteries along the bank which 
were capable of sinking them. Harrison's Land- 
ing, therefore, was selected as the most favorable 
point for the establishment of depots for the army. 
The wagon-train having safely reached Hax- 



52 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

all's, the necessity no longer existed for holding 
the positions at the ontlet of White Oak BAvamp 
and Glendale. Franklin, at the former, began 
withdrawing in the evening, and the troops at 
Glendale did tlie same. The movement continned 
through the hot, sultry night, and at daylight the 
next morning the whole Federal army was concen- 
trated around ]\Ialvern Hill, which was placed in 
the best possible condition for defence. 

Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about three- 
fourths of a mile wide and twice as long. McClel- 
lan's left and centre were posted on the hill, the 
riglit curving backward through the woods to- 
ward a point on the James below Haxall's Landing. 
Believing that Lee's main attack would be direct- 
ed against his left, McClellan posted heavy masses 
of infantry and artillery on Malvern Hill. Por- 
ter's corps held the lell, the artillery, including 
the reserve, amounting to sixty guns. The gun- 
boats on the James covered the left ilank. 

Greneral Lee had determined to make a most 
formidable attack on the Army of the Potomac 
before it got beyond the reach of his terrible forces. 
He was under greater disadvantage than earlier in 
the campaign, but his grim resolution was never 
alVected by the danger which impended. The last 
battle of the Peninsula was at hand. 

The concentration of the Iinion army had en- 
abled Lee to unite the wing-s of his own army. 
The powerful division under Jackson, held power- 



THE LAST BATTLES. 53 

less SO long at tlie passage from White Oak Swamp, 
was released, and at last the whole Confederate 
army was gathered together for a furious onslaught. 
Lee's line was formed with Jackson's divisions on 
the left and those of Mairruder and Hu2;er on 
the right. Longstreet and A. P. Hill formed the 
reserve, on the left, and took no part in the en- 
gagement. The ground was so unfavorable for 
manceuvring that the afternoon was half gone 
before the line of battle was completed. Then An- 
derson's brigade of D. H. Hill's division attacked 
Couch, but was obliged to fall back. The move- 
ment was a feeler, as may be said, the intention 
of Lee being to storm the 2:)lateau of Malvern on 
the left. He had massed the troops of Jackson, 
Magruder and Huger, therefore, on his right. 
Before making a demonstration Lee issued an 
order stating that he had selected his positions so 
that his artillery could silence that of the Union- 
ists, and that as soon as it was done Armistead's 
brigade of Huger's division ' would dash forward 
with a shout and carry the battery directly in 
front of them. Lee was sure the shout would be 
heard by every one on his right. He therefore 
announced that the outcry was to be the signal 
for an advance all along the line; the instant it 
was made all the troops were to rush forward 
with fixed bayonets. 

About six o'clock in the afternoon General D. 
H. Hill was talking with his brigade command- 



64 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ers, when a thunderous shout fell upon their ears. 
They stopped speaking, listened and looked sig- 
nificantly at each other. 

"That's the signal!" exclaimed General Hill, 
and the others expressed the same opinion. 

Without an instant's delay the advance was 
ordered, but there was either a mistake of the 
signal or the other divisions failed to hear it ; for 
when Hill advanced, he did so alone. Neither 
Whiting nor Magruder nor Huger stirred, while 
the splendid division of the gallant Hill dashed 
against the tier upon tier of batteries trained upon 
them. There could be but one result. The im- 
mense advantage was on the side of the Federals, 
who mowed down the Confederates in winrows. 
They pushed forward with the most desperate 
valor, only to be driven back again and again, 
until the plain *was strewn with the dead and 
dying. Magruder and Huger afterward advanced 
to the support of the decimated force, but they 
did so in such a disjointed fashion that they con- 
tributed no support at all. To quote the report 
of General Hill, "instead of ordering up one or 
two hundred pieces to play on the Yankees, a sin- 
gle battery was ordered up, and knocked to pieces 
in a few minutes ; one or two others shared the 
same fate of being beaten in detail. The firing 
from our batteries was of the most farcical cha- 
racter." When darkness came, the battle was still 
raging. The gloom was lighted up by the red 



THE LAST BATTLES. 55 

flaslies of the guns, and the rattle and roar was 
overpowering; but as the night advanced the fire 
slackened, and at a comparatively early hour it 
died out altogether. 

It cannot be denied that the last battle on the 
Peninsula was ill-managed by the Confederates. 
Stuart, with his splendid cavalry, was still wan- 
dering somewhere in the Peninsula, and thus his 
invaluable services were lost to Lee ; Hill, Magru- 
der and Whiting had no communication with one 
another, and were thus unable to give that mu- 
tual support which was indispensable. 

The six days' fighting had ended at last. The 
frightful first campaign against Pichmond by way 
of the Peninsula had closed in rout and disaster 
to the Federals. The failure to capture the cap- 
ital of the Confederacy was utter and complete. 
As we have stated, McClellan showed rare skill 
and brilliant military ability in extricating his 
enormous army from its dangerous position. Few 
commanders could have done so well — none, bet- 
ter. The last battle, at Malvern Hill, was a defeat 
for the Confederates, but the campaign itself was 
a victory of magnificent proportions. 

As is generally the case, the atmospheric dis- 
turbances caused by a great battle brought on 
violent tempests of rain, and the armies were 
drenched as completely as if they had been floun- 
dering all day in the James Piver. The neces- 
sity for the removal to Harrison's Landing still 



66 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

existed, and during tlie night the troops were 
withdrawn to Harrison's Bar, on the James. Col- 
onel Averill, with a regiment of cavalry, a brigade 
of regular infantry and a battery, covered the rear. 
General J. E. B. Stuart, having found his way 
back from the labyrinths of the Lower Peninsula, 
was sent by Lee after the retreating Federals ; but 
he saw that McClellan had taken up too strong 
a position to be assailed, and he withdrew in the 
direction of Bichmond. Finally the Army of the 
Potomac reached Harrison's Landing and found 
the rest of which they were in such imperative 
need. 

And what was the cost of this tremendous cam- 
paign? The Army of the Potomac, June 20, 
when reunited before Bichmond, had an effective 
force of one hundred and four thousand seven 
hundred and twenty-four men fit for duty, and 
eleven thousand two hundred and eighty-nine un- 
fit for duty. On the 4th of July following, when 
the corps commanders made their reports, fifteen 
thousand two hundred and forty-nine men had 
been lost, of whom fifteen hundred and eighty- 
two had been killed, seventy-seven hundred wound- 
ed, and six thousand were missing, fully as many 
more having gone to the hospitals from sickness 
and exhaustion caused by the fearful strain to 
which they had been subjected. The malarial 
marshes of the Chickahominy were as deadly to 
the Unionists and Confederates as were the shell 



THE LAST BATTLES. 57 

and the bullet. General Lee's losses were scarcely 
short of twenty thousand men, exclusive of five 
thousand more who were rendered unfit for ser- 
vice by the same causes which acted against the 
Unionists. Thus the Confederate chieftain sus- 
tained the loss of more than one-fourth the effect- 
ive force of his entire army. 

After this prolonged and terrific struggle both 
armies rested. McClellan carefully fortified him- 
self at Harrison's Landing, and while he was thus 
engaged Lee fell back to the environs of Rich- 
mond, where he devoted himself to recruiting his 
army and getting ready for the next great cam- 
paign. 

The North and the South were sobered by the 
events in the Peninsula. The self-confidence on 
both sides had given way to a proper appreciation 
of the tremendous proportions of the conflict be- 
tween the two sections. Kecruiting progressed 
rapidly on both sides, and, while the war raged 
in other portions of the country, intelligent and 
farseeing people saw that the decisive struggle 
was to be fought in front of Richmond, the capital 
of the Confederacy. 



CHAPTER Y. 

ROBERT E. LEE. 

RoBEET Edwaed Lee was born at Stratford, 
Westmoreland county, Virginia, January 19, 1807. 
He was the son of Henry Lee, who graduated at 
Princeton College two years before the breaking 
out of the Revolution, when only eighteen years 
of age. In 1776, he was made captain of a cav- 
alry company, and the following year served under 
Washington. Lee became a major, and his legion 
was one of the most famous in the Revolution. In 
July, 1779, he captured Paulus Hook (Jersey City), 
for which he received the thanks of Congress and 
a gold medal. He was made lieutenant-colonel in 
1780, and early in the following year joined Gen- 
eral Greene in the Carolinas. The fame and ex- 
ploits of " Light-Horse Harry " are a part of the 
history of our country. . 

After the war Henry Lee was a member of Con- 
gress, and in 1791 was chosen governor of Virginia. 
He commanded the troops sent to quell the Whis- 
key Insurrection, in 1794. He was ajDpointed by 
Congress to pronounce the funeral oration on the 
death of Washington, but, unable to be present, 

58 



ROBERT E. LEE. 59 

it was delivered by Judge Marshall. He was se- 
riously wounded in 1814 while quelling a riot in 
Baltimore, and never fully recovered from it. He 
died in 1818, in Georgia, while on his return from 
the West Indies. 

The first wife of General Henry Lee bore him 
Henry Lee, celebrated for his literary ability, and 
a daughter, Lucy. By his second wife he had 
Charles Carter, Bobert Edward and Sidney Smith, 
and two daughters, Annie and Mildred. Sidney 
Smith Lee became Commodore Lee of the Con- 
federate navy, and was the father of General Fitz 
Lee. 

Bobert Edward Lee entered the Military Acad- 
emy, at West Point, in 1825. He graduated sec- 
ond in his class, and during the entire four years 
never received a demerit and was never once rep- 
rimanded. On his graduation he was appointed 
second lieutenant in the corps of topographical 
engineers, to which branch, then as now, the most 
distinguished graduates of West Point are assigned. 
He was employed for several years on the coast de- 
fences of the United States. In 1832 he married 
Mary, daughter of George Washington Parke Cus- 
tis, and granddaughter of the wife of Washington 
—a most estimable lady and the possessor of large 
estates, the most widely known being the Arling- 
ton house, in Alexandria county, opposite Wash- 
ington, and the White house, on the Pamunkey, 
the scene of Washington's marriage. 



60 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Kobert Edward Lee was the father of three sons 
and four daughters — George Washington Custis, 
William Henry Fitzhugh and Kobert Edward, and 
Mary, Anne, Agnes and Mildred. The first two 
sons became major-generals, the second son being 
a graduate of West Point, and the third entered 
the war as private and was promoted to a staff 
appointment. In 1836 K. E. Lee was made first 
lieutenant, and in 1838 captain, of engineers. In 
1844 he was a member of the board of visitors to 
the West Point Academy, and in 1845 a member 
of the board of engineers. 

At the breaking out of the Mexican war. Cap- 
tain Lee was assigned to the central army in 
Mexico as chief engineer under General Wool. 
His services were of the most important nature, 
and, as is well known, he won the fullest confi- 
dence of General Scott, who was quick to recog- 
nize his brilliant qualities and selected him as 
one of his personal stafi". He was probably compli- 
mented by the commanding ofiicer more frequently 
than any one else who took part in the war. He 
became the special favorite of the old hero, who 
pronounced him the greatest military genius in 
America. 

Captain Lee was twice brevetted for his services 
in Mexico, and his conduct at Chapultepec led to 
his appointment (September 1, 1852) to the super- 
intendency of the West Point Academy. He held 
this position not quite three years, and it was 



ROBERT E. LEE. 61 

during that period that the course of study was 
extended to cover five years. 

In 1855, Colonel Lee was commissioned lieu- 
tenant-colonel full rank in the Second Cavalry. 
This regiment unquestionably had more officers 
who afterward became famous than any other reg- 
iment ever in the service. Albert Sydney John- 
ston was colonel ; R. E. Lee, lieutenant-colonel ; 
William J. Hardee, senior major; George H, 
Thomas, junior major; Earl Van Dorn, senior 
captain, with Kirby Smith the next ranking cap- 
tain, and with Hood, Fitzhugh Lee, Johnson, 
Palmer and Stoneman among the lieutenants. 

In 1855 this regiment was sent to Texas, where 
for several years it was engaged in continual war- 
fare with the fierce Indian tribes on that exp<5sed 
frontier. In 1859, Colonel Lee returned to Wash- 
ington, and was stationed there during the memo- 
rable John Brown raid, at Harper's Ferry. He 
commanded the battalion of marines which were 
sent to that point. Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart act- 
ing as his aid. When they arrived, the insur- 
gents had retreated to the fire-engine house in the 
armory-yard, where they had barricaded them- 
selves, and had kept up a desultory fire on the 
town during the afternoon. They had captured 
Colonel Washington and other citizens, and were 
holding them as hostages. Colonel Lee imme- 
diately surrounded the engine-house with his 
marines, and the next morning summoned John 



62 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Brown to surrender, pledging himself to protect 
him and his men from the fury of the citizens. 
Brown refused any terms except to march out 
with his men and prisoners, all with their arms 
and with permission to leave without being fol- 
lowed, to the second toll-gate, where he promised 
to release his prisoners. After that he would 
" take his chances." Lee would not agree, and 
at his request Lieutenant Stuart remonstrated 
with Brown on the folly of his course. It availed 
nothing, and under the direction of Lee the doors 
of the engine-house were battered in and the in- 
mates captured. Oiie of the marines was killed 
and one wounded, while several of the insurgents 
were killed and wounded. Brown being among the 
latter. What followed is known to the world. 
Brown and his three surviving comrades were 
indicted for conspiracy with negroes to excite in- 
surrection, for treason against the commonwealth 
of Virginia and for murder. They were found 
guilty, and hanged December 2, 1859. 

Troublous times followed. The flames of civil 
war were kindling throughout the country. Col- 
onel Lee saw with pain inexpressible that the 
fiercest and most gigantic struggle of modern 
times was at hand. He hoped that Virginia would 
remain in the Union, for he was a thorough believ- 
er in States' rights. When she seceded, there- 
fore, he conscientiously believed his duty gave 
him no choice except to follow her. 



ROBERT E. LEE. 63 

No one can fully realize the pain it cost this 
great and good man to draw his sword in the strife. 
General Scott argued and plead with him, and 
showed him the great honors that were sure to 
come to him if he remained in the Union army ; 
but it was purely a question of conscience with 
Lee, who would have laid down his life gladly 
could it have dissipated the black clouds gather- 
ing in the sky. In a letter to his beloved sister 
he said, " With all my devotion to the Union, and 
the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American 
citizen, I have not been able to make up my 
mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my 
children, my home. I have, therefore, resigned 
my commission in the army, and, save in de- 
fence of my native State, with the sincere hope 
that my poor services may never be needed, I 
hope I may never be called upon to draw my 
sword." 

Respecting Lee's resignation J. William Jones, 
D. D., contributes a most interesting statement. 
He says that in obedience to orders to report to the 
commander-in-chief, in Washington, Lee reached 
there on the 1st of March, 1861, just three days 
before the inauguration of President Lincoln. 
" His hopes for the averting of civil war were 
doomed to a sad disappointment, and events fol- 
lowed so rapidly that by the middle of April he 
was compelled to decide whether he would go with 
the North or with Virginia in the great struggle — 



64 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

whether lie would accept the command of the 
United States armies in the field or 'share the 
miseries of his people/ while he gave up place, for- 
tune and his beautiful home at Arlington to serve 
his native Virginia. If any influence could have 
swerved Lee from his purpose, it was his friend- 
ship for his commander and his high respect for 
his opinions. General Scott used all of his pow- 
ers of persuasion to induce him to adhere to the 
Union and serve under the 'old flag/ and finally 
Francis Preston Blair (at General Scott's sugges- 
tion) was sent by Mr. Lincoln to offer him the 
supreme command of the United States armies in 
the field. This statement has been questioned, but 
the proof is conclusive. Besides the positive tes- 
timony of Montgomery Blair, who got it from 
his father, and of Beverdy Johnson and other 
gentlemen, who received it from General Scott, I 
found soon after his death, in General Lee's pri- 
vate letter-book, in his own well-known hand- 
writing, and was permitted to copy, the following 
letter, which settles the whole question beyond 
j)eradventure. Senator Cameron had stated on 
the floor of the Senate that Lee had sought to 
obtain the chief command of the army, and, be- 
ing disappointed, had then 'gone to Bichmoud 
and joined the Confederates.' Beverdy Johnson 
of Maryland — ^himself an ardent Union man — 
repelled the charge, and thereupon General Lee 
wrote him as follows: 



ROBERT E. LEE. 65 

'"Lexington, Va., February 25, 1868. 

" ' Hon. Reverdy Johnson, United States Sen- 
ate, Washington, D. C. — 

" ' My Dear Sir : My attention has been called 
to the official report of the debate in the Senate 
of. the United States of the 19th instajit, in which 
you did me the kindness to doubt the correctness 
of the statement made by the Hon. Simon Came- 
ron in regard to myself. 

" ' I desire that you may feel certain of my 
conduct on the occasion referred to so far as my 
individual statement can make you. I never inti- 
mated to any one that I desired the command 
of the United States army, nor did I ever have a 
conversation with but one gentleman, Mr. Francis 
Preston Blair, on the subject, which was at his 
invitation, and, as I understood, at the instance 
of President Lincoln. 

" * After listening to his remarks I declined the 
offer he made to me to take command of the army 
that was to be brought into the field, stating as can- 
didly and as courteously as I could that, though 
opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could 
take no part in an invasion of the Southern States. 

" ' I went directly from the interview with Mr. 
Blair to the office of General Scott, and told him 
of the proposition that had been made to me, and 
my decision. 

" ' Upon reflection after returning to my home, 
I concluded that I ouglit no longer to retain any 



66 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

commission I held in tlie United States army, and 
on the second morning thereafter I forwarded my 
resignation to General Scott. 

" 'At the time I hoped that peace would have 
been preserved, that some way would have been 
found to save the country from the calamities of 
war, and I then had no other intention than to pass 
the remainder of my days as a private citizen. 

"'Two days afterward, upon the invitation of 
the governor of Virginia, I repaired to Richmond, 
found that the convention, then in session, had 
passed the ordinance withdrawing the State from 
the Union, and accepted the commission of com- 
mander of its forces, which was tendered me. 
These are the simple facts of the case, and they 
show that Mr. Cameron has been misinformed. 

" ' I am, with great respect, your obedient ser- 
vant, 

"'E. E. Lee.' 

" It will be seen from this letter that no sooner 
had Colonel Lee received and rejected this propo- 
sition, which tendered him rank far beyond what 
he could hope for by siding with the Confederates, 
he went immediately to his friend General Scott 
and told him all about it. The last interview 
between Scott and Lee was a very aifecting one. 
The veteran begged Lee to accept the offer of Mr. 
Lincoln, and not to 'throw away such brilliant 
prospects' and 'make the great mistake of his 



ROBERT E. LEE. 67 

life.' Lee expressed the highest respect for Gen- 
eral Scott and for his opinions, repeated what he 
had said to Mr. Blair — that, while he recognized 
no necessity for the state of things then existing, 
and would gladly liberate the slaves of the South, 
if they were his, to avert the war, yet he could not 
take up arms against his native State, his home, his 
kindred, his children. They parted with expres- 
sions of warmest mutual friendship, and General 
Lee returned to Arlington. 

" The night before his letter of resignation was 
written he asked to be alone, and while his noble 
wife watched and prayed below he was heard 
pacing the floor of the chamber above or pour- 
ing forth his soul in prayer for divine guidance. 
About three o'clock in the morning he came down 
calm and composed and said to his wife, 

" ' Well, Mary, the path of duty is now jA'din 
before me. I have decided on my course. I will 
at once send my resignation to General Scott.' 

" Accordingly, he penned the following letter : 

" 'Arlington, Va., April 20, 1861. 

" ' Geisteeal : Since my interview with you on 
the 18th instant I have felt that I ought not longer 
to retain my commission in the army. I therefore 
tender my resignation, which I request you will 
recommend for acceptance. It would have been 
presented at once but for the struggle it has cost 
me to separate myself from a service to which I 



68 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

have devoted the best years of my life and all 
the ability I possessed. 

" ' During the whole of that time — more than 
a quarter of a century — I have experienced noth- 
ing but kindness from my superiors and the most 
cordial friendship from my comrades. To no one, 
general, have I been much indebted as to yourself 
for uniform kindness and consideration, and it has 
always been my desire to merit your approbation. 
I shall carry to the grave the most grateful rec- 
ollections of your kind consideration, and your 
name and fame will always be dear to me. 

" ' Save in defence of my native State, I never 
again desire to draw my sword. Be pleased to 
accept my most earnest wishes for the contin- 
uance of your happiness and prosperity, and be- 
lieve me most truly yours, 

"'K E. Lee. 

" ' Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, 

" ' Commanding United States Army.^ 

"The newspapers of the South, and especially 
of Richmond, were very bitter against General 
Scott for not siding with Virginia, his native State, 
in the contest; but General Lee always spoke of 
his old friend in terms of high respect, while re- 
gretting that he did not see it to be his duty to 
come with his State. Soon after he took command' 
of the Virginia forces a friend called to see him 
one day, accompanied by his five-year-old boy, a 
sprightly little fellow, whom the general soon 



BOBFBT E. LEE. 69 

had dandling on his knee. Soon the father asked 
Henry, 

"'What is General Lee going to do with Gen- 
eral Scott?' 

" The little fellow, who had caught the slang of 
the times, at once reiDlied, 

" ' He is going to whip him out of his boots.' 

" General Lee's voice and manner instantane- 
ously changed, and, lifting Henry down, he stood 
him Ipetween his knees, and, looking him full in 
the face, said with great gravity, 

" ' My dear little boy, you should not use such 
expressions. War is a serious matter, and Gen- 
eral Scott is a great and good soldier. None of 
us can tell what the result of this contest will be.' 

"All through the war he was accustomed to 
speak of General Scott in the kindest terms, and 
a short time before his own death I heard him in 
a company of gentlemen at Lexington, Va., pay a 
warm tribute to the memory of his old friend -and 
esteemed commander. General Scott was even 
more demonstrative in his expressions of admira- 
tion and friendship for Lee. His despatches and 
official reports from Mexico were filled with the 
warmest commendations of his favorite engineer 
officer. Of his services during the siege of Vera 
Cruz, General Scott wrote: 

" ' I am compelled to make special mention of 
Captain R. E. Lee, engineer. This officer greatly 
distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz.' 



70 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" In his report of Cerro Gordo lie mentions sev- 
eral times the efficient service which Captain Lee 
performed, and says, 

"^This officer was again indefatigable during 
these operations in reconnoissances as daring as 
laborious and of the utmost value. Nor was he 
less conspicuous in planning batteries and in con- 
ducting columns to their stations under the heavy 
fire of the enemy.' 

"In his official report of the final operations 
which captured the City of Mexico, General Scott 
declares Captain Lee to have been ' as distinguished 
for felicitous execution as for science and daring,' 
and says again, ' Captain Lee, so constantly distin- 
guished, also bore important orders from me (Sep- 
tember 13) until he fainted from a wound and the 
loss of two nights' sleep at the batteries.' When, 
soon after General Scott's return from Mexico, a 
committee from ^Richmond waited on him to ten- 
der^him a public reception in the capitol of his 
native State, he said, ' You seek to honor the wrong 
man. Captain E. E. Lee is the Virginian who de- 
serves the credit of that brilliant campaign.' 

"General William Preston of Kentucky says 
that General Scott told him that he regarded Lee 
* as the greatest living soldier in America,' and that 
in a conversation not long before the breaking out 
of the war General Scott said with emphasis, 

" ' I tell you that if I were on my death-bed 
to-morrow, and the President of the United States 



BOBEBT E. LEE. 71 

should tell me that a great battle was to be fought 
for the liberty or slavery of the country, and asked 
my judgment as to the ability of a commander, I 
would say with my dying breath, Let it be Robert 
E. Lee.' 

" I have been allowed to copy the following auto- 
graph letter of General Scott, which illustrates this 
point : 

" ' Headquarters of the Army, May 8, 1857. 

" ' Hon. J. B. Floyd, Secketaey of Wae — 

" ' SiE : I beg to ask that one of the vacant sec- 
ond lieutenancies may be given to W. H. F. Lee, 
son of Brevet Colonel B. E. Lee, at present on 
duty against the Comanches. 

" ' I make this apjDlication mainly on the extra- 
ordinary merits of the father, the very best soldier 
I ever saw in the field ; but the son is himself a 
very remarkable youth, now about twenty, of a 
fine stature and constitution, a good linguist, a good 
mathematician and about to graduate at Harvard 
University. He is also honorable and amiable, like 
his father, and dying to enter the army. I do not 
ask the commission as a favor, though if I had in- 
fluence I should be happy to exert it in this case. 
My application is in the name of national justice, 
in part payment (and but a small part) of the debt 
due to the invaluable services of Colonel Lee. 
" * I have the honor to be, with high respect, 
" ' Your obedient servant, 

" ' WiNFiELD Scott.' 



72 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

"In a public address delivered in Baltimore 
soon after tlie death of General Lee, Hon. Kev- 
erdy Johnson said that he ' had been intimate with 
General Scott, and had heard him say more than 
once that his success in Mexico was largely due 
to the skill, valor and undaunted energy of Lee. 
It was a theme upon which he (General Scott) 
liked to converse, and he stated his purpose to 
recommend him as his successor in the chief com- 
mand of the army. I was with General Scott in 
April, 1861, when he received the resignation of 
General Lee, and witnessed the pain it caused him. 
It was a sad blow .to the success of that war in 
which his own sword had as yet been unsheathed. 
Much as General Scott regretted it, he never failed 
to say that he was convinced that Lee had taken 
that step from an imperative sense of duty. Gen- 
eral Scott was consoled in a great measure by the 
reflection that he would have as his opponent a 
soldier worthy of every man's esteem, and one who 
would conduct the war upon the strictest rules of 
civilized warfare. There would be no outrages 
committed upon private persons or private prop- 
erty which he could prevent.' 

"A prominent banker of New York who was 
very intimate with General Scott has given me a 
number of incidents illustrating Scott's high opin- 
ion of Lee. On one occasion a short time before 
the war this gentleman asked him in the course 
of a confidential interview, 



ROBERT E. LEE. 73 

" ' General, whom do you regard as the greatest 
living soldier?' 

" General Scott at once replied, 

" ' Colonel Robert E. Lee is not only the greatest 
soldier of America, but the greatest soldier now liv- 
ing in the world. This is my deliberate conviction 
from a full knowledge of his extraordinary abil- 
ities ; and if the occasion ever arises, Lee will win 
this place in the estimation of the whole world.' 

"The general then went into a detailed sketch 
of Lee's services and a statement of his ability as 
an engineer, and his capacity not only to j^lan cam- 
paigns, but also to command large armies in the 
field, and concluded by saying, 

" ' I tell you, sir, that Robert E. Lee is the 
greatest soldier now living; and if he ever gets 
the opportunity, he will prove himself the great- 
est captain of history.' 

"In May, 1861, this gentleman and another 
obtained a passport from General Scott to go to 
Richmond to see if they could do anything to 
promote pacification. In the course of the inter- 
view General Scott spoke in the highest terms of 
Lee as a soldier and a man, stated that he had 
^rejected the supreme command of the United States 
army, and expressed his confidence that Lee would 
do everything in his power to avert war, and would, 
if a conflict came, conduct it on the highest prin- 
ciples of Christian civilization. He cheerfully 
granted the passport, and said, 



74 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

"'Yes, go and see Eobert Lee. Tell him for 
me that we must have no war, but that we must 
avert a conflict of arms until the sober second 
thought of the people can stop the mad schemes 
of the politicians.' 

"In the interview which these gentlemen had 
with General Lee he most cordially reciprocated 
the kindly feelings of General Scott, and expressed 
his ardent desire to avert war and his willingness 
to do anything in his power to bring about a set- 
tlement of the difl&culties. But he expressed the 
fear that the passions of the people. North and 
South, had been tpo much aroused to yield to 
pacific measures, and that every effort at a peace- 
ful solution would prove futile. Alluding to Mr. 
Seward's boast that he would conquer the South 
in 'ninety days,' and to the confident assertions 
of some of the Southern politicians that the war 
would be a very short one. General Lee said with 
a good deal of feeling, 

" ' They do not know what they say. If it comes 
to a conflict of arms, the war will last at least four 
years. Northern politicians do not appreciate the 
determination and pluck of the South, and South- 
ern politicians do not appreciate the numbers, 
resources and patient perseverance of the North. 
Both sides forget that we are all Americans, and 
that it must be a terrible struggle if it comes to 
war. Tell General Scott that we must do all we 
can to avert war ; and if it comes to the worst, we 



ROBERT E. LEE. 75 

must then do everything in our power to mitigate 
its evils.' 

"Alas that the wishes and aspirations of these 
two great soldiers could not have been realized! 
Men will differ as to whether Scott or Lee was 
right in the course which each thought proper 
to pursue on the only great question which ever 
divided them, but all must admire that pure 
friendship which neither time nor circumstances 
could break." 

Colonel Lee resigned his commission April 20, 
1861, and proceeded at once to Richmond, where 
he offered his services to Virginia. Governor 
Letcher immediately conferred on him the rank 
of major-general, and he was given charge of the 
force that the Legislature authorized for the de- 
fence of the State. 

General Lee began without delay the task of 
organizing this force and of preparing for the 
invasion that was certain to come. This was a 
most difficult work, but it was accomplished with 
consummate skill and success. 

Virginia seceded April 17, and joined the Con- 
federacy May 8. General Lee was ordered to 
retain command of the Army of Virginia until 
the military organization of the Confederacy was 
completed. He was made a general in the regu- 
lar army, ranking next to Sidney Johnston. The 
Federal forces at Fortress Monroe were heavily 



76 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

reinforced, Alexandria was occupied in the latter 
part of May, and, soon after. General McClellan 
with a strong column entered West Virginia. The 
first conflict of any moment was at Great Bethel, 
between Yorktown and Hampton, on the 10th of 
June, where a column of Federals numbering five 
thousand men, with artillery, was defeated by a 
force of eighteen hundred infantry and six pieces 
of artillery. Other engagements followed, and 
finally, July 21, took place the battle of Bull Run, 
ending in the utter rout and overthrow of the 
Union army and their turbulent flight to the 
entrenchments of Washington. But everything 
went wrong for the Confederates in West Vir- 
ginia. The people were strongly Union in senti- 
ment, and McClellan pushed matters with such 
vigor and ability that he became the most popular 
general in the Federal army, and soon after suc- 
ceeded to the supreme command. 

General Garnet, the Confederate commander, 
having been killed, General Lee was ordered to 
West Virginia to assume command of the army in 
that region. This was his first service in the field 
during the civil war. He displayed caution, skill 
and true generalship ; but the operations in West 
Virginia had little effect on the progress of the 
war, and therefore it is not necessary to follow 
them in detail. 

In the fall of 1861 the efforts of the Federal gov- 
ernment were directed chiefly against the Southern 



ROBERT E. LEE. 77 

coast, and General Lee was ordered to Charleston 
and to take command of the coast department. 
The repeated failures of the Union attempts to 
make any real impression in that section during 
the years that followed attest the skill and thor- 
oughness with which Lee performed this duty. 

General Lee was made commander-in-chief of 
the Confederate armies March 13, 1862. He re- 
tained the jiosition, however, but a few months. 
General McClellan, with his enormous and admi- 
rably-disciplined army, landed on the Peninsula 
in May and began his campaign against Richmond. 
During the terrible struggle at Seven Pines, as has 
already been told. General Johnston was severely 
wounded. Naturally enough. General Lee suc- 
ceeded him, and thenceforward directed all the 
movements of the Confederate army in Virginia 
to the close of the war. 

The history of the campaign in the Peninsula 
has already been told. 



n. 

THE CAMP-FIRES IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



CHAPTEE, yi. 

ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 

On tlie 7tli of July a steamer on its way from 
Fortress Monroe stopped at Harrison's Landing, 
and a single passenger stepped ashore. He was 
tall, angular and of uncouth figure, with strongly- 
marked features ; the eyes and countenance which 
were wont to light up with original and quaint 
humor were serious and grave to the last degree. 
Those who looked at the visitor recognized Pres- 
ident Lincoln, who had come to Harrison's Land- 
ing to consult with the commander of the Union 
army about the measures to be adopted in the 
alarming crisis. General McClellan believed that 
all the resources of the government should be used 
to forward him men and munitions of war. The 
James River was now open to him as a line of 
supplies, and he favored the bold design of trans- 
ferring the Army of the Potomac to the south 
bank of that stream and destroying the commu- 

78 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 79 

nications of Richmond by way of Petersburg. 
The wisdom of this plan cannot be questioned in 
face of the fact that two years later General Grant 
adopted it, captured Richmond and destroyed the 
Southern Confederacy. 

President Lincoln was much impressed by the 
views of McClellan ; but when he returned to 
Washington, he was dissuaded by General Hal- 
leck, commander-in-chief of the army, from allow- 
ing McClellan to execute his plans. McClellan 
was shortly afterward removed from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, which was placed in 
charge of Major-General John Pope. Pope came 
from the West with a reputation for vigorous 
aggressive warfare that promised great results in 
the East. 

General Pope was not afflicted with undue mod- 
esty, and was no way backward in proclaiming the 
mighty things he proposed to do. He dated his 
" Headquarters in the Saddle " — evident reversal 
of facts as concerned himself — and announced 
that he came from a region where they hunted the 
enemy and when they found him beat him. 

A month passed after the visit of President Lin- 
coln to Harrison's Landing, and the army was still 
there. Some desultory firing and a few skirmishes 
broke the idle stillness now and then, but it needed 
no very observant eye to note beneath all this calm 
the preparations for a most important movement. 
Transports were continually coming and going 



80 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

laden witli cavalry, war-material and tlie sick and 
wounded, and everywhere was the bustle of activity 
and preparation. The truth was that in spite of 
McCIellan's protest it had been decided to transfer 
the army to Fortress Monroe, and the government 
had decided to take charge of the conduct of the 
' war with a view of teaching the West Pointers 
that some things could be done as well as others. 

General Lee remained before Richmond, watch- 
ing every movement of McClellan at Harrison's 
Landing. It was not long before he learned that 
another army was advancing from the Upper Rap- 
pahannock and had already occupied Culpeper 
county. There could be no doubt that it intended 
to capture Gordonsville, the point of junction of 
the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central 
Railroads, with the purpose of advancing upon 
Richmond. It was this "Army of Virginia," 
numbering fifty thousand men that had formerly 
served under Banks, McDowell and Fremont, 
which was placed under the immediate command 
of Pope. He assured the President and other par- 
ties who were interested in the question that they 
need feel no further concern for the safety of the 
national capital. He would attend to that; and 
if Lee presumed to make any demonstration, he 
would be taught a lesson that he would remem- 
ber a long time. 

General Pope's next proceeding was the issu- 
ance of orders so oppressive and tyrannous to the 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 81 

citizens around him that General Lee, by direction 
of the Confederate authorities, sent an indignant 
protest to General Halleck, commander-in-chief 
of the Union armies. The result was a modifica- 
tion of Pope's orders so as to bring him within 
the pale of civilized warfare. 

Pope's army lay at Culpeper, the right extend- 
ing toward the Blue Ridge and the left almost 
reaching the Pa23idan River. He thus threatened 
to destroy Lee's communications with South-west- 
ern Virginia. The movement of Poj^e was a wise 
one, for at the time it was made the main Federal 
army was at Harrison's Landing, and Lee could 
not assure himself as to what part it was intended 
to play in the great camj^aign about to open. He 
therefore determined to remain for the time in 
front of Richmond ; for should he withdraw, the 
temptation to march in would be too great for the 
Union army to resist. 

On the 13th of July, Lee sent Jackson in the 
direction of Gordonsville ; he led his old division 
and the fire-tried one of Ewell. They went by 
railroad to Gordonsville, where they arrived on 
the 19th of July, and Jackson at once set himself 
to work to penetrate the design of the Union com- 
mander. He found that, as we have stated. Gen- 
eral Pope had advanced to the Rapidan and was 
threatening the railroad connections ; furthermore, 
he quickly learned that the Federal force was so 
much larger than his own that it would have been 



82 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

folly to attack it. He sent to General Lee for 
reinforcements, and the Confederate leader imme- 
diately forwarded A. P. Hill's division. General 
D. H. Hill, who commanded a moderate force on 
the south bank of the James River, was ordered 
to create a diversion by opening fire on McClel- 
lan's transports. It was now brain against brain. 
This state of indecision lasted until nearly the 
middle of August, when the secret was discovered. 
It was known that General Burnside had reached 
Hampton Roads from the southern coast with a 
large force. The direction taken by his flotilla 
would settle the question ; for if the new advance 
was intended to be by way of the James, the 
flotilla would ascend that river; if General Pope 
was to make the real movement. General Burn- 
side would move in that direction. 

One evening early in August a small steamer 
bearing a flag of truce ascended the James, and, 
passing the Confederate outpost, halted at Aiken's 
Landing, a place designated for the exchange of 
prisoners. One of the passengers was noticeable 
for the extreme anxiety he showed to land. As 
soon as he touched the shore he made for General 
Lee's headquarters, scarcely taking breath until he 
had made known the important news he carried. 
He was the famous partisan John S. Mosby, and he 
had penetrated the secret which General Lee was 
so anxious to learn. Mosby told the commander 
that at the very moment he was leaving Hampton 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 83 

Koads that morning the whole of Burnside's corps 
was embarking, and he knew beyond all ques- 
tion that its destination was Acquia Creek. This 
solved the perplexing problem, and Lee's anxiety 
now was to strike Pope before Burnside could join 
him. Jackson was apprised of the important news, 
and with his usual promptness he started on the 7th 
of August to attack Pope at Culpeper. Ewell 
led, followed by Winder and A. P. Hill, forming 
all together an army of upward of twenty-five 
thousand men. 

So soon as Pope learned of the crossing of the 
Rapidan he put his troops in motion with a view 
of concentrating them in front of Culpeper. On 
the morning of the 8th the Federal cavalry on the 
north bank were driven back by General Bobert- 
son in the direction of Culpeper Court-House. 
They threatened the train of Jackson's division, 
and Lawton's brigade of Ewell's division was de- 
tached to protect it. As a consequence, it took no 
part in the conflict which followed. The infantry 
and artillery, having followed the cavalry across 
the Bapidan, continued toward Culpeper. The 
next day they were near Cedar Bun, within eight 
miles of Culpeper Court-House, where the Fed- 
erals were discovered in strong force. 

The Unionists consisted of Banks's corps, which 
had been sent forward to meet Jackson's advance. 
His command was a powerful one, and was strongly 
posted. Jackson began at once to form his line. 



84 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Ewell's division, the first to arrive, was puslied in 
advance, so as to secure a position on Slaughter 
Mountain where he would be able to bring his 
artillery" to bear on the Federal line. Early's 
brigade was in the advance, and, forming on the 
right of the road and charging across an open 
field, he drove the Federal cavalry to the crest of 
an adjoining hill. While climbing this hill the 
Federal artillery opened on him, and many of 
their cavalry appeared in the fields on the left. 
Protecting his troops as best he could, Early hur- 
ried forward three guns to the crest of Slaughter 
Mountain and replied with spirit to the Federal 
artillery. Jackson's division appearing, a portion 
of it was sent to Early's assistance, the rest being 
held in reserve. While forming in line its leader, 
General Charles S. Winder, was mortally wounded 
by a shell, and the command passed to General 
William B. Taliaferro. During this manoeuvre 
General Ewell occupied the position assigned him, 
on the north-west termination of Slaughter Moun- 
tain, a couple of hundred feet above the valley 
below. Posting Latimer's battery in the most 
available spot, he opened on the Federal guns, 
and the artillery duel continued for some time 
between the two armies. Two hours later Gen- 
eral Banks advanced his skirmishers, and then 
his infantry, from the woods to the rear and left 
of the batteries. A second body of infantry ap- 
peared almost at the same moment from a valley 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 85 

where they were unobserved, and moved against 
Early's right. Banks's attack was an impetuous 
one, and the flame of battle quickly extended along 
the whole line. 

Finding himself sorely pressed, Early called for 
reinforcements. Banks pressed him still harder, 
and, massing his infantry on his right, dashed at 
the Confederate left. Bearing down the forces by 
his superior numbers, he turned the flank and 
gained the Confederate rear. Taliaferro's brigade 
was rolled back, followed by Early's disorganized 
left, and it looked as though the whole line would 
give way before the cheering and enthusiastic 
Unionists. But the keen eye of "Stonewall" 
had detected the peril, and at the critical moment 
A. P. Hill's division arrived. The Stonewall 
brigade, held in reserve, had been called up, and 
Branch's brigade from Hill's division was attached 
to it. Jackson placed himself at their head, and 
then the thunderbolt was hurled against the vic- 
torious Federals. 

" Stonewall Jackson ! Stonewall Jackson !" yelled 
the Confederates, as the well-known figure galloped 
back and forth through the smoke amid the flying 
bullets, cheering the men, who were nerved to their 
utmost by the mere knowledge that he commanded. 
" This was one of the few occasions when he is re- 
ported to have been mastered by excitement. He 
had forgotten, apparently, that he commanded the 
whole field, and imagined himself a simple colonel 



8$ THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

leading his regiment. Everywhere, in the thick- 
est of the fire, his form was seen and his voice 
heard, and his exertions to rally the men were 
crowned with success. The repulsed troops re- 
formed"* and the advance of the Federals was 
checked, and they were forced into the woods, the 
battle continuing with great fierceness until the 
arrival of Pender's and Archer's brigades, when 
a general charge was made on the left and in the 
centre. The Unionists were driven steadily back- 
ward over the valley and into the woods beyond. 
General Ewell joined the impetuous charge, press- 
ing the Federals, who fell back all along the line, 
until at dark the original position of the Confed- 
erates was reoccupied by them. 

Jackson was eager to reach Culpeper Court- 
House before daylight, and he hurried on in pur- 
suit ; but the utmost circumspection was necessary, 
and he had not gone far when he discovered the 
Federals in his front in large numbers. General 
Pope having despatched heavy reinforcements to 
Banks. Jackson sent Field's brigade and Pe- 
gram's battery forward, which opened an effective 
fire ; but the Federals replied with such success that 
the assailants were silenced and the battery with- 
drawn. A careful reconnoissance on the morrow 
convinced Jackson that the Unionists were too 
strong to be assailed, and he posted his army so 
as to resist any attack likely to be made, after which 

* Cooke's Life of Stonewall Jackson. 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 87 

his wounded were sent to Gordonsville, tlie dead 
buried, and a general preparation was made for 
effective operations. The rain fell in torrents all 
day, and on the morrow the request of General 
Pope, sent under a flag of truce, for permission to 
bury such of their dead as had not been interred 
by the Confederates, was granted. On the night 
succeeding (August 11), General Jackson retreated 
to Gordonsville to avoid being attacked by a much 
larger force than his own, and there awaited rein- 
forcements. Little advantage could be claimed by 
either side, though two of the Federal generals 
were wounded and General Prince was made pris- 
oner. 

But the vigorous demonstration of Jackson ex- 
cited the gravest alarm of Halleck, the Federal 
commander-in-chief, for the safety of the Union 
army in Virginia. It required no extraordinary 
sagacity to see that so soon as General Lee could 
relieve himself of McClellan's threatening pres- 
ence he would hurry to the assistance of Jackson, 
or, rather, would assume personal charge of the 
campaign in Northern Virginia. Well might the 
Northern heart tremble for the result ! The grisly 
phantom of the capture of Washington again caused 
many anxious conferences in that city. Pope was so 
far advanced on the Rapidan that a sudden assault 
by Lee would be likely to crush him before any 
reforcements could go to his assistance. McClel- 
lan was urged to hasten the embarkation of his 



88 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

troops at Harrison's Landing, witli a view of giv- 
ing Pope all the help and reinforcements pos- 
sible. 

General Lee saw that his opportunity had come, 
and he grasped it with his usual promptness and 
vigor. General Longstreet with his division and 
two brigades under General Hood were sent to 
Gordonsville from Richmond. General Stuart 
was ordered to leave enough cavalry to menace 
the Federals at Fredericksburg and to guard the 
Central Kailroad, then to report to General Jack- 
son with the remainder. E,. H. Anderson was 
recalled from the James and despatched after 
Longstreet. D. H. Hill's and McLaw's divisions, 
a couple of brigades under General Walker and 
Hampton's cavalry brigade remained on the James 
to resist any demonstration from that quarter. On 
the 15th of August, 1862, Longstreet reached 
Gordonsville, and General Lee was directly be- 
hind him. 

Monday morning, August 25, was one of the 
hottest days of the season. Scarcely a breath of 
air was stirring and the cool shade of the trees 
was never more inviting ; but great interests were 
at stake, and it was the time for work. Jackson 
marched up the south bank of the Rappahannock, 
dragging his cannon with much labor and diffi- 
culty, and crossed at Hinston's Ford. Close under 
the shadow of the Blue Ridge, along roads infre- 
quently travelled, the grim hero led his men, aim- 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 89 

ing in the most direct line possible for Thorough- 
fare Gap, by which the Manassas Gap Railroad 
makes its way through the Bull Run Mountains. 
It was all-essential that this pass should be occu- 
pied in advance of the Federals. Passing through 
Orleans, in Fauquier county, Salem was reached at 
midnight, after a march of thirty-five miles. The 
people along the route gazed at the Confederates in 
amazement and delight. It was a long time since 
they had seen any of them, and they wondered 
what it all could mean. Their eager queries, it 
need hardly be said, were not answered in a very 
satisfactory manner. 

Throughout the day General Stuart had kept 
his cavalry in motion on the right of Jackson 
with a view of concealing his movement from the 
Federals. The exhausted, hungry soldiers threw 
themselves on the ground and slept soundly until 
roused at daylight, when they were again in mo- 
tion. Heading straight for Thoroughfare Gap, 
Jackson found on his arrival that not a solitary 
Federal was in sight. Pushing on through Gaines- 
ville, Bristoe Station, on the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railroad, was reached late in the afternoon. 
Shortly after, General Stuart and his cavalry 
arrived, and took position on the right flank of 
Jackson. This was scarcely done when the rum- 
ble of cars was heard approaching from the direc- 
tion of Warrenton Junction. General Ewell dis- 
posed of his forces to take possession of the train, 



90 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

for the capture was likely to be a valuable one. 
The rumble and roar rapidly increased, and sud- 
denly a heavily-loaded train under full speed thun- 
dered around the curve. The engineer caught 
sight of the Confederates, and he knew what was 
up. He gave his engine full steam and ducked his 
head when the Second Virginia Cavalry raised their 
weapons and fired. The bullets whistled around 
and through the cars, but the track was clear, and 
the terrified fugitives were speedily beyond reach 
of the Confederates. The train reached Manassas 
in safety, but it was hardly out of sight when 
the increasing rumble and roar down the track 
announced that other trains were coming. De- 
termined that no more should run the gauntlet, 
Ewell's- soldiers hastily piled a lot of logs on the 
track. A minute later the second engine burst 
into sight around the curve, and the vigilant en- 
gineer instantly saw that something was amiss. 
He whistled for brakes and reversed, but his mo- 
mentum carried him forward into the obstructions, 
which threw the engine off the track and over on 
its side — fortunately, without injury to him or the 
fireman. Immediately behind the train came a 
third, which was also captured. The noise of still 
others was heard, but from some cause or other the 
drivers seemed to suspect that everything was not 
right. The approaching engineer, having halted 
his train, sent out several ringing blasts from the 
whistle, which, being interpreted into English, were 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK: 91 

addressed to the other engineer in advance and 
asked the question, 

"is it all right ahead?" 

Among Swell's forces were several railroad-men, 
who recognized the signal. One of them ran to 
the prostrate engine, which seemed to be oozing 
steam from from every pore, and, jerking the 
whistle-cord several times, sent back the signal by 
way of reply. 

" All is right ! Come on !" 

But there may have been something in the 
" touch " of the strange hand at the whistle which 
failed to quiet the fears of the cautious engineer 
who was seeking information. He did not ap- 
proach, as he had been signalled to do, but pru- 
dently reversed his engine and lost no time in 
getting back to Warren ton. 

It will thus be seen that the first step in Lee's 
plan of the campaign was successful. Jackson 
had flanked Pope and was now in his rear, where 
his own situation was far from being secure. 

Arriving at Bristoe Station, Jackson ascertained 
that the Federals had stored an immense amount 
of suj)plies at Manassas Junction, only eight miles 
distant. Appreciating the necessity of capturing 
these. General Trimble was sent in that direction 
to make the capture. It was late in the day when 
he started, and, to make sure of its success, Gen- 
eral Stuart was despatched after Trimble with 
orders to take command of the expedition. A 



92 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

smart engagement took place in the early dark- 
ness, wlien the place was captured with several 
hundred prisoners and its enormous supplies. Be- 
sides the horses, negroes and prisoners, there were 
hundreds of tents, about a dozen locomotives, two 
railroad-trains, tons of bacon, hundreds of bar- 
rels of beef, thousands of barrels of flour, wine, 
delicacies of every description and a vast supply 
of forage.' 

The scene which followed was of so ludicrous a 
nature that even Jackson smiled when he looked 
on. There were probably no hungrier men be- 
tween Maine and Texas than were his soldiers 
when they arrived the next day. They had been 
living on roast corn, and their appetites were fierce 
enough to make a pair of calfskin boots tempting. 
They snufl'ed the victuals before they were within 
reach, and as they marched up were told to help 
themselves. It is a waste of words to say they 
accepted the invitation. The splendid bakery, capa- 
ble of turning out fifteen thousand loaves daily, 
was instantly put on "double time" and made 
to do more work than Avas ever done by it before. 
]\Ien with rapacious appetites were not particular 
about a proper degree of baking, and, waiting only 
until the bread was half done, it was hauled from 
the oven smoking, but tossed among the famishing 
Confederates. Whoever caught the prize instantly 
tore it apart, and his jaws closed in it like those 
of a steel trap. Ragged, frowsy, barefooted, with 



ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 93 

spiky hair shooting through the crown of the torn 
hat, the eyes of the Confederate glowed with de- 
light over the top of the loaf as he endeavored 
to force half of it at one time between his jaws. 
Sometimes the tears which filled those jDrojecting 
eyes were not tears of joy : they were caused by 
the bread in the mouth, which seemed red hot 
and fairly sent the steam hissing through ears, 
nostrils and eyes ; but the soldier hung on, for he 
could not afford to lose a single morsel. Many 
a bottle of choice wine, jar of canned fruit and 
jelly which had been sent by mothers, sisters and 
sweethearts in the North to the boys at the front 
failed to reach their destination. It would have 
shocked the heart of the maiden over-much could 
she have seen the bottle of delicious currant-wine 
which she had despatched to her own darling 
Harry grasped by the grimy hand of a shaggy 
Confederate, who, placing the mouth between his 
lips, elevated the bottom until it pointed toward 
the blue sky, and held it there until the contents 
had gurgled down his capacious throat. Then, 
after he had clapped his other hand several times 
against the bottom, to make sure that no stray 
drop escaped, he reluctantly removed it from 
between his teeth, smacked his lips, rubbed his 
stomach, smiled almost to his ears and absolutely 
groaned with bliss. 

How many of the boys who were at Manassas 
that day and took part in the wild feast, and who 



94 THE CAMP-FIEES OF GENERAL LEE. 

are now living, would dare attempt wliat tlien was 
done with, impunity ? One fellow made a splendid 
meal from a raw mackerel and a pint of molasses ; 
anotlier washed down some uncooked pork with 
wine, which, giving out too soon, was supple- 
mented with a gill or so of vinegar ; still another 
smothered a huge chunk of cheese with lard and 
lobster-salad, and then asked his comrades to hold 
him down, inasmuch as he felt so good that he was 
sure the wings were sprouting out of his back. 
In the division of the spoils the scene could not 
have been more ludicrous. A participant told 
Cooke that his share was a toothbrush, a box of 
candles, a quantity of lobster-salad, a barrel of 
coffee, and other articles of diversified nature. As 
one of the happy fellows remarked, it was worth 
starving half to death for the enjoyment that such 
a feast gave. 



CHAPTER VII. 

MANCEUVBINO FOB POSITION. 

Geneeal Lee took with him about seventy-five 
thousand men, divided into two army corps. His 
expectation of surprising Pope failed through an 
intercepted letter which had fallen into Pope's 
hands a few days before, and which made known 
the intended movement. But the Federal com- 
mander, when he could almost hear the tramp of 
the terrible legions, found himself with an effect- 
ive force of only fifty thousand men. Convinced 
that certain defeat awaited him if he remained on 
the Rapidan, he had withdrawn to the Rappahan- 
hock. This course was a wise one, but it did not 
harmonize with the high-sounding proclamations 
which he issued on assuming command of the 
army. The Federal movement, when completed, 
placed E.eno at Kelly's Ford; Banks, at Bappa- 
hannock Station ; McDowell, at Ba|)pahannock 
Ford ; with Sigel on the extreme right, farther up 
the river. It was in front of this formidable array 
that General Lee presented himself on the morn- 
ing of the 21st of August. He was at the head 

95 



96 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of tlie Confederate army, with. Longstreet on liis 
right and Jackson on his left. 

The position of the Federal army completely 
commanded the south bank of the Rappahannock, 
held by Lee ; every crossing was so closely guarded 
that the Confederate leader did not run the risk of 
an attempt to force a passage. The two armies 
spent the day in cannonading each other, and Lee 
determined to cross at a more favorable place. 
General Longstreet was ordered into position 
near the railroad-bridge and Beverly's Ford, so as to 
mask the movements of General Jackson, who had 
been selected to make the crossing at a point far- 
ther up stream. Jackson with his three divisions, 
preceded by Stuart's cavalry, advanced with his 
usual celerity; but he was discovered when near 
Hazel River, which lay on his route. Two Fed- 
eral brigades hastily crossed and attacked his rear 
— not with the exj^ectation of defeating, but with 
the hope of delaying, him. The Confederate 
leader beat them ofP, and reached Freeman's Ford 
before dark. Sigel, however, was strongly guard- 
ing the pass, and, going still farther up, Jackson 
took possession of Warrenton Springs, which was 
guarded by only a small outpost. He had scarcely 
done so when it began raining hard, and the river 
rapidly rose. Early's brigade, which had been 
thrown across the river, found itself cut off from 
the southern bank by the submergence of the 
fords. The situation was very dangerous, for, the 



MANCEUVRTNG FOR POSITION. 97 

high, water having destroyed the fords in front of 
Longstreet, the Federals withdrew from his front 
to concentrate upon Early. General Pope's prep- 
arations for this attack looked as if he thought the 
whole Confederate army was on the southern shore. 
"While the complicated and elaborate preiDarations 
were under way, Stuart and his cavalry appeared 
in the rear of the Federal forces and created con- 
sternation. Stuart captured all the staff-papers of 
General Pope, including his despatch-book, which 
contained copies of the general's correspondence 
with the government. Among the trophies taken 
was a new and gorgeous uniform of General Pope. 
Some days later a burly negro was decked out in 
this, and as he strutted back and forth with his 
chest thrust out like a pouter-pigeon the exhibi- 
tion was one of the most ridiculous that can be 
conceived. It was as dark as Egypt and raining 
furiously. Thus it was that Stuart failed to dis- 
cover a rich convoy parked near him and with a 
weak guard protecting it. Having demoralized 
the wagon and railway service, Stuart dodged the 
forces that were hastily gathering to intercept him. 
While these lively proceedings were under way 
Posser's and Brien's regiments were sent to' attack 
another camp and to destroy the railroad. Before 
anything could be accomplished all the lights in 
the camps were put out, and the men scrambled 
into the wagons. The rain was still pouring in 
torrents, and the darkness was absolutely impene- 



98 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

trable. The Confederates, under the circumstances, 
concluded not to attack, but to give their attention 
to the railroad. When an attempt was made to 
destroy the bridge, the task was found more dif- 
ficult than was anticipated. It was so thoroughly 
saturated that it was impossible to set fire to it. 
Then, when axes were brought, the high water 
placed the men at such disadvantage that little 
could be done. The structure was so strongly 
built that many hours would be required to cut 
it down. Meanwhile, the Federals were gathering 
on the other side the stream and dropping shots 
among the eager Confederates. Every hour of 
delay increased the danger, and Stuart withdrew 
with the same celerity that he had made his ad- 
vance to the point. 

The contrast between the executive ability of 
Lee and Pope was never more vividly shown than 
in the movements and manoeuvring preceding the 
general engagement. Early remained in his ex- 
posed position at Warrenton Springs all day, and 
was never molested. Jackson spent the time in 
erecting a temporary structure, by which commu- 
nications were reopened, and at daybreak Early 
rejoined his chief without receiving a hostile shot. 
Some hours later Buford's cavalry galloped up to 
the spot, looked around, and, finding the bird had 
flown, turned about and galloped back. For three 
days and nights the Federals were kept marching 
toward the different points of the compass, here, 



MANCEUVBING FOJl POSITION. 99 

there, everywhere, through the drenching rain, the 
frightful mud and water, with insufficient rations, 
discouraged, disgusted and Avorn to the hist stages 
of exhaustion. Straggk^rs lined the roads, and a 
more miserable set of wretches the mind cannot 
picture. And during this terrible ordeal the Con- 
federate army for fully one-half the time remained 
tranquil and at rest, husbanding its strength and 
making preparations for the impending struggle. 
General Stuart sent Pope's captured despatch- 
book to General Lee, who sat down at his ease to 
enjoy its contents. The first interesting item on 
which the Confederate leader stumbled was the 
correspondence wherein Pope admitted his inabil- 
ity to hold the Rappahannock and begged for 
reinforcements. Among the other "tidings of 
comfort and joy " was an accurate (because " offi- 
cial") account of the strength and disposition of 
the Federal army, the views of General Pope, the 
fact that McClellan had left Westover, that a part 
of his army was on the way to join General Pope, 
that the rest were following hard after, and that 
the army of Cox was withdrawing from the Kana- 
wha Valley for the same purpose. When all these 
reinforcements should join Pope, he would be at 
the head of an army of two hundred thousand 
men. It need not be said that General Lee found 
this despatch-book " mighty interesting reading," 
and that he fully digested all the contents, turning 
over and sci-utinizino- the covers to make sure he 



100 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENEUAL LEE. 

missed notMng. The conclusion followed as a 
matter of course that if ever there was a call for 
promptness on the part of the Confederates, that 
time had come. It being clear that nothing was 
to be feared from McClellan, the rest of the force 
on the James was ordered up to take part in the 
campaign in Northern Virginia. This force con- 
sisted of a portion of D. H. Hill's command, 
McLaw's division. Walker's two brigades and 
Hampton's cavalry. 

The tactics adopted by Lee were as brilliant as 
they were daring. Conscious of the great stakes 
at risk, he acted on the principle that the more 
audacious his course, the greater were the results 
to be attained. Jackson was directed to cross the 
river above Pope's right, pass around his flank, 
gain his rear and cut his communications with 
Washington ; while the movement was under way 
Longstreet was to occupy Pope's attention by 
threatening demonstrations in front; so soon as 
Jackson had advanced far enough Longstreet was 
to follow him with all haste. By this strategy 
Lee hoped to throw his whole army on Pope's 
line of communications, and to compel him to 
fight before reinforcements could reach him. It 
can readily be perceived that the situation of Jack- 
son would be a most critical one, for he too would 
be cut off from immediate help and was liable to 
be overwhelmed before reinforcements could go to 
his assistance. But the terrible fighter leaped to 



MANCEUVRING FOB POSITION. 101 

the performance of his duty with the eagerness 
which characterized him on every occasion. 

General Jackson on the morning of the 27th 
moved with all his troops except Ewell's divis- 
ion to Manassas. Ewell remained at Bristoe's 
Station, with orders to delay the advance of the 
Federals as much as was possible should they 
withdraw from the Rappahannock, and, if too 
hard pressed himself, to fall back and rejoin the 
main body at Manassas. 

And what was General Pope doing all this 
time? 



CHAPTER VIII. 

GENERAL POPE'S MOVEMENTS. 

Lee retained Longstreet's command in front to 
divert Pope's attention while Jackson was exe- 
cuting his flank movement. Stealthy as was the 
latter, it did not escape the knowledge of Pope, 
who, however, was unable to make certain of its 
precise purpose. His position, it may be said, was 
that of a man watching a body whirling about his 
head with inconceivable celerity. He became be- 
wildered and began sending orders hither and 
thither, marching his men up and down and here- 
and there until the wonder became whether he 
ever would be able to extricate the army from 
its labyrinth of danger. Fitz-John Porter tele- 
graphed to Burnside, " I suspect the Confederates 
know what they are doing, which is more than 
any one here or anywhere knows." Finally, as 
the best course. Pope decided to fall back nearer 
Washington. Shortly after reaching this decision 
he awoke to the fact that Jackson was in his rear, 
at Manassas. 

Now was the opportunity for Pope to deliver a 
most effective blow ; for when Jackson was at Man- 

102 



GENERAL POPE'S MOVEMENTS. 103 

assas, Longstreet was two marches off. What was 
to prevent Pope from placing himself between the 
two columns and overwhelming each in detail ? 
He had received large reinforcements from the 
Army of the Potomac and other sources, and was 
amply able to carry out this plan, which required 
only promptness and ordinary generalship. Pope 
exhibited intermittent flashes of perception, and 
he now appeared to grasp the situation; but he 
could not hold fast long enough to make his 
movements effective. 

The only thing for Pope to do was to push for- 
ward his left and occupy the road by which Long- 
street must advance to join Jackson. "With this 
end in view, he ordered General McDowell, with 
his own and Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division, 
to march to Gainesville. This would place forty 
thousand men directly in the road by which the 
Confederate main column must march to join 
Jackson. Reno's corps and Kearny's division of 
Heitzelman's corps were directed to support this 
force, which marched for Greenwich, while Pope, 
with Hooker's division, advanced along the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad toward Manassas Junc- 
tion. Banks was to remain at Warrenton, reliev- 
ing Porter's corps, which was also ordered to 
Gainesville. To quote Swinton, "These disposi- 
tions were not only correct: they were brilliant. 
The lame and impotent sequel is now to be seen." 

The main column, under McDowell, was to reach 



104' THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

its position at Gainesville and Greenwich on tlie 
niglit of the 27th. It succeeded in doing so, and 
at the same time Po]De, with Hooker's command, 
advanced along the railroad in pursuit of Jackson 
at Bristoe Station. During the afternoon, when 
near the place, Pope came upon General Ewell, 
who, it will be remembered, Jackson had left at 
that point for the very purpose of obstructing the 
Federal march. A sharp engagement instantly 
opened, and Ewell, finding himself hard pressed, 
fell back, as he had been directed to do, and joined 
Jackson at Manassas Junction. Under the belief 
that the battle would be renewed in the morning 
at Bristoe Station, General Porter was ordered up 
from Warrenton Junction ; but the intense dark- 
ness and the difficulties of the road prevented his 
reaching Bristoe until about nin6 o'clock the next 
day, yet nothing was lost by the delay, inasmuch 
as Ewell had already joined Jackson. It now 
looked as if Jackson was inextricably entangled 
and was sure to be entrapped. In his order to 
McDowell, Pope exultingly added, " If you will 
march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn 
upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole 
crowd." McDowell with his forty thousand men 
was at Gainesville, between Jackson and Lee, the 
latter being a full day's march distant, west of 
Bull Bun Mountains. 

" When, on the night of the 27th, Pope learned 
that Jackson was in the vicinity of Manasses, he 



GENERAL POPE'S MOVEMENTS. 105 

directed McDowell, witli all his force, to take up 
the march early on the morning of the 28th and 
move eastward from Gainesville and Greenwich 
upon Manassas Junction, following the line of the 
Manassas Gap Railroad, while he ordered Hooker 
and Kearny and Porter to advance northward 
from Bristoe Station ujDon the same place. From 
Gainesville to Manassas Junction the distance is 
fifteen miles ; from Bristoe Station, • it is eight 
miles ; and from Manassas Junction west to Thor- 
oughfare Gap, where Lee must debouch through 
the Bull Run Mountains to unite with Jackson, 
is twenty miles. 

"This move was a great error. Pope's left 
(McDowell's column) was his strategic flank, and 
should have been thrown forward rather than 
retired; for in withdrawing from the line of the 
Warrenton turnpike to Manassas Junction he per- 
mitted Jackson, by a move from Manassas Junc- 
tion to the north of the turnj)ike, to do precisely 
what he should at all hazards have been prevented 
from doing — namely, to put himself in the way 
of a junction with the inain body of Lee's army. 
Could Jackson, indeed, have been induced to re- 
main at Manassas Junction for the convenience 
of Pope, that general's strategy would have worked 
to a charm ; but Jackson was fully alive to the peril 
of his situation, and while Pope thought he was in 
the act of " bagging " Jackson, Jackson was giving 
Pope the slip. The details are as follows : During 



106 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, 
Jackson moved his force from Manassas, by the 
Sudley Springs road, across to the Warrenton turn- 
pike ; crossing which, he gained the high timber- 
land north and west of Groveton, in the vicinity of 
the battlefield of the 21st of July, 1861. When, 
therefore, Pope, with the divisions of Hooker and 
Kearny and Reno, reached Manassas Junction, 
about noon of the 28th, he found that Jackson 
had already gone! 

" Pope then tried to correct his error by calling 
back McDowell's column from its march toward 
Manassas Junction and directing it on Centreville, 
to which point he also ordered forward Hooker, 
Kearny and Reno, and afterward Porter. But 
much time had been lost ; the columns on the 
march toward Manassas had been forced to take 
other roads than those indicated for them, and it 
was late in the afternoou when McDowell, with 
one division of his whole command (King's), re- 
gained the Warrenton turnpike and headed toward 
Centreville. Now, Jackson, as already seen, had 
taken position on the north side of the turnpike, 
near Groveton ; so that on the approach of King's 
column it unwittingly presented a flank to Jack- 
son, who assailed it furiously. Jackson attacked 
with two divisions (the Stonewall division, then 
under General Taliaferro, and Ewell's division), 
while the fight on the Union side was sustained 
by King's division alone. The behavior of the 



GENERAL POPE'S MOVEMENTS. 107 

troops was exceedingly creditable, and they main- 
tained their ground with what Jackson styles 
" obstinate determination." The loss on both sides 
was severe, and on the part of the Confederates 
included Generals Ewell and Taliaferro, both of 
whom were severely wounded, the former losing 
a leg. Unfortunately for Vo^q, during the night 
King withdrew his command to Manassas, leaving 
the Warrenton turnpike available for Jackson's 
withdrawal or Longstreet's advance. That same 
night, too. General Ricketts (whom McDowell had 
detached with his division to dispute the passage 
of Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet) also with- 
drew to Manassas. Thus affairs went from bad 
to worse."* 

* Swinton. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. 

" They've cut the wires ! The Confederates 
are between Pope and Washington!" 

It was an anxious group that were gathered 
about the electrical instrument at headquarters in 
Washington. The telegraph-wires throbbed with 
the messages flashing back and forth, and the 
party listened to the continuous clicking of the 
instrument as though it was delivering the ver- 
dict of their own doom. 

All at once it stopped ; the chattering tongue 
had become mute. Men looked inquiringly at 
each other and then at the telegraphist. He 
smiled grimly : 

" They^ve cut the wires ! The Confederates are 
between Pope and Washington!^'' 

The explanation, as we learned long ago, was the 
true one. General Stuart had just reached Bristoe 
Station, where he seized the two railroad-trains 
and cut the wires. 

The authorities were at their wits' end; the old 
terror of the capture of Washington caused them 
to quake once more. Was it some daring raiders 
that had cut the wires, or was Lee and his army 

108 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. 109 

between the Union commander and Washington ? 
Ought a regiment or powerful reinforcements be 
sent out to the rescue of Pope? Finally a bri- 
gade of New Jersey troops under General Taylor 
took the cars to Bull Kun Bridge, where they dis- 
embarked, crossed the stream and set out to learn 
what they could about Manassas. The Confeder- 
ates ambushed the entire brigade, killing one-third 
of them and wounding their leader. The rest 
scampered to Centreville, where a few troops ral- 
lied around the remnants of the command. 

It was not until the mornino- of the 29th that 
General Pope learned the real position of his 
adversary, and by that time he had scattered his 
own troops all over the country by his contra- 
dictory orders ; so that their great strength was 
practically unavailable. Sigel and Keynolds were 
near Groveton, and they were ordered to engage 
the Confederates, while Pope endeavored to shape 
up matters elsewhere. Peno's corjDS and Heintzel- 
man, with Hooker and Kearny's divisions, were 
directed to countermarch from Centreville, and 
Porter with his corjDS and King's division of Mc- 
Dowell's command was pushed forward to regain 
the position at Gainesville, which had been aban- 
doned the day before. 

Meanwhile, the redoubtable Jackson maintained 
his position on the elevated land near Groveton. 
He thus secured complete command of the Warren- 
ton road, over which Lee was advancing to join him, 



110 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

and even then was close at hand. The gray-coat- 
ed Cromwell could afford to feel little alarm about 
what his bombastic adversary was doing; never- 
theless, like the true general he was, he disposed 
of his troops in an admirable order, his right rest- 
ing on the Warrenton turnpike and his left near 
Sudley mill. Most of the troops were sheltered 
in the thick woods in the rear of the railroad cut 
and embankment. In obedience to orders General 
Sigel attacked this force, and suffered severely from 
the hot fire he received. Near noon Reno's com- 
mand and the divisions of Hooker and Kearny 
joined him, and Porter had advanced from Man- 
assas Junction with a view of flanking Jackson's 
right by marching to Gainesville; but before he 
could do this Lee's van arrived at Thoroughfare 
Gap, Longstreet reaching the ground before noon. 
Assuming position on Jackson's right, he drew an 
extension of the Confederate line across the turn- 
pike and the Manassas Gap Railroad. By this 
means every point by which Porter could have 
advanced on Gainesville was covered. 

The Union general, however, was about to form 
his line when General McDowell appeared. Mc- 
Dowell says he ordered Porter to advance and 
attack the Confederates, while Porter is equally 
emphatic in declaring that McDowell told him to 
stay where he was; the reader is welcome to be- 
lieve whoever he chooses. McDowell took King's 
division from Porter, and, joining it to Ricketts's 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. Ill 

division (both of which belonged to McDowell's 
corps), moved toward the battlefield of Groveton, 
which was reached toward evening. Porter re- 
mained in his former position the rest of the day. 

Matters went from bad to worse so far as the 
Federals were concerned. Pope's opportunity for 
engaging Jackson's corps alone was gone, and, 
with his own forces out of position, the Union 
leader was compelled to face the whole Confederate 
army under the eye of the masterful Lee himself. 
Pope not only did not know where McDowell and 
Porter were, but he was unaware of the alarming 
fact that Longstreet had joined Jackson. 

No general of ability could find justifiable 
grounds for assailing Jackson in his entrenched 
position, but about the middle of the afternoon 
Pope ordered Hooker to make the attack. The 
indignant Hooker remonstrated, but Pope insisted, 
and the general who well deserved his title obeyed 
with great spirit. So well, indeed, did Grover's bri- 
gade do its work that it penetrated between the 
Confederate brigades of Gregg and Thomas, on 
the extreme left. They secured possession of the 
railroad embankment, and by the most furious 
kind of hand-to-hand fighting held it for some 
time; but Jackson then sent reinforcements for- 
ward, and the Unionists were driven out. When 
the time had passed for helping Hooker, Kearny 
was sent to his assistance, but the Confederates 
quickly drove him out after the others. 



112 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Having learned the location of Porter's com- 
mand, Pope sent him orders to assail the enemy's 
right, flank and rear, Pope believing that the right 
flank of Jackson, near Groveton, was the right of 
the Confederate line. Near sunset, when Pope 
supposed Porter was about to make the attack, 
Heintzelman and Peno were ordered to assault 
the Confederate left. The order was obeyed with 
great dash and vigor. Kearny struck the de- 
moralized division of Hill, on the left of Jackson, 
when their ammunition was nearly exhausted. 
Hill's flank was doubled up on his centre and 
the railroad embankment seized, but the Confed- 
erates had a fashion of throwing reinforcements 
to the right point at the right time, and Kearny 
was driven back. 

All was silent on the left, where Porter was 
expected to join in the battle. The order which 
Pope forwarded to Porter was sent at half-past 
four, and reached him just at dusk, when he 
deemed it too late to do as directed. The night 
was intensely dark, and no attempt to advance 
was made.* 

* This failure of Porter to obey the orders of Pope was the cause 
of an acrimonious discussion for years. Porter was court-martialled 
and dismissed from the army; many heated partisans contended that 
he ought to be shot. Wlien time had allowed the passions on both 
sides to cool, Porter secured a reopening of the case. The testimony 
of Longstreet and other ex-Confederate commanders was secured, and 
it may be said that for the first time the full truth became public. 
Without entering into the discussion, it is enough to say that Porter 
did the best thing possible. By remaining where he was he held Long- 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. 113 

It had been a day of disaster to tlie Union army. 
Pope had thrown away the most tem]3ting chances. 
He had blundered right and left, while Lee and 
his lieutenants had been successful in every direc- 
tion. Thousands of men were killed and wounded, 
and there was little promise of hope for the Fed- 
erals on the morrow. Bitter must have been the 
reflections of their commander when he recalled 
his bombastic proclamations on taking command 
of the army, and then saw how completely he 
had been outgeneralled by his adversaries. In 
the desperate plight in which he was placed he 
ought to have turned over the command of his 
forces to some other leader or retreated to Wash- 
ington ; but he did neither. 

The condition of the Union army was pitiable. 
The men had scarcely a mouthful to eat for two 
days ; they were worn almost to death from con- 
tinual marching and fighting ; stragglers were 

street's corps inactive in his front daring the terrible battle. It was 
utterly beyond his power to make the attack which the commanding 
general ordered, inasmuch as Longstreet's* corps was directly in his 
path. No doubt Porter was impatient with Pope and gave him little 
sympathy, but it was a fortunate thing for the Union army that he did 
not obey the orders of its commander. Porter continually knocked at 
the doors of Congress for relief; he obtained many friends who were 
anxious to see justice done him. Among these the most noted was 
General Grant, who at first had denounced him in the severest terms. 
Finally a bill was introduced reinstating Porter in the army without 
back-pay. It passed both Houses of Congress with little opposition, 
but was vetoed on technical grounds by President Arthur. The moral 
purpose of Porter's persistent battle for justice, however, lias been 
accomplished. 



114 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

everywhere; the horses had been in harness or 
under the saddle for more than a week ; there was 
uncertainty in all directions, except the single one 
as to the incompetency of the general command- 
ing. Pope decided to hold his position, and make 
another attack on the morrow. Before doing so 
it was natural that he should send a despatch to 
Washington announcing that Lee was in full 
retreat and fleeing to the mountains. The next 
day Pope revised this opinion. 

Saturday, August 30, dawned bright and clear, 
and at the earliest streakings of light the con- 
fronting armies began assuming position for the 
tremendous conflict. General Lee's position was 
the same as on the previous day — his left near 
Sudley Ford, his centre at Groveton and his right 
on the Manassas Gap Pailroad. Colonel S. D. Lee 
held the centre with thirty-two pieces of artillery ; 
Longstreet's command stretched away obliquely 
from Jackson's, forming with it an angle of 
nearly forty-five degrees. The cavalry covered 
both flanks, the entire army being present, with 
the exception of Anderson's division, which was 
held in reserve. 

"Now, by one of those curious conjunctures 
which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that 
the opposing commanders had that day formed 
each the same resolution : Pope had determined 
to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined 
to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. 115 

about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to 
feel the enemy's left the refusal of that flank by 
Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for 
the purpose of making his contemplated attack on 
Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confeder- 
ates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike 
toward Gainesville. To take advantage of the 
supposed retreat of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell 
with three corps — Porter's in the advance — to fol- 
low up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike and 
* press the enemy vigorously during the whole 
day.' But no sooner were the troops put in mo- 
tion to make this j)ursuit of a supposed flying foe 
than the Confederates, hitherto concealed in the 
forest in front of Porter, uncovered and opened a 
heavy fire from their numerous batteries, and while 
King's division was being formed on Porter's right 
in order to press an attack clouds of dust on the 
extreme right showed that the enemy was moving 
to turn the Union line in that direction, and that, 
instead of retiring, he was in the full tide of an 
offensive movement. To meet this manoeuvre, Gen- 
eral McDowell detached Peynolds's command from 
the left of Porter's force, north of the Warrenton 
turnpike, and directed it on a position south of 
that road to check this menace. The Warrenton 
turnpike, which intersects the Manassas battlefield, 
runs westward up the valley of the little rivulet of 
Young's Branch. From the stream the ground rises 
on both sides — in some places quite into the hills. 



116 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

The Sudley Springs road, on crossing the stream 
at right angles, passes directly over one of these 
hills, just south of the Warrenton turnpike, and 
this hill has on it a detached road with fields 
stretching away from it some hundreds of yards 
to the forest. This is the hill whereon what is 
known as the ' Henry house ' stood. To the west 
of it is another hill — the Bald Hill, so called — 
which is, in fact, a rise lying between the roads 
and making about the same angle with each and 
running back to the forest. Between the two hills 
is a brook, a tributary of Young's Branch. Upon 
the latter hill General McDowell directed Bey- 
nolds's division and a portion of Bicketts's com- 
mand, so as to check the flank manceuvre that 
menaced the seizure of the Warrenton turnpike, 
which was the line of retreat of the whole army."* 
The disastrous blunder of these movements lay 
in the fact that when Beynolds's division was de- 
tached from Porter's left it uncovered the very key 
to Porter's line. Colonel Warren, who commanded 
one of Porter's brigades, saw the danger, and with- 
out waiting for orders rushed forward his brigade of 
a thousand men and assumed the place vacated by 
Beynolds's division. Porter then made his attack 
on the Confederate position, but he accom]3lished 
nothing substantial, and finally, after suffering 
great slaughter from the artillery and infantry 
fire, he was driven back from the field. The truth 

* Swinton. 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEROR. 117 

was that, in making the attack on Jackson, Porter 
exposed himself to Longstreet's batteries. " It gave 
me an advantage I had not expected to have," said 
Longstreet, "and I made haste to use it. Two bat- 
teries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed 
in position immediately and opened. Just as this 
fire began I received a message from the command- 
ing general informing me of General Jackson's con- 
dition and his wants. As it was evident that the 
attack against General Jackson could not be con- 
tinued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, 
I made no movement with my troops." Before the 
second battery could be placed in position the enemy 
began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the 
ranks were broken and that portion of his army 
put to flight. Colonel Warren with his thousand 
men maintained his position against great odds, 
fighting with splendid valor till all of Porter's 
troops had retreated, and then he fell back only 
when the Confederate bayonets were pressing the 
very faces of his men. 

Night was at hand, and the Federal troops not 
only had suffered fearfully, but were in a demor- 
alized condition. Jackson was quick to perceive 
this, and started in pursuit. Longstreet, sure that 
he would be ordered to join, threw his troops against 
the Federal centre and left. In a brief while the 
whole Confederate army was advancing upon the 
conquered Unionists. Pope was compelled at last 
to see that he was thoroughly and most ingloriously 



118 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

whipped. Like McClellan in the Peninsula, he 
could attempt but one thing — to extricate and save 
his army. While engaged in the effort, Longstreet 
carried Bald Hill, held by Ricketts and Keyuolds, 
and menaced the Henry house hill. Had this been 
taken, Pope and his army would have been de- 
stroyed; but a battalion of regulars — who are 
ready to die at any time rather than acknowledge 
themselves beaten by volunteers — maintained the 
ground until relieved by the brigades of Meade 
and Seymour. When the gasping troops had fled 
across Bull Bun and scrambled into position on 
the heights of Centreville, they retired. The 
impenetrable darkness and the uncertainty of the 
fords decided Lee to cease pursuit on the banks of 
the stream ; otherwise, to retort with Pope's words, 
he would have " bagged the whole crowd." 

Pope drew a sigh of relief when he reached 
Centreville, for there he united with the corps of 
Franklin and Sumner, and there he remained dur- 
ing the entire day. But General Lee was not yet 
through with him. He sent Jackson to Pope's 
right, while Longstreet was directed to stay on the 
battlefield and engage the attention of the enemy. 
There was still hope of cutting off Pope's retreat 
to Washington. 

As is nearly always the case, the cannonading 
had caused such elemental disturbances that a 
heavy rain set in, and Jackson's march was very 
difficult and rendered tardy, while his men suffered 



THE MARCH OF THE CONQUEBOB. 119 

much from exhaustion. At night he bivouacked 
near Chantilly, pushing on the next morning in 
the same direction. 
* Pope meanwhile had fallen back so as to cover 
Fairfax Court-House and Germantown. There, 
on the evening of September 1, Jackson struck 
his right, at Ox Hill, near Germantown. It was 
raining in torrents, which beat directly in their 
faces as they made the assault, which fell on E-eno, 
Hooker, a part of McDowell and Kearny. The 
Confederates were held at bay until Reno was 
killed, the ammunition exhausted, when the Union 
right fell back in disorder. Kearny instantly for- 
warded Birney's brigade from his own division, fol- 
lowing it with a battery, which he j^laced in position. 
A gap still remained on Birney's right, which was 
pointed out to Kearny. The dashing one-armed 
hero — one of the bravest men on either side — rode 
forward to make a reconnoissance, and before he 
was aware entered the Confederate lines. He was 
in the act of wheeling his horse to escape, when 
he was shot dead. The next day the Federals 
withdrew within the lines of Washington, and the 
disastrous campaign was ended. 

Pope seized the first oj)portunity to vacate his 
command. The Army of Virginia went out of 
existence and its corps were united with the 
Army of the Potomac, who clamored so loudly, 
" Give us back our old commander !" that McClel- 
lan was again made its leader. 



120 TEE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

The precise losses on botli sides during Lee's 
campaign in Northern Virginia cannot be known 
with certainty. The Confederate authorities give 
the following figures as indicating their losses be- 
tween August 23 and September 2 : Longstreet's 
corps, four thousand seven hundred and twenty- 
five men; Jackson's corps, four thousand three 
hundred and eighty-seven ; total, nine thousand 
one hundred and twelve. The confusion in the 
Federal army and its quick reorganization under 
McClellan precluded anything like an accurate esti- 
mate, but their loss was appalling. The Confeder- 
ates captured nine thousand prisoners, thirty pieces 
of artillery and more than twenty thousand stands 
of arms in the engagement on the plains of Man- 
assas alone. They have set down the Union losses 
at thirty thousand, and it is probable that they are 
not far out of the way. 

Lee's campaign in Northern Virginia had been 
a wonderful success, and was a fit introduction to 
the Confederate invasion of the North. 



III. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF ANTIETAM. 



CHAPTER X. 

FACING NORTHWARD. 

It is not to be supposed that when General 
Lee marched from Richmond to prosecute his 
campaign in U]3per Virginia he had any thought 
of making an invasion of the Northern States. 
This, it may be said, is self-evident, for no one 
could have contemplated such colossal incompe- 
tency in the leadership of the Federal armies, 
and consequently the overwhelming success of the 
Confederates was beyond the expectation of any 
one. The Federal army in Northern Virginia had 
been sent skurrying into the entrenchments of 
Washington, and the excitement and consterna- 
tion throughout the North was beyond descrip- 
tion. Months before, the defeat of Banks had 
caused a general fear of the fall of the national 
capital, and now the whole Confederate army was 
almost within sight of the city. 

"Is there to be no end of this? Must we be 
defeated over and over again ? Are there no lead- 

121 



122 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ers who can gain the semblance of a victory with 
the army in Virginia? While our soldiers are 
fighting so well in the West, it is nothing but 
defeat, defeat, defeat, in the East." 

These were the questions and remarks on the 
lips of the millions of angered and impatient 
Northerners. They did not despair, but became 
the more exasperated with the gross mismanage- 
ment of affairs in Washington. The feeling was 
common that, while they felt little admiration or 
sympathy for Pope personally, yet he had been 
"sold out" by Fitz-John Porter, and perhaps 
others. The recall of McClellan to command the 
reorganized Army of the Potomac was one of the 
most satisfactory steps that the Federal government 
could have taken. With that extravagant impul- 
siveness which is characteristic of the American 
people, he had been christened the "Young Na- 
poleon," and all sorts of wild prophecies of his 
success were uttered everywhere. Beyond ques- 
tion he was popular with the army, and the cry 
which we have quoted, " Give us back our old 
commander !" was literally a thunderous demand 
from the Federal soldiers which could not be dis- 
regarded. McClellan assumed command and be- 
gan reorganizing the army with the same vigor 
and ability he had shown from the first. No one 
could surpass him in that respect, and the univer- 
sal confidence felt in his generalship added incal- 
culably to the elan of the soldiers. 



FACING NORTHWARD. 123 

The all-absorbing question that every one asked 
was, " What does General Lee mean to do ?" The 
majority believed that he could walk unopposed 
into Washington and make his own terms with 
the national government, but at no time was there 
danger of such a catastrophe to the Federal cause, 
Lee's men had suffered frightfully ; they were rag- 
ged, barefooted, exhausted and famishing; they 
had been forced to their utmost capacity, and im- 
peratively needed rest. Washington had been put 
in the best condition possible for defence, and had 
a vast force of brave and tried soldiers to man her 
entrenchments. Twice Lee's army could not have 
taken it, so long as the garrison was there. If one 
thing could be set down as certain, it was that the 
Confederate chieftain, after such a magnificent suc- 
cess, would not turn about and march to his own 
desolated valleys and stricken plains without lead- 
ing his powerful legions farther North. 

Many explanations have been given of the Con- 
federate invasion of the North, and even Lee's own 
words are not clear ; but it may be ascribed to 
several causes. The opportunity to do so with a 
triumphant issue was too temj)ting to be resisted. 
Thus far, despite the success of the Confederacy, 
the battle had been fought on her own soil, and 
her sufferings had been great ; consequently, there 
was a natural desire to press the bitter cup to the 
lips of the invaders. Then, the Confederacy had 
many fi-iends in England and France, especially in 



124 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the latter country, where Louis Napoleon was will- 
ing to intervene if England would only join him. 
But the wily " nephew of his uncle " was waiting 
for the Confederates to strike some tremendous 
blow against the North which would justify him 
in stepping between the combatants and ordering 
the warfare to stop. Great as were the victories 
already gained by the Confederates, they were 
hardly enough to warrant this momentous step. 
If Lee could capture Baltimore or Philadelphia 
and cut ofP Washington, he would compel a peace 
on the basis of the independence of the Confed- 
eracy. The gates to Maryland were carried off 
their hinges by the turbulent flight of the Fed- 
eral army, and the broad highway to that beau- 
teous country 

"Fair as a garden of tlie Lord" 

was invitingly open. Food, clothing and abun- 
dant materiel were within the grasp of those who so 
sorely needed them. The famishing nostrils caught 
the odor of smoking viands, and the thin muscular 
fingers twitched with eagerness to clutch the bound- 
less riches upon which their eager eyes rested. 

General Lee saw that the most effective way of 
diverting the demonstration of the Union arms 
from Richmond was by an advance movement 
which, if prosecuted with the success that seemed 
very probable, would prevent any offensive move- 
ments by his enemies until the following year, 



FACING NORTHWARD. 125 

and such delay was of inestimable importance in 
securing the mediation of foreign powers. 

And lastly a natural error prevailed among the 
Confederates respecting the sentiments of the Mary- 
landers : the State, being slave, was considered as 
rightly belonging to the Confederacy. The Union 
troops had been assailed when going through Bal- 
timore on their way to the relief of Washington, 
and it was believed that if a safe opportunity was 
given the citizens they would gladly declare their 
allegiance to the Confederacy, furnish a large num- 
ber of recruits in addition to those already in its 
army, and yield an enormous amount of supplies 
of which the Confederacy stood in extreme need. 
These causes, when united, were enough to justify 
General Lee in his determination to transfer the 
war to Northern soil, and he set out on the cam- 
paign with masterly skill. Instead of assailing 
Washington or Baltimore, he began manoeuvring 
so as to induce McClellan to uncover them. As 
the first step in the important campaign, his plan 
was to enter Western Maryland and establish his 
communications with Richmond through the Shen- 
andoah Valley. Then, by threatening Pennsylva- 
nia by the Cumberland Valley, he hoped to draw 
the Union army far enough into the State to afford 
his army the chance to seize Washington or Bal- 
timore or to compel McClellan to fight when 
removed far beyond his base of supplies. 

D. H. Hill's command had arrived on the 2d 



126 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of September, and tlie Confederate army was a 
compact whole, held well in hand by the mighty 
genius of Lee. Hill's division was assigned to the 
advance, and marched to the Potomac at a point 
nearly opposite the Monocacy. The Federals 
guarding the river were scattered, and the divis- 
ion crossed into Maryland. The rest of the day 
and the following night were employed in destroy- 
ing the locks and embankments of the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Canal, one of the principal means by 
which Washington was supplied with fuel. Jack- 
son, after allowing his soldiers a single day's rest, 
had marched from Ox Hill on the 3d of Septem- 
ber. Two days later he crossed the Potomac at 
White's Ford, near Leesburg, and the bands struck 
up the popular air, "Maryland, my Maryland," 
while the thousands of throats thundered the cho- 
rus with the same enthusiasm shown by the Fed- 
eral legions in singing " John Brown's body lies 
mouldering in the grave." Even the grim, silent 
Jackson was thrilled; his gray eyes kindled, and 
a great joy overflowed his soul. His fervency of 
belief in the righteousness of the Confederate cause, 
his profound piety and faith, saw in the scene the 
fulfilment of God's pleasure and design. He was 
almost overcome with the delight which suffused 
his whole being. 

On the 6th of September the march was re- 
sumed. General D. H. Hill conducting the ad- 
vance, in the temporary absence of Jackson, who 



FACING NORTHWARD. 127 

had been hurt by a fall from his horse. In a few 
hours Frederick City was reached, and on the 8th 
the whole army was drawn up on the left bank of 
the Potomac. Lee had arrived and established 
his headquarters at Frederick. The best of order 
was preserved, and the people were astonished at. 
the considerate treatment they received when the 
temptation to violence was so great. 

But a grievous disappointment awaited the Con- 
federates. Instead of being received with oj^en 
arms, they were viewed with distrust and disfavor. 
They were anything but welcome, for, no matter 
how strongly they might sympathize with the 
invaders, self-interest forbade the people to go 
farther. The ragged and grimy soldiers were not 
calculated to rouse the enthusiasm of the senti- 
mental secessionist, and the officers in charge of 
the recruiting-offices which were opened found 
plenty of leisure-time on their hands, for scarcely 
a recruit came forward. Under these dispiriting 
circumstances, General Lee issued the following 
address to the people of Maryland : 

" Headquarters Army op Northern Virginia, 
Near Frederickton, September 8, 1862. 

"To THE People of Makyland: 

" It is right that you should know the purpose 
that has brought the army under my command 
within the limits of your State, so far as that pur- 
pose concerns yourselves. 



128 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" The people of the Confederate States have long 
watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and 
outrages that have been inflicted on the citizens 
of a commonwealth allied to the States of the 
South by the strongest social, political and com- 
mercial ties. 

"They have seen with profound indignation 
their sister deprived of every right and reduced 
to the condition of a conquered province. 

"Under the pretence of supporting the Consti- 
tution, but in violation of its most valuable pro- 
visions, your citizens have been arrested and 
imprisoned upon no "charge and contrary to all 
forms of law. The faithful and manly protest 
against this outrage made by the venerable and 
illustrious Marylander to whom in better days 
no citizen appealed for right in vain was treated 
with scorn and contempt. The government of 
your chief city has been usurped by armed 
strangers ; your Legislature has been dissolved by 
the unlawful arrest of its members ; freedom of 
the press and of speech have been suppressed; 
words have been declared offences by an arbi- 
trary decree of the Federal executive and citizens 
ordered to be tried by a military commission for 
what they may dare to speak. 

" Believing that the people of Maryland pos- 
sessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a gov- 
ernment, the people of the South have long wished 
to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to 



FACING NORTHWARD. 129 

enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights 
of freemen and restore independence and sov- 
ereignty to your State. 

" In obedience to this wish, our army has come 
among you, and is 2:)repared to assist you with the 
power of its arms in regaining the rights of which 
you have been despoiled. This, citizens of Mary- 
land, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. 
No constraint upon your free will is intended ; no 
intimidation will be allowed. We know no ene- 
mies among you, and will protect all, of every 
opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny 
freely and without constraint. This army will 
respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, 
while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome 
you to your natural position amongst them, they 
will only welcome you when you come of your 
own free will. 

"R E. Lee, 
" Gen. Commanding y 

This proclamation was perused with general in- 
terest by the people of Maryland, but they did 
not flock to the Confederate standard : it was im- 
possible to " enthuse " them. 

An illustrated paper hit ofiP the situation in a 
cartoon which represented a wealthy Marylander, 
a day or two before the arrival of General Lee, 
watching his last load of goods as they were about 
to start Northward. He addressed the driver: 



130 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE, 

"Jim, have you got everything?" 

"Yes, sir." 

"Sure you haven't left anything?" 

"Yes, sir; nothing is left." 

" Not so much as a horse, cow, pig or chicken ?" 

" Not a living creature. There isn't even a hen's 
egg on the place, nor enough to afford a meal for a 
mosquito." 

"All right, then. Drive on, and I'll stay be- 
hind to welcome General Lee and his brave 
boys." 



CHAPTER XI. 
HARPER'S FERRY. 

General Lee rested his line upon the Shenan- 
doah Valley. During the battle of Manassas the 
northern end of this valley was occupied by twelve 
thousand Federals, four thousand of whom, under 
General White, were at Winchester, and the rest 
at Harper's Ferry, under Colonel Miles. So 
soon as White learned of Lee's advance upon the 
Potomac, he withdrew from Winchester and occu- 
pied Martinsburg, while Miles was cut off from 
Washington by Stonewall Jackson, who, it will be 
remembered, had crossed the river near Leesburg. 
However, it was an easy matter for the Federals 
to cross in turn into Maryland, and, falling back, 
join the troops that were organizing for the 
resistance to the Confederate advance. When the 
latter passed the Potomac, Harper's Ferry and 
Martinsburg became of no account; for the rail- 
road passing through those places was of no value 
to the Confederates, because it took a different direc- 
tion from the one they were following. As a con- 
sequence, the Federals who stayed on the Virginia 
shore simply invited the Confederates to make them 
prisoners. 

131 



132 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

General Halleck was still commanding Harper's 
Ferry and Martinsburg from his headquarters in 
Washington, and he sent peremptory orders that 
the former should be defended to the last. Why 
he gave such a ridiculous order is hard to under- 
stand. It is said he claimed that Harper's Ferry 
was the key to Maryland, but, as we have shown, 
the sweep of the Federals had carried the gates 
with them ; so the keys were useless. When Lee, 
at Frederick, learned that the Federals were still 
at Harper's Ferry, he decided to accept the invi- 
tation and go out and " bag the whole crowd." 
With this purpose he suspended for several days 
his advance Northward. 

On the lOtli of September the Confederate army 
turned its back on Washington and took up the 
line of march toward the Upper Potomac, enter- 
ing the mountainous section of Maryland. For 
the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry, Jack- 
son, with his three divisions, the two divisions of 
McLaws and the division of Walker, was detached. 
Jackson was to go by way of Sharpsburg, crossing 
the Potomac above Harper's Ferry and advancing 
by the rear ; McLaws was to proceed by way of 
Middleton, on the direct route to the ferry, and 
occupy the hills known as the Maryland Heights ; 
Walker was to cross below Harper's Ferry and 
seize Loudon Heights. The movement was begun 
on the 10th, and it was intended the surrender 
should be forced by the 13th, after which the cap- 



HARFEB'S FERBY. ■ 133 

tors would immediately rejoin Lee on the march, 
to Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 

It must not be forgotten that McClellan all this 
time was following Lee, though he did it from afar, 
and was obliged to keep so near Washington that 
he could whirl about and run back to its protec- 
tion should the invaders turn in that direction. 
So guarded and slow were his movements that 
Lee was warranted in believing he could detach 
enough of his army to capture Harper's Ferry 
and to return before the Union commander could 
strike him. 

It is one of the remarkable facts connected with 
the history of the late war that whereas General 
Halleck did a most foolish thing in ordering Har- 
per's Ferry to be held, and that General Lee did 
what only ordinary generalship requu'ed him to 
do in capturing it, yet the Federal blunder proved 
in the end disastrous to the Confederate cause. 

On the morning of September 12, Jackson en- 
tered Martinsburg and captured a large amount 
of stores abandoned by the Federals, who had 
withdrawn in great haste. Pushing on, he reached 
the Federal outer line, on Bolivar Heights, in the 
rear of Harper's Ferry, the next morning. Gen- 
eral Hill, still leading the advance, encamped near 
Halltown, a couple of miles from Bolivar Heights. 
The rest of the force was near by, and General 
Jackson now set out to learn whether McLaws and 
Walker had arrived. His signals were answerer) 



134 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

from tlie mountains opposite, and lie instantly de- 
spatched couriers to Maryland and Loudon Heights 
to see whether the two divisions were in position 
for the attack. 

General Walker had crossed the Potomac on 
the night of the lOfch, at Point of Rocks, and 
marched hurriedly to Loudon Heights, which were 
occupied three nights later. The courier sent by 
Jackson dashed up shortly after, and, having com- 
municated with Walker, galloped back to Jackson 
with the news that Walker had arrived. The day 
was so far gone, however, that the attack was de- 
ferred until the next morning. McLaws at that 
time was steadily working his way up Maryland 
Heights, which, once reached, placed Harper's 
Ferry at his mercy, as will readily be perceived 
from the following description. 

The Elk Ridge Mountains, extending north and 
south across portions of Maryland and Virginia, 
seem to have split in two to allow the clamoring 
waters of the Potomac to pass through. This nat- 
urally leaves a high rocky wall on each side. The 
one on the north bank is called Maryland Heights, 
and the one on the south is known as Loudon 
Heights. Directly between the latter and Har- 
per's Ferry the Shenandoah sweejDS into the Po- 
tomac, and behind this river is a smaller ridge, 
known as Bolivar Heights, which slopes off south- 
ward into the Shenandoah Valley. In the little 
basin formed by this trio of mountain-peaks nestles 



HAMPER'S FERRY. 135 

Harper's Ferry, the scene of the opening drama of 
the great civil war, in 1859, when John Brown 
made his memorable raid. Harper's Ferry is one 
of the most picturesque little towns in America, 
the mountain -peaks being about two miles from 
each other, with the town itself slumbering in the 
valley below. It will thus be seen that a strong 
force on any one of these ridges could bombard 
Harj)er's Ferry with the greatest ease. 

Colonel Miles, in distributing his command for 
defence, posted a strong force on Maryland Heights, 
the highest of the three mountain-peaks, but, un- 
fortunately for him, the larger part was down in 
the valley below. The commonest prudence would 
have saved him from leaving a single soldier in the 
death-trap, into which the Confederates could pour 
a resistless fire not only of cannon, but of musketry. 
Had he kept his entire command on Maryland 
Heights, he could have held it with ease until the 
arrival of McClellan, who even then was hurrying 
to his relief. Had the Federals strained their ears, 
they might h^ve caught the boom of Franklin's 
signal-guns. He was hastening to their assistance 
and firing at intervals to apprise Colonel Miles of 
the fact, that he might be encouraged to hold out, 
as he had promised he would do. But the monu- 
mental blundering which was the distinctive fea- 
ture of the Federal campaigns in the East during 
the early years of the war showed itself again at 
Harper's Ferry. It was folly to attempt to hold it, 



136 THE OAMP-FIEES OF GENERAL LEE. 

but Colonel Ford, when he awoke to the fact that 
Stonewall Jackson had turned his eye toward him, 
made only a feeble show of resistance, then spiked 
his guns, tumbled them down the rocks and hur- 
riedly retreated to Harper's Ferry. Thus it was 
that Maryland Heights, towering far above the 
others, was vacated by the Federals. McLaws 
laboriously dragged some of his cannon to the 
top, and, looking across and down upon the other 
mountain-peaks, he saw both swarming with his 
comrades; the Stars and Bars fluttered in the 
wind, and on Loudon and Bolivar the cheers of 
the Confederates swept back and forth through 
the autumn air far above the doomed army 
below. Looking down on the quaint little town, 
nestling in the basin like one of the Alpine vil- 
lages, every private in the Confederate forces felt 
that their game was as good as bagged already. 
The Federals had placed themselves between the 
upper and nether millstones, and they would be 
ground to powder. 

The investment of Harper's Ferry was com- 
plete, and at daylight on the morning of Septem- 
ber 15 a terrific plunging fire was opened on the 
garrison. It had lasted but an hour, when Colonel 
Miles called his officers together and told them it 
was useless to fight longer : they were at the mercy 
of their assailants, and he felt the best thing to do 
was to surrender. All assented, and the Confeder- 
ate artillerymen, who were pouring their fire into 



HABPEB'S FEBBY. 137 

the one common receptacle below, suddenly caught 
sight of a white flag fluttering through the smoke. 
Those who observed the token ceased firing, but 
several shots followed before the signal was fully 
recognized. The last one of these struck and mor- 
tally wounded Colonel Miles. It was fortunate for 
him that it did so ; for had he survived, a disgrace 
awaited him far worse than death. Harper's Ferry 
was taken, and Colonel White surrendered more 
than eleven thousand men, seventy-three pieces of 
artillery, thirteen thousand small arms and an im- 
mense amount of military stores. 

It is said that when the surrender was made 
General Jackson was leaning against a tree, sound 
asleep. Placing his hand on his shoulder, A. P. 
Hill introduced Colonel White, who had come to 
arrange the terms of capitulation. The eyelids 
parted just long enough for the leader to recog- 
nize his visitors, when he sjDoke one word : " Un- 
conditional !" Then the drowsy eyelids drooped 
again, and he resumed his slumber, which was 
destined to be of short duration. 

The terms were not such as Colonel White ex- 
pected, but he had no choice; his command was 
completely disorganized, and it was utterly beyond 
his power to make any further defence. The sur- 
render took place, as has been stated, and stirring- 
events in other quarters immediately demanded 
the attention of Jackson. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

"SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191." 

The surrender of Harper's Ferry was not com- 
pleted when a courier, his horse covered with foam, 
arrived from General Lee with orders for Stone- 
wall Jackson to join him at once. Leaving A. P. 
Hill to receive the surrender and superintend the 
removal of the captured property, and directing 
McLaws and Walker to follow without a moment's 
unnecessary delay, Jackson hurried to rejoin his 
chief. It was a time when no exertion could be 
spared, and the tired leader and equally tired men 
pushed forward all night with grim resolution, and 
reached Lee the next morning at Sharpsburg. 

To understand the important events which im- 
mediately followed, it is necessary to go back a 
few days in the order of events; for the invest- 
ment, assault and capture of Harper's Ferry were 
simultaneous with momentous proceedings in other 
quarters. 

It has already been shown that Lee never medi- 
tated a direct attack on Baltimore or Washington, 
but his manoeuvres were made for the purpose of 
drawing McClellan away from those cities, with a 

138 



''SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191." 139 

view of falling upon them before "Little Mac" 
could return to their defence, or of compelling 
him to accept battle when removed from his base 
of supplies. General Lee left Frederick on the 
10th, after Jackson had gone, and, moving by 
South Mountain, headed toward Boonsboro'. Gen- 
eral Stuart with his cavalry was left east of the 
mountains to watch McClellan, who was known to 
be cautiously advancing. Word having reached 
Lee that the Federals were approaching from the 
direction of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Gen- 
eral Longstreet was sent to Hagerstown to keep 
an eye on their movements and to hold them in 
check, while D. H. Hill halted near Boonsboro' 
with the purpose of shutting off the flight of the 
garrison at Harper's Ferry through Pleasant Val- 
ley, and to render such support to the cavalry as 
might be needed. 

General Lee was making some exceedingly close 
calculations and predicating enormous risks on their 
success. The first fact which he accepted as already 
demonstrated was that Harper's Ferry would be 
compelled to capitulate on the 13th. McClellan 
was advancing so tardily that he would give Jack- 
son time to return and rejoin Lee before the Fed- 
erals could make an attack; but Harper's Ferry 
was not captured until the 15th, and McClellan 
did not allow the grass to grow under his feet, 
though it must be admitted that it sprouted. So 
soon as it was known that General Lee had crossed 



140 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

into Maryland, General McClellan moved to Fred- 
erick City to meet him. He reached that point on 
the 12th, and drove out the cavalry left there by 
General Stuart to watch him. 

The Federal army, it will be remembered, was 
composed of the remnants of the Army of Vir- 
ginia and the Army of the Potomac, and it had 
bean placed in charge of McClellan in obedience 
to the demands of the country and of the army 
itself. Hooker commanded the First Corps (Mc- 
Dowell's old corps) ; General Reno, the Ninth 
Corps, formerly of Burnside's old force; and the 
Twelfth Corps, formerly commanded by Banks, 
was under General Mansfield. Besides these, 
Burnside's corps was brought up from Fred- 
ericksburg and attached to McClellan's forces. 
The effective strength of this army was eighty- 
seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four men 
of all arms. 

On the march to Frederick City, General Mc- 
Clellan advanced by five parallel roads, with the 
purpose of covering Washington and Baltimore. 
The left flank rested on the Potomac, and the 
right on the Baltimore and Ohio Bailroad. 

All this time, as will be remembered. General 
McClellan was in utter ignorance of Lee's plan of 
campaign ; hence the extreme caution with which 
he advanced. But at this juncture a most extra- 
ordinary piece of good-fortune befell the Union 
commander. When he reached Frederick, on the 



''SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191." 141 

morning of the 13th, an officer picked up a piece 
of paper from a small table in the house which had 
served as the headquarters of General D. H. Hill. 
He observed the j^i'inted heading, ^^Headquarters 
Army of Northern Virginia,^^ and, naturally enough, 
unfolded and read the paper, whose great import- 
ance requires that it should be given in full: 

"Headquarters Army op Northern Virginia, 
September 9, 1862. 
"Special Orders 
No. 191. 

"The army will resume its march to-morrow, 
taking the Hagerstown road. General Jack- 
son's command will form the advance, and after 
passing Middleton, with such portion as he may 
select, will take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross 
the Potomac at the most convenient point, and 
by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy 
as may be at Martinsburg and intercept such 
as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. 

" General Longstreet's command will pursue the 
same road as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt 
with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of 
the army. 

" General McLaws, with his own division and 
that of General B. H. Anderson, will follow Gen- 
eral Longstreet. On reaching Middleton he will 
take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday 
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights 



142 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's 
Ferry and vicinity. 

" General Walker with Ms division, after accom- 
plishing the object in which he is now engaged, 
will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford and ascend 
its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of 
Loudon Heights if practicable by Friday morning. 
Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the 
end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. 
He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Gen- 
eral McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting 
the retreat of the enemy. 

" General D. H. Hill's division will form the 
rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken 
by the main body. The reserve, artillery, ord- 
nance and supply trains, etc., will precede Gen- 
eral Hill. 

" General Stuart will detach a squadron of cav- 
alry to accompany the commands of Generals Long- 
street, Jackson and McLaws, and with the main 
body of the cavalry will cover the route of the 
army and bring up all stragglers that may have 
been left behind. 

"The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws 
and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for 
which they were detached, will join the main body 
of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown." 

It is easy to imagine how the eye of McClellan 
kindled when this paper was placed in his hands 



''SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191." 143 

and he read it through from beginning to end. It 
gave him the very knowledge for which he was 
seeking, and for which his government could have 
afforded to pay millions of dollars. There, on the 
white paper before him, was a full revelation of 
Lee's plans, heretofore an impenetrable mystery 
to the Union commander, and the prosecution of 
which had thrown the North into consternation. 

No doubt General Lee smiled in his dignified 
way when he sat down a few days before to ex- 
amine the contents of General Pope's despatch- 
book, but it is safe to conclude that McClellan 
smiled almost to his ears when he perused a copy 
of " Special Orders No. 191." 

The possession of this document was of the great- 
est value to General McClellan. It furnished him 
with an accurate description of General Lee's de- 
signs, showed him the disposition of his forces, 
and gave him an advantage over the Southern 
army which the reader will readily appreciate, and 
which should have resulted in the destruction of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. In short, that 
army was by the discovery of this order placed 
at the mercy of General McClellan.* 

The Union leader saw the inestimable value of 
the hours, and instantly set to work to use to the 
utmost the knowledge which had come to him in 
such an extraordinary manner. Naturally, he de- 
cided to take advantage of the division of Lee's 

* McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee. 



144 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

army by securing tlie passes of South Mountain, 
occupying Pleasant Valley, beating the Confeder- 
ate army in detail and rescuing Colonel Miles at 
Harper's Ferry from Stonewall Jackson, who was 
on the point of griping the garrison by the throat. 
McClellan advanced swiftly, and on the afternoon 
of the 13th was in front of the passes of South 
Mountain. At that very hour McLaws and An- 
derson were placing their forces in position at 
Harper's Ferry. 

After leaving the Potomac, beginning at the 
northern shore of that river and extending through 
Pennsylvania, the great range of the Blue E-idge is 
called the South Mountain. Two miles farther west- 
ward is the range known as Maryland Heights. 
The country lying between these two ranges is 
named Pleasant Valley, and is from two to three 
miles in width; it is very rugged, and almost 
Alpine in its character. There are two roads 
leading from Frederick City to the western part 
of the State — the main, or Hagerstown, road, which 
passes the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, near the 
village of Boonsboro' ; and another, which passes the 
mountain at Crampton's Gap, about five or six 
miles farther to the south. These passes are very 
strong, and are impregnable against direct attack if 
properly defended. They may be turned, however, 
by mountain-roads leading to positions command- 
ing them, high upon the sides of the mountain.* 

* McCabe. 



"SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 191." 145 

The Confederate cavalry in front of the passes 
of South Mountain exerted themselves to check 
McClellan, but he drove them back without dif- 
ficulty. He then determined to throw his centre 
and right against the pass leading to Boonsboro', 
while Franklin's corps was to force the passage 
of Crampton's Gap, assail McLaws in the rear, 
drive him away and rescue the garrison at Har- 
per's Ferry, 

On the afternoon of the 13th, shortly after Mc- 
Clellan's arrival at South Mountain, Lee learned 
of his presence there; he saw at once that the 
Union commander, by some means unknown to 
him, had penetrated his designs. General D. H. 
Hill was ordered to occupy Turner's Gap and 
prevent McClellan from forcing his way through. 
Lee was still ignorant of what was going on at 
Harper's Ferry, though confident it would fall 
that day, which was the date fixed for its capture. 
He had counted on being joined by Jackson and 
his forces before McClellan could strike him, and 
but for the discovery of the orders sent to D. H. 
Hill the junction would have been effected as orig- 
inally intended. This hope was frustrated, and it 
now became necessary to hold McClellan east of 
the mountains until the fall of Harper's Ferry, 
and until Jackson could reunite with the main 
body of the Confederate army. 

General D. H. Hill understood the danger that 
threatened the army. He sent back the brigades 

10 



146 THE AMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of Garland and Colquitt, and shortly after moved 
his whole division to the Gap. McClellan, as 
usual, was tardy in his movements. Had he dis- 
played the vim and dash of Jackson, he would 
have possessed himself of the passes before the 
Confederates had time to take such precautions. 
At the time the Federals appeared in front the 
Confederates numbered scarcely two thousand, but 
they made such a bold stand that McClellan hesi- 
tated until General Hill had placed his whole 
division in position. But this division was only 
five thousand strong, and could not hold the en- 
tire line against such an attack as the Federals 
were capable of making. Hill could occupy the 
pass itself, but could not defend the two moun- 
tain roads by either of which the position might 
be turned. 

Early in the forenoon Reno opened a sharp 
artillery-fire on the Confederate right, forgetting 
the high precipitous peak which overlooked and 
commanded the ridge to the right of the pass. 
Garland's brigade at first checked the Federal ad- 
vance, but, their commanding officer being killed, 
his men were demoralized and driven back, and 
Reno established himself on the first ridge on the 
mountain-side. A vigorous continuance of the 
charge, and the Federals would have gained the 
road; but they had suffered severely. General 
Heno himself being killed. General Hill ordered 
up Anderson's brigade to replace that of Garland. 



"SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 19 IP 147 

They were, directed to hold the road, and Colonel 
Kosser, with his cavalry regiment dismounted as 
sharpshooters, and a battery of artillery were 
ordered to hold a mountain-path farther to the 
right. Colquitt's brigade and two batteries were 
sent to the support of Anderson, and several guns 
were placed in position to command the approach 
to the precipitous peak, which the Federals might 
have seized long before. 

The vital importance of this peak was so clear 
to all that the Unionists determined to secure pos- 
session of it. When Hooker arrived with his 
corps, in the middle of the afternoon, he was 
ordered to carry the position, and he made the 
attempt with great spirit and bravery. The 
ground is very difficult, but the Federals ran nim- 
bly forward, leaping over the obstructions like so 
many deer. The Confederate artillery did little 
damage, owing to the precipitous character of the 
ground, but the riflemen, behind trees, rocks and 
everything that would afford shelter, poured a 
murderous fire into their assailants. They fought 
bravely, however, and before it was dark had car- 
ried the crest. 

Longstreet's main column had reached the pass 
about the middle of the afternoon, and his troops 
were stationed on both sides of the turnpike, near 
the centre of Hill's line. They were speedily en- 
gaged, and, though just in from a severe march, 
they fought with great spirit and repulsed the 



148 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Federal attack on the centre; but wliQn darkness 
ended the conflict, the advantage was on the side 
of the Union forces. Though they had lost many 
men, including General Keno, the Confederate loss 
was still greater. They had repulsed every attempt 
against their centre, but on the left the peak held 
by Rodes's brigade had been carried, and the whole 
Confederate line was commanded by the guns of 
the Federals. Their position was no longer ten- 
able, and Lee decided to retire from South Moun- 
tain and take position at Sharpsburg. 

Lee had heard from Jackson that Harper's 
Ferry was certain to be captured the next day, 
and there was no special reason, therefore, for hold- 
ing the mountain any longer. When stationed at 
Sharpsburg, he would be on the flank of any Fed- 
eral force moving through Pleasant Valley upon 
the Confederates on Maryland Heights. Fur- 
thermore, he would hold the fords of the Poto- 
mac, thus preserving his line of retreat to Vir- 
ginia should he meet with a reverse. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

AT BAY. 

Meanwhile, stirring events were taking place 
six miles to the southward, at Crampton's Gap. 
Franklin had reached there in the middle of the 
forenoon of the 14th, and immediately threw for- 
ward both of his divisions, Slocum on the right 
and Smith on the left. The pass was defended 
by a part of McLaws's force, who himself was en- 
gaged in the investment of Harper's Ferry. The 
Confederates were driven back from the base of 
the mountain, where they were sheltered by a stone 
wall, and forced up its precipitous sides. General 
Howell Cobb had been directed by McLaws to hold 
the pass if he had to lose every man while doing 
so, but he believed the attacking force was much 
less than it was. Such also was the opinion of 
General Stuart, who had been attentively watch- 
ing the battle. It required three hours for the 
Federals to carry the pass, but they finally suc- 
ceeded, capturing several hundred prisoners and 
stand of arms, including one piece of artillery. 

When General McLaws learned that the Union- 
ists had taken Crampton's Pass, he saw he was placed 
in a dangerous situation. Harper's Ferry had not 

149 



150 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

yet fallen, and Ms retreat up Pleasant Valley was 
cut off. If lie withdrew along the river-shore at 
the base of Maryland Heights, his force would be 
decimated by the fire of the garrison at Harper's 
Ferry and Franklin would fall upon his rear. To 
attempt to retreat in any other direction would be 
equally certain to bring disaster. There seemed 
but the one thing to do — fight it out on that line if 
it took all the autumn. General McLaws, therefore, 
left only one regiment to hold Maryland Heights, 
while the major portion of his force took posi- 
tion in Pleasant Valley, less than two miles from 
Crampton's Gap, froili which Franklin's soldiers 
were issuing into the valley. The bold front of 
the Confederates deceived Franklin, and, darkness 
coming on shortly after, no further demonstration 
was made that evening. 

McLaws expected that as a matter of course 
he would be attacked early the next morning, but 
Franklin began cautiously manoeuvring to obtain 
a position from which his artillery could com- 
mand the Confederate line. McLaws was silently 
awaiting the attack, when news reached him that 
Harper's Ferry had surrendered and he was 
ordered to withdraw to the south side of the Po- 
tomac, and to lose not an hour in hastening to 
the assistance of Lee. McLaws did his duty well. 
He crossed over to Harper's Ferry early in tlie 
afternoon, and on the following morning went 
into camp at Halltown, where his men were given 



AT BAY. 151 

a little rest, which they sorely needed. The march 
was taken up again the next day, and just as 
the sun was rising on the 17th he joined Lee at 
Sharpsburg. 

When the Confederates withdrew, on the morn- 
ing of the 15th, McClellan pushed forward with 
all his army in pursuit ; but he had not advanced 
far when the heads of his columns were checked 
at Antietam Creek, a small stream which, running 
toward the Potomac, empties into it six miles above 
Harper's Ferry. On the hills west of this brook 
General Lee had turned at bay, and was waiting 
with his army to give the Federals battle. Mc- 
Clellan had interfered a great deal with the plans 
of the Confederate leader, although he had not 
been able to prevent his carrying out the main 
object of his campaign. The cowardice of the 
garrison at Harper's Ferry and the resistance re- 
ceived at South Mountain had enabled Jackson 
not only to capture the former, but had given him 
the opportunity to rejoin his chief and afford his 
priceless assistance in the general engagement that 
was at hand. 

But many things had gone amiss with Lee. The 
unexplainable occupancy of Harper's Ferry by the 
Federals had caused him to modify his original 
plan far enough to lead him to turn aside and cap- 
ture that point. Though this capture was unex- 
pectedly easy, it necessarily occupied several days 
which were of the utmost account. Worst of all 



152 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

was the discovery of " Special Orders No. 191," by 
whicli tlie whole minutiae of the Confederate cam- 
paign was laid bare to General McClellan, who, as 
McCabe remarks, was given such an advantage 
that he ought to have destroyed the Confederate 
army. 

The Confederate army well-nigh went to pieces 
from straggling; the enfeebled, the sick, the foot- 
sore, the barefooted and the lame dropped out of 
the ranks and were strung all along the weary 
itiarch. So great, indeed, was this straggling that 
at one time General Lee lost heart and declared 
that his army was ruined. It had become imper- 
atively necessary, therefore, that he should turn at 
bay and not only deliver battle, but allow many 
of the stragglers who were laboring painfully for- 
ward to join him. The army which had faced 
about on the west bank of Antietam Creek when 
the battle opened numbered less than forty thou- 
sand muskets. 

The position chosen by Lee was admirable. At 
his back was the Potomac, which by a series of 
most extraordinary curves offered the best possible 
protection to his flanks. In the centre of the 
small peninsula was the little town of Sharpsburg, 
from which start four principal roads. The upj^er 
one runs almost due north, toward Hagerstown ; 
the second follows a south-west course, toward 
Shepherdstown ; the third runs south-east, to Kohr- 
ersville, and crosses Antietam Creek a short distance 



AT BAY. 153 

from Sharpsburg ; away to the nortli-east stretches 
the fourth road, through Keedysville, on the Antie- 
tam, to Boonsboro'. Thus from Sharpsburg as a 
centre extended four great arms ahnost at right 
angles to one another. It was by the road to the 
north-east that the advance divisions of the Army of 
the Potomac debouched on the evening of September 
15, in front of the Confederate position on the west 
side of Antietam Creek. General Lee had posted 
his men so as to guard two of the stone bridges 
across the creek, the other two which span the 
stream being so far removed that they were con- 
sidered of no importance ; besides, his lines would 
have been too attenuated had he attempted to guard 
those bridges. But above the upper bridge were 
a number of fords easily accessible. Instead of 
coming down to the edge of the stream to defend 
these, Lee drew his army back in the direction of 
the Potomac, so as to close the peninsula and rest 
the end of his line on that river. 

On the evening of the 15th, when the Federal 
army emerged to view, Lee had not yet consoli- 
dated his forces, as we have stated ; in fact, his halt 
had for one of its main purposes this very junc- 
tion of his scattered soldiers, to save them from 
being destroyed by McClellan in detail. He had 
twenty thousand men with him when he turned at 
bay, and he had succeeded in posting only two bri- 
gades of Long-street's corps, under Hood, to the north 
of the town, where it confronted the advance of the 



154 TEE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Federals by the upper fords. The principal part 
of his force remained in front of the positions 
which McClellan began to take with his main 
army. Longstreet had deployed on the right of the 
Boonsboro' road, and Hill on the left. The ground 
was elevated, and could not have been better chosen : 
the surface was so rough and uneven, as it sloped 
away to the creek, that it rendered manoeuvring 
by an attacking force very difficult. 

Strange fact that the centre of the Confederate 
line should have been marked by a church which 
seemed to shrink from the dreadful havoc that 
impended ! That house of God, where the words 
of peace and good-will toward men had been so 
often proclaimed, was to tremble with the roar of 
cannon, and the ground was to run red with the 
blood of brothers arrayed against brothers. The 
structure, known as " Dunker Church," stands just 
west of the Hagerstown turnpike, about equally 
distant from Sharpsburg, the Potomac and Antie- 
tam Creek. It is close to the intersection of a 
cross-road running north-east, and a dense wood 
skirts the road at that point. Farther on toward 
Hagerstown was an extensive clearing almost en- 
closed by woods; it sometimes bordered the road 
and at interval's drew away from it. It extend- 
ed, also, a considerable distance to the east of the 
highway just above the church. 

In the direction of the Antietam the ground 
was likewise difficult and rocky, and Lee had 



AT BAY. 155 

drawn up his army in such position that if Mc- 
Clellan threatened his extended left he could mass 
his troops at that point, so as to resist an attack, 
while, with the two bridges on his right and the 
narrow neck of the peninsula on his left to de- 
fend, he was able, in case of reverse, to retreat 
over the Potomac by the Shepherdstown ford. 

The Federal armv beajan arrivino; on the banks 
of the Antietam toward the close of the 15th, and 
by dawn on the next morning all had reached the 
place, with the exception of the two divisions of 
the Sixth Corps and those of Morell and Couch, 
while more than one-third of Lee's army was yet 
on the right bank of the Potomac. McClellan, 
therefore, still held the opportunity for an over- 
whelming assault, and a fog overhung the field of 
operations ; so that his movements could have been 
screened from the Confederates. But the Federal 
commander was not that kind of a general: he 
did not propose to exhaust his men by hurrying 
them into position. He waited until the sun dis- 
sipated the mists, in order that he might see where 
they were going; this took until the middle of 
the day, and the most precious hours were irre- 
coverably lost to the Federal commander. 



CHAPTEE Xiy. 

ANTIETAM. 

By two o'clock in the afternoon McClellan had 
fixed upon his plan of battle. His several corps had 
deployed along the hills on the east of Antietam 
Creek, and opened with artillery on the Confeder- 
ates. Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was posted 
among the hills south- of the Bohrersville road, in 
front of the Confederate right, from which he was 
separated by the stone bridge that spanned the 
creek. On the hills over which ran the Keedys- 
ville road were posted the first line of Sykes's 
division on the left of the road, and Richardson 
on the right. They thus held the positions taken 
the day before. The remaining two divisions of 
Sumner's corps were posted in the rear of Bich- 
ardson. Toward the right Hooker was stationed, 
on the heights whence the road slopes toward 
Antietam Creek. Directly behind him was Mans- 
field's scant corps, while Pleasanton with his cav- 
alry occupied the fords and the upper bridge of 
the creek. This force of McClellan numbered 
over sixty thousand men, fifty thousand of whom 
were prepared for battle. Many of them, however, 
were new recruits who had never been under fire 

166 



ANTIETAM. 157 

before, while the Confederates had been bajDtized 
in the flame of battle. 

But Lee, as we have shown, had less than one- 
half as many men with which to oppose this pow- 
erful army. He arranged his line of battle, how- 
ever, and made his dispositions as calmly and with 
as much confidence as though he was assured of cap- 
turing the entire Federal army. Longstreet was 
on his right, D. H. Hill in the centre, both hold- 
ing the hills which overlook the Keedysville and 
Rohrersville roads, while most of the artillery was 
concentrated in front, so as to guard the passes 
of the little stream. Far over to the extreme 
left, by Hunker Church, Hood was stationed with 
two brigades, while Jackson with his decimated 
divisions strove to cover the extensive opening be- 
tween Hood's right and Hill's left, on the Antie- 
tam, with a view of linking them together^ so far 
as such a thing was possible. 

The fog slowly lifted now and then ; and when 
the armies could catch sight of each other, they 
saluted with their murderous artillery. This con- 
tinued until two o'clock, when Hooker began the 
advance, with the view of crossing the Antietam 
at the upper bridge and fords, held by the Fed- 
eral cavalry, and of attacking the Confederate left. 
McClellan proposed by this means to turn the posi- 
tion of Lee, for it promised to be far less difficult 
than a direct attack in front. Burnside was to 
maintain his original position, on the Bohrersville 



158 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

road, while the rest of the Federals were ordered 
to hold themselves in readiness to follow Hooker 
across the creek and to support him in his attack. 
Hooker obeyed with his usual promptness, and 
came at once in collision with Jackson's outposts, 
which were supported by Hood, who hastened for- 
ward from Dunker Church. The battle, therefore, 
opened in the extensive clearing already referred 
to, which extended to the north and east of this 
church. What promised to be a most sanguinary 
struggle was terminated by darkness, and both 
armies slept on their arms. 

During the night 'Mansfield's corps crossed the 
Antietam and took position behind Hooker, while 
Sumner was instructed to follow at daybreak with 
the Second Corps. Franklin, with the divisions 
of Slocum and Smith, was to advance from Pleas- 
ant Valley, so as to reach the scene of battle by 
ten o'clock; Porter, with his second division, was 
to arrive near the same time. Thus, with the sin- 
gle exception of Couch's division, the whole Army 
of the Potomac would be concentrated for the pur- 
pose of crushing the Confederate army, which had 
not been able as yet to consolidate its different 
wings, though they were hurrying toward the one 
central point. Lee was quick to detect the plan 
of McClellan, and he strengthened his left wing 
by sending Jackson to Hood's brigades, in the 
woods, which they had held with such bravery 
the evening before, and where they had suffered 



ANTIETAM. 159 

severely. D. H. Hill, in the centre, was to sup- 
port Jackson whenever it became necessary. 

Hooker was not the man to hesitate after receiv- 
ing his orders, and he renewed the attack at day- 
light on the 17th with his accustomed spirit and 
dash. It was the purpose of McClellan to compel 
Lee to send most of his forces to the neighborhood 
of Dunker Church, and thus open the way for an 
onslaught by Burnside at the lower bridge. This 
would fall upon Longstreet, on the Confederate 
centre and right; and if successful, the Federals, 
who were threatening Sharpsburg and the Wil- 
liamsport ford, would compel Lee to retreat. Mc- 
Clellan was warranted in believing that his prepon- 
derating numbers would enable him to carry out 
this plan, though it will be seen that it could suc- 
ceed only by the prompt and unfaltering co-op- 
eration of his lieutenants. 

The morning of the 17th, unlike that of the 
previous day, was clear. Hooker advanced his 
three divisions, Doubleday on the right, Meade in 
the centre and Ricketts on the left. Meade quick- 
ly found his men the targets for Starke's division, 
which had relieved Hood, and, sheltered behind 
rocks, stumps, trees and all kinds of debris, poured 
a deadly fire upon the advancing Federals. The 
struggle for the possession of the wood was of the 
most desperate and bloody nature. The losses 
were numerous ; men dropped rapidly, and the 
deaths among the officers were frightful. Vet- 



160 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

erans who had fought in the war from the opening 
battle found the fight in the wood the most san- 
guinary that had yet taken place. How the Con- 
federates held their ground so long against such 
overwhelming odds and after such appalling losses 
is amazing, and was another proof that the world 
has never produced better fighters. 

All three of Hooker's divisions were speedily 
engaged, and were supported by the fire of the 
Federal batteries on the left bank of the Antie- 
tam, which raked the scant soldiers of Jackson, 
though it inflicted less loss than the incessant dis- 
charge of musketry;- still, the Confederates re- 
mained firm for more than an hour, when they 
began falling slowly back, until the large clearing 
already described was reached. Across this they 
ran into the woods on the east, beyond the Hag- 
erstown turnpike, in search of shelter. Hooker 
pressed close behind them, evidently believing that 
he had the Confederates on the run and could keep 
them running; but he committed a costly error. 
Stuart's horse-artillery had occupied the hills fring- 
ins: the woods to the west of Dunker Church, and 
which commanded the patch of forest where the 
Confederates had taken refuge. This artillery held 
Doubleday in check, while Eicketts, on the left, was 
hotly engaged with three brigades under D. H. Hill, 
that had been drawn from the Confederate cen- 
tre for the support of Jackson. Meade was in bad 
shape on account of his great losses, and he received 



ANTIETAM. 161 

a murderous volley of musketry while approaching 
the Hagerstown pike. Lawton, who was held in 
reserve with his division near Dunker Church, was 
now sent forward by Jackson to the support of 
Starke. They supported him with such vigor, and 
from the edge of the woods rained such a destruc- 
tive fire upon the Federals, that they broke and 
skurried for cover. Quick to perceive his oppor- 
tunity, Lawton ordered a charge. He was sup- 
ported by some of Starke's men, and they were 
sweeping everything before them, when at this 
most critical moment the Federal general Mans- 
field, who had been summoned by Hooker in great 
haste, arrived, and but for this timely aid Hooker 
would have been destroyed. 

Exasperated by his bloody repulse. Hooker would 
not admit that his opportunity was gone. He re- 
formed his broken line with the best brigade in 
the centre, and returned to the assault. He suc- 
ceeded in reaching the edge of the woods, but there 
he was again hurled back, with the same dreadful 
losses as before. 

The veteran Mansfield now hurried his men into 
the battle. His two divisions were deployed in the 
shape of a crescent in the clearing, while in the 
woods to the east Greene, with one of the divis- 
ions, attacked Hill, who was fighting Ricketts. 
The Federal Williams, on the right, rushed across 
the Hagerstown pike with his men, and tried des- 
perately to drive out the Confederates from the 
11 



162 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

woods and hills to the west, so as to flank those who 
were defending the position near Dunker Church. 
General Starke was killed, and Lawton, who suc- 
ceeded him, was wounded, while officers as well as 
privates were literally mowed down. Jackson's 
troops fell back before this concentrated attack, 
which threatened to be irresistible. 

But on the Federal side the losses were more 
terrible. Mansfield was dead, and so were hun- 
dreds of his men. Indeed, the ground in both 
the woods and the clearing was strewn with lifeless 
bodies. Those who kept their feet and were able 
to fight had to leap Over the prostrate forms, and 
sometimes they were so close that they lay on top 
of one another. The living trampled the dead and 
dying, whose cries of anguish, joining the crash of 
musketry, the thunder of cannon and the shouts 
of the combatants, made a din whose overpower- 
ing horror was beyond imagination. 

Lee saw that the fate of his army was at stake, 
and he sent all the reinforcements he could spare 
to the support of his left. In fact, he called his 
entire centre to the help of the sorely-pressed Jack- 
son, while Hood, who was held in reserve, joined 
him. Hooker was still fighting as best he could, 
but he could not withstand this impetuous charge, 
which swept him and his men from the open ground 
to the shelter of the wood from which a short time 
before they had dislodged Starke's division. In 
this furious struggle Hooker himself was severely 



ANTIETAM. 163 

wounded, and carried off the battlefield, while Hart- 
suff and Crawford had also been stricken down. 
Finding themselves deprived of leaders, the sol- 
diers fought with blind ferocity. Crouching be- 
hind trees, and, indeed, anything that promised the 
slightest protection, they fired in the direction of 
the Confederates as fast as they could load and dis- 
charge their hot, smoking pieces. The artillery lent 
them great assistance, or they could not have been 
able to make any stand at all. Greene, however, still 
maintained his grip in the woods, which reached 
over to Dunker Church. It was evident that the 
battle itself was to be fought on and around the 
clearing to which we have already several times 
referred. 

But Federals and Confederates were so ex- 
hausted that they could only pant and glare at 
each other while waiting for reinforcements. In- 
deed, the latter were already rushing thitherward 
from both sides. Sumner had crossed the river, 
and was marching rapidly in the direction of 
Hooker's cannon. Lee found himself with only 
two divisions of Longstreet with which to protect 
the entire line of the Antietam, but McLaws out- 
ran Franklin in the race from Harper's Ferry, 
and, crossing the Potomac twice, joined his chief 
just in time to hasten to the defence of Dunker 
Church. But, prompt as he was, Sumner was 
ahead of him with his Second Corps, and the out- 
look was most serious for the Confederates. It was 



164 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

yet early in the forenoon, and most important 
results were to be attained before the sun went 
down in the West. 

With Lee's attention almost entirely occupied' 
with his left, McClellan saw that the time had 
come to assault the Confederate right. McClellan 
from a commanding position was intently watch- 
ing the battle, and fully an hour previous he had 
sent an order to Burnside (who, it will be remem- 
bered, was stationed on the right bank of the 
Antietam, confronting with thirteen thousand men 
the right of Lee's army, with the stone bridge 
between them) to capture the bridge and attack 
Longstreet. Instead of making a general assault, 
Burnside sent Crook's weak brigade against those 
who were defending the bridge, supporting the 
assailants by two regiments only from the divis- 
ion of Sturgis. The Confederates waited until 
the Federals were within a few rods, when they 
drove them back with great loss ; a brigade which 
attempted to cross the stream some distance below 
was repulsed in the same rattling fashion. Two 
more regiments were sent to renew the charge 
at the bridge, but they met with no better suc- 
cess than before, and at the end of two hours not 
the least impression had been made on Lee's 
right. 

McClellan could not comprehend the inactivity 
of Burnside, and sent order after order to him to 
make a general attack. With such a powerful 



ANTIETAM. ^ 165 

force at hand, Burnside continued to send driblets 
— as they may be called — to the assault, with the 
result that the Confederates defeated them every 
time with little difficulty, inflicting great loss upon 
the assailants. 

Sumner and his Second Corps were again fight- 
ing on the right, Sedgwick in the advance, with 
French close behind him. Forming his division 
in column by deployed brigades, Sedgwick de- 
bouched into the clearing, on the east side, and, 
charging diagonally across it, drove back Hood's 
two brigades, who were making such a gallant fight. 
Sedgwick pressed steadily forward until he reached 
the Hagerstown pike, across which he passed until 
he entered the woods, from which Hooker and 
Mansfield had been repeatedly driven. Dunker 
Church was occupied, and the Confederates were 
driven across the open fields beyond. Thus the 
Federals had secured the key to the battlefield, and 
it looked as if the struggle was decided irretriev- 
ably against the Southerners ; but the bravery and 
impetuosity of Sedgwick proved his weakness.* 
He had been carried by the momentum of his 
own assault too far, and his flanks were exposed. 
True, General Doubleday and the woods afforded 
some protection to his right, but the left invited 
attack by the Confederates, and two of his divis- 

* One of the remarkable facts connected with this battle was that a 
considerable time elapsed before either the Federal or the Confederate 
leaders perceived the immense value of this position. 



166 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ions were beyond supporting distance. Now was 
the time when lie needed reinforcements. 

The Confederates were equally in need, and were 
fortunate enough to receive them first. McLaws, 
with five thousand men, arrived from Sharpsburg 
by the Hagerstown pike, and without a moment's 
delay hurled them against Sedgwick's left. Sedg- 
wick faced his third brigade about, but it was too 
late. The charge of the Confederates bore down 
everything before them. The brave General Sedg- 
wick, who had been wounded three times and 
refused to relinquish his post, exerted himself to 
the utmost to rally his troops. He shouted and 
besought them to stand firm, dashing hither and 
thither and swinging his sword over the heads of 
the terrified soldiers ; but all in vain. The panic 
was complete, and the Federals were driven pell- 
mell out of the woods they had so recently secured 
at such a terrible cost. A charge was made by Wil- 
liams's second brigade, under Gordon, but the most 
it could do was to withdraw again with enough haste 
to prevent its capture. McLaws was on its heels, 
and would have inflicted sad havoc had he not 
been checked by the Federal artillery-fire. 

Previous to this, Sumner, with a view of saving 
Sedgwick, had ordered his two other divisions to 
attack, but the divisions were widely separated. 
The three columns of the first, on reaching 
the cross-road leading to Dunker Church, were 
wheeled in line of battle, and marched around the 



ANTIETAM. 167 

end of the wood to attack the right of McLaws; 
but an enfilading fire threw the second line into 
confusion. The rest of the two divisions held their 
ground more firmly, and speedily came into col- 
lision with Hill's soldiers near the Houlette farm, 
which lies to the north-east of Dunker Church. 
This was at the very moment that Sedgwick was 
hotly repelling the attack of McLaws at Dunker 
Church. The whole right, therefore, were fight- 
ing furiously. It was the golden opportunity for 
Burnside, but he stirred not. Sumner and Sedg- 
wick listened, so far as they could amid the crash 
and swirl of battle, for the sounds of his attack, 
which would divert the unbearable pressure upon 
them ; but a tomblike silence prevailed in that 
direction. Messengers were continually galloping 
from McClellan to Burnside with positive orders 
for him to attack at once and with all his force, 
but a wooden man might as well have occupied his 
place; he continued immovable.* 

Lee was not the leader to allow such an oppor- 
tunity to pass unimproved. He detached another 
division from Longstreet's corps and sent B. H. 
Anderson to check the Federals, who were besin- 
ning to make progress on the Confederate left. 
Thus it was that Longstreet was charged with the 

* It is hard to understand this inactivity of Burnside. Porter dis- 
liked Pope, but the commander of the Ninth Corps and McClellan were 
warm personal friends, and Burnside could not have failed to see the 
urgent need of such an advance, which he had been repeatedly ordered 
to make. 



168 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

defence of the whole line of the Antietam, when 
his force amounted only to about four thousand 
men. 

And still Burnside, with three times as large a 
force, gave no sign of moving. 



CHAPTER XY. 

ANTIETAM (Concluded). 

McLaws, finding his soldiers exposed to a most 
destructive fire, assailed the right flank of the first 
division that had been sent to the help of Sedg- 
wick. He failed, however, to break it, while far- 
ther along the Federal left General Meagher's 
Irish brigade held their own against the most de- 
termined Confederate assaults. Meagher himself 
was wounded, but the lads from the Emerald Isle 
rallied under Colonel Burke and fought with a 
bravery worthy of all praise. 

The Confederates, as was their favorite custom 
during the war, repeatedly massed their soldiers 
and made impetuous assaults upon what appeared 
to be the weakest portion of the Federal line ; but 
for a time little was accomplished by this course. 
The Roulette farm was taken and the hills near 
by were reoccupied, but the Confederates made 
such a determined stand at the sunken road near 
by that for a time they could not be dislodged. 
Finally they were flanked by a couple of regi- 
ments, driven out, and after another furious con- 
flict the Federals gained possession of the Piper 
house. 

169 



170 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

It was now higli noon, and matters looked bad 
for the Confederates. Dunker Church had been 
turned, and a little farther advance would yield 
to Sedgwick not only the clearing, but the woods 
through which the tide of battle had swept so 
often during the forenoon. Pleasanton covered 
the movement with three batteries of horse-artil- 
lery and protected his flank ; he drove out the de- 
tachments left by Lee to guard the bridge of the 
Keedysville road. Thus the way was opened for 
Porter to cross the Antietam with his two divis- 
ions. But insurmountable obstacles interposed. 
The Federal division which had turned Dunker 
Church could not advance unassisted. Hooker 
and Mansfield's men were mixed up with Sedg- 
wick's, and the Confederate batteries near Dunker 
Church enfiladed the Federals every time they 
attempted to advance. Porter continued in re- 
serve, and still General Burnside slept. 

During the last hour, however, the Federals had 
received the powerful reinforcement of Franklin 
with the two divisions of the Sixth Corps. Be- 
tween twelve and one o'clock they swung into line 
to the support of the right, but the loss on each 
side had been so fearful, and the exhaustion so 
great, that neither could assume the offensive. Lee 
had not a man in reserve, while only about half of 
the Federal army had been engaged. The Confed- 
erate leader contracted his lines by withdrawing his 
left wing from Dunker Church, which was imme- 



ANTIETAM. Ill 

diately taken possession of by the Federals, who 
also sent a brigade to rescue a battery in immi- 
nent danger of capture on the Hagerstown pike, 
while another brigade had been sent to the relief of 
French, who was short of ammunition. McLaws's 
soldiers were encountered in the woods, near Dunk- 
er Church, and they repulsed the Federal attack ; 
but Franklin massed all of Slocum's division behind 
the church and prepared to assault the Confeder- 
ate left wing. The divisions of French and Rich- 
ardson, which had been doing a large share of the 
fighting on the Union side, opened a lively fire 
upon the Confederates, during which General 
Kichardson was mortally wounded. Under the 
protection of Pleasanton's cavalry Porter had 
secured possession of the Keedysville road, and 
hurried six battalions of infantry across to the 
support of the mounted batteries of the cavalry 
division. 

It was one o'clock, and Burnside still slept. De- 
termined to wake him up at all hazards, McClellan 
sent a superior ofiicer with instructions to see that 
his orders were executed. This awoke Burnside, 
and he prepared to make a resolute effort to carry 
the passes of the Antietam. The fire of Long- 
street's artillery converged upon this bridge with 
such deadly effect that the partial attempts, as they 
may be called, were easily repulsed, and the stern 
necessities of the case caused Lee to withdraw most 
of his men to defend the tremendous assaults on 



172 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

his left. As a consequence, when Burnside threw 
forward the four regiments of General Ferrero, 
supported by a powerful force, Toombs and his 
weak brigade were unable to stem the rush. The 
Federals lost nearly three hundred men, but they 
carried the bridge. Simultaneously, Rodman's 
division availed themselves of a newly-discovered 
ford lower down-stream and rushed across the 
Antietam to the western side, while Burnside 
with the Ninth Corps occupied the hills between 
Sharpsburg and the stream adjoining the Rohr- 
ersville road. 

It looked now as if a general advance by the 
Federals would carry every position of the Con- 
federates. With more than double their number, 
McClellan ought to have forced his mighty but 
exhausted adversary into Sharpsburg; but it was 
not attempted, and therefore was not done. Burn- 
side spent a couple of hours in reforming his line 
and waiting for the rest of his corps to join him ; 
Sumner, on reaching Dunker Church, was so im- 
pressed by the disorganization of Sedgwick's corps 
that he assumed the responsibility of forbidding 
the general attack which Franklin was about to 
begin; McClellan, in the centre, held Porter's 
corps in reserve, to be prepared for any demon- 
stration on the part of the Confederates. Thus 
more than twenty thousand men stood idle, when 
Lee had had every one of his engaged for 
hours. 



ANTIETAM. 173 

When the afternoon was half gone, Burnside 
was forcing Toombs's attenuated and exhausted 
brigades before him, and had ahnost secured the 
Confederate artillery, when A. P. Hill, arriving 
from Harper's Ferry with his powerful division, 
assailed Burnside's left flank with a furious im- 
petuosity which carried everything before it. The 
Federals were checked, and then compelled to fly. 
They fought desperately, and several diversions 
were made in their favor ; but there was no stop- 
ping the Confederates, and finally Burnside was 
driven to the shelter of the bins' overlooking the 
Antietam. This ended the fighting on the Fed- 
eral left, and, as that on the right had ceased some 
time before, hostilities for the day were over. The 
battle of Antietam, the fiercest and bloodiest of the 
war thus far, was ended. The Federal loss was one 
thousand and forty-three prisoners, nine thousand 
four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two thou- 
sand and ten killed. This appalling loss included 
three division commanders, two corps command- 
ers and eight generals. Lee had more than fif- 
teen hundred killed, including Generals Starke 
and French, while his wounded and prisoners 
swelled the total to fully eight thousand. No 
such bloody battle had been fought since the 
opening of the war, and it carried sorrow and grief 
to thousands of homes through the North and the 
South. The scene on the Antietam battleground 
on the evening of September 17, 1862, was one 



174 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of the most awful that imagination can conceive, 
and yet Death was to garner more terrible harvests 
before the strife should cease. After consulting 
with his lieutenants on the morning of the 18th, 
McClellan decided to defer assailins; Lee until the 
next day, the attack at that time being based on 
the expected arrival of promised reinforcements 
from Washington ; but on the night of the 18th, 
Lee withdrew across the Potomac, and on the 
morning of the 19th he and his army stood on 
the soil of Virginia. 

The Federals claimed Antietam as a great vic- 
tory, and the Confederates did the same. The 
former vaunted themselves much on the fact that 
Lee was forced to turn back from his contemplated 
invasion of the North and to withdraw once more 
to his old fighting-ground, but the Confederates 
claimed that the withdrawal of Lee was not in 
consequence of the battle of Antietam — or Sharps- 
burg, as they call it — but had been decided upon 
before the conflict took place. Lee was disappoint- 
ed in obtaining recruits in Maryland and he was 
far removed from his base of supplies, while he 
knew that immense reinforcements were on their 
way to McClellan. Common prudence, therefore, 
dictated that he should fall back nearer his base, 
where he could easily sustain himself, as he proved 
more than once. There can be no question that 
Lee handled his troops with far more ability than 
did McClellan. The very fact that with half as 



ANTIETAM. 175 

many soldiers, poorly supplied, he was able to 
repel assault after assault and to inflict such fright- 
ful losses upon his assailants, leaves no ground for 
argument on this point. General Lee was one of 
the greatest generals of modern times. 

General Longstreet was the first to withdraw on 
the night of the 18th, recrossing the river near 
Shej^herdstown. The rest of the army followed, 
the cavalry bringing up the rear, and the next 
morning the troops were in position to receive 
any attack which the Federals might choose to 
make. Finding his wily adversary had gone, Mc- 
Clellan began to think about pursuit. Porter was 
pushed forward and crossed the river at a safe 
distance from the main body, but, falling upon 
Pendleton and his six hundred infantry, drove 
him off and captured four of his guns. A con- 
siderable force was established on the south shore 
when General Lee, who was some distance away, 
learned what had taken place ; he sent A. P. Hill 
back with orders to force Porter over the river. 
The scene which followed was frightful. The Fed- 
erals were attacked with such fury that they were 
driven headlong into the Potomac. Hundreds were 
taken prisoners, and hundreds more were drowned 
or shot. 

AVhen General Lee was in the neighborhood of 
Winchester, he issued the following general order 
to his gallant army, which had endured so many 
hardships : 



176 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
October 2, 1862. 
" General Order 
No. 116. 

" In reviewing the achievements of the army dur- 
ing the present campaign, the commanding general 
cannot withhold the expression of his admiration 
of the indomitable courage it has displayed in 
battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and 
hardship on the marcli. 

" Since your great victories around Richmond 
you have defeated the enemy at Cedar Mountain, 
expelled him from the Kappahannock, and after a 
conflict of three days utterly repulsed him on the 
plains of Manassas and forced him to take shelter 
within the fortifications around his capital. 

"Without halting for repose you crossed the 
Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper's Ferry, 
made prisoners of more than eleven thousand men, 
and captured upward of seventy pieces of artillery, 
all their small arms and other munitions of war. 

" While one corps of the army was thus engaged, 
the other ensured its success by arresting, at Boons- 
boro', the combined armies of the enemy advancing 
under their favorite geueral to the relief of their 
beleaguered comrades. 

" On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one- 
third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until 
dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed 
every attack along his entire front, of more than 
four miles in extent. 



ANTIETAM. 177 

" The whole of the following day you stood pre- 
pared to resume the conflict on the same ground, 
and retired next morning, without molestation, 
across the Potomac. 

"Two attempts subsequently made by the ene- 
my to follow you across the river have resulted in 
his complete discomfiture, each being driven back 
with loss. 

"Achievements such as these demanded much 
valor and patriotism. History records few exam- 
ples of greater fortitude and endurance than this 
army has exhibited, and I am commissioned by the 
President to thank you in the name of the Confed- 
erate States for the undying fame you have won 
for their arms. 

" Much as you have done, much more remains 
to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens 
us with invasion, and to your tried valor and 
patriotism the country looks with confidence for 
deliverance and safety. Your past exploits give 
assurance that this confidence is not misplaced. 

"R. E. Lee, 
^^ Commanding General." 

The battle of Antietam ended McClellan's mili- 
tary career. The North had manifested great im- 
patience with his long delay the previous year in 
marching against Bichmond : his popularity, how- 
ever, was very great, especially with his soldiers 
and subordinates ; and the impatience became exas- 

12 



178 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

peration when he shrank from vigorously pursuing 
Lee after the battle of Antietam, but he was en- 
gaged in organizing just such a pursuit when he 
received an order relieving him from the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, which was 
turned over to General Burnside. 



lY. 

THE CAMP-FIRES OF FREDERICKSBURG AND 
CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

BESTING ON THEIR ARMS. 

The Confederate army was in a deplorable con- 
dition. Cold weather was at hand, and the major- 
ity were in rags and without shoes. Still more, they 
were half starved and subjected to suffering which 
would have rendered desperate, men with half their 
courage. General Lee was urgent in his demands 
that the government should do something at once 
for the fire-tried veterans who had fought so hard 
for their country, but the government seemed un- 
able to rise to the occasion, and the citizens of 
Richmond and Petersburg became so indignant 
that they forwarded a large supply of shoes to 
the army. This stirred the authorities to do 
something. 

Meanwhile, the stragglers were rapidly gathered 
in, and their " vacation " had placed them in the 
best possible condition. The army rapidly aug- 

179 



180 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

mented, and in less tlian a month was in better 
condition than before. Those were jolly and en- 
joyable days, and the Confederates were a happy 
lot, overflowing with rugged health and exuberant 
spirits, dearly loving a frolic and continually sky- 
larking. Their sport may have been rude and 
boisterous, but it was honest and gave them the 
vitality they needed to carry them through the 
tremendous campaigns yet before them. 

"The only useful occupation of this brigade," 
wrote one of Jackson's soldiers, "has been to de- 
stroy all the railroads in reach — apparently, too, 
for no better reason than the fellow had for kill- 
ing the splendid anaconda in the museum : because 
it was his ' rule to kill snakes wherever found.' 

"It is when idle in camp that the soldier is a 
great institution, yet one that must be seen to be 
appreciated. Pen cannot fully paint the air of 
cheerful content, hilarity, irresponsible loungings 
and practical spirit of jesting that obtains, ready to 
seize on any odd circumstance in its licensed levity. 
A * cavalryman ' comes rejoicing in immense top- 
boots, for which, in fond pride, he has invested full 
forty dollars of pay ; at once the cry of a hundred 
voices follows him along the line : ' Come up out 
o' them boots! Come out! Too soon to go into 
winter-quarters ! Boots, where be you going with 
that fellow ?' A bumpkin rides by in an uncom- 
monly big hat, and is frightened by the shout, 
* Come down out of that hat ! 'Tain't any use to 



BESTING ON THEIR ARMS. 181 

say you ain't there, for we see your legs sticking 
out.' A fancy staff-officer was horrified at tlie 
irreverent reception of his nicely- twisted mous- 
tache as he heard from behind innumerable trees, 
' Take them mice out o' your mouth I We see 
their tails hangin' out.' Another, sporting im- 
mense whiskers, was urged to ' Come out of that 
bunch of har ! I know you're in thar : I see your 
ears working.' 

" Whenever there was great cheering along the 
line, it used to be said, 'It's either Jackson or a 
rabbit.' The meaning of this was that whenever 
a rabbit was started in the bivouac of a brigade 
the entire complement of officers and men would 
turn out to pursue Bunny, and, by heading him off 
here and turning him there, poor Bunny, who in 
the end would become bewildered by the diabol- 
ical yells and cheers which met him at every turn, 
was generally captured. General Jackson shunned, 
if he could, the demonstrations which greeted him 
whenever he passed a camp of his own corps or of 
Longstreet's. The men would gather on the road- 
side waving their hats and yelling like demons, the 
yells being taken up from camp to camp as ' Old 
Jack' went skurrying along on his old sorrel as 
fast he could lay feet to the ground. There was a 
spice of mischievousness in this, for soldiers are like 
schoolboys, and they knew how badly Jackson hated 
notoriety ; but their admiration and enthusiasm for 
him were such that they would have charged the 



182 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

very gates of Hades at his bidding. Never were 
more genuinely sorrowful tears shed than those 
that fell from the eyes of his army on Jackson's 
bier. 

" Just before the battle of Fredericksburg (Burn- 
side's), General J. E. B. Stuart presented Jackson 
with a brand-new uniform covered with gold lace 
and stars and as gaudy as a peacock's train. Jack- 
son had never worn it, but on the morning of the 
grand assault Stuart had j)ersuaded him to put it 
on. Accompanied by Stuart and some of his staff, 
he rode slowly in front of the Confederate lines from 
right to left; but he was not recognized until he 
reached Pickett's division, then placed in the centre 
of the line. Stuart mischievously pointed out the 
gorgeous-looking individual to some officer of the 
division, and it ran down the line like wildfire: 
' Old Jack's got a new uniform !' Instantly the men 
leaped upon the breastworks, yelling wildly and 
swinging their hats, until Jackson could bear it no 
longer ; but, turning a reproachful look upon Stu- 
art, he clapped spurs to his old sorrel and galloped 
off to his own command. Suffice it to say he pulled 
his new duds off as soon as he had an opportunity. 

" Now, who can explain the philosophy of it ? 
Neither Johnston nor Beauregard nor Longstreet 
nor Hill nor Early, nor even Jeb Stuart, was ever 
looked upon by the army in the same light as Lee 
and Jackson, and yet all these officers were wor- 
thy of enthusiastic admiration and unflinching 



BESTING ON THEIR ARMS. 183 

support. It is one of the mysteries that make us 
believe that actions and events are largely beyond 
the ken of the pure reasoning faculties." 

In the month of October, in accordance with 
an act of the Confederate Congress, the Army of 
Northern Virginia was divided into two corps, and 
the command of the First assigned to Major-Gen- 
eral Longstreet and that of the Second to Major- 
General Jackson. Longstreet's corps included the 
divisions of McLaws, Hood, Pickett and Walker; 
Jackson's, the divisions of A. P. Hill, Ewell and 
Jackson's old division, under General Taliaferro. 
General D. H. Hill commanded the reserve. Gen- 
eral Stuart the cavalry and General Pendleton the 
artillery. At that time the Army of Northern 
Virginia numbered about sixty thousand men. 

President Davis's extreme partiality was a great 
injury to the Confederacy. It was said that any 
man for whom he had formed a friendship years 
before was certain of a " soft " position under the 
new order of things, and the President shut his 
ears against every complaint made by aggrieved 
parties, no matter what their rank. He was unjust 
and severe to those for whom he formed a dislike, 
and could see no good in them. J. D. McCabe, Jr., 
as illustrative of this weakness on the part of the 
President, mentions the case of Colonel Northrop, 
commissary-general under the Confederate govern- 
ment. More than twenty years before, he and Mr. 
Davis had been friends in the Black Hawk war ; 



184 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

part of the interval had been spent by Northrop 
as a patient in an insane asylum. His appoint- 
ment to the important post named caused much 
surprise and indignation, but the President could 
not be dissuaded, and he sustained that officer 
against the whole country. General Lee joined 
the list of remonstrants and more than once urged 
the President to remove him for incompetency, 
but without avail. 

The wonder is how the Confederacy stood North- 
rop. He not only knew nothing of the duties 
of his office, but he insulted those who came in 
contact with him, and acknowledged the right of 
no one besides the President to presume to make a 
suggestion to him. His mismanagement and brutal- 
ity starved the army in the midst of plenty, robbed 
the people and in the end caused all classes to dis- 
trust and dislike the government ; yet when Senator 
Orr, on the 18th of January, 1864, when the cause 
was on the verge of the destruction to which Col- 
onel Northrop had contributed so greatly, waited on 
Mr. Davis to ask the removal of the commissary- 
general, the President declared to him that Col- 
onel Northrop was one of the greatest geniuses in 
the South, and that if he had the physical capacity 
he would put him at the head of an army. When, 
finally, he did resign, a general shout of thankful- 
ness went up from the whole South.* 

The army, as a matter of course, was paid in 

* A Bebd War^Clerk's Diary. 



BESTING ON THEIR ARMS. 185 

Confederate money, wliicli rapidly deteriorated in 
value; even their pittances reached them only at 
long intervals. Secretary Memminger showed an 
incompetency on a par with that of Northrop. 
Great wars and revolutions are the occasions when 
bad men flourish and sleek hypocrisy rolls up its 
ill-gotten gains. In the North men made fortunes 
in the bounty business, and millions were accumu- 
lated by the " trooly loyal " out of their contracts 
with the government, which were so fat that they 
fairly exuded oil. They were present in the South. 
Some of them strutted about in uniform, pretend- 
ing that trifling wounds were too severe to permit 
them to join the brave boys at the front ; some of 
them clamored for more vigorous measures on the 
part of the government, but took care that they 
received their wages in yellow gold ; some of them 
held back their corn for higher prices and calmly 
swore that the Federals had ruined their crops, and 
then looked upon the starving soldiers with assumed 
pity ; some of them locked up thousands of shoes 
and clothing, while there was nothing between the 
bare feet of the gra3^-jackets and the frozen ground. 
These wretches, in fact, were everywhere, and man- 
aged to cast an anchor to windward by sending a 
good quantity of gold to Europe to await their 
flight when the " cruel war was over." It seems 
inevitable that such shameful accompaniments 
should mark every revolutionary movement, and 
no surprise, therefore, should be felt that there was 



186 THE CAMP-FJBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

SO mucli of it both north and south of Mason and 
Dixon's line during the war. 

The Confederate government became uneasy over 
the preparations of the Federal authorities for a 
more vigorous prosecution of the war. They asked 
Lee to fall back to the valley, but he replied he 
was strong enough to beat McClellan, and said that 
if he withdrew it would be to yield his means 
of subsistence to the Federals, because he had 
not any way of carrying it with him. Instead of 
retreating before the enemy showed himself, he 
ordered the cavalry in the neighborhood of Cul- 
peper and Manassas to make more offensive oper- 
ations. 

General Lee organized a diversion with a view 
of inducing the Federals to draw off" some of the 
troops from McClellan's army or to cause him' to 
delay his advance into Virginia. General Loring 
was directed to march from Western Virginia with 
some eight thousand men, threaten Wheeling, and 
afterward join the Army of Northern Virginia by 
way of the Monongahela. Loring concluded that 
Lee didn't understand his business, and he there- 
fore declined to make the movement. As a conse- 
quence, Loring was removed ; but the Confederate 
government refused to allow Lee to draw any 
troops from Western Virginia to reinforce his 
own. Indeed, this policy of scattering was carried 
to a dangerous point by the government, despite 
the protests of the leading journals, and of Lee 



BESTING ON THEIR AR3IS. 187 

himself. It was utterly beyond tlie power of tlie 
Confederacy to defend its immense line of seacoast 
or one-half the extended points which were threat- 
ened. Its true course was to contract its lines and 
to concentrate its troops. 

The Baltimore and Ohio Kailroad was most un- 
fortunately located — that is, for its own welfare. 
It had been used by both Federals and Confeder- 
ates, and played an imj)ortant part in the war. 
At the beginning of hostilities. Sharp, the super- 
intendent of transportation, whose sympathies were 
strongly with the South, performed a most remark- 
able exploit. He ran about a dozen locomotives out 
to Martinsburg, had them taken from the rails, and 
under a strong military escort they were dragged 
by mules across the country over the turnpike to 
the nearest railroad-line, whence they were taken 
to Richmond. They did effective service during 
the war, and after the close of hostilities most of 
the engines were recovered by the Baltimore and 
Ohio road. Some of them were found as far south 
as New Orleans. 

Many strange experiences took place along the 
line of this railway. An engineer told the writer 
that one night he was running at a high rate of 
speed, only a short distance out of Baltimore. He 
had behind him some valuable supplies belonging 
to the Federal government, and a strong guard was 
on board. There was little fear of trouble, but of 
course he kept a vigilant lookout. He was intently 



188 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

watching the rails as the gleam of his headlight 
struck them, when all at once, to his unspeakable 
dismay, one of them leaped aside and bounded out 
of sight. There was no person near it, nor was 
there any evidence that it had been touched ; yet 
it not only bounded from its position on the ties, 
but went skipping and plunging down the bank 
into the woods, where it disappeared. The engi- 
neer reversed and applied his brakes, but he was 
so close to the gap that there was no saving the 
engine, which the next moment was bumping over 
the gravel and ties. The engine didn't upset, but 
it was badly damaged, and a long delay followed. 
Investigation showed that the missing rail had been 
unfastened and then carefully put back in place. 
Around each end was wound a telegraph-wire, 
which reached downward into the woods at the side 
of the track ; several men held the concealed ends 
and waited for the train. At the right instant the 
unfastened rail was snapped down the bank out 
of sight, after which those who did it ran back in 
among the trees and concealed themselves. 

As the war progressed this railroad-line became 
more useful to the Federals than to the Confeder- 
ates, and Lee determined to damage it to the utmost. 
Accordingly, some forty miles of it between Sir 
John's Kun and Harper's Ferry were destroyed 
and all the bridges and culverts blown up. 



CHAPTER Xyil. 

STUART'S RAID INTO PENNSYLVANIA. 

About this time General Stuart performed an 
exploit of such a daring nature that it won the 
admiration of the Federals as well as of the Con- 
federates. 

General Lee knew of the vigorous preparations 
on foot by his adversaries for the prosecution of 
the war, and he decided to learn something more 
definite; he therefore ordered "Jeb" (J. E. B.) 
Stuart to make an excursion into Pennsylvania 
in quest of this knowledge. General Stuart imme- 
diately organized a force of eighteen hundred men 
and four pieces of artillery, under the command 
of General Hampton and Colonels W. H. F. Lee 
(son of General Lee) and Jones. The men were 
enjoined to exercise propriety and to confine them- 
selves strictly to the objects of the expedition. On 
the morning of October 9, the command started on 
its perilous mission, and the following day crossed 
the Potomac between Hancock and Williamsport, 
driving off a Federal picket stationed there. A 
short distance out, on the National road, a dozen 
men in charge of a signal station were captured 

189 



190 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

with their flags and apparatus. By this means 
the interesting information was gained that a large 
Federal force had gone by, scarcely an hour be- 
fore, in the direction of Cumberland. Stuart was 
strongly tempted to dash into Hagerstown and 
secure the immense lot of Federal stores there, 
but the main object of his expedition would there- 
by be imperilled, and he kept straight ahead, fully 
alive to the value of every hour. 

Just as it was growing dark the galloping horse- 
men reined up in sight of Chambersburg. Having 
no knowledge of the force that might be in the 
place, Stuart felt that it .would not do to wait till 
morning; but he wished to give the women and 
children time to take themselves to a place of safety. 
He therefore sent a summons into the city demand- 
ing its surrender under a threat of almost immediate 
shelling in case of resistance. The officer who rode 
into the place with the summons hunted high and 
low for some official to whom to deliver it, but not 
one could be found. It looked as if all the fright- 
ened authorities had "resigned," but there were 
plenty of people in the streets, and to a number 
of these the order was read. Shortly after, the 
command rode into town and occupied it. 

The inhabitants, naturally enough, were in a 
state of excitement at sight of the Confederate 
cavalry among them, and for a time general con- 
sternation reigned everywhere; but General Stu- 
art assured all that if they would remain in their 



STUART'S RAID INTO PENNSYLVANIA. 191 

homes they would uot be disturbed. This pledge 
was kept in spirit and letter. The people at first 
peeped timidly out from their houses upon the 
bronzed troopers, but, finding them harmless so 
long as undisturbed, they viewed them more at lei- 
sure, and even ventured to enter into conversation 
with them. The troopers were models of courtesy 
and politeness, never intruding into a house with- 
out asking permission and returning profuse thanks 
for the attentions received. Indeed, the Confeder- 
ates were so scrupulously careful in this respect that 
they were bitterly denounced by the fiery Daniel 
in the Richmond Examiner for playing the part 
of milksops. "Treat them as they treat us!" he 
insisted. Nearly three hundred sick soldiers were 
found in the hospital in Chambersburg ; they were 
paroled and left where they were. A large lot of 
arms were destroyed, the railroad and telegraph 
wire cut, and the railroad-station, machine-shops 
and several trains of loaded cars were burned. 

By this time the Army of the Potomac, and, 
indeed, the whole North, knew of the startling 
raid on which Stuart was engaged. The call to 
capture the daring troopers came from every 
quarter, and McClellan resolved that not one of 
the party should escape him again. He quickly 
made preparations intended to render it impossi- 
ble for them to recross the Potomac. 

General Pleasanton, at the head of his fine cav- 
alry, was despatched in pursuit of Stuart, under 



192 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

orders to spare neither men nor horses and never 
to rest until the whole party were destroyed or 
captured. General Averill, on the Upper Poto- 
mac, was also directed to join in the pursuit, 
while General Crook, who was at Hancock, on his 
way to Western Virginia, was ordered to place his 
division on the cars, and to be ready to move to 
any point above Hancock in the event of Stuart 
attempting to return in that direction. The com- 
mander at Harper's Ferry was instructed to keep 
a sharp eye on every ford in his vicinity ; General 
Burnside was to send two brigades on the cars to 
Monocacy Junction, and to wait there, with steam 
up, ready to hasten to any point on the line which 
Stuart might threaten ; Colonel E-ush, at Fred- 
erick, was to keep his lancers ranging through 
the neighborhood of Chambersburg, so as to warn 
Burnside of Stuart's arrival ; while General Stone- 
man, at Poolesville, guarding the fords below the 
mouth of the Monocacy, was to prevent Stuart 
from crossing the river. 

With all these precautions, it would seem beyond 
the power of Stuart to extricate himself and his 
command from the labyrinth of danger in which 
they were involved. The situation was exciting; 
for while the cavalry leader knew that everything 
possible had been done and was under way to bag 
him, yet he was without definite knowledge of the 
nature of the measures taken by the Federals. It 
was not at all impossible, therefore, that he might 



STUART'S BAW INTO PENNSYLVANIA. 193 

run into tlie very trap set for him. He was con- 
vinced, however, that General Crook, whom he had 
so narrowly missed on his entrance into Federal 
territory, would do everything to head him off 
from the Upper Potomac. Carefully looking over 
the ground, the Confederate leader decided to take 
the most direct route, which led through Leesburg. 
It was necessary that the Federals should be de- 
ceived -as to his intentions. When, therefore, 
Stuart left Chambersburg, on the morning of 
October 11, he headed for Gettysburg, but after 
passing the Blue Kidge wheeled about, galloped a 
half dozen miles in the direction of Hagerstown, 
and then passed through Emmettsburg, where he 
was loudly cheered by the inhabitants, who in- 
formed him that he was directly behind a party 
of Rush's lancers. Scarcely reining up, Stuart 
galloped in the direction of Frederick, and speed- 
ily captured a messenger beariug a despatch from 
Colonel Rush. An examination of this despatch 
made known that while the Federals were un- 
certain of the precise locality of Stuart, yet they 
were making thorough preparations to secure him. 
The value of this despatch lay in the fact that it 
gave him a pretty clear idea of the nature of the 
arrangements for his capture. 

Stuart felt that it was no time to let the grass 
grow under his feet, and he certainly was in im- 
minent danger of being taken by the enemy. He 
followed a bee-line toward the Potomac and crossed 

1.3 



194 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the Monocacy a short distance from Frederick, 
pressing onward through Liberty, New Market 
and Monrovia, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
and at break of day on the 13th he was in Hyatts- 
town, which was on IMcClellan's line of wagon- 
communication with Washington. Several wagons 
were captured, and the troops galloped into Barnes- 
ville, out of which a squadron of Federal cavalry 
had ridden but a short time before. 

By this time Stuart had a clear idea of the 
plans of McClellan. He was aware that a divis- 
ion of five thousand men were vigilantly guarding 
the fords in front of him. Every passing hour 
increased his peril, and, believing that the boldest 
course was the safest, he continued straight for the 
Potomac, prepared to cut his way through whatever 
troops might oppose. The point at which he aimed 
was Poolesville ; but when he came in sight of it, 
he wheeled aside and took to the woods, speedily 
debouching into the highway leading from Pooles- 
ville to the mouth of the Monocacy. 

The troopers were no more than fairly in the road 
when they found themselves confronted by the head 
of the column of General Pleasan ton's cavalry, who 
were on their way to Poolesville. Stuart instantly 
charged and drove them back on their infantry, 
which boldly advanced to recover the lost ground. 
The Confederates leaped from their horses and hot- 
ly engaged the Federal skirmishers. The latter 
were held in check until the artillery could be 



STUART'S RAID INIO PENNSYLVANIA 195 

brought up, when Pelham promptly opened with 
his single piece, which did most effective service. 
Aided by this "bombardment" and the conceal- 
ment of the ridge on which Pelham was firing, 
Stuart hurried his command to White's Ford, scat- 
tering with the rest of his artillery some two hun- 
dred Federal infantry on the Virginia shore. As 
good fortune would have it, the interposing canal 
was dry, and the Confederates crossed to the south 
side of the Potomac without the least difficulty. 

Stuart was no more than fairly on the Virginia 
shore when the cavalry and infantry of General 
Stoneman came forward on the rush. Pelham 
received them with his guns, favorably located on 
the proper side of the stream, and held back Stone- 
man from crossing the stream in ]3ursuit. General 
Stuart leisurely retired from the river during the 
day, and on the 14th rejoined the army at Win- 
chester. On the march not a man was killed, 
though two of them lost their way and two or 
three others were wounded. An unexpected re- 
sult from this brilliant raid was the ruin of many 
Federal horses. Those belonging to Pleasanton and 
Averill were so completely used up that they were 
worthless, and the advance of the Army of the Po- 
tomac was delayed until they could be replaced. 

As evidence of the extraordinary vigor of this 
raid, it may be stated that Stuart marched between 
eighty and ninety miles in twenty-four hours, while , 
Pleasanton did almost as well. 



196 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

The following is the despatch which General 
Lee sent to Richmond: 

"Winchester, Va., October 14, 1862. 

" Hon. G. W. Randolph : 

"The cavalry expedition to Pennsylvania has 
returned safe. They passed through Mercers- 
burg, Chambers burg, Emmettsburg, Liberty, New 
Market, Hyattstown and Burnsville. The expe- 
dition crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, 
and recrossed at White's Ford, making the entire 
circuit, cutting the enemy's communications, de- 
stroying arms, etc., and obtaining many recruits. 

"E. E. Lee, General." 

Late on the night of November 7, General Mc- 
Clellan was sitting in his tent at Pectortown talk- 
ing with General Burnside. A violent snow-storm 
was raging, and the particles sifted against the tent 
like so much fine sand. By and by, when there 
was a lull in the conversation. General Bucking- 
ham was presented as the bearer of despatches 
from Washington. He handed a letter to Mc- 
Clellan, who opened and read the following: 

" War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 
Washington, November 5, 1862. 
" General Orders, 
No. 182. 

"By direction of the President of the United 
States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan 



STUART'S RAID INTO PENNSYLVANIA. 197 

be relieved from the command of the Army of the 
Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take 
the command of that army. 

"By Order of the Secretary of War. 

"E. D. TOWNSEND, 

^'Assistant Adjutant- General." 

McClellan read the desj^atch through carefully, 
and then, without the least agitation, passed it 
over to Burnside with the remark, 

"Well, general, you are to command the army 
now." 



CHAPTER Xyill. 

THE UNION ADVANCE. 

At the time McClellan was relieved from the 
command of the Army of the Potomac he was well 
advanced on his new campaign against the Army of 
Northern Virginia. The Federal forces numbered 
one hundred and ten thousand men fit for duty. 
McClellan's plan contemplated an advance up 
the Shenandoah Valley, directly against Lee, but 
President Lincoln was strongly in favor of enter- 
ing Virginia east of the Blue Eidge, in the attempt 
to cut off the Confederate army from Richmond ; 
he promised McClellan thirty thousand more men 
if this plan was followed. The advance, however, 
was deferred until bad weather set in and the roads 
became almost impassable, but the route east of 
the Blue Kidge was finally agreed upon. 

McClellan's plan, as stated by himself, was as 
follows : " To move the army well in hand parallel 
to the Blue Eidge, taking Warrenton as the point 
of direction for the main body, seizing each pass 
in the Blue Ridge by detachments as we approached 
it, and guarding them after we had passed so long- 
as they would enable the enemy to trouble our 
communications wath the Potomac. We depended 

198 



THE UNION ADVANCE. 199 

upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until 
the Manassas Gap Railway was readied; when 
that occurred, the passes in our rear were to be 
abandoned and the army massed, ready for action 
or movement in any direction. It was my inten- 
tion, if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, 
I found that the enemy were in force between it 
and the Potomac, in the Valley of the Shenandoali, 
to move into tlie valley and endeavor to gain his 
rear. I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did 
expect that by striking in between Culpeper Court- 
House and Little Washington I could either sep- 
arate their army and beat them in detail or force 
them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and 
thus place the Army of the Potomac in position 
to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon 
Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula if, 
as I apprehended, it was found impossible to sup- 
ply it .by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad 
beyond Culpeper." 

But the days went by, and still McClellan did 
not move. Finally the impatient President sent 
him peremptory orders to advance, and the move- 
ment was begun at Berlin, five miles below Harper's 
Ferry. On the 2d of November the entire army 
was across the river. 

The very hour that Lee learned of McClellan's 
advance he put his own army in motion. He com- 
prehended the Federal plan of campaign, despite 
the efforts made to mask it, and sent one division 



200 THE CAMP-FIJiES OF GENEEAL LEE. 

of Longstreet's corps to the neighborhood of Up- 
per ville to Avatch the movemeuts of the Federals. 
Jackson ^Yas ordered to take position on the road 
betAveen Berryville and Chark^stown, to prevent 
any advance from Harper's Ferry and to check 
any movement through the passes of the Bhie 
Ridge into the valley. The cavalry was directed 
to co-operate with him. 

In the latter part of October the Union army 
began withdrawing from the mountiiins and moved 
toward AYarreuton. Longstreet's corps immediately 
passed the Blue Eidge and posted itself at Culpeper 
Court-House. In order to .delay the Federal army 
by exciting the fears of General McClellan for the 
safety of his rear, Grcneral Jackson was ordered to 
remain for some time near Milhvood. He advanced 
one of his divisions to the east side of the Blue 
Kidge, and remained west of it with his main body. 
As soon as Long'street moved to Culpeper the cav- 
alry were withdrawn from the valley and sent after 
him. The danger to which this separation of the 
two portions of the Confederate army exposed Gen- 
eral Lee was very great, and would have been rash- 
ness on the part of any commander had it not been 
required by the necessities of the case. It is said 
that both Generals Lee and Jackson were convinced 
of their ability to foil the designs of General Mc- 
Clellan, in spite of the risk attending a division of 
the army.* 

* Cix)ke's Life of StonmxiM Jackson. 



THE UNION ADVANCE. 201 

General Burn side was without the ability to com- 
mand the Army of the Potomac, and he knew it. 
He had declined twice before to become .its leader, 
and gladly would he have evaded the great respon- 
sibility a third time. He shrank from taking the 
mantle from McClellan's shoulders, and it was a 
bright day for the Confederate cause when he con- 
sented to do so. Assuming command of the fine 
army, he remained quiet at Warrenton for ten days, 
while he familiarized himself with his new duties. 
An important step was taken by consolidating the 
six corps of his army into three grand divisions 
of two corps each, the right grand division being 
under General Sumner, the centre grand division 
under General Hooker and the left grand division 
under General Franklin. 

At this time the Confederate army was divided 
by two marches, and Burnside was presented with a 
most inviting oi^portunity for striking a. blow; but 
he had made " other arrangements," and did not 
propose to be diverted from them. His plan was 
to march direct to Fredericksburg and establish 
himself on the south side of the Rappahannock 
before his design could be detected and interfered 
with. There is good authority for saying that at 
that time the Federal leader had no fixed cam- 
paign in his mind, but he hoped to be able to 
spend the winter with his army in Fredericks- 
burg, within easy reach of his base of supplies. He 
did not favor the overland route to Eichmond, but 



202 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

hoped, when spring should come, to embark his 
entire army and repeat McClellan's attempt to 
reach the Confederate capital by way of the Pe- 
ninsula. 

When the Union commander explained ' his plan 
of operations, it aroused no enthusiasm in Wash- 
ington ; but assent was given, and on the 15th of 
November the movement in front of Warrenton 
began. The scheme was that the army should 
move along the northern side of the Rappahan- 
nock to Falmouth, where it would cross by means 
of a ponton-bridge (the boats of which were to 
be forwarded from Washington) and take posses- 
sion of the bluffs on the other shore. He had 
scarcely begun the movement when General Lee 
detected his purpose, but he made no attempt to 
interfere with his adversary. As the army of Lee 
was only about half that of Burnside, his inten- 
tion was to avoid a battle unless his opponent 
tempted it by some great blunder on his part, 
or unless Lee was forced to deliver battle in self- 
defence ; in which event, he meant it should be 
from his own chosen position. His ultimate in- 
tention was to hold the Federal army at bay by a 
series of manoeuvres and counter-movements until 
the season was too far advanced for it to attempt 
anything before spring. Burnside's purpose being 
apparent, Lee at once instituted a counter-move- 
ment, passing the Bapidan and hurrying in the 
same direction. A reconnoissance by Stuart left 



THE UNION ADVANCE. 203 

no doubt of the Federal plan, and Lee moved with 
his accustomed vigor and promptness. 

General Sumner with the advance of the Fed- 
eral army arrived opposite Fredericksburg on the 
afternoon of November 17. The little town at 
that time was occupied by a regiment of Virginia 
cavalry, four companies of Mississippi infantry and 
a single light battery. It would have been a very 
easy matter for Sumner to cross and seize the 
heights back of the place, and he was anxious to 
do so, but Burnside forbade him. The other two 
grand divisions speedily followed, and on the 
evening of the 20th the entire Army of the Poto- 
mac was concentrated opposite Fredericksburg ; but 
when Burnside looked across the narrow river to 
the heights beyond, he saw the crimson flags and 
the multitudinous gray-coats grimly awaiting him. 
At that time, too, Stonewall Jackson was hasten- 
ing thither ; so that Lee was confident of having 
his whole army in hand in time to repel the Fed- 
eral assault. 

Finding himself confronted by the Army of 
Northern Virginia, under the matchless Lee him- 
self, Burnside could only proceed to establish his 
communications by way of Aquia Creek and com- 
plete his preparations for the tremendous assault 
upon the Confederate lines. His troops were post- 
ed along the northern shore from opposite Port 
Koyal to a point above Falmouth. Aquia Creek 
was made his base of supplies, and the railroad 



204 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

from that point to the Rappahannock was com- 
pleted. Burnside had thrown away a golden 
opportunity that could never come again when 
he forbade Sumner to cross the river and seize 
the heights on the other side, but now, having 
resolved on an advance movement, he delayed no 
longer than was absolutely necessary. 

Lee employed himself in strengthening his new 
position. A strong battery was posted on the bank 
four miles below Fredericksburg, so as to prevent 
any Federal gunboats from ascending the Rap- 
pahannock. The fords above were also closely 
guarded by the cavalry, and W. H. F. Lee and 
his brigade were at Port Royal sharply watching 
their adversary. 

When Burnside felt ready to make the attempt 
to cross, there were no ponton-trains, and they 
did not arrive until a week later — a period which, 
it need not be said, was improved to the utmost 
by the Confederate leader. Rash and reckless as 
Burnside sometimes showed himself to be, he did 
not dare to throw his army against the tiers of 
cannon which frowned upon him from the com- 
manding heights behind Fredericksburg. A flank 
movement seemed indispensable, and preparations 
for making it at Skenker's Neck, twelve miles 
below Falmouth, were set on foot; but before 
anything could be done the Confederates discov- 
ered the project, and met it with such efiective 
means that it was abandoned. 



THE UNION ADVANCE. 205 

The Confederate left seemed vulnerable to a 
movement up the Kappahannock, but none was 
attempted. Why it was not cannot be fully under- 
stood; but one discovery had much weight with 
Burnside: he learned that his threatened advance 
across the river at Skenker's Neck had caused Lee 
to station a large force at that point to prevent 
the turning movement. The Federal commander, 
therefore, was of the belief that by making a sud- 
den advance Lee and his army would be taken at 
great disadvantage and driven from their entrench- 
ments before the force at Skenker's Neck could be 
summoned to their assistance. Could Burnside 
have forced this plan to the conclusion, he hoped 
it would have been a triumph indeed ; but there 
were the gravest reasons for fearing a disastrous 
repulse. The most skilful leader might well shrink 
from taking such a risk against an army of proven 
courage under such a chieftain as Lee, but Burn- 
side did not hesitate, and on the 10th of Decem- 
ber, 1862, the prejDarations were complete for open- 
ing the battle of Fredericksburg. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE BIGHT. 

Let us look over tlie scene of conflict before 
the bloody drama opens. 

Fredericksburg lies on the south bank of the 
Rappahannock, and directly opposite extends a 
range of hills which completely command the city. 
On the southern shore the land is lower, but the 
depth of the channel is such that a line of bluffs 
is formed, which serve as excellent entrenchments 
for a force after crossing to attack the troops be- 
yond. The only offset to this advantage is a range 
of hills enclosing the level ground. Beginning 
on the west of Fredericksburg — where it is called 
" Marye's Hill" — it curves around back of it, grad- 
ually sloping away from the city, until about a 
mile from the river it becomes a level plain. It is 
thus seen that it is easy for a strong force to cross 
the Rappahannock from the northern shore, because 
the bluffs command the opposite city and banks, 
while on the southern side the opponents must 
necessarily post themselves so far back that little 
resistance can be offered. It was not difiicult for 
the Federal army to reach the other shore, but the 

206 



THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE BIGHT. 207 

all-important question was, What was to be done 
after it got there? 

On the night of December 10, General Hunt, 
chief of artillery of Burnside's army, posted one 
hundred and forty-seven cannon on the Stafford 
Heights, designed to command the city, to protect 
the crossing of the river and to occupy the atten- 
tion of the Confederate batteries beyond. Burn- 
side's plan was to cross at five different points by 
means of ponton-bridges, three of which were to 
span the river opposite the city and two a couple 
of miles below. The grand divisions of Sumner 
and Hooker were to use the upper, and Frank- 
lin's grand division the lower, bridge. 

Lee could not prevent the Federals from coming 
over, and his dispositions were made with that fact 
in view, and with the purpose of opening on his 
adversary after he should plant himself on his side 
of the E,a23pahannock. With a view of annoying 
the Federals as much as possible while attempting 
the crossing, the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Mississippi regiments, of Barksdale's brigade, were 
posted along the southern shore. They were able 
to secure good shelter, and were very successful in 
their work. 

Burnside made his preparations with great 
secrecy, and at two o'clock on the morning of 
December 11 the working- parties cautiously moved 
down to the edge of the stream and began launch- 
ing the boats and constructing the bridges. A 



208 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

heavy fog overhung the Rappahannock, which 
gave ground for the hope that the hridges might 
be finished without discovery ; but the Confeder- 
ates were on the alert, and the Federals were no 
more than fairly at work when the boom of two 
cannon in quick succession announced that the 
movement was discovered. 

The Mississippians in Fredericksburg were wide 
awake. In the stillness of the night they could 
hear the bridge-builders, and as the wintry morn- 
ing slowly broke they caught the outlines of the 
spectral forms through the mist. The riflemen 
instantly opened with such effective aim that the 
toilers were driven from their work. The attempt 
was several times repeated, but the Mississippians 
commanded the situation until they were dislodged 
by a furious bombardment from the one hundred 
and forty-seven Federal cannon. 

This bombardment was frightfully disastrous to 
Fredericksburg. Many of the citizens who had 
fled on the first alarm had returned with their fam- 
lies, believing they were in no danger. Burnside 
gave no notice of his intention, but opened with 
such fury that consternation, terror and widespread 
death followed. In the bleak morning the women 
and children fled to the open fields, half clothed 
and terrified, while others crouched in the cellars 
of their houses and tremblingly prayed for the 
awful storm to subside. The bombardment lasted 
an hour, during which tons of death-dealing mis- 



THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE BIGHT. 209 

siles were hurled into the city, and it was set on 
fire in several places. Little else, however, was 
accomplished, for the guns could not be depressed 
enough to reach the sharpshooters along-shore, 
while the Confederate army was too far removed 
to receive any material injury. 

At noon another attempt was made to lay the 
ponton-bridge, but the workmen were again driven 
off. Then Burnside hastily crossed three regiments 
in boats, who drove the Mississippians into the 
upper part of the town ; after which, but a few 
minutes sufficed to complete the structure. Later 
in the afternoon Howard's division of Couch's corps 
passed over and entered the town, the Mississip- 
pians keeping up the fight until dark, when they 
were withdrawn. Franklin found no such diffi- 
culty when he attempted to lay his bridges, two 
miles below. The sharjjshooters were without j^ro- 
tection, and were easily driven off; so that by noon 
he had completed the means for transporting his 
division across the river. 

The sheltering mist and fog still brooded over 
the river and served the Federals well. All 
through the raw and chilly night of Decem- 
ber 11, during the following day and part of the 
following night their legions were hurrying over 
the ponton-bridges which spanned the stream. 
The Confederates crouched among the hills above, 
grimly awaiting the hour for opening the death- 
struggle. By dawn of the 13th the entire Army 

14 



210 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of the Potomac was on the southern shore of the ^ 
Kappahannock, and at the same hour the whole 
Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated on 
the heights behind Fredericksburg. 

General Lee's position was as follows : Long- 
street's corps constituted the left, with Anderson's 
division resting on the river, and those of McLaws, 
Pickett and Hood extending to the right in the 
order named. Ransom's division supported the 
batteries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot 
of which Cobb's brigade, of McLaws's division, and 
the Twenty-fourth North Carolina, of Ransom's 
brigade, were stationed, protected by a stone wall. 
The immediate care of that point was given to 
General Ransom. The Washington Artillery oc- 
cupied the redoubts on the crest of Marye's Hill, 
and those on the height to the right and left were 
held by part of the reserve artillery. Colonel E. P. 
Alexander's battalion and the division batteries 
of Anderson, Ransom and McLaws. A. P. Hill, 
of Jackson's corps, was posted between Hood's right 
and Hamilton's Crossing, on the railroad ; his front 
line, consisting of the brigades of Pender, Lane and 
Archer, occupied the edge of a wood. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Walker, with fourteen pieces of artillery, 
was posted near the right, supported by the Forti- 
eth and Thirty-fifth Virginia regiments, of Field's 
brigade, commanded by Colonel Brockenborough. 
Lane's brigade, thrown forward in advance of the 
general line, held the woods, which here projected 



THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT 211 

into the open ground. Thomas's brigade was sta- 
tioned behind the interval, between Lane and Pen- 
der, and Gregg's in rear of that, between Lane and 
Archer. These two brigades, with the Forty-seventh 
Virginia regiment and the Twenty-second Virginia 
battalion, of Field's brigade, constituted General 
Hill's reserve. Early's and Taliaferro's divisions 
composed Jackson's second line, D. H. Hill's divis- 
ion his reserve. His artillery was distributed along 
his line in the most eligible positions so as to com- 
mand the open ground in front. General Stuart, 
with two brigades of cavalry and his horse-artil- 
lery, occupied the plain on Jackson's right, extend- 
ing to Massaponax Creek.* 

This position of Lee was one of unusual strength, 
and fully justified his confidence that he could suc- 
cessfully resist every attempt of the Federals to carry 
it. Burnside, having failed to surprise Lee, deter- 
mined to storm the Confederate position. His plan 
contemplated the assault of Jackson at Hamilton's 
Crossing by Franklin's grand division, which com- 
posed the Union left, strengthened by one of Hook- 
er's corps, the force including about one-half the 
Federal army. The point aimed at was the weak- 
est part of the Confederate line. After carrying 
it Franklin was to seize the railroad and the wag- 
on-road leading to Richmond, while Sumner with 
the rest of the army was to storm the formidable 
heights on Lee's left. 

* General Lee's report. 



212 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Early on the morning of the 13th, General Lee 
mounted his horse at his headquarters, in the rear 
of his centre, and galloped along his line of bat- 
tle toward his right, where he expected the main 
assault would be made; Generals Jackson and 
Stuart rode with him. The cavalry leader was, as 
usual, in full uniform ; but Lee was in his suit of 
plain gray, with slouch hat, high cavalry-boots, 
short cape, without sword and with little to denote 
his exalted rank. Jackson amazed every one by 
his appearance; he was clothed in a uniform so 
gorgeous that it fairly dazzled the eyes of the be- 
holders. The fact was, as we have stated in another 
place, the uniform was a present to him from Stu- 
art, who mischievously enjoyed the fun it caused 
among the soldiers and the disgust of Jackson 
himself over the attention he excited. 

The Confederate army was in high spirits, and 
cheered the leaders as they rode along the lines. 
The officers continued until they reached the river- 
road approaching Fredericksburg parallel to the 
line of battle; there they paused and endeavored 
to find out whether the Federal line was moving. 
The fog would not permit them to see clearly, but 
from the gray mist came the hum and muffled roar 
which told of the number in motion. General Lee 
■was still intently peering into the obscurity, when 
the near crack of rifles fell upon his ears : the Fed- 
eral sharjDshooters had caught sight of the famous 
leaders and were firing at them. Lee remained sev- 



THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE BIGHT. 213 

eral minutes as though unconscious that he was the 
target for so many bullets, and then rode back in 
his dignified fashion until he reached the eminence 
in his centre, near the telegraph-road; there he 
stationed himself, so as to overlook and direct the 
battle. 

It was near ten o'clock when the fog lifted and 
the combatants gained a clear view of each other. 
The column of General Franklin was seen moving 
to attack the Confederate right, near Hamilton's 
Crossing. The force was Meade's division, which 
was checked for a time by an extraordinary ob- 
struction in the form of a single section of a bat- 
tery of Stuart's horse-artillery, under the command 
of the daring youth Major Pelham ; he was on the 
Port Royal road, and opened a destructive enfilad- 
ing fire upon the Federal left. Four of their bat- 
teries hotly replied, but he held his ground until 
ordered to withdraw by Stuart. Thereupon Frank- 
lin extended his left down the Port Royal road, and 
opened his batteries ui^on Jackson's lines. Receiv- 
ing no rej)ly, the Federal infantry were pushed for- 
ward toward the position held by Walker's guns. 
When but little more than two thousand feet sepa- 
rated them, Walker's fourteen guns converged on 
the advancing line with such fury that for a few 
minutes it was thrown into confusion. The men 
soon rallied, however, and rushed forward, assail- 
ing Jackson's front line, under A. P. Hill. Before 
an open space between the brigades of Archer and 



214 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Lane could be closed Meade's two diyisions swarmed 
through, and forced back Hill's men upon Jackson's 
second line. Jackson immediately brought up this 
line, which included the divisions of Early, Trim- 
ble and Taliaferro. Attacking the Federals in front 
and on both flanks, they were driven over the rail- 
road upon the plain beyond. Taliaferro's division 
routed the Federals from the woods in front and 
drove them into the railroad-cut, from which they 
were dislodged by Hoke and Atkinson's batteries 
and forced across the plain to the shelter of their 
own batteries. The assault on Jackson's extreme 
left was repulsed by his artillery, while Early drove 
back his assailants until checked by the guns on 
Stafford Heights. Thus the attack of Franklin 
had failed, and for the rest of the day he occupied 
himself in shelling the Confederate line and in 
skirmishing with Jackson's advanced infantry. 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE. 

The withdrawal of the Federal attack on the 
Confederate right was accompanied by the thunder 
of Sumner's assault upon Lee's left. In obedience 
to Burnside's order, this attack was made by a 
single division, suijported by another division. 
General French led the former, and Hancock 
supported it. 

It was about noon when the Federals debouched 
from Fredericksburg and made the desperate at- 
tempt to seize Marye's Hill. From the moment 
they emerged from the town and came into fair 
range they were exposed to a severe fire, which 
rapidly assumed the most murderous character. 
The Federals were mowed down and gaps opened 
in their ranks which Longstreet declared could be 
seen a mile distant. Still the brave men pressed 
steadily forward with a courage worthy of a better 
leader, until the discharge of musketry became a 
literal torrent of flame, as if from the mouth of 
hell itself. No living creature could stand such 
a concentrated tempest, and the shattered columns 
broke and fled, leaving the ground covered with 
dead and dying to the number of one-half the 

215 



216 THE CAMP-FIBESOF GENERAL LEE. 

attacking force. This repulse was one of the 
bloodiest of the war. 

Kight behind French came Hancock, who was 
joined by the fragments of the first line, which 
still preserved its formation, and with the same 
dauntless courage as before they swept into the 
maelstrom of death. For five — ten — fifteen min- 
utes they held their ground with the men melt- 
ing like snowflakes in the sun, until of the five 
thousand whom Hancock led into the charge 
more than two thousand were dead or helpless on 
the ground. But the carnage was not yet com- 
plete, and Howard's division now rushed into the 
crater, Sturgis's and Gettys's divisions of the 
Ninth Corps advancing to the helj) of the sur- 
vivors of the Second Corps, who could go no far- 
ther, and yet would not retire. They succeeded in 
holding for a time their position, though they were 
subjected to a fire so destructive that the wonder 
is they maintained the ground at all. 

It is hardly to be supposed that General Burn- 
side had contemplated the bloody sequence to which 
he was committing himself when first he ordered a 
division to assail the heights of Fredericksburg, but, 
having failed in the first assault, and then in the 
second and third, there grew up in his mind some- 
thing which those around him saw to be akin to 
desperation. Riding down from his headquarters, 
at the Phillips house, about a mile back from the 
river, to the bank of the E-appaliannock, he walked 



THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE. 217 

restlessly up and down, and, gazing over to the 
heights across the river, exclaimed vehemently, 
" That crest must be carried to-night !" Already, 
however, everything had been thrown in except 
Hooker, and he was now ordered over the river.''' 
But Hooker had not parted with his brains, 
even though Burnside had done so. He crossed 
with his three divisions, carefully reconnoitred 
the ground, and saw that he had been directed to 
do that which was absolutely impossible : it was 
only taking his men forward and placing them 
where they were certain to be slaughtered without 
the power to do anything against their enemy. 
Hooker went to Burnside and begged him to with- 
draw his order, but the commander refused. Couch 
had already pushed his men forward, and was striv- 
ing to open a breach large enough to permit the 
rush of the Federals. Nothing, however, was ac- 
complished, and Humphrey's division was formed 
in column of assault and ordered to charge. They 
dashed forward with unloaded muskets, and suc- 
ceeded in advancing as far as Hancock's men had 
done a short time before, when they nearly reached 
the stone wall. Four thousand were in the column 
of assault : in a few minutes seventeen hundred 
were stretched on the ground, and the rest broke 
and fled. The slaughter was appalling, and the 
generalship inconceivable in its stupidity. And 
yet, bloody as was the repulse, there is reason to 

* Swiuton. 



218 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

believe tliat another "charge" would have been 
ordered by the commander had not the gathering 
darkness compelled a cessation of hostilities. 

The night which closed in upon the scene was 
dreadful beyond conception. The Army of the 
Potomac had • suffered the most terrible repulse 
in its history. Of the brave soldiers who had 
marched resolutely forward in obedience to the 
blundering orders, eleven hundred and eighty 
were dead, nine thousand and twenty-eight wound- 
ed and twenty-one hundred and forty-five were 
prisoners. They had stormed the impregnable 
heights of Marye with an unfaltering courage 
which commanded the admiration of the Confed- 
erates themselves ; and when at last forced to flee, 
they left more than six thousand of their num- 
ber either dead or wounded at the base of the 
hill. And the blindest private among the wound- 
ed and survivors knew that it never ought to have 
been ! 

When the different leaders met the commander 
in the gloom of the evening, they were unanimous 
in urging that the army should recross the Rap- 
pahannock without delay ; but Burnside shook his 
head. He had determined upon another assault 
on the morrow, and had, indeed, issued orders to 
that end. There can be no doubt that his brain 
was overweighted by the enormous load of respon- 
sibility, and he was in no condition to command 
such an army. He announced his intention of 



THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE. 219 

leading his old Ninth Corps ; fortunately, how- 
ever, the counsels of his wise and intrepid lieu- 
tenants prevailed, and at the last moment he gave 
over the wild project. 

The loss of Lee, including those of the 11th, 
were fi^e hundred and ninety-five killed, three 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-one wounded 
and six hundred and fifty-three prisoners. This 
was less than one-half the Federal loss, and the 
moral effect of the achievement on the Army of 
Northern Virginia amounted almost to inspiration. 
It was anxious that the fight should be renewed on 
the morrow, and Lee expected that such would be 
the case. 

But the Army of the Potomac had received a 
well-nigh fatal blow. The soldiers lay on their 
arms all the next day — which was Sunday — dis- 
pirited beyond expression and expecting an attack 
from Lee, who, had he known their demoralized 
condition, could have destroyed or captured them 
all. Indeed, he had the cannon-balls heated with 
which to bombard Fredericksburg, where the Fed- 
erals were huddled together; but the Confederate 
leader wished to save his ammunition for the ex- 
pected attack. 

For two days the dead and wounded lay stretched 
on the frozen ground between the lines of the com- 
batants. No more horrible picture of war can be 
imagined than that of the writhing and dying sol- 
diers vainly begging for the help which could not 



220 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

be given tliem. Biirnside finally asked for a few 
hours in which to carry off his wounded. 

The night of the 15th was marked by a vio- 
lent tempest of wind and rain ; in the unspeakable 
gloom and utter darkness the Federal army made 
its way back to the northern shore. On the fol- 
lowing morning General Lee discovered what had 
taken place, though even then he suspected another 
attack upon him was intended. But the battle of 
Fredericksburg was over, and its result was a woeful 
disaster for the Union cause and a corresponding 
triumph for the Southern Confederacy. A few days 
were sufficient to show that no further demonstra- 
tion would be attempted by the Federal army before 
the following spring. The Confederates established 
themselves in winter quartei'S along the Rappahan- 
nock, from Fredericksburg to Port Koyal, and were 
as comfortable as possible in their rude huts. 

On the last day of the " year of battles " Gen- 
eral Lee issued the folio win 2; : 

" Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
December 31, 1862. 

" General Order 
No. 132. 

"The o-eneral commandino- takes this occasion to 
express to the officers and soldiers of the army his 
high appreciation of the fortitude, valor and devo- 
tion displayed by them, which, under the blessing 
of almighty God, have added the victory of Fred- 
ericksburg to the long list of their triumphs. 



THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE. 221 

"An arduous marcli performed with celerity 
under many disadvantages exhibited the discipHne 
and spirit of the troops and their eagerness to 
confront the foe. 

" The immense army of the enemy completed 
its preparations for the attack without interruption, 
and gave battle in its own time and on the ground 
of its own selection. 

" It was encountered by less than twenty thou- 
sand of this brave army, and its columns, crushed 
and broken, hurled back at every point with such 
fearful slaughter that escape from entire destruc- 
tion became the boast of those who had advanced 
in full confidence of victory. 

" That this great result was achieved with a loss 
small in point of numbers only augments the admi- 
ration with which the commandins; oeueral reo'ards 
the prowess of the troops, and increases his grati- 
tude to Him who hath given us the victory. 

" The war is not yet ended. The enemy is still 
numerous and strong, and the country demands 
of the army a renewal of its heroic efibrts in its 
behalf. Nobly has it responded to her call in the 
past, and she will never appeal in vain to its 
courage and patriotism. 

"The signal manifestations of divine mercy 
that have distinguished the eventful and glorious 
campaign of the year just closing give assurance 
of hope that, under the guidance of the same 
almighty Hand, the coming year will be no less 



222 T1J£ OAMP-FIEES OF GENERAL LEE. 

fruitful of events that will ensure the safety, peace 
and happiness of our beloved country and add 
new lustre to the already imperishable name of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. 

"E. E. Lee, Generah" 



EICHAED KIEKLAND, THE HUMANE HERO OF 
FEEDERICKSBUEG. 

" ' Camdkn, S. C, January 29, ISSO. 

"'To THE Editor of the "News and Courier:" 

" ' Yonr Columbia corrospoiulent referred to tlve ineideut narrated 
here, telling the story as 'twas told to liim, and inviting corrections. 
As such a deal should be recorded in the rigid simplicity of actual 
truth, I take the liberty of sending you for publication an accurate 
account of a transaction every feature of which is indelibly impressed 
upon my memory. 

" ' \'«ry truly youi-s, 

" ' J . B. Kershaw.' 

"Eiohani Kirkland was the son of John Kirklaud, an estimable 
citizen of Kershaw county, a plain, substantial farmer of the olflen 
time. In 1S(U he entered as a private Captain J. D. Kennedy's c<.im- 
pimy (E) of the Second South Carolina volunteei-s, in which company 
he was a sergeant in Decembei-, 18l)2. 

"The day after the sanguinary battle of Fredericksburg, Kershaw's 
brigade occupied the road at the foot of Marye's Hill and the ground 
about Marye's house, the scene of their desperate defence of the day 
before. One hundred and fifty yards in front of the road, the stone 
facing of which constituted the famous stone wall, lay Syke's division 
of i-egulars, Ignited States army, between whom and our tivops a mur- 
derous skirmish occupied the whole day, latal to many who heed- 
lessly exposed themselves even for a moment. The ground between 
the lines was bridged with the wounded, dead and dying Feilerals, vic- 
tims of the many desperate and gallant assaults of that column of thirty 
thousand brave men hurled vainly against that impregnable position. 
All that day those wonndeil men rejit the air with their groans ivnd 
their agonizing cries of 'Watex! water 1' 



THE DECISIVE STBUOGLE. 223 

"111 the afternoon the general sat in the north room, up stairs, of 
Mi"s. Stevens's house, in I'rout of the road, surveying the fieUl, ■when 
Kirkhuul came up. Willi an expression of indignant remonstrance 
pervading his person, his manner and the tone of his voice, he said, 

"'CJeneral, I can't stand this.' 

"'What is the matter, sergeant?' asked the general. 

"He replied, 

"'AH night and all day I have heard those poor people crying for 
water, and I can stand it no longer. I come to ask permission to go 
and give them ivater.' 

" The general regarded him for a moment with feelings of profound 
admiration, and said, 

" ' Kirkland, don't you know that you would get a bullet through your 
head the moment you stepped over the wall?' 

"'Yes, sir,' he said, 'I know that; but if you will let me, I am will- 
ing to try it.' 

"After a pause the general said, 

" ' Kirkland, I ought not to allow you to run a risk, but the senti- 
ment which actuates you is so noble that I will not refuse your request. 
Trusting that God may protect you, you may go,' 

"The sergeant's eye lighted up with pleasure. He said, 'Thank you, 
sir,' and ran rapidly down stairs. The general heard him pause for a 
moment, and then return, bounding two steps at a time. He thouglit 
the sergeant's heart had failed him. He was mistaken. The sergeant 
stopped at the door and said, 

'"General, can I show a white handkerchief?' 

"The general slowly shook his head, saying emphatically, 

"'No, Kirkland, you can't do that.' 

"'AH right,' he said; 'I'll take the chances,' and ran down with a 
bright smile on his handsome countenance. 

" With profound anxiety he was watched as he stepped over the wall 
on his errand of mercy — Ohristlike mercy. Unharmed he reached the 
neai'est suH'erer. He knelt beside him, tenderly raised the drooping 
head, rested it gently upon his own noble breast, and poured the pre- 
cious life-giving tluid down the fever-scorched throat. This done, he 
laid him tenderly down, placed his knapsack under liis head, straight- 
ened out his broken limb, spread his overcoat over him, replaced his 
empty canteen with a full one, and turned to another sufferer. By this 
time his purpose was well understood on both sides, and all danger wtis 
over. From all parts of the field arose fresh cries of ' Water ! water ! 
For God's sake, water!' More piteous still the mute appeal of some who 
could only feebly lift a hand to say, ' Here, too, is life and sufl'eriug.' 



224 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" For an hour and a half did this ministering angel pursue his labor 
of mercy, nor ceased to go and return until he relieved all the wounded 
on that part of the field. He returned to his post wholly unhurt. Who 
shall say how sweet his rest that winter's night beneath the cold stars ? 

" Little remains to be told. Sergeant Kirkland distinguished himself 
in battle at Gettysburg and was promoted lieutenant. At Chickamauga 
he fell on the field of battle in the liour of victory. He was but a youth 
when called away, and had never formed those ties from which might 
have resulted a posterity to enjoy his fame and bless his country, but he 
has bequeathed to the American youth — yea, to the world — an example 
which dignifies our common humanity." 



CHAPTER XXI. 

BUBNSIDE'S MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 

General Buenside was a valiant and able 
corps commander, but he demonstrated his utter 
unfitness to handle an army. Such a disastrous 
repulse as the Army of the Potomac had suf- 
fered could be due only to the incompetency of 
its leader, for braver and more heroic soldiers 
never shouldered the musket. We have shown 
how he disregarded the protests of Hooker when 
the latter was ordered to make a charge certain to 
end in frightful disaster, and how he was barely 
dissuaded by the united voice of all his command- 
ers to withdraw an order for a general movement 
which would have resulted in another sanguinary 
defeat. The North was exasperated, and the mo- 
rale of the army itself was seriously impaired. It 
was impossible that it should be otherwise : Burn- 
side's officers had no confidence in his military 
judgment, and the soldiers themselves looked 
upon him as incompetent. He keenly felt all this, 
and, stung to the quick, determined on one more 
effort to recover his waning, if not lost, prestige. 

The first of these movements was undertaken 

15 225 



226 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

toward the close of December. His intention was 
to cross the Rappahannock seven miles below Fred- 
ericksburg, so as to turn the Confederate position, 
and at the same time to send a cavalry expedition 
to cut Lee's communications with Richmond. All 
the preparations were complete, and the raiding 
column had actually started when the commander 
received a despatch from Washington forbidding 
him to enter upon active operations without first 
consulting the President. Naturally enough, Burn- 
side was angered. The cavalry expedition was re- 
called, and he proceeded to Washington to obtain 
an explanation of the reason why he was checked 
on the eve of an important demonstration. The 
explanation was promptly given him, and it was 
not calculated to salve his wounded feelings. Pres- 
ident Lincoln said that certain general officers of 
the army had been to see him with the information 
that another movement was contemplated, and they 
earnestly urged the President to forbid it, for they 
were morally certain it could end only in disas- 
ter. While the President did not prohibit General 
Burnside from active operations, yet he gave him 
to understand that nothing of the kind was to be 
undertaken until after full consultation with the 
government. 

The general found himself in a humiliating 
position. The North was clamoring for him to 
" do something," and yet his own officers and sol- 
diers had lost faith in his ability, and the comman- 



THE MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 227 

der-in-cliief of the army and the navy held him 
motionless. He saw but the single way out of his 
galling situation : that was to organize a campaign 
whose promise of success would win the consent 
of the President, push it to triumph, and thus 
reinstate himself in the confidence of the army; 
but, as Swinton tersely says, "unfortunately, suc- 
cess was already too necessary to him, and he made 
too much contingent upon it; for if success was 
needful as the means of recovering the confidence 
of the army, this very confidence was itself indis- 
pensable as a condition of success." 

Burnside's second plan was to cross the Rappa- 
hannock six miles above Fredericksburg, at a point 
which was fordable in summer, but impassable in 
winter. He explained his purpose to President 
Lincoln, and requested him to approve of it or 
to accept his resignation. The President listened 
carefully until all the details were made clear, when 
he told Burnside to go ahead and he hoped better 
fortune would attend bim that time. The general 
thereupon proceeded to "go ahead." 

As Lee had a force in observation at each point 
where a crossing was likely to be attempted, it was 
decided to make several feints both above and 
below the place selected, so as to conceal the real 
purpose from the Confederate commander. Sig- 
el's corps, which had lately joined the Army of the 
Potomac, was stationed so as to guard the commu- 
nications with Falmouth, while that of Couch was 



228 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

to draw attention to the lower part of the river. 
New roads were cut through the forest, to facili- 
tate the movements of the forces, batteries planted, 
rifle-trenches formed and numerous demonstra- 
tions made at different points. 

The roads were in excellent condition and the 
weather was favorable. January 19 the columns 
were put in motion, and the next night the grand 
divisions of Franklin and Hooker bivouacked near 
the proposed crossing. The preparations were 
speedily completed. The ponton-bridges, which 
had already more than once done duty, were placed 
a short distance back of the river, positions for the 
artillery were selected, and it was decided that the 
passage should be made the following morning. 
But the elements mercifully intervened. A fierce 
tempest of rain swept over the men, who painfully 
toiled in sleet and darkness, drawing the pontons 
nearer the river and dragging the guns into po- 
sition. The weather became biting cold, and all 
through the long hours of inky gloom the brave 
men struggled and floundered in the mud, which in 
that section of the Union assumes a character that 
renders it the worst on the face of the earth. When 
the dismal morning light forced its way through the 
chilling rain, the preparations were not completed ; 
and, besides, the watchful Confederates had discov- 
ered what was going on, and were massed ready to 
repulse the intended crossing. Such being the case 
and the rain still pouring, it would be supposed that 



THE MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 229 

Burnside would be quick to see the utter hopeless- 
ness of the enterprise ; but not so : he kept his poor 
fellows at the wretched business. When the mules 
were hitched to the pontons, they sank to their 
bellies in the sticky paste, floundered, and gave 
up exhausted without stirring the boats ; then long 
ropes were attached, and hundreds of men tugged 
and pulled and tumbled about in the rain and 
mud, and gave up, pantiug and exhausted. 

While the Federals were thus employed the 
Confederates called across the river with such 
unnecessary expressions as "How are you mak- 
ing out, Yanks?"— "All together, now!"— "Here 
we go !" — " Stop and rest, boys, and we'll go over 
in the morning and help you!" 

Burnside persisted in keeping his men at the 
utterly useless toil until the morning of the 22d ; 
the rain was still descending, and he was com- 
pelled to see that it was not only impossible to 
make any advance, but that it would be a her- 
culean task for his army to extricate itself from 
the fathomless sea of mud in which it was strug- 
gling. Not only that, but the three days' rations 
with which they set out were nearly gone. Even 
the commander was compelled to face the hard facts, 
and the order to withdraw was given. Corduroy- 
roads were constructed, and by superhuman exer- 
tions the cannon and vehicles were dragged away 
from the river, which, fortunately, was so swollen 
that the Confederates could not interfere seriously 



230 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

with the retreat, though their stinging taunts ac- 
companied the disheartened Federals until they 
were beyond hearing. 

Burnside was bowed down over the failure of 
his last undertaking. No doubt he felt that the 
stars in their courses were fighting against him; 
but when the elements intervened and prevented 
the crossing in the depth of winter, it was a merci- 
ful intervention indeed. No intelligent person can 
study the situation without reaching the conclu- 
sion that the Union army, under the circumstances, 
had not the slightest prospect of success, and, with 
the Rappahannock behind it, it is hard to conceive 
how it could have been extricated from its exceed- 
ingly perilous situation. In writing to the Rich- 
mond government, Lee said, " It was fortunate for 
the Federals that they failed to get over the river." 
Knowing how careful and modest Lee was in ex- 
pressing his views, it is impossible not to grasp the 
tremendous height and breadth and depth of those 
few words. 

The dismal collapse of the " mud-march," as it 
was called, threatened for a time to destroy the 
morale of the Union army. What little confidence 
the leading officers possessed at one time in their 
commander was irrecoverably gone, and the rank 
and file sought not to conceal their disgust. 

It was natural that General Burnside should 
feel embittered toward the leaders who distrusted 
his ability; it was natural, also, that he should 



THE MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 231 

attribute his failure to their lack of sympathy and 
co-operation. Feeling that such a state of affairs 
could not continue, he determined on heroic meas- 
ures. He therefore made an official request of 
President Lincoln that he would dismiss Generals 
Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane from the 
service of the United States, and would deprive 
Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero and 
Colonel Taylor of their respective commands. The 
only charge that could be brought against these 
men — ^known to be among the most competent in 
the army — was that they lacked confidence in their 
chief. Had the President done as requested, the 
Army of the Potomac would have been hopelessly 
disorganized. AVhen Burnside presented as the 
alternative the acceptance of his resignation, the 
President did not hesitate : Burnside was relieved 
January 25, and the name of his successor was the 
very first which appeared on the list of those who 
he demanded should be dismissed from the service 
of the United States. 

The winter of 1862-63 was a very severe one. 
As early as December a number of the Federal 
pickets were frozen to death while standing guard 
on the Rappahannock, and the condition of the 
Confederate army was deplorable. They were mis- 
erably clothed, and Lee himself notified the War 
Department that several thousand of his men were 
barefooted. He asked the government to seize all 
the shoes in the hands of speculators, pay an equi- 



232 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

table price and distribute them among the soldiers. 
Tbe suggestion, however, was not adopted. 

Like the illustrious Father of his Country, Lee 
shared the privations and sufferings of his men. 
He declined the proffer of a house in which to 
establish his headquarters, but used what is known 
as a " house-tent," scarcely differing from those in 
which the privates slept. It was pitched in a small 
opening in the wood, close to the narrow road lead- 
ing to Hamilton's Crossing, while the tents of the 
officers of his staff were grouped near. The only 
evidence that this was the headquarters of the army 
was the presence of an orderly, who was there to 
summon couriers to carry despatches. 

" Within, no article of luxury was to be seen ; 
a few plain and indispensable objects were all which 
the tent contained. The covering of the command- 
er-in-chief was an ordinary army-blanket, and his 
fare was plainer, perhaps, than that of the major- 
ity of his officers and men. This was the result 
of an utter indifference in Lee to personal conve- 
nience or indulgence. Citizens frequently sent 
him delicacies, boxes filled with turkeys, hams, 
wines, cordials and other things peculiarly tempt- 
ing to one leading the hard life of a soldier, but 
these were almost uniformly sent to the sick in 
some neighboring hospital. Lee's principle in so 
acting seems to have been to set the good example 
to his officers of not faring better than his men, 
but he was undoubtedly indifferent naturally to lux- 



THE MUD-MABCH.—IN WINTER QUARTERS. 233 

ury of all descriptions. In his habits and feel- 
ings he was not the self-indulgent man of peace, 
but the thorough soldier, willing to live hard, to 
sleep upon the ground and to disregard all sensual 
indulgence. In his other habits he was equally 
abstinent. He cared nothing for wine, whiskey 
or other stimulant, and never used tobacco in any 
form. He rarely relaxed his energies in anything 
calculated to amuse him, but when not riding along 
his lines or among the camps to see in person that 
the troops were properly cared for, generally passed 
his time in close attention to official duties con- 
nected with the well-being of his army or in cor- 
respondence with the authorities at Hichmond. 
When he relaxed from this continuous toil, it was 
to indulge in some quiet and simple diversion, 
social converse with ladies in houses at which he 
chanced to stop, caresses bestowed upon children 
— ^with whom he was a great favorite — and fre- 
quently in informal conversation with his officers. 
At ' Hayfield ' and ' Moss Neck,' two hospitable 
houses below Fredericksburg, he at this time often 
stopped, and spent some time in the society of the 
ladies and children there. One of the latter, a 
little curly-headed girl, would come up to him 
always to receive her accustomed kiss, and one 
day confided to him, as a personal friend, her de- 
sire to kiss General Jackson, who blushed like a 
girl when Lee, with a quiet laugh, told him of 
the child's wish. On another occasion, when his 



234 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

small friend came to receive his caress, he said, 
laughing, that she would show more taste in select- 
ing a younger gentleman than himself, and, point- 
ing to a youthful officer in a corner of the room, 
added, 'There is the handsome Major Pelham;' 
which caused that modest young soldier to blush 
with confusion. The bearing of General Lee in 
these hours of relaxation was quite charming and 
made him warm friends. His own pleasure and 
gratification were plain and gratified others, who 
in the simple and kindly gentleman in the plain 
gray uniform found it difficult to recognize the 
commander-in-chief of the. Southern army. 

" No one doubted during the war that General 
Lee was a sincere Christian in conviction, and his 
exemplary moral character and life were beyond 
criticism; beyond this it is doubtful whether any 
save his intimate associates understood the depth 
of his feeling on the greatest of all subjects. Jack- 
son's strong religious fervor was known and often 
alluded to, but it is doubtful if Lee was regarded 
as a person of equally fervent convictions and 
feelings. And yet the fact is certain that faith 
in God's providence and reliance upon the Al- 
mighty were the foundation of all his actions and 
the secret of his supreme composure under all 
trials. He was naturally of such reserve that it 
is not singular that the extent of this sentiment 
was not understood. Even then, however, good 
men who frequently visited him and conversed with 



THE MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 235 

him upon religious subjects came away with their 
hearts burning within them. When the Rev. J. 
William Jones, with another person, went, in 1863, 
to consult him in reference to the better observance 
of the Sabbath in the army, his eye brightened and 
*his whole countenance glowed with pleasure, and 
.as in his simple, feeling words he expressed his 
delight we forgot the great warrior, and only 
remembered that we were communing with an 
humble, earnest Christian.' When he was informed 
that the chaplains prayed for him, tears started to 
his eyes, and he rej^lied, * I sincerely thank you for 
that, and I can only say that I am a poor sin- 
ner trusting in Christ alone, and that I need all 
the prayers you can offer for me.' " * 

One of the several remedies which Lee proposed 
to his government was adopted. He had suffered 
much inconvenience in the previous campaigns on 
account of his inferior artillery and poor fixed 
ammunition. As he possessed a number of supe- 
rior guns which had been captured from the Fed- 
eral army, he replaced his old ones with them, 
so far as they went, while all his twelve-pounder 
howitzers and smooth-bore six-pounders were recast 
into twelve-pounder Napoleon, ten-pounder Parrott 
and three-inch rifle-guns. As a consequence, the 
army was soon better supplied in that respect 
than ever before. 

Meanwhile, the Army of the Potomac was buck- 

* J. E. Cooke's Life of Lee. 



236 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ling on its armor for the spring campaign. Beaten 
though it had been again and again, demoralized 
and shattered by its repeated change of leaders, 
abused by those who stayed at home and found 
their principal employment in criticising the ope- 
rations in the field, it still retained its vitality to an 
amazing degree, and was the nucleus around which 
soon gathered another host, sufficient, it would 
seem, under capable leadership, of sweeping all 
resistance from its path. 

When General Burnside was relieved of its 
command, it was necessary to find another, and, as 
we have intimated, the choice fell upon Joseph 
Hooker, or " Fighting Joe," as he had come to be 
known. He was a soldier of unquestioned ability 
and courage, as he had proved on more than one 
bloody field, and, what was of equal importance, he 
possessed the unbounded confidence of his fellow- 
officers and the soldiers who were to serve under him. 
He at once instituted a number of wise reforms in 
the army. He checked the wholesale desertion by 
removing the causes for it ; he abolished the " grand 
divisions " and infused his own warm vitality into 
the different corps, to each of which was given a 
distinctive badge; to those who were homesick — 
and, indeed, to all who desired it — -he granted fur- 
loughs ; he united the cavalry under one leader 
and rendered it what it should have been — one of 
the most effective arms of the service. He had the 
good sense to see that no important movement could 



THE MUD-MARCH.— IN WINTER QUARTERS. 237 

be made during the tempestuous season, when the 
atrocious roads were impassable, and the time, 
therefore, which must elapse before the setting in 
of spring was wisely occupied in preparing for the 
momentous campaign which was then to open. 

And so it was that when spring came the 
Army of the Potomac numbered one hundred and 
twenty thousand men, with twelve thousand fine- 
ly-equipped cavalry and an artillery force of more 
than four hundred guns. It was composed of the 
First Corps, under General Reynolds ; the Second, 
under General Couch; the Third, under General 
Sickles; the Fifth, under General Meade; the 
Sixth, under General Sedgwick; the Eleventh, 
under General Howard; and the Twelfth, under 
General Slocum. 

The Confederate army was much weaker in 
point of numbers, for General Lee had detached 
two divisions, under Longstreet, for operations 
south of the James River, and those which were 
left showed an effective force of about fifty thou- 
sand men. 



Y. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

PBELIMINABY MOVEMENTS. 

When the next bloody drama opened, General 
Lee and his army occupied the heights ta the 
south of the Rappahannock, from Skenker's. Creek 
to United States Ford — a distance of twenty-five 
miles. He had closely guarded all the available 
crossings of the river, and had so disposed his 
troops that they could readily be concentrated 
upon any threatened point. 

On the morning of March 16, General Stuart 
received a despatch from his chief informing him 
that a column of Federal cavalry was in motion 
and urging him to be on the watch for it along 
the Upper Rappahannock. A small force was 
stationed at Kelley's Ford and General Fitz Lee's 
brigade was placed in readiness to repel any dem- 
onstration. Nevertheless, the pickets were lax, and 
General Averill and his cavalry easily forced the 
passage of the river on the following morning and 
captured the picket-guard. Pushing rapidly for- 

238 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 239 

ward, they collided with Fitz Lee's brigade, and 
a rattling fight opened, and lasted several hours. 
The losses were severe on both sides, those of the 
Confederates including the gallant young Major 
Pelham, who had won such remarkable fame as 
an artillerist. The Federals were finally compelled 
to withdraw, and a period of inactivity lasted until 
about the middle of Aj)ril. Then, when the roads 
were in good condition. Hooker put in operation 
his formidable scheme for the capture of Rich- 
mond and the crushing of the " rebellion." 

Briefly stated, the Federal campaign was as fol- 
lows : Hooker proposed to launch his main army 
against Lee's left by crossing it at Kelley's Ford, 
twenty-seven miles above Fredericksburg, and pass- 
ing around his flank to Chancellors ville. The Con- 
federate right was so strongly posted that it was 
secure. This was to be Hooker's main movement, 
he thinking, with the best of reason, that if it suc- 
ceeded Lee would be compelled to abandon his 
almost impregnable entrenchments and accept bat- 
tle on ground chosen by his enemy. With a view 
of masking his real purpose. Hooker's plan was to 
cross the Happahannock directly opposite Freder- 
icksburg with much flourish, as though his real 
attack was to be made there. The main column 
was composed of the Fifth Corps, under Meade ; the 
Eleventh Corps, under Howard ; and the Twelfth 
Corps, under Slocum. They arrived at Kelley's 
Ford on the 28th of April, and crossed that night 



240 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

with slight opposition, reaching the Kapidan on the 
afternoon of the same day. The points were Ely's 
and Germanna's fords, where the water was quite 
deep and swift. Time was all-important for the 
Federals, and the men were ordered to strip and 
wade the stream. They did so, supporting their 
clothes and cartridge-boxes on their bayonets. The 
crossing was picturesque and ludicrous in the high- 
est degree. The men were in fine spirits, and they 
frolicked like so many schoolboys. Many a bun- 
dle carefully held aloft received a mischievous jolt 
which brought it into the water, and all sorts of 
pranks were played upon one another. In the deep- 
est portion the current reached the armpits of the 
soldiers, numbers of whom were carried off their 
feet, but they were " speared " by a cavalry picket 
below, and the following morning saw the entire 
force safely over. The artillery and trains crossed 
by means of the ponton-bridges. This force, it 
will be borne in mind, was under the immediate 
charge of Hooker himself. Couch's Second Corps 
remained at United States Ford to guard the Kap- 
pahannock at that point until Hooker had marched 
far enough down -stream to uncover it, when it was 
to cross the river and rejoin him at Chancellorsville. 
This programme was carried out without break or 
hindrance, and the four corps bivoucked at Chan- 
cellorsville that night, Thursday, April 30, after 
a long and tedious march. At the same time, 
Hooker established his headquarters in the ham- 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 241 

let, which consisted of a single large brick house 
and several outbuildings. 

The Federal commander had done excellently 
well so far: he had placed himself in a position 
which took in reverse Lee's entire line, and he 
had fifty thousand well-equipped and disciplined 
men under his immediate command, all eager for 
the fray. 

While Hooker was prosecuting this movement 
Sedgwick was equally busy. Early on the morn- 
ing of the 29th he threw three bridges across the 
Kappahannock three miles below Fredericksburg. 
A strong column passed over during that and the 
succeeding day and made formidable demonstra- 
tions, as though it was the intention to attack the 
Confederate position in the rear of the town. Lee 
did not penetrate the meaning of Hooker's move- 
ments until after the crossing of the Rappahan- 
nock, on the 29th, though the Confederate leader 
strongly suspected that an attack was intended on 
his left. 

On the afternoon of April 30, Hooker's troops 
reached Chancellorsville. Posey and Mahone's 
commands had been withdrawn from Banks's and 
Ely's fords by General Anderson and concentrated 
at Chancellorsville ; General Wright's brigade also 
reinforced the Confederate forces shortly after. 
Then General Anderson fell back from Chancel- 
lorsville to Tabernacle Church and awaited Lee, who 
was calmly studying the development of Hooker's 

16 



242 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

intentions. Though, as we have said, he suspected 
the meaning of Sedgwick's demonstrations, he was 
too prudent to act upon his suspicion until it be- 
came certainty ; that certainty was reached on the 
evening of the 30th, when he learned that Sedg- 
wick was sending troops to Hooker at Chancellors- 
ville. Thereupon, General Jackson was ordered 
to march at once to Anderson's support with his 
entire command, excepting Early's division, which 
remained to confront Sedgwick. The order to 
General Jackson was handed him in the evening, 
and he set out to obey it about midnight, taking 
A. P. Hill's, Rodes's and Colston's divisions. He 
marched steadily until the next morning, when he 
reached Tabernacle Church. 

The single brick house honored with the name 
of " Chancellorsville " is about ten miles from 
Fredericksburg, and is in the centre of an almost 
unbroken expanse of thicket and stunted wood, 
known by the name of the "Wilderness." One 
who is familiar with it says, "There all is wild, 
desolate and lugubrious. Thicket, undergrowth 
and jungle stretch for miles, impenetrable and un- 
touched. Narrow roads wind on for ever between 
melancholy masses of stunted and gnarled oak. 
Little sunlight shines there; the face of Nature 
is dreary and sad. It was so before the battle ; it 
is not more cheerful to-day, when, as you ride 
along, you see fragments of shell, rotting knap- 
sacks, rusty gun-barrels, bleached bones and grin- 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 243 

ning skulls. Into this jungle General Hooker pen- 
etrated. It was the wolf in his den, ready to tear 
any one who approached. A battle there seemed 
impossible; neither side could see its antagonist. 
Artillery could not move; cavalry could not ope- 
rate ; the very infantry had to flatten their bodies 
to glide between the stunted trees. That an army 
of one hundred and twenty thousand men should 
have chosen that spot to fight forty thousand, and 
not only chosen it, but made it a hundred times 
more impenetrable by felling trees, erecting breast- 
works, disposing artillery en masse to sweep every 
road and bridle-path which led to Chancellors- 
ville, — this fact seems incredible." 

But it was no part of Hooker's scheme that he 
should be imprisoned in the Wilderness. He fol- 
lowed the retiring Confederate force in the direc- 
tion of Fredericksburg until clear through the 
Wilderness, and, reaching the open country be- 
yond, made his preparations for battle on ground 
admirably fitted for the handling of a large body 
of men. Besides, the distance separating Hooker 
from Sedgwick was shortened one-half and com- 
munication between the two rendered easy. 

A brief way beyond Chancellorsville, toward 
Fredericksburg, is an elevated ridge which com- 
mands the former as well as the region known as 
the Wilderness, and from which the Federal army 
could advance into the open country behind Fred- 
ericksburg. Hooker could not fail to perceive the 



244 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE 

priceless value of this elevation to whomsoever 
could secure it. On the morning of the 1st of 
May he pushed on from Chancellorsville, forcing 
back Anderson's command, and thus gaining the 
ridge. While in the act of doing so Jackson 
arrived. He instantly hurried the brigades of 
Kamseur, McGowan, Heth and Lane to Ander- 
son's assistance, holding the rest in reserve. 

Jackson appeared at a most critical moment, 
but Hooker scarcely waited to identify the Con- 
federate force, when, to the amazement of the other 
officers, he gave orders to withdraw from the eleva- 
tion and to take position in the Wilderness. The 
leaders protested against the movement, impress- 
ing upon him the enormous value of the ridge just 
secured; but all the fight seemed to have been 
knocked out of Hooker. He had decided to fall 
back to Chancellorsville, assume the strongest posi- 
tion possible, and there await the attack of Lee. The 
unquestionably brave Federal leader seemed to have 
been suddenly stricken with an absolute collapse of 
all the qualities which had won for him the compli- 
mentary sobriquet of "Fighting Joe." His army 
withdrew as ordered, and took form in the jungle, 
which was one of the very worst fighting-grounds 
that could have been chosen. Jackson, as was to 
have been expected, immediately occupied the ridge 
which had been turned over to him very much as 
a gentleman rises from his chair and bows a lady 
to it. Jackson followed the Federals until under 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 245 

the fire of their works at Chancellorsville. He was 
too wise with his small force to attack his enemies 
in their strong position, and he fell back a short 
distance and awaited the arrival of Lee, who joined 
him at nightfall with the rest of McLaws's and An- 
derson's divisions. 

Hooker's line of battle ran east and west along 
the Fredericksburg and Orange Court-House plank- 
road, with Chancellorsville placed in the middle of 
a clearing. The line was some five miles in length, 
reaching from a short distance east of Chancellors- 
ville westward in front of the Orange plank-road 
for three miles, when the right flank bent sharply 
back in a defensive crotchet. Meade's corps (Fifth), 
with one division of Couch's (Second), formed the 
left ; Slocum's corps (Twelfth) and one division of 
Sickles's (Third) , the centre ; and Howard's (Elev- 
enth), the right. The other divisions were held in 
reserve. As General Hooker had concluded to 
fight a defensive battle, trees were felled in front 
of the line to form abatis and rifle-pits were thrown 
up, and during the whole night the woods resounded 
with the strokes of a thousand Confederate axe-men 
engaged at the same work.* 

Bad as was the position in which the Federal 
commander had placed his army, General Lee him- 
self was in a situation so perilous that all his mas- 
terly genius was required to avert disaster and to 
lead it to another of its many triumphant victories. 

* Swinton. 



246 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

He had an army of forty thousand men at Chan- 
cellorsville, and General Early, with eight thou- 
sand more, held the heights of Fredericksburg. It 
will be observed, therefore, that the Confederate 
army was in a very critical position ; for should 
General Hooker and his eighty thousand men at 
Chancellorsville, and Sedgwick with his thirty 
thousand men at Fredericksburg, seek to come 
together, the Confederate army would be crushed 
between them. Again, if Sedgwick should assail 
Early at Fredericksburg and drive him from his 
position (as undoubtedly he could do), it would 
then be an easy matter for .Sedgwick to fall upon 
Lee's rear, while Hooker could advance from Chan- 
cellorsville, and, between the two Federal columns, 
the Confederate army was in great danger of being 
ground to atoms. 

What should be done ? 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT. 

In this desperate situation of the Confederate 
army Stonewall Jackson submitted a plan to his 
chief, which the latter accepted and acted upon at 
once. The proposal was worthy of the great and 
daring brain which conceived it, and stamped Stone- 
wall Jackson as one of the most brilliant soldiers 
of his time. It was this : General Lee with the 
divisions of McLaws and Anderson was to keep 
Hooker engaged all the next day by threatening 
demonstrations, while Jackson moved with his 
corps around the Federal right wing and by a 
sudden resistless attack doubled it up upon Hook- 
er's centre, took his line in reverse and shut him 
off from his line of retreat by way of United States 
Ford. In accordance with this admirable scheme, 
General Lee commenced a series of demonstrations 
the following morning (Saturday, May 2) against 
the Federal left. He first attacked Couch's corps, 
on the left, then Slocum's, in the centre, slowly 
and steadily moving to the right until Hooker was 
fully convinced that he intended to play into his 
hands by assailing his powerful army in its en- 

247 



248 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

trencTied position. But all this time Stonewall 
Jackson and his battle-tried veterans, twenty-two 
thousand altogether, were executing their splendid 
flank movement. A requisite to success was that 
it should be concealed from the Federal army. 
Jackson had started at an early hour, and a little 
more than a mile from Chancellorsville he left 
the plank-road and took the Old Mine road, in the 
direction of the Furnace, a group of old buildings 
used for smelting iron, and lying between two 
and three miles to the right of Chancellorsville. 

Just as Jackson and his men reached this point 
General Sickles discovered the rapidly-moving sol- 
diers, but, as the road dips to the southward near the 
hill. Sickles made the natural mistake of suppos- 
ing the Confederates were retreating toward Rich- 
mond. He hastily sent forward two divisions to 
reconnoitre, and, suddenly surrounding the Twen- 
ty-fourth Georgia after the passage of the main 
column, nearly the whole regiment was captured. 
General Sickles was so certain the Confederates 
were withdrawing that he telegraphed the result to 
Hooker, who, equally positive, sent word to Sedg- 
wick : " We know the enemy is flying, trying to 
save his trains; two of Sickles's divisions are 
among them." 

Pleasanton's cavalry and two brigades of infantry 
were sent to the help of Sickles, while Jackson was 
doing his utmost to reach a position from which to 
deliver his terrible blow. It was difiicult to force 



JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT. 249 

their way through the broken country, and the 
road was very narrow for the passage of artillery. 
Striking the Brock road, Jackson turned into and 
followed it until he reached the point where it 
crosses the Orange plank-road, quite near the 
Federal flank. A moment later General Fitz 
Lee pointed out a hill from the top of which could 
be seen the entire Federal position ; acting On this 
suggestion, Jackson quickly grasped the situation. 
One of his aids was sent to order the column to 
cross the plank-road, thus gaining the turnpike. 
This was effected late in the afternoon, and the 
Federal line was thus completely turned. With- 
out losing a minute, the troops were made ready 
for action. Rodes's division was deployed in line 
of battle to the left of the turnpike, A. P. Hill 
and Colston following close after with artillery and 
advancing along the road in column. Jackson had 
not only determined to strike the Federal flank, 
but he was resolved on executing a much more 
important movement, and one of amazing daring : 
it was to extend his lines to the left, swing round 
the left wing, and thus interpose himself between 
Hooker and the Kapidan. The Federal line, against 
which Jackson made ready to launch his men like 
so many thunderbolts, reached across the old turn- 
pike, and behind it was a second line, covered by 
artillery in the earthworks at Chancellorsville. It 
was Howard's Eleventh Corps, that was all uncon- 
scious of what was coming. 



250 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

The Federal troops were mostly at supper, when 
their blood was curdled by the fierce yells which 
suddenly rent the air, and Jackson and his brave 
men burst upon them with the resistless fury of a 
cyclone. The rout was complete and the demoral- 
ization indescribable. E-odes and his men with their 
frightful outcries stormed the works, swarmed like 
a mountain-torrent over them, and, pressing on^ fol- 
lowed by the division in the rear, captured or killed 
everybody that came within reach. The Federal 
artillery dashed off, the horses lashed to a dead run, 
and the guns, bounding against tree-trunks and 
stumps, were quickly overturned. No such wild 
panic had been seen during the war, and it was 
pushed with resistless impetuosity. Colston's divis- 
ion overtook Rodes's line, and the two leaped into 
the Federal works together. Colonel Crutchfield, 
Jackson's chief of artillery, lost no time in hurrying 
his batteries to the front and opening a hot fire on 
the Federal works at Chancellorsville. The infan- 
try pressed steadily onward until the whole Elev- 
enth Corps were flying like chaff in a whirlwind. 

Stonewall Jackson was at the head of his men ; 
those who saw him declare that he seemed carried 
away by the excitement of the moment. He leaned 
forward on his horse, extending his arm far in 
front, as though he wished " to push the men for- 
ward," and his voice was heard exclaiming, " Press 
forward! press forward!" every few minutes dur- 
ing the entire attack. When not thus mastered by 



JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT. 251 

the ardor of battle, his right hand was raised 
aloft with that gesture now familiar to his men, 
as though he were praying to the God of battles 
for victory.* 

It was near six o'clock in the evening when the 
assault was made, and it lasted for two hours, dur- 
ing which the Eleventh Corps was forced back on 
the Twelfth, which held the centre, and Jackson's 
advance was within a half mile of Hooker's head- 
quarters. By this time it had become dark, and the 
Confederates suddenly found themselves entangled 
in the abatis of felled trees with which Hooker had 
bordered his works around Chancellorsville. The 
confusion became so great that the troops were 
halted, and Rodes was ordered to fall back and 
reform his men, while A. P. Hill's division was 
stationed in their front. The scene which fol- 
lowed surpassed the wildest flights of delirium. 
Soldiers, horses, wagons, cannon and ambulances 
dashed pell-mell across the clearing around Chan- 
cellorsville, men and beasts crazed with terror and 
aiming straight for the Rappahannock, as though 
intent on plunging in to escape the yelling demons 
at their heels. Officers shouted, swore, begged, 
entreated and showered blows upon the frantic 
fugitives without producing the slightest effect. 
A person when thoroughly panic-stricken is a rav- 
ing lunatic, and therefore beyond control. But for 
the intervening abatis which entangled the pursu- 

* Cooke's Lij'e of StoncwaM Jackson, 



252 TEE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ing Confederates, the history of Hooker's army- 
would have ended then and there. 

A momentary flash of genius came to the Fed- 
eral leader. Quick to note the check in the pursuit, 
he was equally quick to take advantage of it. He 
opened with his twenty-two guns upon the woods 
held by the Confederates, and, placing himself at 
the head of his old division, became the splendid 
soldier he had shown himself on many a battle- 
field. The fire of his daring stayed the disorgan- 
ized masses, and he posted them on the clearing, 
directly in front of Jackson, and coolly awaited 
his charge. Fresh artillery were hurried for- 
ward, and were soon driving their fiery missiles 
into the woods which held the Confederates. It 
was a storm against which it was idle to beat, and 
the hurricane-like charge of Jackson was stayed. 

It was ten o'clock, and the moon was climbing 
the sky. The dense gloom of the forest was lit up 
by flashes of fire, and the missiles described flaming 
curves high in the air overhead, while the crash 
of musketry, the scream of shells, the boom of 
cannon, the shrieks of the dying, the frenzied 
prayers and yells of those who still grappled in 
the death-combat, made a scene which belongs not 
to earth, but to Hades. 

Soon it was reported that the Federal line was 
advancing, and A. P. Hill ordered his men forward 
to check it. They were in motion, when in the 
uncertain moonlight they saw two ofiicers walking 



JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT. 253 

slowly to the rear, supporting between tliem an- 
other, who was wounded. It was evident he was 
badly hurt, for he leaned heavily upon his friends 
and was moving slowly and with great pain. 

"Who is he? Who is he?" asked the troops 
as they hurried by, suspecting that he was some 
distinguished leader who was thus escorted. 

"A Confederate officer," was the invariable re- 
ply to these questions, which were repeated every 
few seconds. 

Suddenly an old veteran thought he saw some- 
thing familiar in the limp, bareheaded figure stag- 
gering like a drunken man between the officers. 
He took two or three steps forward, stopped short, 
and, peering intently for a moment, exclaimed, 

"Great God! that is Stonewall Jackson!" 



CHAPTER XXIY. 

THE FALL OF STONEWALL JACKSON. 

When the lull in the terrific fighting came, it 
was near ten o'clock in the evening ; the stillness 
which succeeded was oppressive from its contrast 
with the infernal uproar that shook the earth and 
air but a brief while before. A few ragged clouds 
drifted in front of the moon, which looked down 
on one of the saddest scenes that had greeted it 
during all the long ages it had swung round this 
planet. 

Stonewall Jackson was intent on completing the 
movement which we have already explained. He 
was burning with eagerness to swing his troops 
around, so as to cut off the Federals from United 
States Ford, and thus capture the entire army. So 
anxious was he to learn the precise position of his 
enemy that while his troops were forming for the 
assault he rode forward to reconnoitre, instructing 
his men not to fire unless cavalry approached from 
the direction of the enemy. He was accompanied 
by a few officers, and advanced quite close to the 
Federal lines. When the little group dare go no 
farther, they reined up and listened intently for 
sounds from .the direction of Chancellorsville. 

254 



THE FALL OF STONEWALL JACKSON. 255 

Suddenly a volley was fired at them by the Con- 
federate infantry, who took them to be Federals 
on a reconnoissance. Several of the party were 
struck, and fell from their horses; and Jackson, 
seeing the danger, wheeled to the left and galloped 
into the woods to escape a renewal of the fire. A 
minute later the men fired again, when less than 
a hundred feet distant. Jackson was struck three 
times — twice in the left arm, and once in the right 
hand. He dropped the bridle-reins with his left 
hand, but caught them again with the bleeding, 
tremulous fingers of the right. His startled horse 
wheeled and dashed toward Chancellorsville, and 
an interposing limb struck Jackson in the face, 
brushed off his cap and came near sweeping him 
from his horse. By a great effort, however, he 
retained his seat until he reached the road, where 
Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff-officers, ten- 
derly helped him from his steed and laid him at 
the foot of a tree. All was still again, and only 
Captain AVilbourn and a courier were with the 
stricken chief, whose wounds were more severe 
than was supposed. 

On the edge of the wood, a short distance off, 
were seen the dark outlines of a horse and rider 
as silent and motionless as if carved in stone. Cap- 
tain Wilbourn called to this horseman to ride back 
and learn what troops had fired on them. Without 
speaking, the stranger rode away, and was seen 
no more. The identity of this mysterious person 



256 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

was unknown for a long time, and caused raucli 
speculation and wonder; but after the war, when 
the matter was discussed. Captain Revere, of the 
Federal army, stated that it was himself. He 
was on a reconnoissance, when he came upon the 
group at the foot of the tree, and was not long in 
learning they were Confederates. When ordered 
to find out who had fired the destructive volley, 
he rode off, and took good care not to return. 

General Jackson was supported by his officers, 
but speedily became so weak that he was unable 
to walk even when leaning on the shoulders of 
his friends ; he was therefore placed on a litter 
and carried toward the rear. A short distance 
only was passed when the artillery-fire from the 
direction of Chancellorsville became so fierce that 
the bearers were forced to lower the litter and lie 
down beside it. In a few minutes the fire slack- 
ened, and the bearers resumed their work. They 
walked slowly and with great care, but in the dark- 
ness they sometimes stumbled, and Jackson suffered 
dreadfully. When the moonlight fell upon his 
ghastly face, his friends were shocked, believing 
he was dying; but he rallied, and when borne to 
a place of safety sent a note to General Lee in- 
forming him of his misfortune. The note did not 
reach Lee until near daylight the next morning. 

When Jackson fell, the command naturally de- 
volved upon General A. P. Hill ; but almost the 
next moment he was wounded, and it then went to 



THE FALL OF STONEWALL JACK'SOX. 257 

General Eodes, but, brave and capable as he was, 
he was so unacquainted with Jackson's command 
and his plans that he sent for General Stuart, to 
whom the command was formally relinquished. 
In consequence of the confusion and darkness, 
Stuart was unable to do anything, and deferred all 
operations until morning. As it was necessary that 
General Lee should know the particulars of Jack- 
son's misfortune. Captain Wilbourn was sent to 
give him the sad information. The following is 
Captain Wilbourn's interesting statement, as fur- 
nished by J. E. Cooke : 

Lee was found lying asleep in a little clump of 
pines near his front, covered with an oilcloth, to 
protect him from the dews of the night, and sur- 
rounded by the officers of his staff, also asleep. It 
was not yet daybreak, and the darkness prevented 
the messenger from distinguisliing the command- 
er-in-chief from the rest. He accordingly called 
for Major Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, and tliat 
officer pi'omptly awoke, when he was informed of 
what had taken place. As the conversation con- 
tinued the sound aroused General Lee, who asked, 

"Who is there?" 

Major Taylor informed him, and, rising upon 
his elbow, Lee pointed to his blankets and said, 

" Sit down here by me, captain, and tell us all 
about the fight last evening." 

He listened without comment during the recital, 
but when it was finished said with great feeling, 

17 



258 THE CAMP-FJF.ES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" All, captain, any victory is dearly bought which 
deprives us of the services of General Jackson even 
for a short time." 

From this reply it was evident that he did not 
regard the wounds received by Jackson as of a 
serious character — as was natural, from the fact 
that they were only flesh-wounds in the arm and 
hand — and believed that the only result would be 
a temporary absence of his lieutenant from com- 
mand. As Captain Wilbourn continued to speak 
of the incident, Lee added with greater emotion 
than at first, 

"Ah ! don't talk about -it. Thank God it is no 
worse !" 

He then remained silent, but, seeing Captain 
Wilbourn rise as if to go, he requested him to 
remain, as he wished to " talk with him some 
more," and proceeded to ask a number of ques- 
tions in reference to the position of the troops, 
who was in command, etc. When informed that 
Rodes was in temporary command, but that Stuart 
had been sent for, he exclaimed, " Rodes is a gal- 
lant, courageous and energetic officer," and asked 
where Jackson and Stuart could be found, calling 
for pencil and paper to write to them. Captain 
Wilbourn added that, from what he had heard 
Jackson say, he thought he intended to get pos- 
session, if possible, of the road to United States 
Ford, in the Federal rear, and so cut them off 
from the river that night or early in the morn- 



THE FALL OF STONEWALL JACKSON. 259 

ing. At these words Lee rose quickly and said 
with animation, 

" These people must be pressed to-day !" 
About this time a messenger arrived from Wil- 
derness Tavern with a note from the wounded gen- 
eral. Lee read it with much feeling, and dictated 
the following reply : 

"General: I have just received your note 
informing me that you were wounded. I cannot 
express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have 
directed events, I should have chosen, for the good 
of the country, to have been disabled in your stead. 

" I congratulate you upon the victory, which is 
due to your skill and energy. 

" E. E. Lee, General." 

General Jackson's wound soon assumed a grave 
character. His arm was amputated, but the relief 
was only temporary. Pneumonia set in, and he 
died on the following Sunday, May 10. In the 
delirium of his last moments he called out, 

"A. P. Hill, prepare for action!" 

When Stonewall Jackson breathed his last, Lee 
exclaimed, " I have lost my right arm !" and he 
spoke the truth. He was the ablest of the many 
brilliant lieutenants that gathered around the 
illustrious leader of the Southern armies. No 
man aroused such enthusiasm among his troops, nor 
was ever a commander more idolized by his men than 



260 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

was the fiery Virginian, whose sweep was as resist- 
less as that of the Alpine avalanche. He was not 
a great general like Lee, with the power to plan and 
combine immense campaigns, but as an executive 
officer the world has never seen his superior. His 
intense piety resembled at times the fanaticism of 
Cromwell. He believed in the righteousness of 
the Southern cause with all his heart, body, mind 
and soul. He felt no more doubt of its triumph 
than he had of the rising of the sun. Next to 
his God and the Confederacy, he rested his faith 
in General Lee. No man was ever more warmly 
loved than was the commander of the Confeder- 
ate armies by Stonewall Jackson. He ardently 
believed that a better man or an abler military 
leader than Lee had never lived, and Jackson 
was thrilled by an exalted joy in carrying out 
in his own resistless fashion the plans and orders 
of his superior. 

" General Lee is not slow," said Jackson, in dis- 
cussing the military question with a friend ; " no 
one knows the weight upon his heart, his great 
responsibilities. He is commander-in-chief, and 
knows that if an army is lost it cannot be replaced. 
No ! There may be some persons whose good opin- 
ion of me will make them attach some weight to 
my views ; and if ever you hear that said of Gen- 
eral Lee, I beg you will contradict it in my name. 
I have known General Lee for five and twenty 
years. He is cautious — he ought to be — but he 



THE FALL OF STONEWALL JACKSON. 261 

is not 'slow.' Lee is a phenomenon. He is the 
only man whom I would follow blindfold." 



WHY "STONEWALL" JACKSON DID NOT DEINK. 

Colonel A. E. Boteler, in the Philadelphia Weekly Times, tells the 
following story concerning General Jackson : 

"Having lingei'ed to the last allowable moment with the members 
of my family ' hereinbefore mentioned' — as the legal documents would 
term them — it was after ten o'clock at night when I returned to 
headquarters for final instruction, and before going to the general's 
room I ordered two whiskey-toddies to be brought up after me. When 
they appeared, I offered one of the glasses to Jackson ; but he drew back, 
saying, 

" ' No, colonel, you must excuse me : I never drink intoxicating 
liquors.' 

" ' I know that, general,' said I ; ' but, though you habitually abstain, 
as I do myself, from everything of the sort, there are occasions — and this 
is one of them — when a stimulant will do us both good. Otherwise, I 
would neither take it myself nor offer it to you. So you must make 
an exception to your general rule, and join me in a toddy to-night.' 

" He again shook his head, but, nevertheless, took the tumbler and 
began to sip its contents. Presently putting it on the table, after hav- 
ing but partially emptied it, he said, 

" ' Colonel, do you know why I habitually abstain from intoxicating 
drinks ?' and, on my replying in the negative, he continued : ' Why, 
sir, because I like the taste of them ; and when I discovered that to 
be the case, I made up my mind at once to do without them alto- 
gether.' " 



CHAPTER XXV. 

THE LAST STBUOGLE AT CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 

General Jacksojst liad fallen in battle, as may- 
be said, but the hurrying rush of the furious strife 
could not be checked or stayed therefor. Stuart, 
his successor, made his dispositions to renew the 
battle at daylight, forming the corps in three 
lines, Hill's division being the first, Colston's the 
second and Rodes's the third. 

On the Federal side the savage doubling up of 
Hooker's right by Jackson rendered necessary sev- 
eral important changes in the line. Accordingly, 
ai new front was formed on that flank with Sickles 
and Berry. Reynolds's corps had arrived from 
below Fredericksburg, and greatly added to the 
spirit of the army. There was no talk of retreat- 
ing, and the struggle on the morrow, therefore, 
was certain to assume a tremendous .and decisive 
character. Sedgwick was below Fredericksburg 
with the Sixth Corps, numbering twenty-two thou- 
sand men. General Hooker sent orders to him to 
occupy the town, seize the heights, move to the 
plank-road connecting that place with Chancel- 
lorsville and join the main body by daylight the 
following morning. 

262 



THE LAST STRUGGLE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. 263 

At early dawn General Stuart oj)ened his attack 
on the Federal lines, scarcely a half mile distant. 
Their war-cry was " Charge, and remember Jack- 
son !" Sweeping resistlessly forward, they quickly 
occupied the ridge of which mention has been made, 
and, bringing up thirty pieces of cannon, turned 
them upon their adversaries. The Federals re- 
sisted bravely and assailed Stuart's left with great 
vigor. For a time it looked as if they could not 
be checked, but at last they fell back. Meanwhile, 
General Lee was pressing the Federal left and cen- 
tre with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, 
slowly forging to the right to unite with the Sec- 
ond Corps. Anderson's division was on his left, 
&nd, pushing forward, it gradually formed a con- 
nection with Stuart at the moment the latter had 
repulsed the attack on his left. The Confederate 
army ^was now reunited, and General Lee gave 
the command to storm the Federal works around 
Chancellorsville. The assault was made with fiery 
energy, and after a savage struggle the works were 
captured; but the Federals rallied, and with the 
same splendid valor drove out the Confederates. 
Again was the position taken, and again lost. The 
flame of battle surged back and forth, until, on the 
fourth charge, when the dead bodies were so thick 
that the feet of the combatants could not touch the 
ground, the works were secured, and at ten o'clock 
the Confederate flag floated over Chancellorsville. 

The scene at that time was horrible beyond de- 



264 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

scription. The woods, which were full of wounded, 
had been set on fire by the shells and the blazing 
building, and hundreds of poor fellows were burn- 
ing to death ; many more than is suspected per- 
ished in this awful manner. The shouts of com- 
batants, the shrieks of those caught in the roar- 
ing flames, the heavy discharge of artillery and 
the crash and rattle of musketry gave to the 
picture a terrible grandeur such as must haunt 
all the participants therein to their last hour. 

It is hard to find a satisfactory explanation of 
Hooker's course at Chancellors ville, where, it is 
said, he went in with the. stride of a giant and 
came out with the step of a dwarf. His combina- 
tions and plans were excellent, in a military sense, 
and ought to have ensured success even against such 
a masterly leader as Lee, whose army numbered 
less than one-half as many as that of the Feder- 
als, while at the beginning of the battle he was 
placed at great disadvantage as respects position. 
We are inclined to believe that the true explana- 
tion was given by a Federal soldier, which is to 
the effect that when Hooker was awakened from 
his exultant dream that Lee would not dare give 
him battle the Federal commander was scared into a 
perfect collapse of terror. The knowledge that Lee 
meant fight, and the fiery disruption of Jackson on 
his flank, drove all courage from him, and his only 
thought and hope was to get beyond reach of the 
impetuous Confederates and their fearless leaders. 



THE LAST STRUGGLE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. 265 

As if convinced that defeat awaited him, Gen- 
eral Hooker had caused a strongly-entrenched line 
to be constructed in the rear of his first position, 
so as to cover the United States Ford. It had the 
form of a redan thrown forward in the angle be- 
tween the Kapidan and the Rappahannock, and 
was very strong. The corps of Meade and Rey- 
nolds, incredible as it may seem, had been held 
idle during the struggle of the morning, and they 
were now formed within it ; there for the time the 
disorganized fragments of the rest of the army 
found temporary shelter. But, strong as it was, 
General Lee resolved to attack it ; the fire of bat- 
tle possessed him and his men, and they meant 
that the Federal army should not escape them 
again. But at the moment the mailed hand was 
raised to smite, an alarming sound from the direc- 
tion of Fredericksburg caught his ear. With his 
hand still aloft, the warrior listened : the ominous 
rumble was the tramp of Sedgwick's legions, who, 
having vanquished Early at Fredericksburg, were 
advancing to assail him in the rear. 

It will be recalled that Hooker had ordered Sedg- 
wick to attack Early at Fredericksburg Heights, 
and then to hasten to his assistance. These orders 
reached Sedgwick about midnight, and he im- 
mediately put his column in motion. The town 
was occupied before daylight Sunday morning, a 
small Confederate force being driven back. It 
was not yet light when a detachment was sent 



266 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

to seize the heights occupied by Early. The as- 
sault was repulsed, when Gibbons's division of 
Couch's corps, which was opposite Falmouth, was 
ordered to join the assailants. Early had under 
him his own division and Barksdale's brigade of 
Mississippians, of McLaws's division. This force 
was attacked by more than three times its number. 
Before the overwhelming onslaught, the defenders 
could not sustain themselves : they were driven 
back, and ere noon the entire Confederate force 
was killed, captured or dispersed. Unable to stay 
the resistless torrent, the Confederates retreated 
over the Telegraph road southward, and General 
Sedgwick, as instructed by his chief, immediately 
advanced up the turnpike toward Chancellorsville 
for the purpose of attacking Lee in the rear. It 
was this intelligence which arrested Lee when on 
the very point of storming the Federal works at 
Chancellorsville. ^ 

With that intuitive grasp of all the possibilities 
which often flashed upon Lee like an inspiration, 
he determined not to await the arrival of Sedgwick, 
but to send a force large enough to defeat him. 
Nine times out of ten such a division of his army 
in front of an enemy much his superior numer- 
ically would have resulted in disaster, but this 
occasion may be called the " tenth." Sedgwick 
was a skilful and brave general with more than 
twenty thousand men flushed with victory ; Hooker 
was cowed, beaten and paralyzed. Nothing was to 



THE LAST STRUGGLE AT CHANGELLORSVILLE. 267 

be feared from him : everything was to be dreaded 
from the detachment hurrying along the plank- 
road. And then and there, in front of the Fed- 
eral host, General Lee detached five brigades from 
his little army and sent them back to give battle 
to Sedgwick. To this force it was expected that 
Early's troops would be added, while General Wil- 
cox, who had been sent to guard Banks's Ford, was 
already in motion to disjDute the Federal advance. 
When the brigades sent by Lee had united with 
General Wilcox, they immediately formed in line 
of battle, which opened at four o'clock and lasted 
until dark. Sedgwick was effectually checked, and 
made no effort to advance farther that day. 

When he left Fredericksburg, Early returned 
and took possession of the heights, thus placing 
himself in the rear of Sedgwick and enabling him 
to prevent him recrossing the Rappahannock at 
Fredericksburg. Lee resolved to crush Sedgwick 
and then to turn and assail Hooker, in accordance 
with his original plan. With this purpose, he 
assumed personal command of three brigades of 
Anderson's division and on Monday morning 
marched to Salem Church, where he proceeded to 
form his line of battle. Unexpected delays pre- 
vented the attack until late in the afternoon, when 
a general advance was made upon Sedgwick with 
the purjDOse of cutting off his retreat by way of the 
river. But the Federals resisted with such stub- 
bornness and bravery that Lee was foiled. They 



268 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

held their ground until dark, when they were so 
hard pressed that they began slowly falling back. 
They retreated in good order to Banks's Ford, 
where a ponton-bridge had been laid, and over 
which in the gathering gloom of night the Fed- 
erals effected a safe passage to the other shore. 

Having disposed in this decisive fashion of 
Sedgwick, Lee returned to finish Hooker, but that 
leader had imj)roved the hours of grace unexpect- 
edly given him ; and when, on Wednesday morn- 
ing, everything was ready for the grand assault, 
the Federal works were found deserted. General 
Hooker and his army had recrossed the river, cov- 
ering the ponton-bridge with pine-boughs, so as to 
muffle the sound of the artillery-wheels. 

The Confederate loss at Chancellorsville aggre- 
gated ten thousand two hundred and eighty-one ; 
the Union loss was seventeen thousand one hun- 
dred and ninety-seven killed, wounded and miss- 
ing. Besides the killed and wounded left behind, 
fourteen pieces of artillery and twenty thousand 
stand of arms fell into the hands of the Confed- 
erates. For them the victory was the grandest of 
the war. They had disastrously beaten an army of 
more than double their numbers, and the general- 
ship displayed by General Lee was of the most 
remarkable character. It was fitting that the noon- 
tide of Stonewall Jackson's life should be crowned 
by one of the most daring, brilliant and decisive 
exploits recorded in history. 



YI. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF GETTYSBURG. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 

The magnificent achievements of the Army of 
Northern Virginia were not duplicated by the other 
armed forces of the Confederacy : there was but 
one Lee, and the Federals had made substantial 
progress in the West. General Bragg had been 
discomfited so often that the people clamored for 
his removal, but President Davis clung all the 
closer to him. General Pemberton was shut in 
at Vicksburg, with General Grant grimly waiting 
till starvation should compel him to succumb, and 
matters in the Trans-Mississippi Department were 
in anything but an encouraging shape for the 
Southern cause. 

Profoundly sensible of the gravity of the situ- 
ation, General Lee visited Richmond and held a 
long conference with the authorities. At the con- 
sultation it was determined to invade the North a 
second time. There were the best of reasons for 
such a course. The Army of Northern Virginia 

269 



270 THE 0A3rP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

was nearly seventy thousand strong, and there were 
no better soldiers in the world. The splendid tri- 
umph at Chancellorsville had roused them to the 
highest pitch of enthusiasm, and their morale Y^as 
perfect. They were in the finest state of disci- 
pline, were excellently armed, and, as Longstreet 
expressed it, were in a condition to undertake 
anything. It was known, at the same time, that 
the Federal army was in worse form than it had 
been for many months. The best tribute to its 
discipline and cohesiveness was the fact that after 
such blundering leadership it still remained an 
army ; but the terms of -enlistment of many of 
the troops were expiring, and the desertions were 
so numerous that General Hooker notified Pres- 
ident Lincoln that his infantry was reduced to an 
effective strength of eighty thousand men. 

Vigorous preparations were instantly set on 
foot for the invasion of the teeming fields of 
Pennsylvania, where the Confederate legions saw 
corn, wine and oil in abundance. General Long- 
street's corps had rejoined the army immediately 
after Chancellorsville, and General Ewell suc- 
ceeded Jackson in the command of the Second 
Corps. A third corps was organized and placed 
under A. P. Hill, and both he and Ewell were 
raised to the grade of lieutenant-general. Long- 
street's corps included the divisions of McLaws, 
Hood and Pickett ; Swell's corps, the divisions of 
Early, Rodes and Johnson ; and Hill's corps, the 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 271 

divisions of Anderson, Pender and Heth. Be- 
sides these, there were ten thousand cavalry under 
Stuart. These preparations were not unknown to 
Hooker nor to the North, whose system of gather- 
ing news through the papers made it impossible 
for such a great movement to be kept secret for 
any length of time. There were intimations in 
the journals of a mighty campaign in process of 
organization south of the Potomac, and something 
" in the air " prepared every one for the starthng 
tidings which speedily flashed across the border. 

By the first day of summer everything was in 
readiness for the advance, and General Lee began 
manoeuvring to draw General Hooker from his 
position on the Bappahannock. On the 3d of 
June, Longstreet's corps marched from its en- 
campments at Fredericksburg and on the Bapi- 
dan toward Culpeper Court-House, followed the 
next day and the succeeding day by Swell's corps. 
A. P. Hill stayed at Fredericksburg with a view 
of deceiving Hooker into the belief that the entire 
Confederate army still confronted him. 

Though well aware that something unusual was 
going on, General Hooker had no means as yet of 
learning the truth. In hope of gaining light, he 
sent, June 6, Sedgwick's corps across the Bap- 
pahannock at Deep Bun. General Hill notified 
Lee of the movement, but, knowing its meaning, 
Lee permitted Ewell and Longstreet to continue 
their march to Culpeper Court-House, where they 



272 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

arrived on the 8tli. General Stuart and his cav- 
alry were there awaiting them. 

THE CAVALRY-FIGHT AT FLEETWOOD, OR BRANDY 
STATION. 

Caution, skill, energy and fine generalship 
marked the movements of General Lee in mar- 
shaling his hosts for the terrific struggle at Get- 
tysburg. His purpose was to manoeuvre so as to 
withdraw the Federal army from Virginia with- 
out bringing on a collision between the armies. 
The first step was to send forward one division of 
LoDgstreet's corps toward -Culpeper ; this was fol- 
lowed by another, and then all of Swell's corps was 
sent in the same direction. A. P. Hill stayed on 
the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fred- 
ericksburg, to confront the Federal advance upon 
Richmond. 

It was at this juncture that one of the most im- 
pressive scenes of the war took place. On the 8th 
of June, Lee's head of column reached Culpeper, 
and a review of Stuart's cavalry took place in a 
broad open space east of the court-house. Above 
a little knoll rose a tall pole from which floated 
the Confederate flag, while directly below sat Gen- 
eral Lee on his charger; his short cavalry cape 
fell from his shoulders, and the old slouch-hat half 
concealed the grave, handsome face beneath. His 
bright, clear eyes looked out on the long column 
of eight thousand cavalry, first drawn up in line, 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 273 

and then passing in front of the= commander at a 
gallop, Stuart and his staff at the head, with sabres 
at tierce-point. Such a display always delighted 
the chivalrous Stuart, who bounded into battle 
with the overflowing spirits of a boy let loose 
from school. A sham-conflict followed — a pro- 
ceeding so puzzling to the Federals that the next 
morning they sent two divisions of cavalry, sup- 
jDorted by two brigades of picked infantry, to learn 
what it meant. This force crossed at Kelley's 
and Beverley's fords, and the result was the most 
remarkable cavalry-fight of the war. It is con- 
ceded by both sides that it surpassed any combat 
of its kind ever fought on this continent. The 
forces engaged were numerous, the soldiers were 
veterans toughened in battle, and they fought like 
heroes from the very opening to the close. 

The Federal general Buford launched his divis- 
ion against one of Stuart's brigades near Beverley's 
Ford. It was just as day was breaking, and the 
assault was made with such fierceness that the Con- 
federates were forced back toward Fleetwood Hill. 
Stuart had established his headquarters on the crest 
of this hill, and, seeing how the battle was going, 
he spurred to the front on a swift gallop, open- 
ing with a destructive fire from his artillery and 
sharpshooters, while Hampton's division was sent 
to attack the Federal left. But, at the same time, 
the Federals were making a most dangerous move- 
ment against Stuart's rear. General Gregg, with 

18 



274 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the second division of Federal cavalry, crossed at 
Kelley's Ford, below, and, ignoring the force there, 
attacked the rear, behind Fleetwood Hill. At this 
time the great sabre-fight was at its height, when 
Stuart was aroused by the assault upon his rear. 
Falling rapidly back, he met the Federals coming 
up the hill, repulsed them and charged in turn. 
Back and forth swung the combatants, as if cling- 
ing to the opposite edges of a great pendulum. The 
Federal artillery was captured and recaptured three 
times, finally remaining in the hands of Stuart. At 
this juncture General Gregg made a fierce charge 
along the eastern slope of the hill, but Stuart had 
anticipated the movement, and checked it by a 
furious fire of shell; and the gallant Georgian 
general P. M. B. Young charged the Federals. 
This was done with the sabre, and carbine and 
pistol played no part in the fight. After a de- 
termined resistance, the Federals were routed and 
driven in disorder toward the river. 

General W. H. F. Lee bravely met the attack 
on the left, near the river, and repulsed it. In the 
fight General Lee, who was the son of the com- 
manding general, was severely wounded, but -he 
drove the Federals back to the river, while Hamp- 
ton, on the right, did the same, under the fire of 
Stuart's guns on Fleetwood Hill. By sunset the 
whole Federal force had retreated to the other side 
of the Bappahannock, leaving behind several hun- 
dred dead and wounded. Besides General Lee, Gen- 



PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. 275 

eral Butler lost a foot, Colonel Williams was killed, 
Captain Farley was slain, Captain White wound- 
ed and Lieutenant Goldsborough captured. The 
Federal loss was severe, among it being the brave 
Colonel Davis of -the Eighth New York Cavalry. 

Many thousand cavalry fought each other in a 
hand-to-hand encounter from morning till night. 
It was "give and take" from the beginning to 
the end, and there were personal encounters, indi- 
vidual exploits and wonderful escapes which, if 
all told, would fill this volume. 

What a significant proof of the prodigious cha- 
racter of the civil war that this tremendous caval- 
ry-contest — the most remarkable, as has been said, 
that was ever fought in this country — was in real- 
ity only a preliminary skirmisli, as may be said, 
of the stupendous shock of arms that was to shake 
the continent ! It had no perceptible effect on the 
great contest, and more than one history of those 
eventful times makes no mention of it. 



CHAPTER XXYII. 

MANCEUVBING FOB BATTLE. 

The most important result of the cavalry-fight 
at Brandy Station was the discovery by Hooker 
of Lee's presence at Culpeper and his plan of 
invasion. These facts were learned through cap- 
tured correspondence. 

Hooker saw that no time was to be lost. He 
immediately pushed up the river to Rappahan- 
nock Station and Beverley, while the cavalry 
guarded the fords above. Suspicious as he was 
of the intention of the Confederate leader, he 
could not be certain of the form it would take. 
He supposed he was attempting to repeat the 
campaign of the previous year in which Pope 
figured so discreditably ; he therefore gave his full 
attention to protecting his communications and to 
guarding against a sudden march by the Confed- 
erates upon Washington. 

Lee was advancing with the greatest secrecy and 
skill, his eye fixed upon Hooker like the scrutiny 
of a tiger when stealing upon his prey. He saw 
that his opponent was completely deceived, and 
he therefore ventured on another daring move. 
Swell's corps marched swiftly toward Chester Gap, 

276 



MANCEUVRING FOB BATTLE. 277 

hurried through that defile, and reached Winches- 
ter at the close of the afternoon of the 13th, hav- 
ing marched more than seventy miles in three days. 
By this audacious manoeuvre Lee's line of battle 
was expanded to a length of one hundred miles, 
for his right (Hill's corps) was at Fredericksburg, 
his centre (Longstreet's corps) was at Culpeper, 
and his left (Ewell's corps) was at the head of 
Shenandoah Valley. The mere statement of the 
fact would condemn the military judgment of Lee 
were it not supplemented by the fact that he 
knew his man. They had met before, and it was 
an encounter of a giant and a dwarf. 

The wisdom of striking the Confederate army 
while drawn out in this attenuated fashion could 
not fail to present itself to Hooker, who suggested 
it to President Lincoln and General Halleck ; but 
they disapproved of it. The opinion of the Pres- 
ident was expressed in his characteristic fashion : 
" In case you find Lee coming to the north of the 
Eappahannock, I would by no means cross to the 
south of it. I would not take any risk of being 
entangled on the river, like an ox jumped half 
over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front 
and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or 
kick the other." Some days later the President 
wrote: "I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, 
is your true objective-point. If he comes toward 
the Upper Potomac, fight him when opportunity 
offers ; if he stays where he is, fret him and fi'et 



278 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

him." Still later, when the Confederate advance 
became definitely known, the President wrote to 
General Hooker : " If the head of Lee's army is 
at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank- 
road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 
the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could 
you not break him ?" 

Hooker broke up his camps along the Rappa- 
hannock as soon as he learned that Lee had 
entered the Shenandoah Valley, and headed for 
Washington, following the line of the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad. Lee did not hesitate, but 
pushed his grand campaign with his accustomed 
brilliancy, boldness and skill. 

Hill waited at Fredericksburg until the Union 
army withdrew, when, his purpose accomplished, he 
marched for Culpeper, where Longstreet's corps 
were still in position, while Ewell, remembering 
that he was at the head of Stonewall Jackson's old 
division, was dashing into the Shenandoah Valley. 
General Jenkins with his cavalry brigade had been 
directed to ]3ush toward Winchester, and Imboden 
and his troopers had approached Romney to shut 
off any reinforcements that might be sent by way 
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. They were 
in position and ready to co-operate with Ewell 
when he entered the valley. 

When Ewell crossed the Shenandoah River near 
Front Royal, he sent Rodes's division to Berryville 
to cut off communication between Winchester and 



MANCEUVRING FOB BATTLE. 279 

the Potomac, while with the divisions of Early and 
Johnson he advanced straight upon Milroy in Win- 
chester. This town, from its peculiar position, had 
a most extraordinary experience during the war. 
The contending hosts swept back and forth through 
it time and again, until the inhabitants had to be 
alert to keejD informed as -to which authority was 
over them. It had changed hands as often as four 
times in one day, and during the war was captured 
and recaptured more than sixty times. 

When Ewell thundered at the gates. General 
Milroy and about six thousand men were within. 
Ewell was eager to make a closer acquaintance with 
this individual, whose outrages in the valley were 
of such character that the Confederate government 
had ordered its forces to refuse him the rights of 
a prisoner of war if captured. When Milroy found 
who was after him, his chief solicitude was to get 
away. He had the means of making a splendid 
defence, but the following night he crejDt out of 
Winchester with his command. In their tumult- 
uous flight, however, they were intercepted and 
most of them captured. Milroy managed to save 
himself and a handful of men by outrunning their 
pursuers to the Potomac.'^ Berryville having been 

* " Milroy's defence of the post entrusted to his care was infamously 
feeble, and the worst of that long train of misconduct that made the 
Valley of the Shenandoah to be called the Valley of Humiliation." — 
Swinfon. 

" In my opinion, Milroy's men will figiit better under a soldier." — 
General Hooker's letter to President Lincoln. 



280 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

taken, with several hundred prisoners, and the gar- 
rison at Harper's Ferry having withdrawn to Mary- 
land Heights, the valley was entirely cleared of all 
Federal forces. 

Stonewall Jackson's old corps sustained its rep- 
utation for dash, vim and rapidity of movement, 
for it had captured more than four thousand pris- 
oners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, two hundred 
and seventy wagons and ambulances and a large 
quantity of valuable stores. The loss in the corps 
was slight, and as a consequence the enthusiasm 
was unbounded. 

When Hill advanced from Fredericksburg to 
Culpeper, Longstreet left the latter place, marched 
northward along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge 
and took position at Ashby's and Snicker's gaps. 
Behind this screen Hill dodged into the Shenan- 
doah Valley, and posted himself at Winchester. 

Lee's consummate strategy improved his situation 
at every move, until within a couple of weeks from 
the opening of the campaign he had everything in 
the shape desired. He was so strongly posted in 
the valley that he was ready to welcome the attack 
of his enemy, no matter how great his numbers, 
while he was at liberty to send a powerful raiding- 
column into Maryland or Pennsylvania without 
serious danger of being molested. 

But Hooker was in a state of nervous fear, and 
resolved that he would not be drawn into the trap 
which Lee had evidently set for him. The spectre 



MANCEVVBING FOR BATTLE. 281 

of the colossal soldier in the dreaded gray coat still 
haunted the authorities in Washington, and the 
Federal commander clung to his position in the 
neighborhood of Manassas and Fairfax, so as to 
guard the approach to the capital, while Pleasanton 
and his cavalry cautiously felt the ground in the 
direction of the Blue Ridge, where Longstreet 
was powerfully posted, with Stuart's troopers on his 
front. On the 17th of June a brisk collision took 
place between Pleasanton and two brigades of Stu- 
art near Aldie, and General Pleasanton was driven 
back. Feeling quite sure of Lee's position. Hooker 
now sent forward the Twelfth Corps to Leesburg, 
the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thorough- 
fare Gap. While engaged in manoeuvring, it sud- 
denly occurred to Hooker that he was wandering 
about the country precisely as Lee wished him to 
do ; he therefore once more devoted his attention 
to the protection of the capital and awaited the 
further development of Lee's purposes. He was 
not kept long in waiting. 

Hill and Longstreet having relieved Ewell in 
the Shenandoah Valley, the latter, on the 22d of 
June, marched into Maryland. At the same time, 
Lnboden's cavalry, galloping westward, destroyed 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesa- 
peake and Ohio Canal. Having done this dam- 
age, Imboden captured the city of Cumberland, 
Maryland. 

A week previous, when Ewell invested Winches- 



282 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE, 

ter, Jenkins's cavalry were ordered into Pennsyl-. 
vania in quest of supplies. They were directly on 
the heels of Milroy's fleeing wagon-train. The 
terrified teamsters, with their perspiring horses 
lashed to a dead run, tore through the streets of 
Chambersburg, shouting that the whole rebel army 
would be in town before night. That sort of busi- 
ness was not calculated to exert a soothing effect 
on the inhabitants, for, allowing for some natural 
exaggeration, they knew there was a strong substra- 
tum of truth in the announcement. Sure enough, 
the Confederate troopers arrived that evening. The 
inhabitants were treated with much consideration, 
"and, having gathered a large number of horses and 
cattle, Jenkins sent them toward the Potomac, while 
he and his cavalry set out to join Swell's force, 
which, it will be remembered, had entered Mary- 
land- on the 22d of June. Ewell advanced by two 
columns on Hagerstown, and, crossing the border 
into Pennsylvania, moved up the Cumberland Val- 
ley, reaching Chambersburg the next day. 

By this time, as may well be supposed, the North 
was in a state of unprecedented excitement. The 
Confederates were advancing toward the polar 
star, and who should say where they would stop ? 
Many believed they would " water their horses in 
the Delaware," and that Philadelphia was doomed 
to fall. The State records and treasures were has- 
tily sent forward to New York, and consternation 
prevailed such as was never known since the open- 



MAN(EUVRING FOB BATTLE. 283 

ing of the war. President Lincoln issued a proc- 
lamation, calling upon the States of Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia to fur- 
nish one hundred thousand militia, to serve for 
six months unless sooner discharged, to repel the 
invasion. Even in New York the people listened 
trembhngly for the tramp of the armed legions 
from the South. Major- General Couch had been 
detached from the command of the Second Corps 
of the Army of the Potomac and assigned to the 
command of the Department of the Susquehanna, 
with his headquarters at Harrisburg. He issued 
a stirring appeal to the Pennsylvanians to rally 
to the defence of their State, and Governor Cur- 
tin called on the militia to come forward. The 
response was so feeble that it was not until sev- 
eral regiments arrived from other States that 
General Couch was able to make the least pre- 
tence of defence. Even then he was compelled to 
confine his attempts to fortifying the line of the 
Susquehanna. 

On the 27th of June the entire Confederate 
army^was concentrated at Chambersburg. Gen- 
eral Lee issued a complimentary address to his 
soldiers, and strict orders were enforced against 
the sale of liquors or molestation of persons and 
private property. Lee felt himself greatly handi- 
capped by the absence of Stuart and his cavalry, 
for without them he had been unable, since cross- 
ing the Potomac, to gain any reliable news of the 



284 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Army of the Potomac. With the purpose of keep- 
ing the Federal army east of the Blue Ridge, so 
that Lee might preserve his own communications 
with the Valley of Virginia through Hagerstown 
and Williamsport, Ewell was sent with a division 
east of South Mountain. It halted at York, while 
the rest of the corps proceeded to Carlisle. Lee 
had his forces well in hand and was about to 
advance upon Harrisburg, when he was checked 
by the first authentic tidings of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

Hooker did not dare move to the northern side 
of the Potomac until Lee fully disclosed his pur- 
pose; when he learned that the rear of the Con- 
federate army was entering Maryland, he ventured 
to move. The Federal army made the crossing of 
the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry on the 25th and 
26th of June and began concentrating at Fred- 
erick. This position was of vast importance, for, 
as will be seen, it enabled Hooker either to pass 
South Mountain and intercept Lee's communica- 
tions or to move toward the Susquehanna in the 
event of Lee marching upon Harrisburg. Hooker 
inclined to the former plan', and accordingly ad- 
vanced his left wing to Middleton and sent General 
Slocum with the Twelfth Corps to Harper's Ferry. 
At that point was a garrison of eleven thousand 
men, which it was intended should unite with Slo- 
cum and by moving upon Chambersburg threaten 
the Confederate rear. This proposal, however, was 



MANCEUVRING FOR BATTLE. 285 

vetoed by General Halleck, whose aflPection for 
Harper's Ferry would not countenance its aban- 
donment. Hooker insisted, and showed the great 
results promised by his plan. Halleck would not 
yield, and, exasperated by the stupidity of his 
superior officer, Hooker resigned. His resigna- 
tion was accepted, and on the next day, June 28, 
Major-General G. G. Meade, commanding the Fifth 
Army Corps, became commander of the Army of 
the Potomac. Though General Meade never rose 
to the height of a great soldier, he was a man who 
understood his profession too thoroughly to fail to 
do it honor, and his apj^ointment was one of the 
wisest ever made by his government, which also 
had the good sense to refrain from trammelling 
him with instructions to pursue any definite policy, 
leaving him to be guided by the necessities of the 
situation.* 

When General Meade assumed command, the 
army was lying near Frederick City, with its left 
thrown out to Middleton. On the 29th, Lee learned 
that its advanced force was beyond Middleton, as 
if it meant to pass over the mountains and assail 
his rear. Ewell's troops were at York and Car- 
lisle, while Stuart's whereabouts were still un- 
known. Seeking to draw Meade away from the 
Potomac, Lee began concentrating his army east 
of the mountains. Longstreet and Hill were 
ordered to advance from Chambersburg to Get- 

* J. D. McCabe, Jr. 



286 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

tysburg, while Ewell was directed to marcli from 
York and Carlisle to the same point. Feeling 
keenly the loss of Stuart, Lee proceeded at a lei- 
surely pace, and thus, not knowing the movements 
of Meade, the latter was enabled to reach Gettys- 
burg first, and to fortify it against the Confederate 
advance. Stuart had harassed the flanks of the 
Federal army while it was in Virginia, but he was 
not able to delay its progress. He crossed the Po- 
tomac at Seneca Falls, and, passing east of Meade's 
army, arrived at Carlisle just after Ewell had left 
for Gettysburg. 

On the night of June 30, Meade learned that Lee 
was concentrating his forces east of the South 
Mountain to meet him. It was beyond Meade's 
power to determine where the shock of battle would 
take place, as that must depend largely on circum- 
stances which could not be foreseen. The general 
line of Pipe Creek, on the dividing-ridge between 
the Monocacy and the waters running into Ches- 
apeake Bay, was selected as a favorable position, 
though its ultimate adoption was held contingent 
on developments that might arise. Accordingly, 
orders were issued on the night of the 30th for the 
movement of the different corps on the following 
day. The Sixth Corps, forming the right wing of 
the army, was ordered to Manchester, in rear of 
Pipe Creek, headquarters and the Second Corps 
to Taneytown ; the Twelfth and Fifth Corps, form- 
ing the centre, were directed on Two Taverns and 



3IAN(EUVRTNG FOR BATTLE. 287 

Hanover, somewhat in advance of Pipe Creek ; 
while the left wing, formed of the First, Third 
and Eleventh Corps, under General Reynolds, as 
it was closest to the line of march of the enemy, 
was thrown forward to Gettysburg, toward which, 
as it happened, Lee was then heading. Strateget- 
ically, the position at Gettysburg was of supreme 
imj)ortance to Lee, for it was the first point in his 
eastward march across the South Mountain that 
gave command of direct lines of retreat toward 
the Potomac ; but it was not of the same moment 
to Meade, especially if a defensive rather than an 
offensive battle was to be fought, and the topograph- 
ical features of Gettysburg, that make it so advan- 
tageous for the defence, were then wholly unknown 
to him. While, therefore, the left wing, under 
Peynolds, was thus thrown forward in advance 
of the rest of the army as far as Gettysburg, it 
was not with any predetermined purpose of tak- 
ing up position there, but rather to serve as a 
mask while the line of Pipe Creek was assumed. 

But, while in war commanders propose, fate or 
accident (so called) often disposes ; and at the time 
these movements were in execution events were 
occurring that were to lift the obscure and insig- 
nificant hamlet of Gettysburg into historic im- 
mortality as the scene of the mightiest encounter 
of modern days.* 

On the 29th of June the Federal general 

* Swinton. 



288 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Buford and his cavalry occupied Gettysburg, to 
which point General Reynolds had been ordered. 
On the following night two divisions of Hill's 
corps bivouacked within half a dozen miles of Get- 
tysburg, on the Baltimore and Chambersburg road, 
while Ewell paused at Heidlersburg, nine miles dis- 
tant from the little town. General Reynolds with 
the left wing of the Federal army was on Marsh 
Creek, four miles south of Gettysburg, his pur- 
pose being to occupy the town the next morning. 
Longstreet's corps was west of the mountains, and 
only the two divisions of , Hill were east. Such 
was the situation at dawn of the fateful 1st of 
July, 1863. - 



CHAPTER XXyill. 

GETTYSBURG: FIBST DAT. 

In the warm sunshine of the morning of July 1, 
A. P. Hill and Ewell continued their advance to- 
ward Gettysburg, destined to be the scene of one 
of the most terrific battles of modern times. A 
mile from the town Hill's advanced division came 
in collision with Buford's cavalry, posted on the 
Chambersburg road, along which the Confederate 
divisions were approaching. Buford served his 
artillery with such skill that he held the Confed- 
erate force in check until the arrival of Keynolds, 
who, hearing the sound of his guns, hurried for- 
ward with his own First Corps and the Eleventh 
Corps, under General Howard. An hour later 
Keynolds came upon the field with the division 
of the First Corps under General Wads worth. 
Keynolds's instructions were to avoid bringing on 
an engagement at Gettysburg, but, in case the Con- 
federates appeared in force, to fall back to Pipe 
Creek. He found Buford so hard pressed, how- 
ever, that he was compelled to throw forward his 
main body to save him. While advancing, he was 
assailed with such suddenness that the line of bat- 
tle was formed under fire. This attack was made 

19 289 



290 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

by the division of General Heth, of HilFs corps, 
which was in the advance. They forced the Union- 
ists backward, but whilp following up their success 
they were in turn repulsed by an attack on their 
right flank led by General Reynolds in person. 
In the charge the Confederates had several hun- 
dred men captured, including Brigadier-General 
Archer, while General Reynolds was shot dead by 
a rifle-ball. His loss was a severe one to the Fed- 
eral army. " He was a brave and skilful soldier, 
an honest-hearted gentleman, and had conducted 
himself so humanely and generously to the peo- 
ple of Fredericksburg that they mourned his death 
almost as though he had been one of their own 
leaders."* The Federals rallied, and speedily re- 
covered the ground from which they had been 
driven on the right, manoeuvring so well that they 
surrounded two regiments of Davis's brigade of 
Mississippians in the railroad-cut and compelled 
them to surrender, with their Ibattle-flags. The 
battle of Gettysburg having opened, events hur- 
ried on with tremendous speed. The two remain- 
ing divisions of the First Corps of the Federal 
army arriving on the ground, one of them was 
immediately thrown forward to support the left, 
which was hard pressed by Hill. The fight be- 
caijie fierce and sanguinary. 

It will be remembered that Ewell encamped 
the night before at Heidlersburg, nine miles from 

. * J. D. McCabe, Jr. 



GETTYSBURG: FIRST DAY. 291 

Gettysburg. While on the march to the latter 
point the thunder of cannon announced the 
opening of the great battle, and he made all haste. 
E,odes, with the advance, reached the field just as 
Hill was crowding the left so hard. "Without 
delay he secured a commanding position on the 
Federal right and opened briskly uj)on it. The 
Federals responded by throwing forward a divis- 
ion of infantry, who speedily captured several hun- 
dred members of Iverson's North Carolina brigade. 
Thus, contrary to the intentions of both Meade 
and Lee, a severe conflict was brought on when 
both commanders were manoeuvring for position 
in which to receive instead of to make an attack. 
When the boom of the cannon fell upon Lee's ears, 
he was at the headquarters in the rear of his troops 
which Hill had left a short time before. He sup- 
posed it was an accidental collision with a body of 
Federal cavalry ; when he learned that Hill was 
engaged in a desperate fight with the Union infan- 
try, he was astonished, and by no means pleased, for 
his army was not in shape to deliver battle. But 
it was upon him, and could not be avoided. He 
ordered Hill's corps to be closed up, and sent for- 
ward reinforcements as rapidly as he could ; then, 
mounting his horse, he rode in the direction of 
the firing. 

Meanwhile, the line of battle rapidly widened, 
the two armies having gradually extended, in the 
form of a crescent, for a distance of several miles, 



292 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Gettysburg being in the rear of the curve. The 
Eleventh Corps of the Federals came upon the 
field, General Howard taking command after the 
fall of Reynolds. Almost at the same time Pen- 
der's division of Hill's corps arrived opposite, and 
directly afterward Early's division of Ewell's corps 
came up and took position to the north of the town, 
across the Harrisburg road. This caused the Fed- 
erals to extend their lines still farther to the right, 
thereby weakening them to a fatal degree. 

At three o'clock in the afternoon Early made 
a fierce assault upon the Union right, under Gen- 
eral Barlow, who was severely wounded, and his 
men were driven back. Rodes charged the Fed- 
eral centre, which was the key-point to the field, 
and, breaking through, swept away the right of ihe 
First Corps and the left of the Eleventh. The 
break was a disastrous one, and the Federals fled 
tumultuously into Gettysburg, the right of the 
First Corps swarming among the streets in such a 
disorganized state that Early captured more than 
five thousand prisoners and several pieces of artil- 
lery. The Confederates were still in close pursuit 
when they were recalled by their commander. 

General Meade, having learned of the fall of 
Reynolds, sent General Hancock, who arrived at 
the hour the terrified Federals were pouring 
through Gettysburg. Hancock had been instruct- 
ed to examine the ground with a view of determin- 
ing whether it was best to make a stand there or 



GETTYSBURG : FIRST DAY. 293 

retire to Pipe Creek, as was the first intention; 
but on his arrival the Federal general found a 
more serious duty on hand. He saw at once that 
unless the panic of the First and Eleventh Corps 
was stayed a great disaster was likely to overtake 
the Union army. That able soldier by the mag- 
netism and power of his presence did that which 
Howard could not do. The panic was checked, and 
the contending hosts paused to take breath and con- 
centrate their strength for the next leap at each 
other's throats. 

General Hancock formed his line along Ceme- 
tery Hill, to the south and west of the town. This 
position was one of immense strength, and after 
carefully examining it from a distance General 
Lee decided to make no attack upon it until the 
arrival of Longstreet and the remainder of Ewell's 
corps. These troops were ordered to hurry for- 
ward, while the Confederate leader did everything 
possible to learn the exact strength and disposi- 
tion of the Federal army. In his failure to storm 
and carry the heights before Hancock seized them 
General Lee let slip an opportunity which rarely 
presents itself during a campaign. He has been 
sharply criticised by his own friends for his inac- 
tion on that important occasion, but such criticism 
cannot be justified. No man, no matter how great 
his intelligence and ability, ought deliberately to 
pronounce judgment against the military genius 
of General Lee; the very fact that he refrained 



294 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

from carrying the heights is proof that he had 
the best of reasons for this course. At this remote 
day no one can have sufficient grounds upon which 
to base a judgment contrary to that of the South- 
ern leader. It was as Stonewall Jackson once 
remarked : Lee never for one moment forgot the 
enormous responsibility which rested upon his 
shoulders. There were doubtless many instances 
in which he might have accomplished almost 
miraculous results by launching his hosts where 
opportunity presented, but in doing so he inevi- 
tably ran the risk of failure — failure disastrous, 
overwhelming and irremediable. He showed his 
wisdom by declining such "extra-hazardous" 
risks. In the instance under discussion he was 
without definite knowledge of the movements, 
strength and disposition of Meade's army ; his 
own had not yet arrived on the ground (though 
he had more than enough to capture the heights), 
and doubtless he had reasons which have never 
been clearly set forth for refraining from the assault. 
Nevertheless, the truth remains that the failure to 
occupy the heights was disastrous beyond calcula- 
tion in its consequences to the Confederate army. 
Now that Destiny had ordered that the supreme 
life-and-death struggle between the Southern hosts 
and the Northern legions should take place around 
this insignificant hamlet, and that consequences 
momentous to mankind for ages to come should 
flow therefrom, let us try to understand the bat- 



OETTYSBURO: FIRST DAY. 295 

tie-ground and the complex movements which took 
place thereon during those fateful days in July, 
1863. 

Gettysburg lies in the centre of a small valley 
formed by several ranges of hills; north of the 
town the country is not so rugged, but south, east 
and west the hills are high and steep. To the 
westward, distant about a mile, is a ridge border- 
ing the east bank of Willoughby's Kun ; a quarter 
of a mile from the town, in the same direction, is 
another elevation, called Seminary Ridge. It was 
in the valley between these ridges that the battle 
of July 1 was fought. South of the town, and 
a quarter of a mile away, is Cemetery Kidge, run- 
ning due south. Just beyond the limits of Gettys- 
burg this ridge makes a curve to the eastward, and 
then, turning to the right again, falls off toward the 
south, forming a hook whose convexity is turned to- 
ward Gettysburg, and is called Cemetery Hill. Far- 
ther to the eastward, where it slopes to the south, it 
is named Gulp's Hill. Keturning now to the main 
ridge, wliich recedes with almost arrowy direct- 
ness straight away from Gettysburg toward the 
south, the ridge is found to terminate three miles 
distant in a sort of flourish known as Round Top, 
which is a high wooded peak. Just north of this 
peak is a smaller one, called Little Round Top, or 
Weed's Hill. Crossing over to Gulp's Hill, on the 
right, a small stream, known as Rock Creek, flows 
along the base and empties into the Monocacy, while 



296 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Plum Kun, anotlier creek, runs in front of Ceme- 
tery Ridge from near Cemetery Hill to Round Top 
and beyond. To the west of this ridge the country 
is commanded by it, and is of a broken character. 
The Taney town road, running due south along 
Cemetery Ridge, crosses the elevation at the ceme- 
tery ; the Baltimore turnpike crosses the ridge a 
short distance to the east and trends to the right, 
passing over Rock Creek about a mile eastward 
from the Taneytown road. The Emmettsburg 
road turns off from the Baltimore turnpike just 
out of Gettysburg, and, bearing to the westward, 
intersects the Taneytown road in front of the 
cemetery and continues to the south-west, the 
highways named spreading out from the south- 
ern outskirts of the town like the three spokes of 
a wheel. Beginning at Round Top, the terminus 
of the ridge, and passing directly northward around 
the curve called the Cemetery and on to the other 
terminus, Culp's Hill, the distance is about four 
miles. From the eastern side of Gettysburg put 
out the Bonnaughtown road and the York turn- 
pike; to the north-east, the Harrisburg road; to 
the north, the Carlisle road ; to the north-west, the 
Mummasburg road ; and south of this, the Cham- 
bersburg turnpike and Millerstown road. 

A careful study of the map is necessary to un- 
derstand the battle of Gettysburg. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY. 

The struggle on the afternoon of July 1 had 
been severe, but it was only the prelude of what 
was to come. 

On the night following this grand opening 
General Meade brought up the remainder of his 
army (excepting the Sixth Corps, which was on its 
way from Manchester) and posted it on Cemetery 
Kidge. The right, consisting of Slocum's corps 
the (Twelfth) and Wads worth's division of the 
First Corps, held Culp's Hill ; the centre, composed 
of Howard's Eleventh Corps and Robinson's and 
Doubleday's division of the First Corps, were on 
Cemetery Hill ; the left, including Hancock's Sec- 
ond Corps and Sickles's Third Corps, were posted 
along Cemetery Ridge,; while Sykes's Fifth Corps 
was in reserve on the right, and Sedgwick had not 
yet arrived. This line of battle, as will be per- 
ceived, following the line of the ridge, partook of 
the form of a horseshoe facing northward toward 
Gettysburg. It was a grand position, and was 
held by one hundred thousand men and two 
hundred guns. 

297 



298 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE 

On the same evening that the Federals assumed 
this line the Confederates occupied Gettysburg and 
the country to the east and west. Ewell was on 
the left, and held the town ; Hill's corps took pos- 
session of Seminary Kidge, thus confronting the 
centre and left of the Federal line on Cemetery 
Ridge; while Pickett's division, which did not 
arrive until the morning of the 3d, were posted 
on the right of Hill, in front of Round Top. 

Here, again, we reach a point where General 
Lee has been severely criticised for his course of 
action. It is plain to all that the Federal posi- 
tion was almost, if not <^uite, impregnable in its 
strength ; it certainly was as strong as was Freder- 
icksburg when Burnside launched the brave Army 
of the Potomac against it. Why, then, when Lee 
was far removed from his base of supplies, did he 
attack his powerful and strongly-entrenched adver- 
sary. Lee himself refers to the question as follows : 
" It had not been intended to fight a general battle 
at such a distance from our base unlSss attacked by 
the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly con- 
fronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of 
great difiiculty to withdraw through the mountains 
with our large trains. At the same time, the coun- 
try was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in 
the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was 
occupying the passes of the mountains with regular 
and local troops. A battle thus became, in a meas- 
ure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY. 299 

issue of the engagement of the first day, and, in 
view of the valuable results that would ensue from 
the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was 
thought advisable to renew the attack." There is 
more in the foregoing words than appears at first 
sight. A strong factor in the arguments which led 
Lee to renew the attack was the unbounded confi- 
dence of his soldiers. When they recalled Manas- 
sas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and the Wil- 
derness, they could not be blamed for their faith 
in their own superiority over their adversaries — a 
faith which doubtless amounted to a contempt for 
them ; and it is not at all unlikely that Lee him- 
self felt it to a less degree, though it cannot be said 
he despised his enemy. The courage and self-con- 
fidence of the Confederate army were so strong that 
battle could not be denied them. 

The 2d of July dawned bright and clear and 
with the armies confronting' each other in their 
new positions. Most of the day was spent in ad- 
justing the troops, so that it was not until quarter 
to five in the afternoon that Lee opened the attack. 
The result of his careful reconnoissances was the 
decision that the left and left centre of the Federal 
line was the proper point of attack. This was held 
by Sickles's corps, and was opposite Longstreet. It 
was at this point that General Sickles committed a 
serious indiscretion which threatened grave conse- 
quences. Directly in front of him the ridge was 
not clearly defined, but several hundred yards far- 



300 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ther on tlie elevation becomes considerable. Fear- 
ing the consequences of the seizure of this ridgt 
by the Confederates, he seized it himself. Hu 
meant well enough, but he was mistaken in judg- 
ment. "Though to a superficial examination the 
aspect of this advanced position seems advanta- 
geous, it is not really so, and, prolonged to the 
left, it is seen to be positively disadvantageous. It 
affords no resting-place for the left flank, which 
can be protected only by refusing that wing and 
throwing it back through low ground toward 
Hound Top ; but this, in turn, presents the dan- 
ger of exposing a salient in a position which, if 
carried, would give the enemy the key-point to 
the whole advanced line."* 

General Lee was quick to detect the blunder 
of Sickles, and he directed Longstreet to attack 
at once ; for he understood the value of the posi- 
tion in the main struggle to follow. It was a quar- 
ter to five, therefore, when Longstreet opened a 
heavy cannonade upon Sickles, in which Ewell, 
on the left, speedily joined. Under cover of this 
cannonade Hood's division charged against Sick- 
les's left, which curved back from a peach-orchard 
along the Emmettsburg road toward Round Top. 
Attacking sharply. Hood swung around to the 
right, and, unperceived by Sickles, shoved his 
right wing in between his extreme left and Round 
Top. And there and then took place one of 

* Swinton. 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY. 301 

those incidents which no human prescience can 
foresee, and which, apparently unimportant in 
themselves, are the source of tremendous results. 
At the time Hood was assailing Sickles, Little 
Hound Top was comparatively undefended, and 
yet it was the key-point to the whole Federal 
line. Had Hood suspected the truth, he would 
have taken possession of it with a rush. Still, seeing 
the importance of the position, he cautiously worked 
his way toward it with a part of his division, and 
was certain to secure it unless some extraordinary 
obstacle presented itself. That obstacle appeared 
at the most critical moment. At the time of the 
attack, General Warren, chief-engineer, and his 
officers were using Little Kound Top for signal- 
ling-purposes, when, seeing that the quarters were 
likely to become very warm, they began gathering 
up their flags to leave; but Warren, understand- 
ing the imperative necessity of holding the hill, 
told them to make a show of occupancy by waving 
their flags while he cast about him for some force 
to bring to the spot. It happened just then that 
Barnes's division was passing on its way to rein- 
force Sickles. Warren assumed the responsibility 
of detaching a brigade, with which he hurried back 
to position, dragging, with great labor, a battery up 
the hill. All this was done while Hood's men were 
advancing, and they now charged gallantly. The 
fight was hand to hand and of the most desperate 
character, but the Texans were repulsed; they 



302 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

clung, however, to the rocky glen at the base of 
the hill, and, resolutely pushing their way up the 
ravine between the Round Tops, turned the left 
Federal flank, but only to be driven out by a fierce 
charge with the bayonet. Meanwhile, Hood had 
hurled his left against Sickles's centre, and Mc- 
Laws's division was sent to his support. Sickles 
speedily found himself so hard pressed that he 
called for reinforcements, and three brigades were 
sent him ; but even with their help he was unable 
to hold his position. Longstreet, concentrating 
upon his exact centre, near the peach-orchard, 
succeeded in breaking through, drove back the 
Federals and secured the key-points to Sickles's 
advanced line, thus proving the error committed 
by that officer in making the movement before 
the battle. The Federals tried again and again 
to regain the orchard, but Longstreet repulsed 
them each time with great slaughter. As Long- 
street continued pushing forward, another divis- 
ion was brought up, and assailed him just as he 
reached a wheatfield and fringe of woods on the 
west side of Plum Run. The Federals, in turn, 
were gaining, when Hood, having carried Sickles's 
left, appeared on the right of the peach-orchard. 
Ayres's division of regulars was advanced to meet 
him, but he forced his way through an opening be- 
tween Caldwell's left and Ayres's right, and doubled 
both divisions back on their main line, at Cemetery 
Ridge. Sickles's left had fared ill, and his centre 



GETTYSBURG : SECOND DAY. 303 

now became the target of the Confederates. A. P. 
Hill suddenly assailed Humphreys's division (con- 
stituting Sickles's right wing) with Anderson's 
division. Humphreys was speedily driven back, 
and the whole advanced position of Sickles fell 
into the j)ossession of the Confederates, Sickles 
himself being disabled and losing a leg. But, de- 
spite the brilliant work of the Confederates, the 
main line of the enemy had not been broken. 
There was scarcely any hope for Longstreet, 
though his exuberant men pushed on and soon 
reached Cemetery Ridge, where General Hancock 
repulsed their attack. Night was now close at 
hand, and Longstreet withdrew his men to the 
western verge of the wheatfield, where they re- 
mained till morning. 

Ewell, as ordered by Lee, had made an assault on 
the Federal right centre, at Cemetery and Culp's 
Hill. The design was to prevent his enemy send- 
ing reinforcements to the left, where Longstreet 
was pounding with such vigor ; but Ewell was so 
delayed that he did not attack until sunset. With 
Early's division on his right and Johnson's on his 
left, Ewell dashed forward in the face of a heavy 
artillery-fire, charged up the slope, and in a short 
fierce struggle drove out the Federal artillerists and 
infantry, whose works at nightfall remained in the 
hands of the Confederates. If he could retain his 
grip throughout the next day, it would enable Gen- 
eral Lee to take Meade's entire line in reverse. 



304 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Thus closed the second day with matters in an 
unsatisfactory shape for both sides. Lee had not 
succeeded, nor had he failed ; he had gained some 
important advantages, but the Federal main line 
remained substantially intact. Longstreet had not 
accomplished what was intended, though he occu- 
pied strong ground and had forced Sickles from 
his advanced position. Lee had sought to drive 
the Federals from Cemetery Ridge, but found him- 
self unable to do so, though he had pushed back 
the right and left and gained considerable advan- 
tage. It was the hairbreadth mischance by which 
the Confederates failed to seize Kound Top Hill 
which prevented the complete success of Lee's 
movement in that direction. 

The losses during the first two days in July were 
appalling, amounting to more than twenty thousand 
men on each side ; among these were many of the 
best officers, either killed or wounded. General 
Barksdale was in the hands of the Federals, mor- 
tally wounded, while the tidings from the sangui- 
nary field threw hundreds of homes in both North 
and South into mourning. 

While this terrible fighting was going on. Gen- 
eral Lee, it need scarcely be said, attentively watched 
every part of the field. " In company with General 
Hill, he occupied during the battle his former posi- 
tion on Seminary Ridge, near the centre of his line, 
quietly seated, for the greater portion of the time, 
upon the stump of a tree and looking thoughtfully 



GETTYSBURG : SECOND DAY. 305 

toward the opposite heights, which Longstreet was 
endeavoring to storm. His demeanor was entirely 
cahn and composed ; an observer wonki not have 
concluded that he was the commander-in-chief. 
From time to time he raised his field-glass to his 
eyes, and, rising, said a few words to General Hill 
or General Long of his staff. After this brief col- 
loquy he would return to his seat on the stump 
and continue to direct his glass toward the wood- 
ed heights held by the enemy. "A notable circum- 
stance, and one often observed on other occasions, 
was that during the entire action he scarcely sent 
an order. During the time Longstreet was en- 
gaged — from a little before five until night — he 
sent but one message and received but one report. 
Having given full directions to his able lieutenants 
and informed them of the objects which he wished 
to attain, he, on this occasion as upon others, left 
the execution of his orders to them, relying upon 
their judgment and ability." * 

On the night succeeding the second day's battle 
Lee held a council of war with his leading officers ; 
the great question discussed was whether the attack 
should be renewed on the morrow or whether they 
should fait back toward the Potomac. Weighty 
reasons could be adduced for either course. The 
Confederate supplies, including ammunition, were 
running low and the army had lost severely. All 
seemed to feel that the fate of the Southern Con- 

» J. E. Cooke. 
20 



306 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

federacy rested on the bayonets of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, and the defeat of one was the 
doom of the other. On the other hand, the success 
of Lee, while not decisive, was encouraging, and the 
splendid army of veterans was unshaken in spirit 
and determination. In the words of J. E. Cooke, 
" the issue of the second day had stirred up in Lee 
himself all the martial ardor of his nature, and 
there never lived a more thorough soldier, when 
he was fully aroused, than the Virginian. All this 
soldiership of the man revolted at the thought of 
retreating and abandoning his great enterprise. He 
looked, on the one handj at his brave army, ready 
at the word to advance again upon the enemy — at 
that enemy, scarce able on the previous day to hold 
his position — and, weighing every circumstance in 
his comprehensive mind, which ' looked before and 
after,' Lee determined on the next morning to try 
a decisive assault upon the Federal troops, to storm, 
if possible, the Cemetery Ridge, and at one great 
blow terminate the campaign and the war." 



CHAPTEE XXX. 

GETTYSBURG: THIRD AND LAST DAY. 

It will be remembered that at the close of the 
second day Lee had accomplished nothing in the 
way of piercing the Federal lines except on their 
right, where Ewell had effected a lodgment within 
the breastworks on Gulp's Hill. This fact led Lee 
to strengthen Johnson, who was close to the eleva- 
tion, with the intention of making his main assault 
at that point ; but before the preparations could be 
completed, Meade during the night posted a strong 
force of artillery so as to bear upon Johnson, and 
at the earliest streakings of light on July 3, he 
opened a heavy fire, and a powerful force of in- 
fantry moved against the Confederates. A fierce 
conflict was instantly precipitated, and, though 
Johnson was outnumbered, he held his ground 
for four hours, when he was driven out and the 
Federal line re-established. 

This disaster compelled Lee to change his plan 
of battle, and he now determined to make the 
Federal centre his objective point, hoping to break 
apart the two wings. These preparations consumed 
several hours, during which an impressive silence 

307 



308 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

reigned over the embattled hosts, though the Fed- 
erals saw their foe busily employed in massing his 
artillery. When the sun was directly overhead, 
Lee had one hundred and forty-five pieces of 
cannon on Seminary Ridge, opposite to Meade's 
centre. Divining Lee's purpose, the Federal com- 
mander lined the crest of Cemetery Hill with 
eighty pieces of artillery. 

At one o'clock the Confederate batteries sud- 
denly opened, and, a short time after, the Federal 
battery replied from the opposite heights. The 
thunder and flame and smoke of more than two 
hundred pieces of artillery made up the most ter- 
rific cannonade that can be conceived. For two 
hours the tremendous outburst continued, the earth 
quivering from the shock, while the whole valley 
fairly rocked with a thunderous outroar such as 
was never before heard on the American conti- 
nent. The terrible enginery of war combined to 
give the scene a grandeur that was awful in its 
very sublimity and caused strong men leagues 
away to turn pale with terror. 

Gradually the Federal fire slackened, and the 
crouching troops grasped their muskets with a 
tighter grip, compressed their lips and braced 
themselves for the more deadly shock that they 
knew was coming. From Seminary Kidge, a mile 
away, as the heavy bank of vapor lifted, debouched 
a column of five thousand men clad in Confederate 
gray, their red battle-flags flying and the gun-bar- 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD AND LAST DAY. 309 

rels and bayonets gleaming in the sunlight. They 
marched with the beautiful even tread of a dress- 
parade, but the fire of deadly determination was in 
their eyes, and they meant that no mortal power 
should check their advance upon the Federal 
position. This was Major-General Pickett's division, 
formed in double line of battle, supported by Heth's 
division, of Hill's corps, under General Pettigrew. 
Pickett had only arrived that morning, but his 
command was the very flower of the Confederate 
army, every man a hero and all under the leader- 
ship of heroes seasoned in the flame of many bat- 
tles. Heth's division was composed principally of 
new troops from North Carolina. General Wilcox's 
brigade was also designed to cover Pickett's right 
flank during the advance, the assaulting column 
numbering about thirteen thousand, all under the 
command of General Pickett. Kemper's and Gar- 
nett's brigades were in front, with Armistead close 
behind ; Pettigrew marched on the left, and Wilcox 
with his troops in columns of battalions following 
on the right. The two armies were silent, all eyes 
fix:ed upon the impressive scene. The splendor of 
that advance compelled murmurs of admiration 
from tens of thousands of enemies. It was mag- 
nificent and thrilling beyond description. It was 
like a vast machine working with absolute precis- 
ion and perfection. 

With the same even, unvarying, beautiful step 
the line swept forward until the Emmettsburg road 



310 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

was reached, when the Confederate batteries stopped 
their thunder, for the infantry was coming within 
their range. When they were about halfway be- 
tween the two armies, the Federal artillery opened 
and mowed down scores ; but the gaps were imme- 
diately closed up, and the line advanced still faster 
and without a tremor until within musketry-range, 
when the crest of the hill outblazed with the fire 
of the Federal infantry, and the deadly sleet was 
driven in the very faces of the assailants. Petti- 
grew's division, despite the efforts of its command- 
er, was hurled backward, leaving two thousand 
prisoners and fifteen standards in the hands of 
the Union army. 

As Wilcox had fallen behind, Pickett and his 
heroes were left alone to breast the awful tempest. 
With the same marvellous precision they delivered 
a volley at the breastworks in their front, and then 
with their resounding yells rushed up the crest of 
Cemetery Ridge and took possession of the works 
at the point of the bayonet. But at what fearful 
cost! Garnett was dead; Armistead lunged for- 
ward, mortally wounded while cheering on the 
breastworks ; Kemper was helpless ; the dead and 
dying were everywhere, and the triumph was of 
only a few minutes' duration. The Federals ral- 
lied on their second line, against which Pickett's 
men dashed in vain, and a converging fire was 
poured upon them against which nothing with the 
breath of life could stand. Looking around for 



GETTYSBURG : THIRD AND LAST DAY. 311 

liis support, Pickett saw that he was alone, and it 
was death to every one of his command to attempt 
to hold his works. The order was given to fall 
back, and sullenly and reluctantly the survivors 
withdrew from a charge that was as sublime in its 
true heroism and daring as that of the immortal 
Six Hundred at Balaklava. 

Of the five thousand men who advanced with 
such proud bearing under Pickett, thirty-five 
hundred were killed, wounded or prisoners in the 
hands of the Union army. Of his three brigade 
commanders, Garnett was killed, Armistead dying 
and Kemper frightfully wounded. Of the four- 
teen field-officers who were in the advance, only 
one came back. The Federals paid dearly in 
killed and wounded for their victory, among the 
latter being Generals Gibbon and Hancock, though 
the latter remained on the field until the issue was 
decided. 

Standing on Seminary Ridge, General Lee, with 
his glass to his eyes, watched the wonderful charge, 
fight and repulse of Pickett. When he saw the 
broken masses reeling back, he rode among them 
and by his cheerful words and manner did his 
utmost to comfort the brave fellows. They cheered 
him in turn, and showed their faith in his prowess 
was unshaken. But Lee realized that it was im- 
possible to break through the Union lines. There 
was some apprehension that Pickett's repulse 
would be followed by a general attack on the part 



312 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of Meade, but lie was too wise to incur such a 
risk, and quiet reigned for the rest of the day. 

That night the corps of General Ewell was 
withdrawn from the town and posted on Semi- 
nary Ridge, where the entire Confederatfe army 
entrenched itself. The Federals occupied Gettys- 
burg the next morning. Finding he was in no 
danger of attack. General Lee began removing his 
wounded and his arms from a portion of the field. 
The retreat was begun at night by the Chambers- 
burg and Fairfield roads, which lead through the 
South Mountain range into the Cumberland Val- 
ley. As usual, a severe storm came up in the 
afternoon and lasted through the night, making 
the retreat laborious, slow and painful. 

The second Confederate invasion of the North 
was ended. 

The Union loss at Gettysburg was two thousand 
eight hundred and thirty-four killed, thirteen thou- 
sand seven hundred and thirty-three wounded, and 
six thousand six hundred and forty-three missing, 
making the dreadful total of twenty-three thousand 
one hundred and ninety. The Confederate losses 
cannot be given with accuracy, but, owing to the 
circumstances of the battle, they must have been 
considerably greater. General Lee left most of 
his wounded in the hands of his enemy, who 
claimed a capture of thirteen thousand six hun- 
dred and twenty-one prisoners. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 

So soon as General Meade learned of the re- 
treat of General Lee he made haste to pursue him. 
Sedgwick's corps was despatched along the Fair- 
field road, and his cavalry gallojDcd over the Har- 
risburg highway. The Confederate rear-guard was 
overtaken late in the day at the point where the 
Fairfield road runs along the South Mountain. 
Before any attack could be made Sedgwick was 
recalled by an order from Meade, who had deter- 
mined on another route : that was to take the one 
east of the mountains, which was almost twice as 
long as the road by which Lee was retreating. 
Hoping to intercept Lee, General French, who was 
at Frederick with the garrison of Harper's Ferry, 
was ordered to seize the lower passes of the South 
Mountain before they could be occupied by Lee. 
French was also to occupy Harper's Ferry. These 
orders were promptly carried out by French, who 
sent out a cavalry force as far as Williamsport and 
destroyed a Confederate ponton-bridge across the 
Potomac. Meade carefully felt his way, being 
joined on the march by French's division and 
other, reinforcements sent from Washington, until 

313 



314 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

his army was nearly, if not quite, as strong as 
before the battle. On the 7th of July the Fed- 
eral headquarters were at Frederick, and three 
days later were at Antietam Creek. 

General Lee had from the first a work of ex- 
treme difficulty before him, but he went at it with 
that calm self-conlidence which he never failed 
to display under the most adverse circumstances. 
One part of his train followed the Fairfield road 
and the rest went through Cashtown, General Imbo- 
den's cavalry guarding the advance. The immense 
length of the wagon- trains exposed them to Fed- 
eral forays, and as they defiled from the mountain- 
passes they lost a few wagons and ambulances from 
this cause. 

July 6 the Federal cavalry made an attack at 
Williamsport, but were driven off by Imboden be- 
fore any substantial injury was inflicted. General 
Stuart and his cavalry arrived soon after, and not 
only repelled another assault, but pursued their 
assailants several miles. The violent rain-storm 
which had lasted so many hours rendered the roads 
passable only by great labor, and the army plodded 
slowly after the wagon-trains. The pursuit by 
Meade was " from afar," and was conducted with 
such extreme circumspection that Lee would not 
have had the slightest difficulty in getting away 
but for the fact that on reaching the Potomac it 
was found so swollen by the recent rain as to be 
no longer fordable, and the single ponton-bridge he 



TEE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 31 5 

possessed had been destroyed by the enemy. The 
only thing, therefore, to do was to wait till the 
river's volume should subside. Accordingly, he 
selected a secure position, and the three days which 
passed before his pursuers appeared were spent in 
strengthening it against attack. A portion of the 
old ponton-bridge was recovered, and after great 
labor a new bridge was finished on the 13th. 

The situation of the Confederate army during 
those days was very critical. Ammunition and 
supplies were low, and none could be obtained 
from any source. The river was impassable, and 
the Federal army, reinforced and exultant, was 
approaching. It came in sight on the 12th, and 
Lee gathered his forces for the assault which he 
was confident would be speedily made ; but it was 
Meade who seemed to think himself in danger, 
for he began to fortify his line. But at high 
noon on the 13th those who examined the subsid- 
ing Potomac reported that it was fordable, and, 
everything being in readiness. General Lee ordered 
the passage to be begun that night. The frightful 
condition of the roads, however, delayed every- 
thing; so that the troops did not arrive until 
after daylight on the 14th. Ewell's corps had ford- 
ed the river at Williamsport, while those of Long- 
street crossed on the bridge at Falling Waters. 

On the night of the 13th, General IMeade deter- 
mined to attack the Confederate army the follow- 
ing morning. His preparations were elaborated 



316 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

with the care and skill which he always displayed. 
When, at last, these were completed, the Federal 
commander awoke to the fact that Lee and all 
his army were on the other side of the Potomac. 
They had withdrawn with complete success. Two 
guns so mired that their horses could not drag them 
off and several disabled wagons were left, including 
a number of men, who, throwing themselves in the 
mud alongside the road and sinking into heavy 
sleep, were missed in the darkness by the officers 
sent to arouse them, and thus fell into the hands 
of the pursuers. On the 15th of July, General 
Lee withdrew from the Potomac to the neighbor- 
hood of Winchester. Two days later a detachment 
of Federal cavalry which had crossed at Harper's 
Ferry were attacked by General Fitz Lee at Kear- 
nysville and driven back with considerable loss. 

General Meade, unwilling to relinquish the great 
prize almost in his grasp, as it seemed, determined 
to cut off Lee from Richmond or compel him to 
fight before he could move east of the Blue Ridge. 
Crossing his army at Harper's Ferry on the 17th 
and 18th of July, he sought to occupy the passes 
before they could be reached by the Confederates. 
Thereupon, Lee turned up the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, his progress hindered by the high water in 
the Shenandoah Piver. Longstreet was ordered on 
the 19th of July to proceed to Culpeper Court- 
House by way of Front Poyal. He succeeded in 
moving part of his command over the Shenandoah 



THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 317 

in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas 
and Chester Gaps by the Federals. A ponton- 
bridge was laid ; the rest of the corps crossed, and 
marched through Chester Gap to Culpeper, where 
they arrived on the 24th. Hill's corps followed, 
Ewell reaching Front Royal on the 23d and en- 
camping near Madison Court-House on the 29th. 
A portion of the Federal army entered the valley 
during this march of Lee, and a capital o^Dcning 
was presented for a flank attack ; but it failed 
through the mismanagement of General French, 
who was buffeted hither and thither and held back 
by the Confederates as they willed until the oppor- 
tunity had passed. Finding, at last, that the Con- 
federate army had successfully eluded him, Meade 
marched at a leisurely pace toward the Rappahan- 
nock, while Lee withdrew to the vicinity of Cul- 
peper. 

The failure of the second Confederate invasion 
of the North was a tremendous blow to the South, 
accompanied as it was by the fall of Vicksburg and 
the loss of the Mississippi River ; but the Confed- 
eracy only buckled on its armor and prepared again 
for the fiercer conflict that was to come. It was the 
general belief throughout the South that had a great 
victory been won at Gettysburg the South and the 
North ^ would have formed a treaty of peace on 
terms acceptable to both. The South was none 
the less determined to win those terms, but the 
disasters caused her to realize that the struggle 



318 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

would be harder, longer and more sanguinary than 
before. July 15, President Davis issued his proc- 
lamation calling into the military service all per- 
sons residing in the Confederacy, and not legally 
exempt, between the ages of eighteen and forty- 
five years. The 21st of August was appointed a 
day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. It was 
observed throughout the South, and nowhere more 
impressively than in the army.* 

* General Lee's order respecting the observance of this day is wor- 
thy of preservation : 

" Headquarters Army of Northern Virgiota. 
August 13, 1863. 
" General Order, 
No. 83. 

''The President of the Confederate States has in the name of the 
people appointed the 21st day of August as a day of fasting, humilia- 
tion and prayer. A strict observance of the day is enjoined upon the 
officers and soldiers of the army. All military duties except such as 
are absolutely necessary will be suspended. The commanding officers 
of brigades and regiments are requested to cause divine services suit- 
able to the occasion to be performed in tlieir respective commands. 

" Soldiers ! we have sinned against almighty God. We have forgot- 
ten his signal mercies, and have cultivated a revengeful, haughty and 
boastful spirit. We have not remembered that the defenders of a 
just cause should be pure in his eyes, that ' our times are in his hands/ 
and we have relied too much on our own arms for the achievement 
of our independence. God is our only refuge and our strength. Let 
us humble ourselves before him. Let us confess our many sins and 
beseech him to give us a higher courage, a purer patriotism and more 
determined will, that he will convert the hearts of our enemies, that 
he will hasten the time when war, with its sorrows and sufferings, shall 
cease, and that he will give us a name and place among the nations of 
the earth. 

"E. E. Lee, General." 



YIL 
THE SECOND CAMP-FIRE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

A SERIES OF MANCEUVBES. 

A PERIOD of rest and inactivity now followed in 
Northern Virginia. The vast conflict was pushed 
in other quarters, and tremendous campaigns were 
lost and won in the South and South-west. In 
September, Longstreet's corps was sent to Tennes- 
see to help Bragg against Kosecrans. The vete- 
rans acquitted themselves with the same courage 
and skill they had shown in the East. 

General Meade's army was also weakened by 
the withdrawal of a large portion, which was for- 
warded to North Carolina, while another force was 
sent to New York to assist in quelling the riots 
that had broken out there from the attempt to 
enforce the Conscription act. But, deeming him- 
self strong enough to make a demonstration against 
the Confederate army when weakened by the with- 
drawal of Longstreet's corps, Meade sent his cav- 
alry across the Kappahannock, and General Lee, 
believing that a general attack was contemplated, 

319 



320 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

retired to a strong position behind the Kapidan. 
Meade was afraid to assail him, and prepared for 
a flank movement; but before he could put it in 
execution he was notified from Washington that it 
was necessary to detach two more corps from his 
army and send them to Tennessee, where matters 
were in a critical state on account of the defeat of 
Rosecrans at Chickamauga — an achievement with 
which the fire-tried veterans of Longstreet had 
much to do. 

The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were trans- 
ferred, with Hooker as their commander, to the 
West. This left Meade in such a weakened con- 
dition that he was obliged to remain strictly on 
the defensive. When his absent men were re- 
turned to him and he was about to assume the 
offensive, Lee himself initiated a series of import- 
ant operations. His purpose was to deliver a blow 
which would seriously disable the Army of the 
Potomac or compel it to keep beyond the Rappa- 
hannock until the season was so far advanced that it 
could attempt nothing until spring. His first move 
was intended to take the Confederate army around 
the right flank of Meade and lodge it between him 
and Washington. The Rapidan was crossed on 
the 9th of October, and, advancing with great 
care and secrecy, he passed by way of Madison 
Court-House well to the right of Meade. Hamp- 
ton's cavalry division, under Stuart, moved on the 
right of the column, while that of Fitzhugh Lee 



A SERIES OF MANOEUVRES. 321 

remained to guard the southern line of the Rapi- 
dan and to mask the general movement. 

The first definite tidings reached Meade on the 
lOtli in the shape of an attack on his outpost at 
James City, consisting of a detachment of Kilpat- 
rick's cavalry and an infantry force belonging to 
the Third Corps. They were pushed back to Cul- 
peper Court-House, where the Federal army lay. 

Meade saw that his right flank had been turned, 
and without delay he started his trains toward the 
Rappahannock, following with his army the same 
night. When Lee, therefore, approached Cul- 
peper, on the 11th, he discovered that the Federal 
army had passed beyond the Rappahannock. He 
halted for the rest of the day. Stuart bore hard 
upon the rear of Meade's column, covered by Pleas- 
anton's cavalry. General Fitz Lee's division, which 
had repulsed Buford, rejoined General Stuart. In 
the afternoon the Federal cavalry near Brandy Sta- 
tion was driven across the river by Stuart. The 
next morning, October 12, Lee resumed his ad- 
vance with the purpose of reaching the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad north of the city and 
checking the retreat of the Federal army. A force 
of their cavalry was encountered and defeated at 
Jeffersonton, and late in the afternoon Lee reached 
the Rappahannock opposite Warrenton Springs. 
Cavalry and artillery were drawn up on the opposite 
bank, but they were driven away and the river was 
crossed. Pushing o^, Stuart speedily reached War- 

21 



322 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

renton, where the Confederate army was concen- 
trated on the 13th. Uncertain of the whereabouts 
of Meade, Lee believed he had halted between 
Warrenton Junction and Catlett's Station, on the 
railroad. To settle the question, General Stuart 
with two thousand cavalry was sent in the direc- 
tion of Catlett's. 

A curious complication was brought about by 
Meade's change of mind and subsequent course. 
Believing he had been too hasty in retreating 
across the Rapidan, he turned back toward Cul- 
peper to meet Lee and give him battle. This 
movement was begun on the afternoon of the 
12th, so that it came about that, while the Con- 
federate army was hurrying to interpose itself 
between the Federal army and Washington, the 
Federal army was groping southward in search of 
its opponent. The scattering of the cavalry at the 
crossing of the Rappahannock speedily became 
known to Meade, who saw at once the compro- 
mising situation in which he was placing himself 
by his false move. He immediately recalled the 
troops on the way to Culpeper Court-House ; and 
on the day that Lee concentrated at Warrenton, 
Meade returned to the north side of the Rappa- 
hannock. The unexpected movement of Lee had 
" disjointed " French's corps, and Meade was there- 
fore compelled to await his arrival. General War- 
ren, with the Second Corps, was ordered to halt 
until French could be brought into his right place, 



A SERIES OF MANCEUVRES. 323 

and to cover the retreat " of the army with his own 
corps, moving through Fayetteville and Auburn to 
Catlett's Station, after which he was to follow the 
line of the railroad northward." This movement 
was under way when Stuart set out on his recon- 
noissance to Catlett's Station. Observing French's 
column in the act of withdrawing from the river, 
he fell back toward Warren ton. On entering the 
road leading from Warrenton to Manassas, Stuart 
suddenly found himself confronted by the corps 
of General Warren, and the still more alarming 
discovery was made that he was hemmed in be- 
tween the Federal columns and in imminent dan- 
ger of being captured or destroyed. The cavalry 
were in the most perilous situation that can be 
conceived. Their immunity for the time depended 
on not being seen by the Federals, who, it may be 
said, surrounded them ; but it looked as if discov- 
ery must come every minute. The cavalry were 
in a strip of woods, in which they hid themselves 
on seeing their danger; but their enemies were 
so close that the neigh of a horse, the clank of 
a sabre or an incautious word would betray them. 
Stuart called his officers around him to consider 
what should be done. By way of introducing the 
subject, he stated that the question of surrender was 
not before them : under no circumstances would he 
consider that. The conclusion was that the only 
course was to abandon their nine pieces of horse- 
artillery and cut their way out under cover of the 



324 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

darkness. But Stuart was not satisfied with this 
decision, which compelled him to lose his guns, 
and he decided on another course. Several of his 
men were dismounted, and each was given a mus- 
ket and an infantry knapsack. Trusting the night 
to conceal their uniforms, they were directed to make 
their way through the Federal lines to Warrenton, 
tell General Lee that Stuart was surrounded and 
ask him to send some friends to help him out. A 
couple of these men succeeded in stealing through 
the Federal lines, and lost no time in hastening to 
Lee and apprising him of the perilous situation of 
Stuart. It would have been an irreparable loss to 
the Confederate army should the dashing officer be 
captured or slain, and Lee was quick to respond to 
the appeal of his lieutenant. But the hours were 
most anxious ones to Stuart and his command as 
they crouched among the trees, expecting every 
moment to be discovered. During the night two 
of Meade's officers wandered among the troopers 
with no suspicion of their danger until each felt 
the cold muzzle of a pistol against his nose, lit up, 
as it seemed, by the gleam of the soldier's eyes 
behind it, and the whole endorsed by the whispered 
threat that the least move or outcry would bring in- 
stant death. The prisoners submitted quietly, and 
caused no trouble. Early the next morning, Cald- 
well's division, posted on the heights of Cedar Run 
to protect General Warren's rear, stirred up their 
camp-fires and began preparing breakfast. It was 



A SEBIES OF MANCEVVRES. 325 

not long before they were alarmed by the sharp 
firing of musketry from the advance of General 
Swell's column, approaching over the Warrenton 
road. The sounds thrilled the anxious troopers 
with delight, for it was the announcement that 
their friends were at hand and danger was past. 
Immediately, Stuart opened with his artillery on 
the Federal line, causing great confusion and the 
loss of a number of lives ; then, limbering up his 
guns, he dashed off and joined General Ewell. 

General Lee intended, after crossing the E-ap- 
pahannock, to leave Warrenton in two columns. 
His left, under Hill, was to march along the turn- 
pike to New Baltimore, there to move to the right 
and hasten to Bristoe Station. The right, under 
Ewell, was to proceed through Auburn and Green- 
wich to the same point, where the two wings would 
unite. When General Warren found himself at- 
tacked by Ewell and Stuart, he believed he was 
surrounded, and hastily prepared to make a good 
fight to save himself; but Stuart, having sent his 
compliments, was only too glad to extricate him- 
self from his dangerous position, and the Confed- 
erate advance was checked until Ewell arrived 
with his main body. Then the pressure became 
too great, and Warren retreated across Cedar Run. 

In the mean time. General Meade was advancing 
along the railroad toward Centreville, with Warren 
bringing up the rear. It was at Centreville that 
the Federal commander had determined to give 



326 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

battle. Lee bent all his energies to intercept bis 
opponent before he could reach that point, but 
Meade was hurrying over the interior and shorter 
line, and easily maintained the lead. The whole 
force was beyond Bristoe Station when General 
Hill and two of his brigades came panting to the 
spot. Hill quickly formed his line for the pur- 
pose of attacking the rear, when, to his astonish- 
ment, Warren and his troops appeared, coming 
toward Bristoe. They had been delayed by the 
causes explained, and, hurrying along the rail- 
road, reached Bristoe just in time to find them- 
selves confronted by Hill's corps. The situation 
again became critical for Warren, who was in dan- 
ger of being overwhelmed by the whole army of 
Lee ; but the Federal commander disentangled him- 
self with highly creditable vigor and skill. War- 
ren was thoroughly acquainted with the ground, 
and he posted his men along the railroad, where 
most of them were protected by a steep embank- 
ment. The attack of Hill was repulsed with heavy 
loss, including four hundred and fifty prisoners, 
five pieces of artillery and two standards. It may 
be said that Warren's situation in a brief while 
became more dangerous than before, for the bat- 
tle was hardly over when Ewell's corps appeared. 
Before the dispositions for attack, however, could 
be made, night set in, and under its protection 
Warren withdrew and joined Meade at Centreville. 
The position of the Federal commander was ad- 



A SERIES OF MANCEUVBES. 327 

mirable. He was not only strongly entrenched, 
but in the event of defeat he could fall back on 
Washington, the effort of Lee to cut him off from 
the national capital having been foiled. Lee saw 
that nothing was to be gained by assault, and he 
therefore withdrew in the direction of the Rappa- 
hannock. With a view of hindering as much as 
possible Meade's return to Culj^eper, he destroyed 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad between Bull 
Run and Warrenton Junction. 

The withdrawal of the Confederate army was 
covered, as usual, by Stuart, who was continually 
skirmishing with the Federal cavalry. On the 
19th he was at Buckland with Hampton's divis- 
ion. A brisk interchange of shots took place with 
the Federals, and he retreated slowly toward War- 
renton, with a view of drawing his enemies after 
him, so as to give Fitzhugh Lee, who was approach- 
ing by the Auburn road with his division, a chance 
to assail Kilpatrick, who commanded the Federal 
cavalry, in front and rear. The programme was 
carried out without halt or hitch. A few miles 
from Warrenton, Fitzhugh Lee made his attack, 
and Stuart wheeled about and assailed Kilpatrick 
in front. The latter retreated in confusion, fol- 
lowed by Stuart to the vicinity of Haymarket, and 
by Fitzhugh Lee to Gainesville.* At the latter 

* " I pursued them from within three miles of Warrenton to Buck- 
land, the horses at full speed the whole distance, the enemy retreating 
in great confusion." — Siimrfs Report. 



828 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

point the Federal infantry rallied to the support 
of the cavalry. Having secured a number of 
prisoners, Stuart fell back toward Buckland. 

The Army of the Potomac advanced to War- 
renton, where it was forced to wait until the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad could be repaired. This 
was soon accomplished, and it resumed its advance 
in two columns toward the Rappahannock, behind 
which Lee had taken position near Culpeper, with 
Ewell on his right, Hill on the left and his cavalry 
on each flank. The major part of the army was 
well back from the river, but outposts were estab- 
lished at Kelley's Ford down stream and at Rap- 
pahannock Station above, and on the north bank 
of the Rappahannock. The Federal army was 
divided into two columns, the left under Gen- 
eral French, consisting of the First, Second and 
Third Corps, and the right under General Sedg- 
wick, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. 
The latter was ordered to cross the river at Rap- 
pahannock Station, while French was to force the 
passage at Kelley's Ford. This ford was guarded 
only by Rodes's division of Ewell's corps, and they 
were easily driven away by French, who secured 
a number of prisoners. 

At Rappahannock Station, General Early threw 
Hoke's and Hays's brigades into the strong works 
which had been erected some time before by the 
Federals on the northern bank. The force num- 
bered about two thousand men, and it was believed 



A SERIES OF MANCEUVRES. 329 

that if defeated they would be able to recross the 
stream under fire of the guns. It was a foolish 
and costly mistake to the Confederates. The col- 
umn of Sedgwick came up late in the afternoon, 
and as quickly as they could make ready stormed 
the works, killing and wounding a hundred, cap- 
turing fifteen hundred prisoners and four guns. 
The few men who escaped did so by swimming 
the river. Not wishing to be drawn into a gen- 
eral engagement, Lee withdrew behind the Rapi- 
dan, while Meade resumed the position he held 
before his retreat to Centreville. 

The campaign was without substantial result to 
either side. It consisted mainly of manoeuvres 
accompanied by little fighting, and the relative 
position of the two armies at its close was the 
same in effect as at its opening. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE CAMP-FIRE OF MINE BUN. 

Having withdrawn behind the Kapidan, Lee 
placed his army in winter-quarters. His position 
was so strong that he had no fear of successful 
molestation from the enemy, against whom was 
opposed only the single corps of Ewell. Hill's 
corps was stationed in detached divisions at dif- 
ferent points on the Orange and the Virginia 
Central Railroads, with a view of making it more 
convenient to subsist it through the winter. Hill's 
cantonments stretched almost to Charlottesville, 
while the artillery was still farther back, but so 
situated that it could be concentrated at any men- 
aced point. The lower fords of the Eapidan — 
Ely's, Culpeper Mine, Germanna and Jacob's Mill 
— were left unguarded. 

This fact becoming known to Meade, he allowed 
the clamor throughout the North to tempt him to 
another effort to deliver an effective blow against 
the Army of Northern Virginia. His plan was 
simple enough ; he trusted that by crossing the 
Rapidan at the lower fords he could wedge his 
army between the corps of Ewell and Hill and 
overwhelm them in detail. His troops, supplied 

330 



THE CAMP-FIBE OF MINE BUN. 331 

with ten days' rations, were to move as follows: 
"The First Corps was to cross the Rapidan at 
Culpej^er Mine Ford and proceed to Parker's 
Store, on the j)lank-road to Orange Court-House. 
The Second Corps was to cross at Germanna Ford 
and proceed out on the turnpike (which ruiis par- 
allel with the j3lank-road) to Robertson's Tavern. 
To this point, also, the Third Corps, crossing at 
Jacob's Mill Ford, and followed by the Sixth 
Corps, was to march by other routes, and there 
to form a junction with the Second Corps. With 
the left at Parker's Store and the right at Robert- 
son's Tavern, the army would be in close commu- 
nication on parallel roads, and by advancing west- 
ward" toward Orange Court-House would turn the 
line of Mine Run defences, which, it was known, 
did not extend as far south as to cross the turn- 
pike and plank-roads."* The Federal columns 
started promptly, as intended, on the morning of 
November 26, and, as the point of concentration 
was barely twenty miles distant, Meade was confi- 
dent of having his army in position by noon the 
next day. The river, however, was not crossed 
until the following morning, when, in obedience to 
orders, the army pushed on with all possible haste. 
No matter how secret the precautions of such 
a great movement, it could not be concealed from 
Lee, who noted the " signs " a couple of days be- 
fore. All the fords were put under the closest 

* Swinton. 



332 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

surveillance, and it soon became known where 
Meade intended to cross. Lee suspected he was 
making for Chancellorsville, so as to gain his rear, 
and he vigilantly watched for the first indication 
of Meade's purpose. It came in an altogether 
unexpected manner. 

The Second Corps of the Federal army, under 
General Warren, reached Robertson's Tavern short- 
ly after noon, and immediately became involved in 
a brisk skirmish with Ewell, but, under orders to 
refrain from battle until the arrival of French, no 
attack was made. But French began with a stum- 
ble and kept it up all the. way. After crossing the 
Kaj)idan at Jacob's Mill, he took the wrong road 
to Robertson's Tavern, and, passing far to the right, 
suddenly ran against Johnson's division of Ewell's 
corps. Johnson attacked at once, and a brisk fight 
followed, which lasted until sunset. By the time 
French was able to extricate himself and open 
communication with Robertson's Tavern it was 
night. 

It was this occurrence which gave Lee the knowl- 
edge he wanted, and he made his dispositions with 
his accustomed promptness and skill. Hill's corps, 
scattered here and there south of Orange Court- 
House, was ordered up, and reached the ground 
during the night. Thereupon, Ewell was with- 
drawn to the west side of Mine Run, where prep- 
arations were immediately perfected to shut oif the 
Federal advance in that direction. The southern 



THE CAMP-FIRE OF MINE RUN. 333 

line was of exceptional strength. It followed a 
range of hills some seven or eight miles in length, 
extending due north and south, with the Mine 
Kun Creek flowing along its base. Lee superin- 
tended most of the engineering operations in per- 
son ; which statement is all that is required to 
show they were beyond improvement. He and 
his officers and men were in the highest spirits, 
for no one had a doubt of their ability to defend 
themselves against any assault that could be made. 
It was this formidable line of fortifications which 
barred Meade's advance on the wintry morning of 
the 28th of November. Still, the Federal com- 
mander had no thought of retiring, and, placing 
his army in position, he spent the day in hunting 
the most favorable point of attack. The result 
of these careful reconnoissances and the council 
that followed was the decision that General War- 
ren, with some twenty-six thousand men, was to 
seek to turn the Confederate left, while Sedgwick, 
with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, was to attempt to 
turn the right. French, with three divisions, was 
to take no part, but to hold the line between Sedg- 
wick and Warren. The next day was spent in 
perfecting preparations. It was agreed that on 
tlie morning of the 30tli the attack should open. 
Sedgwick was to deliver a heavy artillery-fire, after 
which Warren would advance, and an hour later 
Sedgwick was to make his effort to turn the right. 
Everything was in readiness at daylight, and the 



334 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

army impatiently awaited the signal. Soon the 
boom of Sedgwick's cannon awoke the oppressive 
stillness, and the thunder rolled along the line, but 
in the direction of Warren, on the left, the silence 
continued like that of the tomb. Meade and the 
rest of the army were astounded, unable to under- 
stand the cause of this extraordinary inaction ; but 
the explanation was speedily brought to. the leader 
by an aide from Warren. 

General Warren, when he came to inspect the 
Confederate right, just before 'attacking, found that 
Lee had made it absolutely impregnable. He might 
launch his command against it, but it would be 
Fredericksburg over again. His men were ready 
to attempt whatever was required of them, but, 
with a moral heroism which did him credit, War- 
ren declined to order the assault, preferring to 
sacrifice himself rather than his men. General 
Meade^ immediately rode over to the line. and care- 
fully inspected it ; he was compelled to acknowledge 
that Warren was right and it would be a crime to 
order men to make the assault. It was a bitter 
disappointment to the Federal commander, but he 
was too good a soldier not to see the truth as it 
was. He had advanced in order to satisfy the im- 
patient demands of the North, and now, having 
marched his army up the hill, it only remained to 
march it down again. He might move far over to 
the left in the hope of manoeuvring Lee out of his 
position, but the issue would be very doubtful, as 



THE CAMP-FIRE OF MINE RUN. 335 

liis trains were beyond the Kapidan and supplies 
were low. Besides, they were on the edge of win- 
ter, and the weather was already so severe that a 
number of soldiers had frozen to death. On the 
night of December 1, therefore, Meade returned to 
his old position on the Eapidan. As soon as his 
flight was discovered Lee started in pursuit, but 
the Federal army was too active, and crossed over 
the river before he could overtake it. 

Both armies now went into winter-quarters, Lee 
holding the south bank of the Kapidan, his canton- 
ments extending from the river along the railroad 
to Orange Court-House and Gordonsville. Meade's 
troops were distributed along the Orange and Alex- 
andria Railroad all the way from the Rapidan to 
the Rappahannock. The feeling was general that 
the final conflict was approaching, and both gov- 
eriiments put forth their utmost efforts to prepare 
for the life-and-death struggle. 



" We were on the Kapidan River where it was a little stream hardly 
one hundred feet wide. General Lee sent me word I must go out and 
break up the communication between our pickets and the enemy's. 
They had got to trading with each other in newspapers, tobacco, and 
whatever would vary the monotony of picket-life. They would not 
shoot at each other, and so it was not military-like; so I started out 
one morning on my horse and rode the whole length of the picket- 
line, and just as I came to a certain point I saw that there was con- 
fusion and surprise, as if I had not been expected. 

" ' What is the matter, men, here ?' I asked. 

" ' Nothing, general ; nothing is here.' 

"'You must tell me the truth,' said I. 'I am not welcome, I see, 
and there must be some reason for it. Now, what is the matter?' 



336 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

" ' Tliere has been nobody here, general. We were not expecting 
you, that is all.' 

"I turned to two or three of the soldiers and said, 

"'Beat down these bushes here.' 

" They had to obey, and there suddenly rose up out of the weeds a 
man as stark naked as he had come into the world. 

" ' Who are you ?' asked I. 

" ' I am from over yonder, general. 

" ' Over yonder ? Where ?' 

"He pointed to the other side of the river. 

" ' WJiat regiment do you belong to ?' 

"'The One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania, general.' 

" ' What are you doing in my camp ?' 

" ' Why, I thought 1 would just come over and see the boys.' 

" ' See the boys ! What boys ? Do you mean to say you have entered 
my camp except as a prisoner? Now, I am going to do this with you : 
I am going to have you marched to Libby prison just as you are, 
without a rag of clothes on you.' 

'' ' Why, general, you wouldn't do that just because I came over to 
see the boys? I didn't mean any harm. I felt lonesome over there 
and wanted to talk to the boys a little, tliat's all.' 

" ' Never mind, sir ; you mai-ch from this spot, clothed as you are, 
to Libby prison.' 

" ' General,' said the man, ' I had rather you would order me to be 
shot right here.' 

" ' No, sir ; you go to Libby.' 

"Then several of my soldiers spoke up: 

"'General, don't be too hard on him; he's a pretty good fellow. He 
didn't mean any harm ; he just wanted to talk with us.' 

" ' This business must be broken up,' said I — ' mixing on the picket- 
line.' 

" It had not been in my heart, however, to arrest the man, from the 
beginning. I only wanted to scare him, and he did beg hard. 

"'I'll tell you what I will do with you this time,' for I saw he was 
a brave, good-humoi"ed fellow : ' if you will promise me that neither 
you nor any of your men shall ever come into my lines again except 
as prisoners, I'll let you go.' 

" ' God bless you, general !' said the man ; and without any more ado 
he just leaped into that stream, and came up on the other side and took 
to the woods." — General Gordon. 



Till. 
THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

THE WILDERNESS. 

Late in the tempestuous winter of 1864 a 
heavy-set, grim-featured man clad in the uniform 
of a major-general in the United States army sat 
in his tent in the South-west intently studying the 
most momentous question of the century : " How 
shall the Federal Union be restored?" He was 
a born fighter ; he had led his blue-coated legions 
to triumph on more than one crimson battle-field. 
He believed in "pounding" his adversary — in 
" never letting go," and in winning by hard knocks 
and the momentum of superior numbers. Contem- 
plating the mighty resources of the North and the 
fast-waning strength of the South, he felt that the 
problem was solved. With an army practically 
limitless in numbers, in a superb state of disci- 
pline, with able lieutenants and the command of 
boundless wealth and material, he had but to keep 
hammering away, and, though the mallet was wood, 

22 337 



338 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

yet under the multitudious blows the rock at last 
raust be. split to fragments. The man was Ulysses 
S. Grant, who on the 2d of March, 1864, was con- 
firmed by the Senate lieutenant-general, and on 
the 10th of the same month, by special order of 
President Lincoln, assigned to the command of 
the armies of the United States. 

In his ragged tent on Clarke's Mountain, in 
Virginia, sat, at the same time, a man of hand- 
some features, erect form, clear eye, silvered beard 
and august presence wrestling with the problem of 
his life: "How shall the Southern Confederacy 
conquer a peace and secure its independence?" 
For three years he had led his army to victory 
after victory. While the leaders of his opposing 
forces had been weighed in the balance and found 
wanting, this man had grown steadily in the con- 
fidence and love of the Southern people until he 
was now their idol. He had won the fear and 
respect of his foes ; he had proven to the world 
that he was master of the science of war. While 
•disaster had overtaken the gray-coated hosts in 
other sections, he had never been overthrown ; he 
still rode his white horse a conqueror, and the army 
under him was still defiant and eager for the fray. 
But, while the Federal power must increase, the 
Confederate power must decrease. There were no 
more resources upon which to draw ; the currency 
was fast becoming worthless ; many brilliant officers 
had fallen, and brave men had been stricken down 



THE WILDERNESS. 339 

by tens of thousands; the ranks were decimated, 
and the long, thin, gray battle-line of ragged 
and gaunt veterans was daily growing thinner and 
weaker. The South itself was in the field, and the 
Southern Confederacy was upborne on the bayonets 
of the Army of Northern Virginia. If that was 
conquered, then was the end. But not yet. In 
the face of discouragement and defeat elsewhere, 
Robert E. Lee contemplated the future with the 
serene assurance of the Christian warrior and the 
high resolve to do his whole duty and to leave the 
issue with the God of battles. 

In the month of April, 1864, the Army of 
Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac 
awoke from their winter's sleep, and, springing to 
their feet, confronted each other, as they had done 
so many times in the terrible years that were gone. 
They glared fiercely, compressed their lips, knit 
their muscles and entered upon the most terrific 
struggle of modern times. It was the last cam- 
paign, and soon the last camp-fire would be ex- 
tinguished. 

When General Grant came to Virginia, the 
Army of the Potomac was reorganized into three 
corps, Major-General W. S. Hancock commanding 
the Second; Major-General G. K. Warren, the 
Fifth; and Major-General John Sedgwick, the 
Sixth. The command of the army continued with 
General Meade, and Major-General P. H. Sheridan 
was made the leader of the cavalry corps. Before 



340 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

active operations were begun, the Ninth Corps, 
under Burnside, returned East from its cam- 
paign in Tennessee and united with the Army 
of the Potomac, which as it marched southward 
numbered one hundred and forty thousand men 
of all arms. 

Months before the opening of the last campaign 
the " dead point " of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia had been reached : no more reinforcements 
could be obtained. The corps of Longstreet, which 
had been doing such effective work in Tennessee, 
rejoined Lee the 1st of May, but it brought only 
two divisions. As nearly as can be ascertained, 
the effective force of Lee's army was slightly more 
than fifty thousand men. The line defended by 
the Confederate army was naturally strong, and 
had been fortified to such an extent that no fear 
was felt of a direct attack. The line of the E,api- 
dan was held by small detachments, mainly for the 
purposes of observation. The army itself was dis- 
tributed from the vicinity of Somerville Ford, on 
the Rapidan, to Gordonsville. Hill was at Orange 
Court-House ; Ewell, on the Rapidan ; and Long- 
street, at Gordonsville. It was necessary for Lee 
to keep vigilant watch and be ready to concentrate 
at any threatened point. The plan of General 
Grant was to cross the Rapidan, attack Lee's right, 
cut his communications, and, forcing him out of 
his position, compel him to fight between his line 
and Richmond. If Lee should be beaten, then 



THE WILDERNESS. 341 

Grant intended to pursue him to Richmond and 
capture both the army and the city. Simulta- 
neous with this movement, Major-General B. F. 
Butler was to ascend the James Biver from Fort- 
ress Monroe, seize City Point, and, advancing up 
the south bank of the river, cut the Confederate 
communications south of the James, and, if possi- 
ble, capture Petersburg. General Grant intended, 
in case of his own failure to defeat Lee before 
reaching Bichmond, to move his whole army to 
the south side of the James and attack from that 
direction. In such an event Butler's column would 
be used to cover the transfer. While these import- 
ant movements were in progress in Eastern Vir- 
ginia the army of General Sigel was to be organized 
into two expeditions, one in the Kanawha Valley, 
under General Crook, and the other in the Shen- 
andoah Valley, under Sigel in person. The latter 
was to cut the Central Bailroad, one of the great 
channels of supplies for Lee, while the former, 
seizing the Virginia and Tennessee road, would 
shut out the other source, in South-western Vir- 
ginia. If this grand scheme could be pushed to 
a successful conclusion, then, beyond all question, 
the days of the Confederacy were numbered. 

The Army of the Potomac began moving at 
midnight on the 3d of May. The advance was 
in two columns. The right, consisting of Warren 
and Sedgwick's corps, crossed the Bapidan at Ger- 
manna Ford, and the left, which was Hancock's 



342 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

corps, made the passage six miles below, at Ely's 
Ford. The army bivouacked on the night of the 
4th between the Kapidan and Chancellorsville. 
Early the next morning the march was resumed. 
Having turned Lee's right flank, Grant intended 
to push quickly through the Wilderness to Gor- 
dons ville, thus planting his army between that of 
Lee and Kichmond. But Lee, watching every act 
of his adversary, was quick to fathom his plan and 
to form a brilliant and audacious scheme. He de- 
cided to allow Grant to cross the Rapidan without 
molestation, and then to assail him while marching- 
through the Wilderness.* Amid the thicket and 
ooze, where the Federal commander could not use 
his artillery, the Southern leader believed he could 
destroy his army. Accordingly, while it was cross- 
ing the Kapidan, he sent forward Ewell's and Hill's 
corps, the former by the old turnpike, the latter by 
the plank-road, and directed Longstreet to march 
without delay from Gordonsville and move down 
on the right of Ewell, so as to assail the Federal- 
advance while it was in motion. Curiously enough, 
while Warren's corj)S, constituting this advance, 
bivouacked that night at Old Wilderness Tavern, 
at the intersection of the road from Germanna Ford 
with the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike, the 
camp-fires of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps 
were kindled along the latter highway. Only three 
miles separated the hostile forces, and neither sus- 
pected the fact. 



THE WILDERNESS. 343 

Each column resumed the march early the next 
morning, the Federal army still unsuspicious of any 
assault from Lee, who was supposed to be hurrying 
in the direction of Richmond, on the hunt for some 
suitable place where he could make a stand against 
the host almost three times as numerous as his own. 
Sedgwick's corps followed Warren, and, to protect 
against any demonstration from Lee by way of the 
Orange Turnpike, Griffin's division was thrown 
out on that road, while Crawford's division^ was 
advanced by way of a wood road to Parker's Store. 
As we have stated, Johnson's division, of Ewell's 
corps, encamped May 4 within three miles of Old 
Wilderness Tavern, where Warren lay with the 
Federal advance. Rodes was in' the rear of John- 
son, while Early followed, coming to a halt at Lo- 
cust Grove. Johnson learned of the presence of 
his enemy the next morning, and, hastening for- 
ward, secured some high ground, where he began 
forming his line. 

General Grant, who had reached the field, was 
still unsuspicious of the scheme of General Lee. 
Believing the force in advance was insignificant 
in numbers, he made his dispositions to brush it 
from his path. About noon three divisions of War- 
ren's corps made a furious assault on Johnson's 
division. A hot fire was poured into them, but 
they pushe;! on unflinchingly, and broke the line 
where it crossed the turnpike and was held by the 
brigade of General J. M. Jones. With exultant 



344 - THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

cheers the Federals swept forward, the Confederate 
leader being killed while vainly trying to rally his 
men. The whole division was in imminent danger 
of being routed, when General Stewart at the crit- 
ical moment, brought his brigade from its position 
in line of battle and launched it upon the head 
of the victorious column. The shock checked the 
exultant Federals, who were tumbled back in 
such headlong haste that two pieces of artillery 
were left behind and captured. The stillness was 
scarcely broken by the sound of firing when Gen- 
eral Ewell sent Rodes's division to Johnson's assist- 
ance, and ordered General Gordon to take his own 
and Daniels's brigades and repel the foe on the 
right. Gordon obeyed orders in his usual vigor- 
ous fashion, driving back the Federals for more 
than a mile and capturing an entire regiment. The 
attack on the left was a little later, and was repulsed 
by the brigades of Pegram and Hays. The orig- 
inal position was taken, and Ewell awaited the 
arrival of Hill and Longstreet. 

The severity of the opening struggle showed 
Grant his mistake. He saw that Lee intended to 
force him to battle in the Wilderness, and he there- 
fore made his dispositions to accept the conflict in 
that most unfavorable spot. 

The Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, was 
brought up, and Hancock was directed to hurry 
forward with the Second. He was approaching by 
the Brock road, which crosses the Orange plank- 



THE WILDERNESS. 345 

road between two and three miles south-west of 
Old Wilderness Tavern and four miles south-east 
of Parker's Store. A. P. Hill's corps, which had 
left Verdiersville early that morning, was moving 
along the plank-road toward the Brock road cross- 
ing, which, if reached in time, would enable him 
to cut off the Second Corps from the main army. 
Seeing the danger. General Meade despatched 
Getty's division, of Sedgwick's corps, to seize and 
hold the important point until the arrival of Han- 
cock. Shortly after Getty reached the ground. Hill, 
having repulsed Warren, came in front of the cross- 
roads. Uncertain of the strength of his enemy, he 
took position across the plank-road and began to 
develop it. 

Very soon, by direction of Lee, communication 
was opened with General Ewell. An examination 
of the map will show that the Confederate line 
extended from the woods on the right of the Or- 
ange plank-road to a point beyond the old turn- 
pike, on the left. The distance was fully six 
miles, and nearly all of it led through dense for- 
est. Directly in front was the thicket occupied by 
the I ederal army. 

Hancock secured the position on the Brock road, 
and distributed his line along it. Late in the after- 
noon he received orders from General Grant to 
attack Hill's corps and drive it back to Parker's 
Store. Hill was drawn up in battle-line about fifty 
rods distant, and received the impetuous assault of 



346 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Hancock with such a destructive fire that he was 
repulsed with severe loss. Again and again was 
the charge repeated, but in vain ; the fighting 
ceased at nightfall, and nothing had been accom- 
plished. 

General Longstreet had set out from Gordons- 
ville as soon as Lee's order reached him, and was 
but a few miles distant on the evening of the 5th ; 
but, as no artillery was used, the density of the 
woods prevented his hearing the sounds of mus- 
ketry. The first knowledge he received that a 
battle was in progress was the order fi'om Lee to 
go to the assistance of Hill. The command was 
obeyed with such promptness that Longstreet 
reached Hill's position by daylight. As he was 
expected, Hill's men began retiring, but while 
doing so the Federals renewed their attack on 
his line. Both armies had arranged to open the 
fight that morning, but Lee anticipated Grant by 
advancing Ewell against Sedgwick's corps. His 
purpose was to turn Grant's left and compel him 
to retire to the E-apidan. Hill's soldiers were 
taken " on the hip " by the unexpected assault. 
The brigades of Heth and Wilcox were tumbled 
together and over upon Longstreet's column, which 
had not yet formed in battle-line. The furious - 
rush of the Federals swept everything before it, 
until the disorganized masses were within a hun- 
dred yards of the spot where Lee had established 
his headquarters. Longstreet, however, proved 



THE WILDERNESS. 347 

himself the man for the emergency. Kershaw's 
division was thrown forward, and the Federals were 
held at bay until all of Longstreet's corps could be 
brought up, when they were launched against the 
Unionists, who were driven back, and the Conled- 
erate line was re-established. 

Grant was now in the Wilderness, and Lee de- 
termined he should have no rest. It was not yet 
noon when Longstreet suddenly assailed Hancock's 
left with such fury that it was pushed toward the 
Brock road, which Longstreet determined to seize; 
could he succeed in doing so, Grant would be com- 
pelled to retreat to the Eapidan under the most dis- 
astrous circumstances. "Elated by his success. 
General Longstreet spurred forward to lead this 
movement in person, but on the way paused^ to 
receive the congratulations of General Jenkins, 
a young officer who by his rapid rise and extraor- 
dinary skill had become a favorite with the whole 
army ; at this moment a heavy discharge of mus- 
ketry was fired upon them by their own troops, 
who had mistaken them and their escorts for Fed- 
eral cavalry, General Longstreet vainly shouted 
to his men to cease firing, but before he could make 
them understand their mistake he was shot in the 
throat, the ball passing out through his right shoul- 
der. He fell from his horse by the side of his friend 
General Jenkins, who had been killed at the first 
fire, and at first his staff thought he too was dead. 
Discovering that he was only wounded, they pro- 



348 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

cured a litter, and he was borne to the rear, the 
troops testifying their sympathy by loud cheers as 
the litter was carried along the line." * It was a 
strange coincidence that both Stonewall Jackson 
and Longstreet should have been shot through 
mistake by their own men. 

The loss of Longstreet at this critical juncture 
was a severe one, and General Lee took personal 
charge of the serious business on the right. Dur- 
ing the delay caused by the incident the Federals 
detected the intended demonstration, and made 
hasty preparations for it. The assaults of the 
Confederates were repelled, and after a time the line 
became so much shaken that it was ready to break. 
Realizing the desperate crisis, Lee galloped to the 
Texas brigade, determined to lead them in a charge 
that should be decisive. " Those who saw him at 
that moment describe his appearance as inexpress- 
ibly grand. He had removed his hat, and, bare- 
headed and with his hair floating in the wind and 
his features glowing with the fire of a true soldier, 
he pointed in silence toward the Federal line with 
a gesture far more eloquent than words could have 
been. For a moment the troops paused and gazed 
first at their commander and then at one another, 
as if hesitating whether to allow him to incur such 
danger. Then a ragged, scarred veteran, approach- 
ing the commander-in-chief, seized his bridle-rein 
and turned his horse's head, saying respectfully 

* J. D. McCabe, Jr. 



THE WILDERNESS. 349 

but firmly, ' You must not expose yourself, General 
Lee. You must go to tlie rear. We will obey your 
orders ; we have never faltered yet, and will not do 
BO now.— Will we, boys ?' he added, turning to his 
comrades. Instantly the whole line took up the 
cry, ' No ! no ! General Lee to the rear !' and the 
men refused to move until General Lee had with- 
drawn to a safer position. Touched to the heart 
by this affecting proof of the devotion of his 
troops. General Lee bowed and rode back, while 
the line, with deafening cheers, moved forward to 
the charge."* 

The troops redeemed their pledge. With their 
ear-splitting yells they charged once more, driving 
the Federals into the log breastworks they had 
thrown up on the Brock road. The assailants were 
almost against them, when they were seen to be on 
fire, caught from the woods, which had been aflame 
for several hours. The fighting then went on amid 
the blaze, smoke and heat, the Confederates finally 
planting their battle-flags on the captured works. 
Many of the Federals ran toward Chancellorsville, 
but others rallied and in a desperate charge drove 
out the captors. By this time it was dark, and 
hostilities ceased for the day. 

General Gordon had done magnificently on the 
left. Ewell early in the forenoon repulsed the 
repeated efforts of Sedgwick and Burnside to car- 
ry his position. Toward night, Gordon, with several 

* J. D. McCabe, Jr. 



350 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

scanty brigades, leaped against Sedgwick's line 
with irrestrainable ferocity. It was torn and rolled 
back for a distance of two miles, when darkness 
compelled the cessation of a charge which other- 
wise promised to overthrow that wing of the army. 
In this terrific assault Gordon captured Generals 
Seymour and Slialer and a large number of men. 

Neither leader showed any wish to resume the 
offensive on the morrow. The Federal position 
had been proven too strong to be carried, and 
Grant not only had suffered frightful losses, but 
had learned that Lee could not be driven from his 
position. But, with that bull-dog tenacity so cha- 
racteristic of the Federal commander, he spent the 
next day in hunting for some point where he could 
fasten his teeth in his watchful enemy. He decided 
that Spottsylvania Court-House was the spot, and 
on the night of the 7th the Federal army marched 
thither by way of Todd's Tavern. The lions were 
impatient that they had been hampered by the jun- 
gle ; they now bounded into the open plain, where 
their rage would be without hindrance. 

While making this movement, Grant sent Gen- 
eral Sheridan with orders to make a dash toward 
Richmond and sever Lee's communications. Mov- 
ing to the right of the Confederate army, Sheridan 
cut the Central Hailroad at Beaver Dam Station, 
and then, galloping to Ashland, tapped the Fred- 
ericksburg road. Stuart and his cavalry were hard 
after the raiders, but their mount was scarcely equal 



THE WILDERNESS. 351 

to what was required of them. Sheridan, however, 
was overtaken while preparing to burn Ashland, 
and run out of town. Sheridan and his troopers 
then headed in the direction of Eichmond, but 
Stuart, by a shorter route, reached the Yellow 
Tavern, where, within seven miles of the Capital, 
he again attacked the Federals as they came up. 
In the fight General Stuart was mortally wounded, 
and died in Eichmond the next day. His loss was 
one of the severest encountered by the Confederacy 
during the war. The immediate effect of the fall of 
Stuart was a collapse of the energy usually shown 
by his command. The Federals withdrew to a 
stretch of woods near the turnpike, where they 
kept up a show of resistance while repairing the 
Meadow bridge, across the Chickahominy, over 
which they rode without molestation, and galloped 
down the Peninsula. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 

Had the first commander of the Army of the 
Potomac been in charge after the battle of the 
Wilderness, he would have begun to fortify and 
entrench himself and awaited reinforcements ; the 
second commander would have attempted several 
more utterly hopeless charges until his loss was 
greatly increased, and then would have fled ; the 
third commander would have made all haste to 
Washington ; but Grant, despite the shocking list 
of killed and wounded, did not stop or wait. Hav- 
ing determined to pass around Lee's right, he lost 
no time in making the movement. Hancock's 
corps held possession of the Brock road, leading 
straight to the objective-point, Spottsylvania Court- 
House, fifteen miles distant. The wagon-trains were 
sent off during the day, and the Fifth Corps were 
directed to start as soon as it was dark and occupy 
the village without delay. The rest of the troops 
were to move directly behind them, the expecta- 
tion being that at daylight the entire Federal army 
would be concentrated between Lee and Eichmond. 

But the moving wagon-trains convinced Lee that 
something of the kind was intended. Uncertain, 

352 



SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 353 

however, of the plan of his enemy, he ordered 
General E,. H. Anderson, commanding Longstreet's 
corps, to hold himself in readiness to march to 
Spottsylvania early the next morning. Anderson, 
as directed, withdrew his men from their entrench- 
ments and began hunting for a suitable place to 
bivouac. The burning woods rendered this diffi- 
cult to find, and he finally decided that, inasmuch 
as his destination was Spottsylvania, he would make 
the march at night. It was this singular cause that 
took his corps to the battle-ground so much earlier 
than was originally intended. He reached Spottsyl- 
vania at daylight, and found Fitzhugh Lee's cav- 
alry sharply engaged with Warren, who wag" just 
coming up. Lee had done his utmost to impede 
the Federal advance along the Brock road, barri- 
cading it and fighting continually wherever any 
opportunity presented itself. He was still contest- 
ing the advance, when Anderson came up and found 
Spottsylvania in the possession of a detachment of 
Federal cavalry. Anderson quickly sent a part of 
his command to the relief of Fitzhugh Lee, while 
he gathered the others together to drive out the 
cavalry from the village. 

Believing he had only the advance-guard of the 
Confederate army in front of him, Warren con- 
tinued to push on until he began ascending the 
ridge on which Anderson had posted his soldiers. 
Then such a destructive fire of musketry was de- 
livered in the faces of the advancing Federals that 

23 



354 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

they broke and fled in disorder, Robinson, their 
leader, being severely wounded. Almost at the 
same moment the Union cavalry were driven from 
the village, and Anderson hurried forward his whole 
force with the intention of seizing and holding the 
valuable position. The remainder of Warren's corps 
were sent ahead on the double-quick and made a 
gallant and determined attack on Anderson, but 
were unable to carry the position. Falling back, 
the Federals began entrenching while they awaited 
reinforcements before renewing the attack. Gen- 
eral Sedgwick came up during the afternoon with 
the Sixth Corps, but the day was drawing to a close 
when the preparations were completed. Crawford's 
division was advanced, but was repulsed. Ewell, 
however, while taking position, was suddenly as- 
sailed, and driven back with the loss of a hundred 
prisoners. The rest of Ewell's corps came up dur- 
ing the night, and Early took command for the 
time, on account of the sickness of A. P. Hill. 
Thus again Lee had anticipated Grant in securing 
possession of a coveted position, and there he held 
him at bay day after day, until the Federal leader 
had paid appalling toll in human life. 

Monday morning, May 9, the Confederate army 
was in position at Spottsylvania, and confronted 
Grant with the same defiance it had shown for 
years. Anderson's corps formed the right, and 
reached from the river Po northward to the court- 
house ; Ewell was in the centre and Hill held the 



SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHIGKAHOMINY. 355 

left, his line curving backward toward the south. 
Thus Lee's line was in the form of a semicir- 
cle extending along a range of heights enclosing 
Spottsylvania Court-House. The Federal line was 
formed with Hancock on the right, Warren and 
Sedgwick in the centre and Burnside on the left. 
Most of the day was consumed by the Federals in 
assuming position, during which time the Confed- 
erate sharpshooters were busy. One of the results 
of their work early in the day was the killing of 
General Sedgwick, who was shot dead while stand- 
ing in the breastworks along the lines. He was 
one of the bravest and most competent officers of 
the Federal army, and for a time his loss caused 
a grief almost akin to consternation. 

The valley of the Po extended between Han- 
cock's position and that held by Hill's corps, and 
one of the branches . of that somewhat uniquely- 
named river flows through it. On the afternoon 
of the 9th, Hancock was sent across the stream to 
intercept a wagon-train moving toward Spottsyl- 
vania Court-House. The crossing was made, but 
before he could go far darkness stopped him. It 
is scarcely necessary, however, to say that it did 
not stop the wagon-train, which passed safely with- 
in Lee's lines. Hancock pushed on the next morn- 
ing, and was not long in finding that A. P. Hill's 
corps was strongly entrenched along the east bank 
of the Po, so as to command the approaches to 
the stream. Early in the afternoon Hancock was 



356 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENEBAL LEE. 

ordered to return to liis original position, and while 
doing so Barlow's division, covering his withdrawal, 
was fiercely assailed by Heth's division, of Hill's 
corps, and sufiered considerable loss. 

Bloody work was going on in other quarters. 
General Warren repeatedly assaulted Field's posi- 
tion, which was Hill's right. Again and again were 
the bluecoats rushed forward, and again and again 
were they driven back with scores and hundreds 
killed. When Hancock had safely returned, he was 
directed to unite with Warren's corps and make an- 
other assault on the same position. They succeeded 
in carrying the first line of breastworks, but were 
able to hold them only a few minutes, when they 
were driven out, leaving many dead behind them. 
On the left of Warren a part of the Sixth Corps 
assailed General K.odes, on the left of Ewell's po- 
sition, pierced his line, and gained possession of the 
works, including nine hundred prisoners and six 
guns. The demonstration was unsupported, and 
Rodes, rallying his men, drove out the Federals 
and recaptured the guns. 

The events of the day induced Lee to think 
Grant would concentrate all his efforts as-ainst his 
left; most of the night of the 10th and much of 
the 11 til were occupied, therefore, in strengthening 
that wing. It was made so strong, indeed, that 
Grant declined to make the assault. He was con- 
vinced that the Confederate right centre was the 
weakest point; he resolved to attack his enemy 



8P0TTSYLVANIA TO THE CIIICKAIIOMINY. 357 

there with Hancock's corps and to support it \)y 
his whole army. 

The selection made by Grant was a wise one, 
being a salient which had been thrown out to cover 
a hill several hundred yards in front of the general 
line with the purpose of preventing the Federals 
from occupying it with their artillery. The blun- 
der committed by the Confederates at that point 
was similar to the disastrous error made by Gene- 
ral Sickles at Gettysburg. The salient was held by 
General Edward Johnson, of General Ewell's corps. 
As if to complete the first error, Johnson's artil- 
lery was withdrawn during the night, and he was 
left with notliing except his infantry to defend the 
position. Discovering the preparations for attack 
in his front, Johnson sent for the guns; but at 
daylight, while being placed in position, the Fed- 
eral attack was made. It was an overwhelmino; 
rush gallantly but vainly resisted. More than 
three thousand prisoners were captured, among 
them being Generals Johnson and G. H. Stuart. 
Besides, twenty-five cannon were secured and the 
Federals held the works. Hancock's soldiers were 
so elated that they charged on toward the interior 
line of works, in the rear of Johnson's position. 
The Confederate line had been broken, and the 
wedge was driving the wings farther and farther 
apart. The fiery General Gordon, in charge of 
Early's division, threw forward his men, and Rodes 
and Wilcox hastened to his assistance. The strug- 



358 THE CAMF-FIRES OF OENEEAL LEE. 

gle was desperate ami bloody, lasting for hoiii*s, but 
it was repulsed. Grant believed that the tremen- 
dous resistance encountered at the right centre in- 
dicated that Ijce had greatly weakened his lines 
at other points. Generals Warren and Burnside, 
therefore, ^Ycre ordered to assail the Southern right 
and left wings. Tliey obeyed with great vigor, but 
accomplished nothing. 

]Mean>YhiK\ Lee was determined to retake the 
line which Hancock had captured. During the 
day he made tive desperate chai*ges agirinst it, but 
the Federal concentration there rendered it impreg- 
nable. The struggles in tVont of this fatal salient 
displayed the ferocity oi' so many jungle-tigei-s. 
The slaughter was horrible, the dead lying cross- 
wise, mixed together and on top of one another, two, 
three, four, and in some places more, deep. It was 
the most dreadful massacre that had taken place 
during the entire war.* At midnight it was seen 
that the vantage-point could not be recovered, and 
tlie Confederates, grimy, bleeding, sullen and balHed, 
drew back, and Lee formed them on his interior 
lines. Disappointed though the Southern leader 
was, yet he had kept the Federals witlun the cap- 
tured position, and had foiled every etVort to pene- 
trate fartlier or to pierce his lines anywhere else. 
The losses had been very heavy, amounting to 

* Thoiv has boon pivsoiviHl tor yom> in Washington tho tinnk of 
a tivo oigUtoon inohos in vliauiotor >Yhioh was ont in two hv tho bullets 
at 8potts_vlv;uiia, 



SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CllKJKAIlOMINY. 359 

eight thousand for the Federaln, and they were 
nearly as great on the Confederate side. 

Grant determined to pass around to Lee's right 
and shove back that wing. General Warren was 
sent to unite with Burnside on the left, and to take 
position on the extreme left. This was done after 
an arduous march, and early on the 14t]i the Fifth 
and Ninth Corps assailed Wilcox's division, but 
were repulsed. Some hours later Lane and Mahone 
made a sudden charge, which resulted in the cap- 
ture of several hundred prisoners and a number 
of standards. General Meade himself narrowly 
avoided capture, barely succeeding in "readjust- 
ing " his position before Mahone could secure him, 
and thus escaped. Tlie manoeuvring of General 
Grant resulted in such a shifting of positions that 
he was compelled to change his base of supplies 
from Port Koyal to Aquia Creek. On the 18th 
the corps of Hancock, Burnside and Wright were 
again hurled against the Confederate works in 
the rear of the salient Hancock had carried six 
days before, but the attempt was hopeless, and 
was soon abandoned. 

General Grant had followed out his favorite plan 
of "hammering" his enemy, tie had lost about 
forty thousand men, and the enemy in his front 
was still unsubdued. It looked, indeed, as though 
it was absolutely beyond the power of any force 
that could be brought into the field to dislodge the 
Army of Northern Virginia ; indeed, there was but 



360 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the one way — to move around between it and Rich- 
mond. 

As before, Grant was prompt to resort to this 
method. His preparations were begun on the 
afternoon of the 19th. Detecting it almost imme- 
diately, Lee threw forward Ewell's corps, and de- 
livered such a severe blow to the Federal left that 
General Grant was forced to delay his movement 
until the 21st. The Federal army reached Milford 
the next day. On the morning of the 23d, Grant 
arrived at the North Anna River. Rapid as had 
been his march, he found that Lee was there ahead 
of him, with his invincible army in position and 
perfectly willing to be attacked in the usual fash- 
ion. Here was another chance for pounding, and 
Grant got his hammers ready. General Hancock, 
with the Federal left, and General Warren, with 
the right, were ordered to force a passage of the 
river. Warren did so unmolested at Jericho Ford, 
and pushed on toward the Central Railroad. At 
Noel's Station he came in collision with Wilcox's 
division, of A. P. Hill's corps. The other divis- 
ions of this corps were hurried up, and gave War- 
ren so much attention that he was held motionless 
the rest of the day. Hancock reached the river 
six miles above, driving off the three regiments 
guarding the telegraph-bridge. He held the bridge 
until daylight, repulsing several attempts to drive 
him away, and the next morning crossed to the 
south side of the river. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 361 

General Lee, previous to tins, had established 
his centre at Oxford Mills, a mile above the tele- 
graph-bridge. His right, extending southward to 
Hanover Junction, was protected by a series of 
almost impenetrable marshes, while his left, run- 
ning west, rested on Little Kiver. As the centre 
was strongly entrenched, it will be seen that his 
position was an admirable one. An examination 
of his line and the disposition of the Confederate 
forces was such that Grant could not attack, except 
with a part of his forces, without crossing the river 
twice, while the Confederates themselves could con- 
centrate on any j)art of their line which might be 
menaced. Furthermore, Lee could assail the right 
or left and prevent either wing going to the assist- 
ance of the other. Lee's conception was such a 
masterly one that Grant found himself baffled be- 
fore a gun was fired. With a view of gaining some 
advantage of position — or, rather, with a view of 
making his own less perilous — he sent Burnside 
to cross with the Ninth Corps at Oxford Mills; 
he was to push away Lee's centre from the river 
arxl open communication between Warren and 
Hancock. But when Burnside got one division 
over, it was shaken up so roughly that he was 
forced to withdraw it again. At the same time, 
Warren was assailed savagely by Hill's troops, and 
found it very difficult to extricate himself from his 
dangerous position. 

Grant was now driven to the liumiliatins; 



362 THE GAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

conclusion that, in common parlance, lie had un- 
dertaken a contract in which he was "unable to 
deliver the goods." For him to "hammer" his 
adversary would be like using an egg with which 
to smite a stone. There was but the one thing to 
do : that was to withdraw from his dangerous posi- 
tion while able to do so. Accordingly, on the night 
of the 26tli of May, he sullenly retreated across the 
North Anna. Had Lee possessed an army any- 
where equal in numbers to that of his adversary, 
he would have fallen upon him while he was with- 
drawing and delivered a mortal blow, but the South- 
ern leader could not afford- to lose any men ; for when 
one was gone, no one was left to fill his place. 

Defeated though Grant had been in his effort to 
cut the communications between Lee and Rich- 
mond, he decided to make one more attempt before 
the Army of Northern Virginia could reach the 
defences of its capital. He now hastened down 
the north bank of the Pamunkey toward Hanover- 
town, preceded by the cavalry of General Sheridan. 
Crossing at Hanovertown, after a hurried night- 
march, he despatched a strong force to Hanover 
Court-House to cut off Lee's retreat or to learn his 
movements. But no discovery was made, for Lee 
had not moved in that direction. He had marched, 
instead, across the country on the direct road to 
Cold Harbor. Reaching Tottapotomoi, he formed 
his lines on the main highway between Hanover- 
town and Richmond. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 363 

And SO again, and for the third time, when the 
Federal lion crept toward Richmond, he found the 
Confederate tiger crouching in the path and eager 
for him to approach within reach of his claws. 
Those claws were sharp, and the valor which con- 
trolled them knew no fear. The lion turned aside 
to hunt some path by which he could pass around 
the formidable adversary. It seemed to Grant that 
the wiser course was to move farther to the left, 
and to cross the Chickahominy in the vicinity of 
Cold Harbor. Accordingly, his cavalry was sent 
thither, and he followed rapidly with his infantry. 
As before, Lee was quick to detect his intention, 
and he sent Longstreet's corps to interpose itself 
between the Federal army and Richmond. 

For the fourth time when the lion stepped 
stealthily along the forest-path he was arrested by 
a growl, and, raising his head, saw the tiger crouch- 
ing before him, lashing his tail, showing his sharp 
teeth and inviting him to come a little closer. At 
last the lion forgot that the tiger is stronger than 
himself, and leaped upon him. 

Considerable lighting took place while the armies 
were swinging into position, but the shock came on 
the morning of June 3, when Grant hurled his 
whole force against that of Lee. The attack was 
made all along the line, and the vast Army of 
the Potomac in the gray of the early-morning light 
rushed like demons at the throats of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. But the latter were not taken 



364 . THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

unawares. The struggle was one of the most bloody 
recorded in the history of war. Within the space 
of twenty minutes the Federal loss amounted to 
twelve thousand men. The assailants fought with 
all the courage that man possessed, but they had 
undertaken the impossible: every attack was re- 
pulsed in the same dreadful fashion. The slaugh- 
ter is almost inconceivable, and no man who was 
engaged in that awful conflict can recall its mem- 
ory to-day without a shudder. It is useless to give 
the movements in detail. General Lee had been 
reinforced by Breckenridge's command, of two 
thousand men, from the Valley of the Virginia, 
and also by Hoke's and Pickett's divisions, from 
Beauregard's army, south of the James. This 
brought his force up to forty-four thousand of all 
arms. 

The second battle of Cold Harbor raged with 
more or less fierceness for four or five hours. At 
the end the Federals were defeated at every point ; 
they had lost thirteen thousand men, while the 
loss of the Confederates amounted to scarcely twelve 
hundred. Every Federal soldier saw the utter folly 
and madness of the attack, in which there was no 
vestige of generalship. 

As if enough poor fellows had not been slaugh- 
tered. General Meade, some hours after the failure 
of the first assault, sent orders to each corps com- 
mander to renew the attack without reference to 
the other troops. When the orders reached the 



SPOTTSVLVAMA TO Till': ('II ICK A IKnilX V. :\(\f} 

nu>n, not one oC lliom slirrocl. 1(, was not, i-owanl- 
ico wliii'li rcsl rained lluMn, unl(>ss ll\al man ho. 
(IcHMnod a. coward who rcrnscs a. |>lnii<;(' into n liory 
liirmuH' lieali'd seven limes liolier (lian before. 

Tlu^ loss of (lie (/on federates from (he opening 
of (he overhind eani|)ai<;n to its elose, at (h(> C^hieU- 
iiliominy, was, as nearly as can be aseerlained, abont 
eigliteen (honsand men; (ha( of (General (Jran(. 
almost reached (he awfnl (o(al of six(.y thonsaiul 
— <;Tea(c'r (lian (lie en(ire army under Lec^!'" 

The North beii;aii to ask whether (his was lo *^o 
on for ev'tM'. Humani(y sickened at (his e(c'rnal 
least of blood, and (he ftieling sh(>wed ilsell" in 
many (]u;T]-(ers (hat the North was payioi; (oo 
dearly for (lu' |)riz(> for which it had conlended so 
Ion*;". " Now, so •;lo()my was (he mili(jiry oudook 
after \\\v ac(ion on (he Chickahominy, and ((► snch 
a (lei;ree, by conse(]nence, had (lie moral sprini; of 
the |)ul)lic mind becomi' relaxed, that there was at 
(his (ime <;real dan^'cr of ii collapse of (he war. 
The archives of (he S(.aie I)epaiimen(, when one 
day made |>nblic, will show how deeply (he j;'ovi'rn- 
ineiit was aHecUHl l)y the want of military sncreess, 
and to what resolutions the Executive hud, in con- 
sequence, come." I 

* Swinton. i IWid. 



CHAPTER XXXyi. 

CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864. 

Hurled back bleeding and stunned, the Army 
of the Potomac lay motionless for days, while its 
antagonist crouched fierce and defiant, awaiting an- 
other attack. But the lesson had not been thrown 
away on General Grant. The appalling losses of 
his campaign and the failure to accomplish any- 
thing substantial had taught him that it was use- 
less to try to reach Hichmond by the overland 
route. His "hammering" might be continued 
until the plain was strewn with the bodies of 
Union soldiers, and still the gate would be barred. 
He therefore gave up the attempt to capture the 
city from the north or east, and decided to move 
rapidly upon Petersburg, seize that place, and 
thus cut the Confederate communications with the 
South. 

Petersburg lies twenty-two miles south of Rich- 
mond, and is connected with the South and West 
by the Weldon and Southside E-ailroads. The lat- 
ter crosses the Danville line, the principal avenue 
of communication between the capital and the Gulf 
States. When these roads were seized, including 
those north of the city, Richmond would no longer 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF IS64. 367 

be tenable, and the authorities must surrender or 
retreat. With the fall of the capital the Southern 
Confederacy would pass out of existence. 

General Grant held position in front of Lee 
until June 12, when, moving once more by his left 
flank, he passed over the Chickahominy and ad- 
vanced to City Point, where the Appomattox and 
James unite. The latter was crossed on pontoons, 
and without delay the march was resumed toward 
Petersburg. 

In point of fact, this city could have been taken 
weeks before by the Federals. General Butler, by 
direction of General Grant, had sailed from Fort- 
ress Monroe May 4 with a column of thirty thou- 
sand troops, and, landing at Bermuda Hundred, 
began throwing up entrenchments. Instead of 
seizing Petersburg, he continued entrenching, and 
the arrival of a force from the South under the 
direction of Beauregard caused him to devote all 
his energies to saving his command from destruc- 
tion. As it was, he narrowly escaped. Finally, he 
retreated before the savage attack of Beauregard, 
and took shelter behind his works across the neck 
of the Peninsula. There his situation was such 
that General Grant wrote of him, " His army was 
as completely shut off as if it had been in a bottle 
strongly corked." 

Although the Federal commander used the ut- 
most celerity in marching against Petersburg, he 
failed to take it by surprise. He did not reach the 



368 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

vicinity until the 15th, but by the next day the en- 
tire Federal army was south of the James. Fully 
aware of his movements, General Lee offered no 
opposition, for the Army of Northern Virginia 
was too weak in numbers. He had just detached 
Early's corps from the army, and was left with 
only thirty thousand men. But, detecting the pur- 
pose of the Union leader, he hastened southward to 
confront him as he had done so many times before. 

Petersburg offered such sturdy resistance to Gen- 
eral Grant's attack, on the 15th, that the works were 
held until darkness ended the struggle. When the 
sun rose on the morrow *and all eyes were turned 
toward the city, they saw long lines of soldiers de- 
filing into the breastworks. Above the myriads 
of gleaming bayonets fluttered the torn battle-flags 
of the Army of Northern Virginia. Once more 
the exultant lion found the tiger crouching in the 
path before him. 

General Lee lost no time in drawing a regular 
line of earthworks to the east and south of the city, 
but the first spade was scarcely taken up when 
Grant assailed him with such fierceness that the 
Confederates were forced from their advanced posi- 
tion and compelled to take shelter behind the sec- 
ond line of works, which were then in a fair state 
of completion. General Grant hurled his men 
against this second line with the same desperate 
valor as before. On the 17th, Hancock and Burn- 
side renewed the attack, but it was not until near 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ISGlt. 369 

nightfall that they succeeded in carrying a part 
of the entrenchments, and these were retaken after 
dark. 

The formidable line of works which General Lee 
had been constructing immediately around the city 
were sufficiently completed, and he withdrew within 
them on the morning of the 18th. A few hours 
later a general assault was made by General Grant, 
but it was repulsed. The attack was repeated twice, 
but in each instance the Federals were driven back 
with heavy loss. From the firing of the first gun 
until the close of the day above mentioned, the 
total Federal loss was slightly less than ten thou- 
sand men. This result proved that the whole Army 
of Northern Virginia was south of the James, and, 
overpowering as were the numbers of the Union 
host, it could not take Petersburg by direct assault. 
As General Grant had secured his grip, however, 
he did not loosen it, but set deliberately to work to 
besiege the city. Muskets were thrown aside and 
spades taken up. The thousands of men toiled like 
beavers, and it required but a few days for the 
Federal army to entrench itself from the river to 
the Norfolk Railroad. Then the left wing began 
slowly creeping around, so as to complete the invest- 
ment of the city. The long arms of the octopus 
were gradually closing about the lusty victim, 
who, undismayed, fought fiercely to save himself 
from strangulation. 

On the 21st a heavy Fede;-al line was advanced 

24 



370 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

toward the Weldon Railroad, but General Mahone 
with his division plunged between the two Federal 
corps, doubled them up, repulsed the attack, and 
when he withdrew took with him sixteen hundred 
prisoners, four pieces of artillery, eight stands of 
colors and a large number of small-arms. Simul- 
taneous with this demonstration, the Federals sent 
out a cavalry expedition under Generals Wilson 
and Kautz, with the purpose of operating against 
the railroads south of the Appomattox. Starting 
at night, the horsemen proceeded to Ream's Sta- 
tion, on the Weldon Railroad, where the depot was 
burned and considerable of the track destroyed. 
Then the cavalry struck across the country to- 
ward the Southside Railroad. Kautz galloped 
to Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and 
Richmond and Danville Railroads, where he did 
all the damage possible. Wilson went to Notto- 
way Station and destroyed several miles of track. 
General Lee sent Fitzhugh Lee's division of cav- 
alry in pursuit of the raiders, and Mahone's infan- 
try moved down the Weldon Railroad to cut off 
their retreat in case they sought to return by the 
route taken on the advance. 

Fitzhugh Lee came up with Wilson near, Din- 
widdle Court-House, but in his attack was repulsed. 
He annoyed the cavalry considerably, and the next 
day threw himself across Wilson's line of march. 
Wilson could not break through, and turned off to 
the Danville Railroad, where he effected a junction 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF IS64. 371 

with Kautz. They then made for the railroad- 
bridge over Staunton River, but it was gallantly- 
defended by a number of home-guards, and, Fitz- 
hugh Lee arriving soon after, Wilson retreated, 
leaving his thirty dead on the field. Finding he 
was in hot quarters, Wilson galloped off with all 
haste, reaching Sappony Church toward the close 
of the 28tli. There he ran against Hampton's 
cavalry, who were hunting for him. A sharp fight 
lasted through most of the night, but Wilson was 
defeated and hurried in the direction of Keam's 
Station ; but when he reached the railroad, he was 
assailed by Mahone's infantry, while Hampton and 
Lee's cavalry closed in upon his rear. The sit- 
uation for the Federals had become desperate, and 
they fled in panic, losing their trains, artillery and 
everything that could impede their flight. At last 
the terrified troopers managed to cross the Notto- 
way E-iver, and rode breathlessly into the Union 
lines, having inflicted little su"bstantial harm on 
their enemies. 

The fervid days of summer wore on, and no 
collision of importance took place. General Lee 
steadily improved his defences, until on the 1st of 
July the Federal engineers pronounced them im- 
pregnable against assault. The line consisted of 
a chain of redans connected by infantry parapets 
of a powerful profile, while the approaches were 
completely obstructed by abatis, stakes and entan- 
glements. Beginning at the south bank of the Ap- 



372 TBE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

pomattox, it enveloped Petersburg on the east and 
south, stretching westward beyond the farthest 
reach of the left flank of the Union army. A 
continuation of the same system to the north side 
of the Appomattox protected the city and the Pe- 
tersburg and Hichmond Railroad against attack 
from the direction of the front, held by Butler's 
force at Bermuda Hundred. The defence of Hich- 
mond was provided for by its own chain of forti- 
fications.* 

Despite the invulnerabilty of the Confederate 
lines. General Grant determined to make one more 
effort against them. This time he decided to avail 
himself of an extraordinary expedient proposed by 
Burnside, which was to explode a mine so near 
the works that a breach would be opened, through 
which the assailants could rush before the defend- 
ers would have time to recover from the terror into 
which they would be thrown. The entrenchments 
of Burnside's Ninth Corps were within one hun- 
dred and fifty yards of the Confederate line, which 
just opposite formed an angle covered by a fort. 
Under this fort was carefully stowed six tons of 
powder, the operation being completed without 
causing any suspicion on the part of the defend- 
ers. This enormous bulk of explosives was fired 
at forty-two minutes past four o'clock on the morn- 
ing of July 30. A solid mass of earth, as if it 
were the vast lid of some volcano, rose slowly in 

* Swinton. 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF I864. 373 

the air until it had reached a height of two hundred 
feet, where it seemed to poise motionless for several 
minutes, when it shuddered itself apart and began 
raining to the ground again. As it started upward 
the exploding powder flashed through the dark pile 
in a hundred places, and a volume of black smoke 
rolled off in the sky. The thunderous shock was 
felt for miles around, and the report was heard dis- 
tinctly in E-ichmond. But when General Grant 
described that which followed, he fitly called it " a 
miserable affair." In accordance with the prear- 
ranged plsLii, the Federal batteries immediately 
opened upon the Confederates, and soon silenced 
them. Then the assaulting column charged, but 
in a straggling and broken fashion. When they 
reached the site of the fort, it was gone ; in its place 
was a yawning pit a hundred and fifty feet long, 
sixty feet wide and thirty feet deep. Instead of 
advancing, the column sought shelter in this cra- 
ter. Other troops were pushed on, but they hud- 
dled like terrified sheep in the cavity or cowered 
behind the breastworks in the immediate vicinity, 
which the Confederates had deserted for the time. 

The tremendous explosion astounded the defend- 
ers for a brief while, but, seeing the panic-stricken 
Federals in the pit, they ran back to their guns and 
opened on them. The horrible scene is thus de- 
scribed by one who looked upon it : " The * white 
division ' charged, reached the crater, stumbled over 
the debris, were suddenly met by a merciless fire 



374 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of artillery, enfilading tlieni right and left, and of 
infantry fusillading them in front; faltered, hesi- 
tated, were badly led, lost heart, gave up the plan 
of seizing the crest in the rear, huddled into the 
crater, man on top of man, company mingled with 
company; and upon this disordered, unstrung, 
quivering mass of human beings, white and black 
— ^for the black troops had followed — was poured 
a hurricane of shot, shell, canister and musketry 
which made the hideous crater a slaughter-pen 
horrible and frightful beyond the power of words. 
AU order was lost ; all idea of charging the crest 
was abandoned. Lee's infantry was seen concen- 
trating for the carnival of death ; his artillery was 
massing to destroy the remnants of the charging 
divisions. Those who deserted the crater to scram- 
ble over the debris and run back were shot down ; 
then all that was left to the shuddering mass of 
blacks and whites in the pit was to shrink lower, 
evade the horrible mitraille, and wait for a charge 
of their friends to rescue them or surrender." 

Finally, at nine o'clock Mahone rushed forth and 
drove out- the wretched survivors. It is said he 
ordered the firing to cease, for the sight was so 
dreadful that he could not bear it. The Unionists 
lost four thousand men, of whom eight hundred 
were prisoners, including one general oflicer and 
twelve standards. The Confederate loss was a few 
hundred. 

General Grant was still hammering away at Pe- 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF IS64. 375 

tersburg, when the startling news was telegraphed 
him that a Confederate column had crossed into 
Maryland, had scattei-ed the force sent out to meet 
it, and was then in front of the fortifications of 
Washington. The news was alarming indeed ; and 
when it became known throughout the North, the 
belief was general that at last the national capital 
was doomed to fall. 

A part of General Grant's plan of campaign 
was an advance up the valley, with a second from 
Western Virginia toward the Lynchburg and Ten- 
nessee Railroad, the object being to co-operate with 
the main army in cutting the Confederate commu- 
nications. Comparatively little was accomplished 
by the force in Western Virginia, but that in the 
valley, under General Hunter, easily forced its way 
until Lynchburg itself was threatened. When the 
news reached Lee, he was at Cold Harbor, shortly 
after the battle there. General Early was j)romptly 
detached with eight thousand men and orders to 
attack Hunter or threaten Washington. 

General Early quickly obeyed, and assailed 
Hunter with great fury near Lynchburg. Hun- 
ter was defeated and driven in disorderly flight 
toward the Ohio, and Early then galloped down 
the valley and into Maryland, with a view of 
threatening Washington, as Lee had directed. 
When he reached the Monocacy, he was opposed 
by a force under General Wallace, but, driving 
him aside, he pushed on, and on the 11th of July 



376 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

liis column appeared before the capital. Two 
years before, when McClellan was almost similarly- 
placed, a like diversion caused the withdrawal of 
a large number of his reinforcements to the de- 
fence of Washington ; now Grant was left to do 
as he saw fit, and he sent only a comparatively 
small force to the defence of the city. Early was 
not long in learning that Washington was too 
strongly fortified for him to risk a direct attack. 
He skirmished several days before the city, and 
then withdrew in the direction of Winchester, 
taking several thousand cattle and horses with 
him. 

As a matter of precaution, General Grant now 
sent the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps to Washing- 
ton, from which point they went to Harper's Ferry. 
The old Departments of Washington, the Susque- 
hanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department 
were combined in one command and assigned to 
General Hunter, who afterward gave way to Gen- 
eral Sheridan. General Lee held Early's army in 
the valley, with the hope of inducing Grant to 
raise the siege of Petersburg in order to protect 
Washington against the real danger which threat- 
ened it ; but the campaign was not well managed, 
and accomplished no good for the Confederate 
cause. 

Meanwhile, General Grant retained his grip on 
Petersburg. Skirmishing and fighting continued, 
but General Lee was able to repel every assault. 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF ISG4. 377 

Steadily advancing his line, lie sent out a strong 
force in the latter part of August to seize the Wel- 
don Kailroad, a short distance from Petersburg. 
As General Lee anticipated, the effort was success- 
ful; for he had informed the authorities long be- 
fore that it was impossible for him to hold it. An 
attempt, however, to inflict damage upon the road 
farther south was defeated by General Lee, who 
drove back the Federals with heavy loss. 

But all these movements, fighting and forays 
were but by-plays which had no effect upon the 
general result. Like the line of demarcation which 
marks the creeping upward of death when the limb 
of a strong man is seized with gangrene, the Fed- 
eral wing stole steadily westward until it had passed 
over the Vaughan, Squirrel Level, and other roads 
which extend southward from Petersburg, until in 
October it was firmly established on the left bank 
of Hatcher's Eun. A little farther, and the South- 
side Pailroad would be seized. The attempt was 
made October 27, but failed. The Federal column 
was assailed in front and flank by General Wade 
Hampton and his son, General Preston Hampton, 
who was killed, and by W. H. F. Lee with his 
dismounted sharpshooters. Infantry were hurried 
forward under General Mahone, who, to quote the 
words of General Lee, charged and broke three 
lines of battle. During the night the Federals re- 
treated, leaving their wounded and more than two 
hundred and fifty dead on the field. On the Wil- 



378 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

liamsburg E-oad seven stauds of colors and over 
four hundred prisoners were taken. 

No other movement of importance was under- 
t<aken during the year. The Presidential election 
in the North resulted in favor of President Lin- 
coln, and what hopes the Confederates may have 
based on the growth of a peace sentiment in that 
section were dissipated. They saw that all that 
remained to them was to fight to the bitter end. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

CLOSING IN. 

During the winter of 1864-65, General Lee es- 
tablished his headquarters a short distance west of 
Petersburg, on the Cox road, almost opposite his 
centre. Long before, his masterly genius must 
have foreseen the inevitable end, and doubtless 
he fixed, nearly to a certainty, the date and man- 
ner of the downfall of the Southern Confederacy. 

Events in other portions of the country clearly 
foreshadowed the colhipse that was at hand. In 
the Valley of Virginia matters had gone from bad 
to worse. General Sheridan had overwhelmed and 
dispersed Early and his cavalry, so that it may be 
said the valley was entirely cleared of all Con- 
federate forces. Then, with his horsemen, Sheri- 
dan galloped into the lowlands to join General 
Grant in his last campaign against Richmond. 
General Sherman with his mighty host was sweep- 
ing through the heart of the South from Atlanta 
to the sea. General Johnston, with all his splen- 
did generalship, could not with his fragment of an 
army stay the march. Savannah dropped like a 
mellow apple into Sherman's grasp, and, facing 
northward, he advanced to Goldsborough, North 

379 



380 THE OAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Carolina, directly threatening Lee's line of retreat 
from Virginia. 

The fate of the Southern Confederacy rested at 
this time upon the shoulders of one man. John 
Esten Cooke says, "It is doubtful if in any other 
struggle of history the hopes of a people were 
more entirely wrapped up in a single individual. 
All criticism of the eminent soldier had long since 
been silenced, and it may, indeed, be said that 
something like a superstitious confidence in his 
fortunes had become widely disseminated. It was 
the general sentiment, even when Lee himself saw 
the end surely approaching, that all was safe while 
he remained in command of the army. This hal- 
lucination must have greatly pained him, for no one 
ever saw more clearly or was less blinded by irra- 
tional confidence. Lee fully understood and rep- 
resented to the civil authorities — with whom his 
relations were perfectly friendly and cordial — ^that 
if his lines were broken at any point the fate of 
the campaign was sealed. Feeling this truth, of 
which his military sagacity left him no doubt, he 
had to bear the further weight of that general 
confidence which he did not share. He did not 
complain, however, or in any manner indicate the 
desperate straits to which he had come. He called 
for fresh troops to supply his losses ; when they did 
not arrive, he continued to oppose his powerful 
adversary with the remnant still at his command. 
These were now more like old comrades than mere 



CLOSING IN. 381 

private soldiers under his orders. What was left of 
the army was its best material. The fires of battle 
had tested the metal, and that which emerged from 
the furnace was gold free from alloy. . . . He was 
now their ideal of a leader, and all that he did was 
perfect in their eyes. All awe of him had long 
since left them ; they understood what treasures 
of kindness and simplicity lay under the grave 
exterior. The tattered privates approached the 
commander-in-chief without embarrassment, and 
his reception of them was such as to make them 
love him more than ever. . . . He looked much 
older than at the beginning of the war, but by no 
means less hardy or robust. On the contrary, the 
arduous campaigns through which he had passed 
seemed to have hardened him, developing to the 
highest degree the native strength of his physical 
organization. His cheeks were ruddy, and his eye 
had that clear light which indicates the presence of 
the calm, self-poised will. But his hair had grown 
gray> like his beard and moustache, which were worn 
short and well trimmed. His dress, as always, was a 
plain and serviceable gray uniform with no indica- 
tions of rank save the stars on the collar. Cavalry- 
boots reached nearly to his knees, and he seldom 
wore any weapon. A broad-brimmed gray felt hat 
rested low upon the forehead, and the movements 
of this soldierly figure were as firm, measured and 
imposing as ever. He was still almost an anchorite 
in his personal habits, and lived so poorly that it is 



382 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

said he was compelled to borrow a small piece of 
meat when unex]3ected visitors dined with him." 
The Army of Northern Virginia suffered great- 
ly for want of clothing and food, the commissari- 
at being mismanaged beyond endurance. General 
Lee's appeals were unheeded, and many men were 
compelled to desert to save themselves from starving 
to death. At one time the army was on the eve of 
disbandment for lack of food. In the spring Con- 
federate treasury-notes were worth scarcely a cent 
to a dollar, and thousands of soldiers had not re- 
ceived a penny for two years.* The Conscription 
Act brought forth no men, but diminished rather 
than increased the strength of the army. Gross 

* In the last few weeks of the war a Confederate serving under Lee 
wrote home to his father that he was almost barefooted and completely 
discouraged. As soon as the old man received the letter he mounted 
his mule and set off at a gallop, but was soon halted by an acquaint- 
ance, who called out, 

" Hello ! Has there been another fight ?" 

"Not as I've heard of, but I've got a letter from Cyrus." 

" What does Cyrus say ?" 

''He's out o' butes and clean discouraged." 

"And where are you going?" 

" Down to Abner Smith's to borrow seven hundred thousand dollars 
to send to Cyrus to get a cheap pair of shoes, and we're going to write 
him a long letter and send him a box o' pills, and tell him to hang on 
to the last ; for if Cyrus gets low-spirited and begins to let go, the infer- 
nal Yanks will be riding over us afore we kin back a mule outer the 
barn." 

" That's so ! that's so !" nodded the other. " I kin let you have the 
money myself as well as not. I was saving up to buy three plugs o' 
tobacker and a box o' matches all at once, but the army mustn't go bare- 
fut when it only takes seven or eight hundred thousand dollars to buy 
a purty good pair o' shoes." — Austin {Texas) Dispatch. 



CLOSING IN. 383 

favoritism was shown by the authorities, and the 
interference of the Executive threatened to destroy 
military discipline in the army. The proposition 
to arm the slaves was made in November, 1864, 
but the act did not pass until the succeeding March, 
when it was shorn of the wise recommendations of 
General Lee. As a consequence, the effort to raise 
colored troops failed, and possibly it was fortunate, 
under the circumstances, that such was the case. 

January, 1865, was noteworthy as bringing forth 
an effort to secure peace. An interview took place 
between President Lincoln, Secretary Seward and 
others on the Federal side, and Vice-President 
Stephens, Senator Hunter and others for the Con- 
federates, on board a steamer in Hampton Koads. 
The soldiers cheered the ambassadors — if they may 
be thus termed — and proved how such a blessed 
consummation would have been welcomed by them. 
Nothing came of it, however. 

General Lee, by act of the Confederate Congress, 
February 5, 1865, was created commander-in-chief, 
and thus placed beyond all possibility of the inter- 
ference of the Executive. But the advancement 
came too late to prove of any benefit ; the South- 
ern Confederacy was doomed beyond the power of 
mortal man to save it. 

Operations were resumed in February, 1865, on 
the part of the Army of the Potomac, by an at- 
tempt to turn the Confederate right. Petersburg 
and the works were bombarded for several days, 



38'4 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

and on the 5th the Second and Fifth Corps and 
Gregg's cavalry division, after a few hours' march, 
reached Hatcher's Run. Part of the infantry- 
crossed the Vaughan road and made their way to 
Cattail Creek, while the cavalry proceeded to Din- 
widdle Court-House, where they were driven back 
by the Confederate cavalry. Later in the day por- 
tions of Hill's and Gordon's corps attacked the 
infantry, which was on the left bank of Hatcher's 
Bun, near Armstrong's Mill, but the Federals were 
so strongly entrenched that the assailants withdrew. 
On the morning of the 6th, Pegram's division moved 
down the right bank of* the stream to reconnoitre, 
and was attacked by the Fifth Corps. In the sharp 
engagement which followed, General Pegram was 
killed and his division driven back. Evan's divis- 
ion was sent to the support of Pegram's command, 
but that too was forced to withdraw. Mahone then 
charged, and the Federals were driven into their 
entrenchments. The Confederates then drew off, 
having lost a thousand men, while that of their 
enemies was nearly twice as great. 

General Grant had failed to capture the South- 
side Pailroad, but he extended his left to Hatcher's 
Pun, which was connected by earthworks with the 
rest of his line. 

In the month of March, General Lee's army 
numbered less than thirty-five thousand men. Gen- 
eral Longstreet, who had returned to duty some time 
before, commanded the left wing, which was north 



CLOSING IN. 385 

and south of the James ; General Gordon com- 
manded the centre, at Petersburg; while General 
A. P. Hill commanded the right, extending from 
Petersburg to Hatcher's Run. The wretchedly- 
mounted cavalry, so far as possible, guarded the 
flanks. This line, spun out to the utmost extrem- 
ity of attenuation, was forty miles in length. 

Campaigning in the Army of Northern Virginia 
was no holiday parade dui'ing that terrible winter. 
The thirty-odd thousand soldiers had to do picket- 
and guard-duty and cover that entire stretch of 
ground, passing continually from one duty to the 
other. No reserves were available to relieve those 
who gave out, and the men were shifted again and 
again from one place to another to meet the menaces 
of the Federals. Let us recall the military situa- 
tion. General Sherman with his vast army was at 
Goldsborough, only one hundred and fifty miles 
distant, and steadily pushing northward, directly 
upon Lee's line of retreat. The skeleton of an army 
under Johnston could 'do nothing but fall back be- 
fore this overwhelming advance. When Sherman 
should unite with Grant, the latter would have an 
army of two hundred thousand under his imme- 
diate command ; Johnston's force consolidated with 
Lee's would give about one-fourth that number, 
or fifty thousand men. 

They were shoeless, gaunt, ragged and famishing 
while the embattled hosts were closing in around 
them, but they were as brave and defiant as ever : 

25 



386 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

SO long as R. E. Lee was with them, they were 
content. 

The plan decided upon by the Confederate com- 
mander-in-chief was to evacuate the line then held 
by his army, retreat hastily toward Danville, unite 
with Johnston and take a strong position in the 
interior. This decision was reached before Sher- 
man had penetrated as far as North Carolina. 
Johnston was ordered to retire before Sherman, 
and to manoeuvre with his left so as to bring it 
into communication with Lee's right. Ponton- 
trains were made ready and a large supply of 
provisions was ordered to be collected at Amelia 
Court-House, west of Petersburg, with which it is 
connected by the Cox road, and over which Lee 
intended to withdraw his army. But the exten- 
sion of the Federal left had reached Hatcher's Pun, 
which was dangerously close to the Cox road. Be- 
fore the starving tiger could steal out from his lair 
it was necessary that the sleek lion on guai'd should 
be induced to turn his eyes away for a brief while. 

With the purpose of compelling Grant to with- 
draw his left, which was so close to the Cox road, 
Lee prepared to attack his right. The Federal 
position was like adamantine. A cordon of redoubts 
of a powerful profile and armed with the heaviest 
metal studded this line; infantry parapets amply 
manned stretched from work to work. Covering 
the fronts of approach were labyrinthine acres of 
abatis, while all the appliances of ditches, entangle- 



CLOSING IN. 887 

ments and chevaux-de-frise lent their aid to make 
defence sure and assault folly.* 

General Lee fixed upon Fort Steadman as the 
point of assault. This was close to the south bank 
of the Appomattox, and less than two hundred 
yards from the Federal breastworks. It was be- 
lieved that by a sudden rush the work could be 
surprised and captured. After the high ground 
in the rear was gained, the City Point Kailroad, 
which was the chief line of communication of the 
Federal army, might be seized. The attack was to 
be made by two divisions of Gordon's corps, while 
the rest of the army were to be held ready to support 
the movement. If Grant assaulted immediately, so 
as to recover the ground lost, Lee would be ready 
to meet him ; if he hastened toward City Point to 
regain his communications, then the Southern army 
would withdraw over the Cox road. It was quite 
certain, in any event, that the Federal left wing 
would be drawn in, and the Cox road thus opened. 
In the dim light of early morning, March 25, Gor- 
don's two divisions emerged as silently as spectres 
from their works and in columns of attack ran 
across the open space, flung aside the abatis, bound- 
ed into Fort Steadman, and captured the work and 
garrison before the latter understood what was 
going on. Immediately the guns of the captured 
fort were turned on the nearest Federal works. 
Several batteries were abandoned by the defend- 

* Swinton. 



388 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ers and one of their brigades put to flight. The 
impetuous charge had captured nine pieces of 
artillery, eight mortars and five hundred pris- 
oners, among whom was a full-fledged brigadier- 
general. 

Gordon had made a splendid opening, and there 
was every prospect of greater and more brilliant 
success; but his charge was not sustained as was 
promised. The troops which attacked Fort Has- 
kell on his right did so in such a spiritless manner 
that they were immediately repulsed ; many others 
refused to advance at the critical moment and hud- 
dled in the breastworks; seeing which, the Fede- 
rals recovered their self-possession and concentrated 
a heavy fire on Fort Steadman. The situation 
became similar to that which followed the mine- 
explosion some months before. Gordon was caught 
in a frightful trap, from which his high courage 
and masterly leadership could not extricate his 
command. So completely were they encircled by 
the ring of consuming fire that two thousand Con- 
federates surrendered on the spot, bringing up their 
total loss to fully three thousand, while that of the 
Unionists was five hundred less. The repulse was 
followed by the advance of the Federal Sixth 
Corps, which after a hard fight succeeded in cap- 
turing the picket-line in front. The Confederate 
army had suffered a loss which it could ill aflbrd 
to bear, and General Grant still clung to his ad- 
vanced position on Hatcher's Run, overlooking and 



CLOSING IN. 389 

commanding the Cox road, along which Lee meant 
to make his withdrawal. 

Sheridan, having given a quietus to affairs in the 
valley, had rejoined Grant's army before Peters- 
burg. Thus in the latter part of March the Fed- 
eral leader had one hundred and seventy thousand 
men under his immediate direction, inchiding the 
ten thousand sabres of Sheridan, whicli were of 
incalculable service in the last struggle. 

On the 29th of March, General Lee discovered 
that a large portion of the Federal army was mass- 
ing in the works beyond Bergen Mill ; this j^i'oved 
that General Grant was making ready to assail the 
Confederate right. His first intention was to wait 
until General Sherman should cross the Koanoke 
River, but a fear that Lee would withdraw from 
Petersburg induced tlie Federal leader to move 
at once. 

General Grant determined this time that his 
assault against the Confederate right should be 
resistless. Two days previoils Sheridan's cavalry 
were moved to the left, and General Ord, the suc- 
cessor of General Butler in command of the Army 
of the James, crossed from Deep Bottom to the 
Southside with three divisions of infantry and one 
of cavalry. With these he relieved the Second and 
Fifth Corps in the trenches on the left of the Fed- 
eral lines, so they were enabled to take part in the 
movement. The assault in column numbered twen- 
ty-five thousand, and was to be supported by the rest 



390 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

of the army. The Confederate right, against which 
this formidable demonstration was to be made, ex- 
tended several miles south-west from Petersburg. 
The combined force was about fifteen thousand 
men, besides two thousand alleged cavalry under 
Fitzhugh Lee, if the few wretched, broken-down 
steeds can be viewed as of any account. With this 
force Lee took position behind the works extending 
along the White Oak road toward Five Forks. 
The force that remained north of James River 
and in front of Petersburg was barely twenty 
thousand. 

The difficult character of the ground so delayed 
the Federal advance that it was not in position 
until the 31st. When it was gathered near the 
Boydton Poad, beyond Hatcher's Pun, and about 
ready to attack, Lee suddenly assailed it with such 
fierceness that the first lines were scattered like 
chaflf. But a forest of bayonets seeming limitless 
in extent rose beyond, and there was no end to the 
legions of Federals which confronted the assail- 
ants. It was destruction to advance, and Lee fell 
back to his works. Five Forks had been seized by 
Sheridan, but he was driven out, and the Confed- 
erate infantry, after advancing toward Dinwiddle 
Court-House, were withdrawn. Fighting was over 
for the day. 

Five Points was a valuable position, and Lee 
had stationed there the remnants of the . divisions 
of Pickett and Johnston ; they made a desperate 



CLOSING IN. 391 

resistance, but were overwlielnied and scattered. 
Thereupon, the whole right of tlie Confederate 
line and the Southside Kaih-oad passed into the 
possession of the Federal army. 

When Sunday, the 2d of April, dawned, Lee 
was in ill form to withstand the tremendous " ham- 
mering " to which he was to be subjected, but he 
was calm and undismayed. His right wing had 
been destroyed, and he was left with only the rem- 
nants of Gordon and A. P. Hill's divisions. Gen- 
eral Longstreet still confronted his adversary, and 
no troops could be drawn from the north side. 

At the earliest dawn the Unionists advanced 
upon the Confederate works, and in a short time 
the flame of battle outblazed along the whole line 
from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Run. General 
Gordon, who held the left on the Appomattox, was 
attacked by General Parke and the Ninth Corps, 
and after a furious resistance compelled to fall 
back on an inner cordon of works, which he held 
against other attacks. 

The weakest part of the Confederate position was 
the left of A. P. Hill, on the right of Gordon, for 
the reason that the infantry for its defence had been 
withdrawn the day before, and it was now held only 
by the artillerists and a thin picket-line. When, 
therefore, the Sixth Corps bore down upon it, the 
pickets were driven in and the works were cap- 
tured, including the batteries and artillerists. This 
success threatened the ruin of the whole Confed- 



392 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

erate army, for Hill's works were scarcely carried 
when the Second Corps drove the small Confed- 
erate force out of the redoubts of Hatcher's Run, 
and then, connecting with the Sixth and Twenty- 
Fourth Corps, completed the environment which 
was slowly strangling Petersburg. 

Two strong works were left. Forts Alexander 
and Gregg, commanding the ground over which 
the Federals must advance to reach the river. 
Fort Alexander was closer to the assailants, and 
was captured with a hurrah and a rush. This left 
only Fort Gregg, on which for the time the fate of 
the army depended. The garrison consisted of two 
hundred and fifty men, made up of the Fourth 
Maryland Battery with two three-inch rifles and 
thirty men, a body of dismounted artillery-drivers, 
Virginians and Louisianians, carrying muskets, a 
part of Harris's Mississippi brigade and a few 
North Carolinians, all being under the command 
of Captain Chew of the Maryland battery. The 
salvation of the army required that this fort should 
be held until General Lee could take his new posi- 
tion ; if it yielded before, the army was doomed. 

Fort Alexander having fallen. General Ord 
pushed forward Gibbon's division to storm and 
carry Fort Gregg. It advanced in admirable order 
until within fifty yards, when it received such a de- 
structive fire that the troops reeled and fell back. 
The attack and repulse were witnessed by both 
armies. The Confederates broke into admiring; 



CLOSING IN. 393 

cheers, though unable to forward a single musket 
to the help of the little band of Spartans. A sec- 
ond and third charge was made with great daring, 
but they were repelled as splendidly as before ; but 
a fourth assault prevailed. The assailants swarmed 
over and into the works, and found that, out of the 
two hundred and fifty men composing the garrison, 
only thirty were unhurt. All the rest were dead 
or wounded. 

About ten o'clock General Longstreet, having 
discovered the weakness of the Federal line in his 
front, reached the battlefield with Benning's bri- 
gade, less than three hundred strong. It was just 
as the Federals were again moving forward to 
force an entrance into the city. Longstreet han- 
dled this " corporal's guard " with such great skill 
that he checked the advance until Lee could for- 
ward trooj)s to his assistance. 

The line now held by Lee was short but power- 
ful, extending directly around Petersburg, with the 
right flank touching the river above and the left 
resting on the same stream below the city. This 
line was assaulted again and again by the Army 
of the Potomac, but without success. Finally, 
Heth's division, under General A. P. Hill, charged 
the Ninth Corps, on the Confederate left, near the 
river, with a view of recovering some commanding 
ground. The attack was made with the dash and 
courage of that ofiicer, but the Federals, being rein- 
forced, were able to hold the ground. In this fight 



394 THE OAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill was killed. Strange 
it was that after being exposed hundreds of times in 
battle he should be stricken down at the end of^ 
those lurid years, when it may be said the last 
gun of the war was aimed and about to be fired ! 
The day closed and the Confederates still held 
Petersburg, but it had become untenable. Lee saw 
that if he remained longer his whole army would 
be made prisoners ; he determined, therefore, to 
abandon both Petersburg and Richmond, and, re- 
treating into North Carolina, unite with Johnston. 
At eleven o'clock Sunday morning, April 2, he 
telegraphed to the authorities in the capital that 
it was his purpose to retire from Richmond and 
Petersburg that night at eight o'clock. He coun- 
selled them to make everything ready to leave the 
city that evening, unless he soon sent another tele- 
gram advising the contrary. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 

Genekal Lee was anxiously waiting for iiiglit. 
His lines had been broken, the panic-stricken au- 
thorities and citizens were hurrying out of Rich- 
mond, and the circle of the Federal legions was 
narrowing around the gaunt skeleton of the Army 
of Northern Virginia. Every line of retreat, with 
a single exception, led to destruction : that was the 
route westward and up the Appomattox toward the 
Danville line. Even the shadow of the Army of 
the Potomac was already thrown across that path. 
The Fifth Union Corps was at Sutherland's Sta- 
tion, on the Southside Railroad, ten miles west of 
Petersburg, and on a line parallel with that of the 
intended retreat, while Sheridan with his cavalry 
and infantry kindled his camp-fires on the night 
of the 2d at Ford's, ten miles still farther west. 
It will thus be seen that Lee was compelled to 
withdraw along the northern bank of the Appo- 
mattox, thus throwing himself on the exterior line 
and adding much to the difficulty of his march. 

But the great soldier was still undismayed and 
calmly nerved himself for the last struggle. When 
night at last slowly settled over Petersburg, the 

395 



396 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

heavens were one immense glare and the boom of 
cannon and exploding magazines made the earth 
tremble. At midnight the cadaverous figures be- 
gan withdrawing like shadows from their trenches, 
and in the glow of the blazing city hurried silently 
toward the river. They glided so stealthily along 
the hot streets crimsoned by the conflagration that 
the Union jDickets saw not what was going on. At 
three o'clock the city was deserted, and the Peters- 
burg force had reached the north bank of the 
Appomattox. Tramping northward to Chesterfield 
Court-House, they were joined by the division hold- 
ing the front of Bermuda Hundred. The troops 
on the Richmond side were drawn in to Chester- 
field, and the retreat westward was fairly begun. 
The entire army that had defended so long 
and valiantly the line between Petersburg and 
Richmond and around the latter city numbered less 
than twenty-five thousand men. Nearly all were 
barefoot; they were in rags, were living on a few 
grains of corn apiece, were worn out, and in the 
dismal hours of early morning had turned their 
backs on their capital and the .enemy which they 
had beaten times without number. Who of all the 
multitude could be cheerful and hopeful? And yet 
those who were near General Lee at that tim,e tell 
us he was in good spirits. Petersburg was sixteen 
miles behind, and in view of the fact he said, " My 
army is feafe out of the breastworks, and to follow 
me my enemy must abandon his lines, and he can 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 397 

derive no more benefit from his railroads or the 
James Kiver." It is impossible that the Southern 
commander-in-chief dreamed of victory. It must 
have been he believed that by uniting with Johns- 
ton he could still offer such a bold front as to 
compel a peace on advantageous terms. 

General Grant displayed prodigious vigor in 
pressing Lee to the wall. Confident that his an- 
tagonist would retreat, he completed his arrange- 
ments on the night of the 2d for prompt and un- 
relenting pursuit. The flight of the Confederate 
army was discovered on the morning of the 3d. 
General Grant left a garrison in the city and start- 
ed on the run,* determined that it should not escape 
him again. General Ord with the Army of the 
James was hurried along the line of the Southside 
Kailroad to Burkesville, while Sheridan with the 
Fifth Corps and his cavalry made for the Danville 
road, just north of Burkesville. Lee was sixteen 
miles on the way, but the two Federal columns 
were hastening along a shorter line; and if they 
could reach the point before him, he would be 
headed off and compelled to adopt a long and more 
difficult route or take refuge in the mountains. 

The Confederate leader had the most exasperat- 
ing obstacles to overcome. First of all, the Rich- 
mond authorities had turned over to him a wagon- 
train thirty miles in length. It was loaded with 
valueless government rubbish, and, pausing just 
long enough to direct General Lee to take the 



398 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

best care of the same, the authorities resumed their 
flight toward the setting sun. Like a true soldier, 
General Lee did his utmost to obey orders; but 
the enormous train was a complete brake to his 
progress and delayed him greatly. Nevertheless, 
he pushed on, and, crossing the Appomattox again 
at Goode's Bridge, reached Amelia Court-House 
on the 4th. He was now thirty-eight miles west 
of Petersburg. It was there that he received the 
most agonizing blow of the campaign — made so by 
the fact that he was smitten by his own government 
and there was no palliation for the cruel thrust at 
his very heart. 

When Lee decided to abandon Richmond and 
Petersburg, he telegraphed to Danville, as we have 
stated, ordering a large amount of commissary and 
quartermaster stores to be forwarded to Amelia 
Court-House and held there to await his arrival. 
When his troops withdrew from the entrench- 
ments, two days before, they were without rations, 
and during the interval that had passed since 
had not secured a single meal apiece; they were 
actually undergoing the pangs of starvation. But 
they were cheered by the promise that when Amelia 
Court-House was reached they would find abundance. 
Such ought to have been the case, but a cruel disap- 
pointment awaited them. The train loaded with 
stores and provisions reached Amelia Court-House 
from Danville on Sunday afternoon, April 2. At 
that point the officer in charge was met by an order 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 399 

from the Confederate authorities to bring the train 
without delay to Kichmond, as the cars were need- 
ed for transporting the public and private property. 
The officer interpreted the order to mean that the 
train and its contents were wanted there, and he 
proceeded with them to the capital without open- 
ing a car. It should be added that the train safely 
reached its destination ; the stores were carefully 
unloaded, and shortly after were used to help 
make a bonfire of Kichmond. 

When General Lee learned the horrible blunder 
that had been committed and met the gaunt, starv- 
ing eyes of the thousands of brave soldiers fixed 
despairingly upon him, his breast heaved with in- 
dignation and grief. Stupidity, selfishness and base 
ingratitude could inflict more poignant wounds 
than the Army of the Potomac. The stars in 
their courses were fighting against him and his 
suffering comrades; why struggle longer? But, 
with the inborn nobility of his nature, he controlled 
his tempestuous feelings and immediately sent out 
detachments to hunt for food and forage. That 
day and the next were consumed in this blind 
groping for that which did not exist. They were 
journeying through what may be called a desert 
waste. 

This enforced delay gave General Grant the 
golden opportunity, which he improved with the 
same tremendous vigor displayed from the first. 
General Sheridan, who was straining every nerve, 



400 THE CAMP-FIBES OF GENERAL LEE. 

and was far in advance of the rest of the army, ar- 
rived at Jetersville on the afternoon of the morn- 
ing General Lee reached Amelia Court-House. 
Thus the Federal cavalry and Fifth Corps struck 
the Confederate line of retreat seven miles to the 
south-west of the Army of Northern Virginia. 

It was no longer possible for General Lee to 
reach Burkesville, for a force about equal to his 
own was entrenched before him in the road. It 
was impossible to give battle, and only a single 
course lay open to him : that was to push on due 
west in the attempt to reach the hilly region sur- 
rounding Farmville. That place was thirty-five 
miles off, but, once attained, he was hopeful of 
securing his retreat into the mountains. The fam- 
ishing remnant of an army started for that point 
with their undismayed leader. 

The whole Army of the Potomac was concen- 
trated at Jetersville in the evening, and entrenched 
its line in the expectation of an assault by Lee. 
This was out of the question, and the next morn- 
ing General Meade advanced upon Amelia Court- 
House to attack the Confederate army supposed to 
be there. Discovering that Lee was making for 
Farmville by way of Deatonsville, he turned in pur- 
suit, sending the Second Corps direct to Deatons- 
ville, while the Fifth and Sixth moved by parallel 
routes to the north and south. General Ord with 
the Army of the James had reached Burkesville, 
and he was now ordered to hurry to Farmville. 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 401 

Meanwhile, General Sheridan was playing foot- 
ball with the wagon-train. He adopted the very 
effective plan of attacking it with one division, 
and when that was repulsed assaulting it farther 
on with a fresh division, and so on, delivering blow 
after blow until the vulnerable spot was found. 
This was the course followed at Sailor's Creek, 
where more than four hundred wagons were de- 
stroyed and sixteen pieces of artillery and a num- 
ber of prisoners taken. Pickett, whose division 
was reduced to eight hundred men, found himself 
so hard pressed that he sent to General Ewell for 
reinforcements, in order to save the rest of the 
wagon- train. Ewell responded with his corps, 
forty-two hundred strong, but while taking position 
observed that Gordon's corps, forming the rear- 
guard of the army, were following the wagon-train 
by another road. As Ewell was at the rear of 
the wagon-train, it will be seen that he was now 
cut off from the rest of the army. Sheridan kept 
Ewell hotly engaged until the Sixth Corps came 
up. Ewell was immediately assailed by them, and 
he fell back slowly, contesting every foot with won- 
derful bravery. By and by the Federal soldiers 
could be seen on every side, but the Confederates 
fought on. A large number staggered from weak- 
ness, and were scarcely able to keejD their feet; 
many were so worn out that they would drop the 
guns which they had just loaded or discharged, 
and, regardless of the firing, sink down upon the 

26 



402 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

ground and fall asleep.* Pickett's division had 
been broken up and scattered by the heavy col- 
umn thrown against it, and Ewell was forced to 
fight the immense numbers without help ; but his 
grim, starving veterans in the very depths of dis- 
aster proved the royal stuff of which they were 
made. They calmly awaited the advance of the 
Sixth Corps, and when it was at the right point 
delivered such a terrific volley that it broke and 
fell back. The Federals quickly rallied, however, 
and the cavalry closed in upon the rear and flank 
of the Confederates. Finding themselves surround- 
ed by more than four times their number, the men 
threw down their arms and surrendered. This sur- 
render included Lieutenant-General Ewell, General 
Custis Lee and three other general officers. Al- 
most at the same time the energetic Second Corps 
captured, near Sailor's Creek, a number of prison- 
ers, several pieces of artillery, thirteen battle-flags 
and several hundred prisoners. 

Lee continued his retreat with what was left of 
his army, and on the night of the 6th crossed the 
Appomattox at High Bridge, near Farmville, and 
bivouacked on the opposite side of the river. That 
night the general officers gathered around a camp- 
fire to consult as to what should be done. "All 
present agreed that but three lines of conduct yet 
remained open to them — either to disband and 
allow the troops to make their way as best they 

* McCabe states this on the authority of many witnesses. 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 403 

could to some specified rallying-point, to abandon 
the trains and with the infantry cut their way 
through the Federal lines, or to surrender. The 
first course was equivalent to a desertion of the 
cause, for it was certain that the army, once dis- 
banded, would not reassemble, and to turn such a 
throng of starving men upon the country would 
be to bring still greater misery upon the inhabi- 
tants. The second course was doubtful, for it was 
hardly possible to cut through such an army as 
that of General Grant with the little band of 
Confederates; and if it could be done, starvation 
was sure to follow. Nothing remained, in the 
opinion of the council, but to surrender. The 
army had done all in its power to uphold its cause. 
This decision was made reluctantly, and General 
Pendleton, the chief of artillery, was appointed to 
communicate it to General Lee." * 

But the commander-in-chief did not think the 
crisis had come : the bell had not yet struck. 

As soon as the Confederates were across the Ap- 
pomattox the railroad- and stage-bridges were fired, 
but the brigade left by Gordon to see that they 
were destroyed was driven off by the Second Federal 
Corps, who saved the stage-bridge and part of the 
railroad-bridge. A dash was then made at the 
wagon-train and a number captured, but General 
Gordon returned, drove off the assailants and took 
two hundred prisoners. The next day was mainly 

* McCabe. 



404 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

enlivened by continual attacks on the wagon-train. 
The Second Corps pushed on, but about noon found 
itself brought to a stand by the main body of Lee's 
army, strongly entrenched in a commanding posi- 
tion a few miles north of Farmville, The halt had 
been made for the purpose of resting the army and 
holding the enemy at bay until nightfall. The 
works were too strong to be taken in front, and 
Humphreys, the Federal leader, sent back for rein- 
forcements. While awaiting them he concluded to 
improve the time by attacking the Southern left. 
The result may be summed up in the simple state- 
ment that General Humphreys was repulsed with the 
loss of six hundred killed and wounded. When the 
reinforcements arrived, the day was so far gone that 
the attack was deferred until the next morning. 

After occupying Farmville, General Grant sent a 
messenger to General Lee with the following letter : 

"April?, 1865. 

" General : The result of the last week must 
convince you of the hopelessness of further resist- 
ance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia 
in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it 
as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of 
any further effusion of blood by asking of you the 
surrender of that portion of the Confederate States 
army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 
"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

"Gejiebai, R. E. Lee." 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 405 

This communication reached General Lee on the 
night of the day on which it was written. He sent 
off at once the following reply : 

"April 7, 1865. 

" General : I have received your note of this 
date. Though not entertaining the opinion you 
express of the hopelessness of further resistance 
on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I 
reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of 
blood, and therefore, before considering your prop- 
osition, ask the terms you will offer on condition 
of its surrender. 

" K. E. Lee, General. 

"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant." 

General Lee resumed his retreat during the night 
in the direction of Lynchburg, and had progressed 
a number of miles when his letter reached General 
Grant, who without delay forwarded the following : 

"Aprils, 1865. 

" General : Your note of last evening, in reply 
to mine of same date, asking the conditions on which 
I will accept the surrender of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would 
say that, peace being my great desire, there is but 
one condition I would insist upon — namely, that 
the men and officers surrendered shall be disquali- 
fied for taking up arms against the government of 
the United States until properly exchanged. I will 



406 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

meet you, or will designate officers to meet any 
officers you may name for the same purpose, at 
any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of 
arranging definitely the terms upon which the 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will 
be received. 

" U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

"General E. E. Lee." 

General Lee beyond all doubt was in desperate 
straits, but he was not quite ready to yield unques- 
tioningly : 

"April 8, 1865. 

" Geneeal : I received at a late hour your note 
of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend 
to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. 
To be frank, I do not think the emergency has 
arisen to call for the surrender of this army ; but, 
as the restoration of peace should be the sole object 
of all, I desired to know whether your propo- 
sals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, 
meet you with a view to surrender the Army of 
Northern Virginia; but, as far as your proposal 
may affect the Confederate States forces under my 
command and tend to the restoration of peace, I 
should be pleased to meet you at 10 A. m., to-mor- 
row, on the old stage-road to Richmond, between 
the picket-lines of the two armies. 

" R. E. Lee, General. 

" Lieutekant-General U. S. Grant." 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 407 

The foregoing letter reached General Grant late 
at night, and the next morning he replied : 

" April 9, 1865. 

" General : Your note of yesterday is received. 
I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; 
the meeting proposed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead 
to no good. I will state, however, General, that I 
am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and 
the whole North entertains the same feeling. The 
terms upon which peace can be had are well under- 
stood. By the South laying down their arms they 
will hasten that most desirable event, save thou- 
sands of human lives and hundreds of millions of 
property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that 
all our difficulties may be settled without the loss 
of another life, I subscribe myself, etc., 

" U. S. Geant, Lieutenant-General. 
"General R. E.Lee." 

The correspondence between the two leaders was 
written on the wing, Lee continually falling back 
and Grant remorselessly pressing him. 

As we have stated, the Confederate army with- 
drew from its entrenchments on the night of the 
7th, and the following night approached Appo- 
mattox Court-House. So little firing took place 
on the 8th that many began to hope they would 
reach Lynchburg, after all ; but this hope, like all 
the others that had cheered them, was short-lived. 



408 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

On the evening of the 8th, Sheridan reached Ap' 
pomattox Station, five miles south of the court- 
house, and captured four trains of cars loaded 
with supplies sent from Lynchburg for Lee's army. 
Then, throwing his command across the Confeder- 
ate line of retreat, he braced himself to hold the 
position, knowing as he did that the Army of the 
James would be up in the morning and the Army 
of the Potomac were treading on the heels of the 
Southern forces. 

General Lee saw that all retreat was shut off, and 
he had to elect between surrender and cutting his 
way through Sheridan's lines. He chose the latter, 
and ordered General Gordon to carry out the des- 
perate enterprise at all hazards at sunrise the 
next morning. It was a pitiful but impressive 
sight. The once proud and invincible Army of 
Northern Virginia under its matchless leader was 
reduced to eight thousand ragged, gaunt and ex- 
hausted men. 

The impetuous Gordon formed his thin battle- 
line in front ; the fragments of the iron-willed Long- 
street's corps composed the rear, and between the 
lines were the wrecks of the few wagons left of the 
immense train, while around and among them stag- 
gered several thousand stragglers like moving skel- 
etons. They were too weak to carry their muskets. 
The three thousand cavalry looked as if riders and 
horses should be in the hospital. But the first 
beams of the morning sun were hardly seen in the 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 409 

horizon when Gordon moved forward to cut his 
way through the Federal lines. His assault was 
made with such fierceness that the cavalry, which 
had dismounted to resist the attack, was forced 
back upon Ord's infantry. At this juncture Gen- 
eral Sheridan came up from Appomattox Station, 
whither he had been to hurry forward \hi^ Army 
of the James. By his direction the troopers slow- 
ly retreated until the infantry had time to form. 
This required but a few minutes, when Gordon saw 
the forest of bayonets advancing. He then began 
to give ground, and sent word to General Lee that 
the enemy were forcing him back. 

Meanwhile, Sheridan was "jDressing things," as 
ordered to do by Grant. The command to mount 
was sounded, and the cavalry dashed into position 
on the Confederate left flank. When about to 
charge on the doomed band, a white flag was seen 
advancing from the Confederate lines. The mes- 
senger bore a letter from General Lee asking for a 
suspension of hostilities looking to surrender. At 
the same time he forwarded the following note to 
General Grant: 

" April 9, 1865. 

" Geneeal : I received your note this morning 
on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you 
and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced 
in your proposition of yesterday with reference to 
the surrender of this army. 

" I now request an interview in accordance with 



410 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for 
that purpose. 

" Very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" E. E. Lee, General. 

" To Lieut.-General Grant, 
" Commanding Armies of the United States." 

General Grant replied: 

" April 9, 1865. 

"General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate 
States Armies : 
" Your note of this date is but this moment, 
11.59 A. M., received. 

" In consequence of my having passed from the 
Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville 
and Lynchburg road, I am at this writing about 
four miles west of Walters Church, and will push 
forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. 
" Notice sent to me on this road where you wish 
the interview to take place will meet me. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Gkant, Lieutenant-General." 

Generals Grant and Lee met at the house of Mr. 
Wilmer McLean, in the village of Appomattox 
Court-House.* The greeting was courteous, and 

* Major Wilmer McLean, who died in Alexandria recently, was the 
man who literally saw the beginning and the end of the late war. It 
was on his farm that the battle of Bull Bun was fought, and General 
Lee surrendered in his house at Appomattox, to which he had moved 
with his family in order to be free from tlie annoyances of the war. 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 411 

everything was conducted in the best of taste. 
General Grant was delicate and considerate to- 
ward the vanquished chieftain, who appreciated 
the magnanimity of the one whom hard fate had 
designated to be his conqueror. General Lee did 
not proffer his sword, nor did General Grant 
demand it ; but after a few of the exchanges com- 
mon between gentlemen the two great men sat 
down at a wooden table, and in a few minutes 
wrote and signed the following two papers, which 
dissolved for ever the grand old army of North- 
ern Virginia: 

" Appomattox Court-House, Va. 
April 9, 1865. 

" General : In accordance with the substance 
of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose 
to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern 
Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Kolls of 
all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, 
one copy to be given to an officer to be designated 
by me, and the other to be retained by such officer 
or officers as you may designate. The officers to 
give their individual paroles not to take up arms 
against the United States until properly exchanged, 
and each company or regimental commander to 
sign a like parole for the men of their commands. 
The arms, artillery and public property to be parked 
and stacked and turned over by the officers ap- 
pointed by me to receive them. This will not 



412 THE GAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their 
private horses or baggage. This done, each officer 
and man will be allowed to return to his home, not 
to be disturbed by United States authority so long 
as they observe their j)aroles and the laws in force 
where they may reside. 

" U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

" General R. E. Lee." 

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
April 9, 1865. 

" Geneeal : I have received your letter of this 
date containing the terms .of the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, as j)roposed by you. 
As they are substantially the same as those ex- 
pressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are 
accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper 
officers to carry the stipulations into effect. 

" E. E. Lee, General. 

"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant." 

The respective commissioners met the next day 
and drew up and signed the following agreement : 

" Appomattox Court-House, 
April 10, 1865. 

*^ Agreement entered into this day in regard to the 
surrender of the Ai'my of Northern Virginia 
to the United States authorities : 
" 1st. The troops shall march by brigades and 



THE LAST CAMP-FIRE. 413 

detachments to the designated point, stack their 
arms, deposit their flags, sabres, pistols, etc., and 
thence march to their homes under charge of their 
officers, superintended by their respective division 
and corps commanders, officers retaining their 
side-arms and the authorized number of private 
horses. 

"2d. All public horses and public property of 
all kinds to be turned over to staff-officers, to be 
designated by the United States authorities. 

" 3d. Such transportation as may be agreed upon 
as necessary for the transportation of the private 
baggage of officers will be allowed to accompany 
the officers, to be turned over at the end of the 
trip to the nearest United States quartermaster, 
receipts being taken for the same. 

" 4th. Couriers and mounted men of the artil- 
lery and cavalry whose horses are their own pri- 
vate property will be allowed to retain them. 

"5th. The surrender of the Army of Northern 
Virginia shall be construed to include all the forces 
operating with that army on the 8th instant, the 
date of the commencement of the negotiations for 
surrender, except such bodies of cavalry as actu- 
ally made their escape previous to the surrender, 
and except, also, such pieces of artillery as were 
more than twenty miles from Appomattox Court- 
House at the time of surrender on the 9th in- 
stant. 



414 THE CAMP-FIRES OF GENERAL LEE. 

"(Signed) 
"John Gibbon, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
" Chaeles Gkiffin, Brevet Maj.-Gen. U. S.Vols. 
" W. Meeritt, Brevet Maj.-Gen. 
" J. LoNGSTEEET, Lieut.-Gen. 
"J. B. GoEDON, Maj.-Gen. 
" W. N. Pendleton, Brig.-Gen. and Chief of 
Artillery." 

The last camp-fire of General Lee was extin- 
guished. 



THE END. 



The Block-House, the Camp-Fire 

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